JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This second appeal is by the plaintiff. In this appeal he has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Gorakhpur dated 31st May, 2016 dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff, being Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2010, Ram Sawar v. Yogendra and others, and affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No. 24, Gorakhpur in Original Suit No. 732 of 1995, Ram Sawar v. Yogendra and others, dated 26th February, 2010, whereby the suit of the plaintiff for permanent injunction has been dismissed on the ground that the second suit was barred under the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). 2. The essential facts are that the plaintiff instituted a suit, being Original Suit No. 732 of 1995, Ram Sawar v. Yogendra and others, for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in his possession. The case of the plaintiff was that the disputed plot, being Araji No. 311 Kha area 25 desimal (for short, the ‘suit property’), was bhumidhari land of one Sri Ram Vriksha, son of Raghunandan, who transferred the said property in favour of the plaintiff vide a registered sale-deed dated 15th November, 1989. Thus, the plaintiff is owner and in possession of the said property. Adjacent to the said land, the plaintiff’s house exists and he uses the suit property as appurtenant land (Sehan). The plaintiff uses the suit property for tethering his cattle and other useful purposes. According to the plaintiff, the defendants had no concern with the suit property but without any right they are causing interference in the possession of the plaintiff. 3. The defendants contested the said suit and filed their written statement. Their stand was that the plaintiff has filed the suit by concealment of several facts. The defendants have denied the plaintiff’s title over the suit property. They have claimed their possession over it. In addition to above, they also took a plea that previously, the plaintiff instituted another suit, being Civil Suit No. 368 of 1995, wherein he had got an ex parte interim injunction. However, the said suit has been dismissed on 01st August, 1998 for non-prosecution in presence of the defendants. They have claimed their possession over it. In addition to above, they also took a plea that previously, the plaintiff instituted another suit, being Civil Suit No. 368 of 1995, wherein he had got an ex parte interim injunction. However, the said suit has been dismissed on 01st August, 1998 for non-prosecution in presence of the defendants. It was further averred that without taking any step to get the said suit restored and when the interim injunction passed in the said suit stood discharged after dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff has instituted the present suit concealing the aforesaid facts and again has succeeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction. 4. The trial Court received the evidence and framed the necessary issues. One of the issues, being Issue No. 5, was whether the suit was not maintainable. While deciding Issue No. 7, which was to the effect whether suit is barred by the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC, the trial Court found that the present suit, being Original Suit No. 732 of 1995 was instituted on 24th May, 1995 when previous Suit No. 368 of 1995 was pending. It also recorded, after perusal of the pleadings of both the suits, that both the suits are on the same cause of action and similar facts between the same parties, and the plaintiff without taking recourse to the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC and Section 12 CPC has instituted the present suit. On the said ground, the suit has been dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 26th February, 2010. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff-appellant preferred a civil appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2010, Ram Sawar v. Yogendra and others, which has also been dismissed on 31st May, 2016. 6. I have heard Sri Ram Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ram Mohan submits that the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC would be applicable only in those cases where the second suit is filed subsequent to the decision of the first suit. 6. I have heard Sri Ram Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ram Mohan submits that the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC would be applicable only in those cases where the second suit is filed subsequent to the decision of the first suit. In the instant case, the first suit was instituted on 07th March, 1995 and while the said suit was pending, the appellant has filed the second suit on 24th May, 1995, whereas the first suit was dismissed under Order IX Rule 8 CPC on 01st August, 1998. Hence, it cannot be said that the second suit was filed after the dismissal of the first suit. He further urged that from the language of Order II Rule 2 CPC it is evident that the bar of Order II Rule 2 CPC will be attracted only in the event that the first suit stood decided prior to institution of the second suit. Lastly, he urged that in any case no prejudice has been caused to the defendants as the second suit was filed immediately after filing of the first suit. 8. