ORDER : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J. This Review Petition arises out of the judgment of this Court dated 4.11.2016 in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010. The review petitioner is the additional 2nd appellant in the said appeal, which arises out of the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Thrissur dated 23.12.2009 in O.S.No.23/1992, a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction filed by the respondent/plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property having an extent of 3.93 acres, comprised in Sy.No.4/1 of Madakkathara Village, covered by Ext.A1 settlement deed No.2491/74 of SRO Ollukkara dated 13.5.1974. 2. According to the plaintiff, the plaint schedule property belongs to him, which he obtained as per Ext.A1 settlement deed No.2491/74 of SRO Ollukkara dated 13.5.1974. The 1st defendant is the father and the 2nd defendant is the mother of the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff had to go abroad for advanced training and higher studies, he executed Ext.A2 power of attorney No.277/83 of SRO Ollukkara dated 18.6.1983 in favour of the 1st defendant, authorizing him to sell the plaint schedule property for sufficient consideration. By the end of 1984, the plaintiff returned to India and thereupon, he cancelled Ext.A2 power of attorney, by executing Ext.A3 cancellation deed bearing No.433/85 of SRO Ollukkara dated 28.9.1985. The defendants came to know about the cancellation of Ext.A2 power of attorney immediately after execution of Ext.A3 deed. While the plaintiff was abroad, the 1st defendant was managing the plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.A2 power of attorney and he does not have any independent right over the said property. 3. On 25.8.1991, the plaintiff came to know that the 1st defendant fraudulently and in violation of the trust reposed on him by the plaintiff, executed Ext.A4 document No.2697/85 of SRO Ollukkara dated 14.6.1985 on the strength of Ext.A2 power of attorney. As per the recitals in Ext.A4 document, the 1st defendant gifted the plaint schedule property to the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff contended that, the 1st defendant has no power to execute a document like Ext.A4 and that, the 2nd defendant did not obtain any right over the said property on the strength of Ext.A4. As per the recitals in Ext.A4 document, the 1st defendant gifted the plaint schedule property to the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff contended that, the 1st defendant has no power to execute a document like Ext.A4 and that, the 2nd defendant did not obtain any right over the said property on the strength of Ext.A4. Therefore, in the plaint, the plaintiff sought for a declaration that, Ext.A4 document No.2697/1985 dated 14.6.1985 of SRO Ollukkara is void ab initio, not binding upon the plaint schedule property or his right, title and interest over the said property and that, he is having absolute right, title and possession over that property. The plaintiff has also sought for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants and their men from taking usufructs from the plaint schedule property or interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property or executing any documents concerning the same in the name of any person other than the plaintiff or inducting strangers into the said property or committing any waste therein. 4. According to the defendants, the plaintiff has not obtained any right over the plaint schedule property as per Ext.A1 document dated 13.5.1974. The said document was never acted upon and was not intended to be acted upon. Ext.A1 document was executed only with a view to escape from the land reforms legislation, by limiting the extent of the holdings. The plaintiff has no right or possession over the plaint schedule property, which continued to be in the possession of the 1st defendant till 14.6.1985, the date on which he delivered the said property to the 2nd defendant on the strength of Ext.A4 deed. Regarding execution of Ext.A2 power of attorney dated 18.6.1983, the defendants contended that the said document was not executed for selling the plaint schedule property. In fact, the 1st defendant was asking the plaintiff to execute a gift deed in respect of the plaint schedule property in favour of the 2nd defendant before he was planning to go abroad. The plaintiff had agreed to do so and he had taken Ext.A1 document with a promise to execute a gift deed in favour of the 2nd defendant. Since the plaintiff was in a hurry to go abroad, he had executed Ext.A2 power of attorney dated 18.6.1983, in favour of the 1st defendant to facilitate transfer of the said property in favour of the 2nd defendant. Since the plaintiff was in a hurry to go abroad, he had executed Ext.A2 power of attorney dated 18.6.1983, in favour of the 1st defendant to facilitate transfer of the said property in favour of the 2nd defendant. Ext.A2 power of attorney was executed on 18.6.1983 and the plaintiff reached Paris on 20.6.1983. The 1st defendant had received Ext.A2 power of attorney along with Ext.B5 letter dated 27.5.1985 of the plaintiff. 5. The defendants contended that, the plaintiff came to know about the transfer of plaint schedule property in favour of the 2nd defendant, in the year 1985 itself, from his brother Sunil Krishnan (the additional 2nd appellant in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010) with whom he had frequent contacts. After coming to know about such transfer, the plaintiff cancelled Ext.A2 power of attorney by Ext.A3 cancellation deed dated 28.9.1985. The transaction in favour of the 2nd defendant was done with the concurrence of the plaintiff and that, the plaintiff never enjoyed the plaint schedule property. Further, Ext.A4 document dated 14.6.1985 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is perfectly valid, which is binding on the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendants contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the declaration or injunction as prayed for. 6. Pending suit, the 2nd defendant (mother of the respondent/plaintiff) died on 24.1.1993. Since the 2nd defendant had executed a will bequeathing the plaint schedule property to the 1st defendant, the trial court found that the suit does not abate even if her second son (the review petitioner/additional 2nd appellant in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010) is not brought on record. 7. Originally, no oral evidence was adduced on the side of the plaintiff, other than marking Exts.A1 to A4. On the side of the defendants, the 1st defendant was examined as DW1 and Exts.B1 to B10 were marked. Ext.C1 commission report dated 22.6.1993 was marked as court exhibit. The trial court, by the judgment and decree dated 29.2.1996, decreed O.S.No.23/1992 declaring that Ext.A4 document No.2697/1985 dated 14.6.1985 is invalid and not binding either upon the plaint schedule property or the plaintiff and that, the plaintiff has got right, title and possession over the said property and he is entitled for a perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from taking usufructs from the said property and from obstructing the plaintiff from executing any document concerning that property. 8. 8. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 29.2.1996 in O.S.No.23/1992, the 1st defendant filed A.S.No.295/1996 before this Court. As per the order in I.A.No.2549/2003 dated 5.10.2006, the appellant/1st defendant was recorded as the legal representative of the deceased 2nd defendant. This Court, by the judgment dated 5.10.2006 in A.S.No.295/1996, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S.No.23/1992 and remanded the said suit for fresh trial, permitting the parties to lead their respective evidence as to the question of limitation and also the alleged obstruction pleaded in the plaint. The application for amendment of plaint, viz., I.A.No.2448/2003 was transmitted to the trial court for its consideration. 9. After the order of remand, the plaintiff amended the plaint as per the order dated 22.9.2007 in I.A.No.91/2007 and I.A.No.2043/2007. By the order in I.A.No.91/2007 the plaint was amended by inserting Para.3 (a) and reliefs (aa) and (bb). By the order in I.A.No.2043/2007 Para.8 of the plaint was deleted and Paras.9 and 10 were renumbered as Paras.8 and 9. Further, the description of the property in the plaint schedule was amended by deleting the words "along with a residential building and all standing improvements thereon". In the amended plaint, the plaintiff contended that, instead of selling the plaint schedule property for consideration, the 1st defendant acted against the welfare of the plaintiff. The 1st defendant has also diverted income from the plaint schedule property and permitted his second son Sunil Krishnan to enjoy the same. When the plaintiff came to know about the mismanagement of the plaint schedule property by the 1st defendant, he executed Ext.A3 cancellation deed dated 28.9.1985. The plaintiff wanted to state all these facts in his written statement filed in O.S.No.1399/1994 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Thrissur and accordingly he had narrated all these facts to his counsel. However, while drafting Ext.B3 written statement in that suit, the counsel failed to present these facts in the correct perspective and in the chronological order. 10. The plaintiff wanted to state all these facts in his written statement filed in O.S.No.1399/1994 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Thrissur and accordingly he had narrated all these facts to his counsel. However, while drafting Ext.B3 written statement in that suit, the counsel failed to present these facts in the correct perspective and in the chronological order. 10. As per the amended plaint, the plaintiff sought for an alternative relief of recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property on the basis of his title, if it is found that the defendants are in possession of the said property, and also a declaration that he is the owner having exclusive right, title and interest over that property by virtue of Ext.A1 document No.2491/74 dated 13.5.1974 of SRO Ollukkara and that, the 2nd defendant has not acquired any right, title or interest over that property by virtue of Ext.A4 document No.2697/85 dated 14.6.1985. 