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 9. The plaintiff-appellant has filed the present suit, being Original Suit No. 732 of 1995, for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in his possession over the suit property. Indisputably, for the same cause of action he had instituted another suit, being Suit No. 368 of 1995. In both the suits, the parties are same. The previous suit was also filed for the same relief i.e. for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in his possession. He succeeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction therein and it was dismissed on 01st August, 1998 for non-prosecution. In both the suits, the parties are same. The previous suit was also filed for the same relief i.e. for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in his possession. He succeeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction therein and it was dismissed on 01st August, 1998 for non-prosecution. The relief sought for by the plaintiff in the previous Suit No. 368 of 1995 reads as under: ^^1- ;g fd olnwj fMxzh cgd oknh f[kykQ izfroknh] izfroknh dks ges'kk ds fy;s euk fd;k tkos fd os fookfnr Hkwfe uD'kk utjh vjth nkok v{kj v] c] l] n okdk ekStk ebZyk rIik mRrj gosyh ijxuk gluiqj exgj rglhy lgtuok ftyk xksj[kiqj oknh ds lgu dh Hkwfe esa dksbZ vojks/k mRiUu u djsa vkSj u oknh ds ukan efnyk o ?kwj dks /oLr djsa vkSj u oknh ds dCtk n[ky esa dksbZ vojks/k iSnk djsaA 2- ;g fd [kpkZ eqdnek oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyok fn;k tkosA 3- ;g fd mijksDr nknjlh ds vykok oknh ;fn fdlh vU; nknjlh dk gdnkj ik;k tkos mldh Hkh fMxzh cgd oknh f[kykQ izfroknhx.k ikfjr fd;k tkosA^^ The said suit was dismissed on 01st August, 1998. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff on 24th May, 1995. The relief sought for in the present Suit No. 732 of 1995 reads as under: ^^1- ;g fd olnwj fMxzh cgd oknh f[kykQ izfroknhx.k] izfroknhx.k dks ges'kk ds fy;s euk fd;k tkos fd os fookfnr Hkwfe uD'kk utjh vjth nkok v{kj v] c] l] n okdk ekStk ebZyk rIik mRrj gosyh ijxuk gluiqj exgj rglhy lgtuok ftyk xksj[kiqj oknh ds lgu dh Hkwfe esa dksbZ vojks/k mRiUu u djsa vkSj u oknh ds ukan efnyk o ?kwj dks /oLr djsa vkSj u oknh ds dCtk n[ky esa dksbZ vojks/k iSnk djsaA 2- ;g fd [kpkZ eqdnek oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyok fn;k tkosA 3- ;g fd mijksDr nknjlh ds vykok oknh ;fn fdlh vU; nknjlh dk gdnkj ik;k tkos mldh Hkh fMxzh cgd oknh f[kykQ izfroknhx.k ikfjr fd;k tkosA^^ 10. I have carefully read the plaint of the present suit. The plaintiff has not disclosed filing of the previous Suit No. 368 of 1995. In fact, there is not a whisper about the previous suit in the entire plaint. Thus, concealment of a material fact is established from the reading of the plaint itself. 11. I have carefully read the plaint of the present suit. The plaintiff has not disclosed filing of the previous Suit No. 368 of 1995. In fact, there is not a whisper about the previous suit in the entire plaint. Thus, concealment of a material fact is established from the reading of the plaint itself. 11. The questions which fall for determination are: (i) whether the suit is barred under Order IX Rule 9 CPC; and, (ii) whether the plaintiff has not come with clean hands as he has concealed the material fact and the effect of concealment of the fact. 12. Indisputably, the plaintiff has filed two suits for the same cause of action. Learned counsel for the appellant has very fairly submitted that the second suit was on the same cause of action, however, it was filed while the first suit was pending and which was dismissed subsequently on 01st August, 1998. 13. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that no prejudice has been caused due to filing of the second suit as it was filed after filing of the first suit, I find that it is difficult to accept the said submission. The object of Order II Rule 2 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In the event this submission is accepted, the prejudice will be that the plaintiff would be at liberty to file successive suits for the same cause of action which would be against the public policy to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings. 14. This issue has been considered by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 625 . The Supreme Court while considering the public policy under Order II Rule 2(2) & (3) CPC has found that although there was no judgment on the point, but the Court has held that having regard to the public policy the said construction of the law would be appropriate. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has also referred a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Murti v. Bhola Ram, ILR (1894) 16 All 165, and a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji Ramchandra v. Raghunath Shankar, AIR 1954 Bom 125 . The relevant part of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under: “17. The relevant part of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under: “17. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier Division Bench order in R. Vimalchand v. Ramalingam, (2002) 3 MLJ 177 , holding that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC would be applicable only when the first suit is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2(3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline required the learned Single Judge of the High Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2 Rule 2 CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on the same cause of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand fully subserved by holding that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations. Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti v. Bhola Ram, ILR (1894) 16 All 165 and by the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji Ramchandra v. Raghunath Shankar, AIR 1954 Bom 125 .” 15. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I find that no substantial question of law is involved in this case and the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court with reference to Order II Rule 2 CPC does not warrant any interference in the second appeal. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed. 16. No order as to costs.