11. To the amended plaint, the 1st defendant filed additional written statement contending that, the intention of the 1st defendant to transfer the plaint schedule property to the 2nd defendant had been conveyed in the letters sent to the plaintiff. The allegations that the 1st defendant had diverted the income from the plaint schedule property and allowed his other son to enjoy the income therefrom are all baseless. The fact that the plaintiff came to know about the transaction in favour of the 2nd defendant in the year 1985 itself is evident from Ext.B3 written statement filed by him in O.S.No.1399/1994. It was also contended that, the suit is barred by limitation and that, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any reliefs prayed for. 12. After the remand, the plaintiff was examined as PW1 and PWs 2 and 3 were examined on his side. Exts.A5 to A11 were marked on the side of the plaintiff. On the side of the defendants DW1 (review petitioner - power of attorney of the 1st defendant) and DW2 were examined and Exts.B11 to B38 were marked. Ext.C2 commission report dated 20.2.2008 was marked as court exhibit. The trial court, by the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2009, decreed O.S.No.23/1992 in part, thereby directing the 1st defendant to surrender possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within two months from the date of judgment, failing which the plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery by filing execution petition. The trial court, by the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2009, decreed O.S.No.23/1992 in part, thereby directing the 1st defendant to surrender possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within two months from the date of judgment, failing which the plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery by filing execution petition. However, the prayers for declaration and prohibitory injunction were declined. 13. The trial court held that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and that, Ext.A4 document executed by the 1st defendant as power of attorney holder is not binding on the plaintiff, since the 1st defendant has exceeded his powers under Ext.A2 power of attorney. However, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to prove his possession over the plaint schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit. Further, the plaintiff came to know about the execution Ext.A4 document No.2697/85 in the year 1985 itself, as evident from Ext.B3 written statement in O.S.No.1399/1994, and immediately he had executed Ext.A3 cancellation deed dated 28.9.1985. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for declaration within three years from the date of knowledge. Having failed to do so, the prayer for declaration sought for is barred by limitation. 14. However, the trial court held that, in view of the finding that the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property, he is entitled to get recovery of possession of the said property, even without a prayer for declaration. In view of the finding that, the plaintiff had no possession over the plaint schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit, the trial court held that he is not entitled for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants from trespassing into the said property. On the contention raised as to improper valuation of the suit and insufficiency of the court-fees paid, the trial court held that, having failed to raise such a plea in the written statement, the 1st defendant cannot raise such a contention at the fag end of the trial. 15. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S.No.23/1992, the 1st defendant approached this Court in R.F.A.No.140/2010. 15. Challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S.No.23/1992, the 1st defendant approached this Court in R.F.A.No.140/2010. On receipt of notice in R.F.A.No.140/2010, the respondent/plaintiff filed Cross Objection No.79/2010, challenging the findings of the trial court as to the plaintiff's possession over the plaint schedule property after the execution of Ext.A4 document No.2697/85 and also the finding that, the prayer for declaration sought for is barred by limitation. During the pendency of the appeal, the 1st defendant (father of the respondent/plaintiff) died and his second son (review petitioner) was impleaded as the additional 2nd appellant, as per the order dated 1.1.2013 in I.A.No.2489/2012 in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010. 16. After considering the rival contentions, this Court by the judgment dated 4.11.2016 dismissed R.F.A.No.140 of 2010 filed by the review petitioner and Cross Objection No.79 of 2010 filed by the respondent/plaintiff. 17. This Court held that, while executing Ext.A4 document in favour of the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant had acted beyond his authority as an agent of the plaintiff under Ext.A2 power of attorney and as such, Ext.A4 document will not bind the plaintiff and he can very well ignore the same. 18. Regarding the identity of the plaint schedule property, this Court found that, as per Ext.C1 report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner the plaint schedule property can be easily identifiable. The Commissioner has also marked the plaint schedule property in the plan attached to his report, which was prepared with the assistance of the Village Officer. The defendants did not challenge the correctness of the plan so prepared. Therefore, this Court held that, the trial court rightly accepted the plan and sketch which form part of Ext.C1 report and rejected the contention of the defendants as to the identity of the plaint schedule property. 19. Regarding the title and possession of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property, this Court found that, the admission made in Ext.B2 letter itself is sufficient to prove that, the 1st defendant had executed Ext.A1 document with an intention to settle the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. The recitals of Ext.B2 letter would also support the case of the plaintiff, based on the recitals of Exts.A1, A2 and A4 that, he was in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of execution of Ext.A4 document, i.e., as on 14.6.1985. The recitals of Ext.B2 letter would also support the case of the plaintiff, based on the recitals of Exts.A1, A2 and A4 that, he was in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of execution of Ext.A4 document, i.e., as on 14.6.1985. Therefore, this Court held that, the plaintiff has established a clear case for granting a decree for recovery of possession on title. 20. On the plea of limitation, this Court held that, since the plaintiff failed to file the suit for declaration within three years from the date when the right to sue first accrued, i.e., the date on which he came to know about Ext.A4 document, the declaratory relief sought for is barred by limitation. However, in the absence of a plea of adverse possession setup by the defendants, there is no bar on the plaintiff in seeking recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property on the strength of Ext.A1 title even after twelve years from the date of execution/knowledge of Ext.A4 document by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant. Therefore, this Court held that, the relief of recovery of possession sought for on the strength of Ext.A1 title is not barred by limitation and as such, the trial court cannot be found fault with in granting the plaintiff recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property on the strength of title. 21. This Court held further that, the predominant nature of the suit is one for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property on the strength of Ext.A1 title and the prayer for declaration is only subservient to the main prayer for recovery of possession, attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The fact of the plaintiff having sought for such a declaration is of no consequence. When the document is null and void, ignoring the same a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that the said document is a nullity. 22. Regarding the relief of injunction, this Court found that, the trial court, after analysing the oral evidence of Pws.1 and 2, arrived at a finding that the plaintiff did not get back possession of the plaint schedule property from the 2nd defendant after 1985. 22. Regarding the relief of injunction, this Court found that, the trial court, after analysing the oral evidence of Pws.1 and 2, arrived at a finding that the plaintiff did not get back possession of the plaint schedule property from the 2nd defendant after 1985. Since the plaintiff was not successful in proving possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of suit, the trial court has rightly rejected the relief of injunction sought for. Further, when the cause of action for the relief of recovery of possession is not different from the cause of action for declaratory relief and injunction sought for in the original plaint, no amendment of the cause of action stated in the plaint is required. 23. Regarding the valuation of the plaint and the memorandum of appeal/cross-objection, this Court found that, in the amended plaint the plaintiff sought for relief (aa) for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property on the basis of Ext.A1 title, if for any reason it is found that defendants are in possession, and relief (bb) for declaration of title by virtue of Ext.A1 document. However, reliefs (aa) and (bb) were neither valued nor any court-fees paid. The valuation of the appeal and cross-objection is also in respect of reliefs (a) and (b) only. Therefore, the valuation of the plaint in O.S.No.23/1992, the memorandum of appeal in R.F.A.No.140/2010 and the memorandum of Cross Objection No.79/2010 require to be amended by valuing reliefs (aa) and (bb) on the market value of the plaint schedule property, as shown in the plaint, and paying court-fees for the said reliefs as provided under Section 25(a) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959. 24. Accordingly, the review petitioner/2nd appellant was directed to file application for amending the valuation of the memorandum of appeal in R.F.A.No.140/2010 and the respondent/plaintiff was directed to file applications for amending the valuation of the plaint in O.S.No.23/1992 and the memorandum of Cross Objection No.79/2010, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment and remit the deficit court-fees along with the said applications, failing which it was ordered that the consequences as provided under clause (c) of sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959 would follow. 25. 25. Seeking review of the judgment dated 4.11.2016 in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010 the review petitioner/2nd appellant is before this Court. 26. We heard the arguments of learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner/2nd appellant/legal heir of the deceased 1st defendant and also learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. 27. In the Review Petition, it is contended that regarding the relief of recovery of possession and declaration, the review petitioner/2nd appellant has raised various questions on possession, limitation, etc. which were either omitted to be considered or erroneously decided while dismissing the appeal and as such, the judgment of this Court dated 4.11.2016 in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010 is liable to be reviewed. 28. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi ( 1997 (8) SCC 715 ), the Apex Court held that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter can be corrected by exercise of review jurisdiction. Later, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India ( 2000 (6) SCC 224 ), the Apex Court held that, the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. 29. In view of the law laid down as above by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, the review petitioner cannot seek review of the judgment of this Court dated 4.11.2016 in R.F.A.No.140 of 2010 on the ground that certain questions were erroneously decided in the said judgment; since such a contention is not available to the review petitioner in a review petition filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 30. Referring to Article 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner would contend that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff in the year 1991, much after the cancellation of Ext.A2 power of attorney in the year 1985 is barred by limitation. 30. Referring to Article 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner would contend that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff in the year 1991, much after the cancellation of Ext.A2 power of attorney in the year 1985 is barred by limitation. When the time limit prescribed under Article 4 of the Limitation Act for suits by principals against agents for neglect or misconduct is three years from the date on which the neglect or misconduct becomes known to the plaintiff, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff much after the said period of limitation is liable to be dismissed as one barred by limitation. 31. Articles 3 and 4 of the Limitation Act read thus: “3 By a principal against his agent for movable property received by the latter and not accounted for Three years When the account, is during the continuance of the agency demanded and refused or, where no such demand is made when the agency terminates. 4 Other suits by principals against agents for neglect or misconduct Three years When the neglect or misconduct be becomes known to the plaintiff.” Article 3 of the Limitation Act deals with suit for accounts by a principal against his agent for movable property received by the latter and not accounted for. The period of limitation prescribed under Article 3 for such a suit is three years when the account, is during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused or, when no such demand is made when the agency terminates. On the other hand, Article 4 deals with other suits by principal against agents for neglect or misconduct. The time limit prescribed under Article 4 for such suits is three years when the neglect or misconduct becomes known to the plaintiff. 32. Article 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which corresponds to Article 90 of the Limitation Act, 1908, prescribes the period of limitation for other suits by the principal against his agent for neglect or misconduct, i.e., suits which do not properly come under Article 2 or Article 3. The expression 'neglect' or 'misconduct' under Article 4 contemplates something which is tortuous in nature and therefore, necessarily an act that is not authorized under the terms of the agency or contemplated thereunder. 33. The expression 'neglect' or 'misconduct' under Article 4 contemplates something which is tortuous in nature and therefore, necessarily an act that is not authorized under the terms of the agency or contemplated thereunder. 33. Article 4 of the Limitation Act, going by a plain reading of the said provision, relates to suit by a principal against agent for neglect or misconduct. The substantive law relating agent's duty to principal is contained in Sections 211 to 221 of the Contract Act, 1872. Section 211 of the said Act deals with the agent's duty in conducting principal's business. Section 211 provides that, an agent is bound to conduct the business of his principal according to the directions given by the principal, or in the absence of any such directions according to the custom which prevails in doing business of the same kind at the place where the agent conducts such business. When the agent acts otherwise, if any loss be sustained, he must make it good to his principal, and if any profit accrues, he must account for it. 34. Section 212 of the Contract Act deals with skill and diligence required from agent. Section 212 provides that, an agent is bound to conduct the business of the agency with as much skill as is generally possessed by persons engaged in similar business unless the principal has notice of this want of skill. The agent is always bound to act with reasonable diligence, and to use such skill as he possesses; and to make compensation to his principal in respect of the direct consequences of his own neglect, want of skill or misconduct, but not in respect of loss or damage which are indirectly or remotely caused by such neglect, want of skill, or misconduct. 35. Going by Section 212 of the Contract Act, an agent, who is bound to act with reasonable diligence, and to use such skill as he possesses, is bound to compensate his principal in respect of the direct consequences of his own neglect, want of skill, or misconduct. Section 212, therefore, states that the right of the principal against agent when there is neglect, want of skill or misconduct is to file a suit against the agent claiming compensation. A suit of this nature will be governed by Article 4 of the Limitation Act. 36. Section 212, therefore, states that the right of the principal against agent when there is neglect, want of skill or misconduct is to file a suit against the agent claiming compensation. A suit of this nature will be governed by Article 4 of the Limitation Act. 36. In Pannala Jankidas v. Mohanlal ( AIR 1951 SC 144 ) the Apex Court held that Sections 211 and 212 of the Contract Act provide for the consequences of an agent acting otherwise than according to the directions issued by the principal. Under Section 211 of the Act, when an agent conducts the business of the principal otherwise than according to the directions given by the principal, if any loss be sustained he must make it good to his principal and if any profit accrues he must account for it. After making reference to Section 212 of the Act, the Apex Court held that, these sections make it clear that in case of the agent's negligence he is liable to make good the damage directly arising from his neglect but not indirectly or remotely caused by such neglect or misconduct. 37. In the case on hand, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is not one for compensation for any neglect, want of skill or misconduct on the part of the 1st defendant/agent. On the other hand, the alleged misconduct on the part of the 1st defendant/agent is taken as a ground for cancellation of Ext.A2 power of attorney. In such a case, the period of limitation prescribed under Article 4 of the Limitation Act has no application. In that view of the matter, the contention of the review petitioner/2nd appellant that the provision under Article 4 of the Limitation Act applies to the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff and as such, the said suit filed admittedly beyond three years from the date of knowledge of the alleged misconduct by the 1st defendant/agent is barred by limitation can only be repelled and we do so. 38. The learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner would then contend that, the respondent/plaintiff paid court fee only for declaration as the main relief and did not pay court fee for recovery. 38. The learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioner would then contend that, the respondent/plaintiff paid court fee only for declaration as the main relief and did not pay court fee for recovery. By the impugned judgment, even without any application made by the respondent/plaintiff, this Court ordered amendment of the valuation in the plaint and also in the memorandum of Cross Objection with a consequential direction to pay the requisite court fee for reliefs (aa) and (bb), as provided under Section 25(a) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959, which is legally impermissible. 39. Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deals with the power of the court to make up deficiency of court fees. As per the said provision, where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fees; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 40. In Nawab John A. v. V.N. Subramaniyam ( 2012 (7) SCC 738 ) the Apex Court held that, from the language of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure it follows that when a plaint is presented to a court without the payment of appropriate court-fees payable thereon, undoubtedly the court has the authority to call upon the plaintiff to make payment of the necessary court-fees. Such an authority of the court can be exercised at any stage of the suit. Therefore, any amount of lapse of time does not fetter the authority of the court to direct the payment of such deficit court-fees. As a logical corollary, even the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred from paying the deficit court-fees because of the lapse of time. 41. Therefore, any amount of lapse of time does not fetter the authority of the court to direct the payment of such deficit court-fees. As a logical corollary, even the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred from paying the deficit court-fees because of the lapse of time. 41. In the context of Section 12(4) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, a Division Bench of this Court in P.P.S. Pillai v. Catholic Syrian Bank ( 2000 (3) KLT 629 ) held that, sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act confers jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties the correctness of the order passed by the trial court affecting the fee payable on the plaint. If the court of appeal decides that the fee paid in the lower court was not sufficient, the appellate court shall require the parties liable to pay the deficit court-fees, within a time as may be fixed by it. The further provision is that, if the deficit fee is not paid within the time fixed and the default is in respect of a relief which has been dismissed by the lower court, the appeal shall be dismissed. The principle laid down in P.P.S. Pillai's case (supra) has been reiterated by another Division Bench of this Court in Peter Cherian v. Abraham (2007 (4) SCC 680). 42. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, we find absolutely no error apparent on the direction contained in the impugned judgment by which the respondent/plaintiff and the review petitioner were permitted to amend the valuation of the plaint in O.S.No.23/1992, the memorandum of appeal in R.F.A.No.140/2010 and the memorandum of Cross Objection No.79/2010 by valuing reliefs (aa) and (bb) on the market value of the plaint schedule property, as shown in the plaint, and paying court-fees for the said reliefs as provided under Section 25(a) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959. 43. In the result, we find no error apparent on the face of record, warranting review of the judgment dated 4.11.2016 in R.F.A.No.140/2010 invoking the powers under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Review Petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.