JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This is plaintiff’s second appeal under Section 100,C.P.C. 2. The plaintiff instituted a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession. Plaintiff’s case is that original owner of plot No. 65 area 35 dismal and plot No. 56 area .04 dismal, was Shanker who was his grandfather. The suit property has been transferred illegally by defendant No. 4 (defendant second set) in favour of defendant No. 1 to 3 (defendant first set. It is necessary to set out genealogy of the parties: SHANKAR (Dead) Seeta (Dead) Raju (Dead) (Issueless) Ram Shakal (dead) (Issueless) Ram Chandra (Dead) (Issueless) Jeeta Jang Bahadur Dasarath (Dead) (Issueless) 3. It is stated in the plaint that Shanker, grandfather of the appellant had two sons namely Seeta (dead) and Raju (dead), of whom Raju died issueless. Seeta has five sons namely Ram Sakal, Ram Chandra, Jeeta, Jang Bahadur and Dasarath. Ram Sakal, Ram Chandra and Dasarath died issueless. Consequently, the appellant alongwith fourth respondent Jeeta and Shanker became co tenure holder of the aforesaid land and they were in possession of the land in dispute. It is stated that defendant-respondent No. 4 herein by showing himself as son of Ram Chandra who died issueless, has sold 1/4th his share to respondent No. 1 and 2 by registered sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 in a clandestine manner. The appellant had no knowledge about the sale-deed. After the aforesaid sale-deed, Shanker also died. Thus, the appellant and respondent No. 4 became co tenure holder of the aforesaid land. 4. The appellant came to know about the sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 in the month of October, 1988 when defendant respondent No. 1 and 2 started causing interference in peaceful possession of the plaintiff appellant. The appellant made enquiry and then came to know that defendant-respondent Phool Badan has sold 1/4th share of the land in dispute in favour of defendant respondent No. 1 and 2 by registered sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 and also found that mutation proceedings was carried on for mutating name of defendant respondent No. 1 and 2 in place of Phool Badan. Thereafter on the advice of counsel, the appellant filed an objection in mutation proceedings on 30.11.1988. The said mutation proceeding was decided in favour of defendant respondent No. 1 and 2 on 3.7.1988. Thereafter on the advice of counsel, the appellant filed an objection in mutation proceedings on 30.11.1988. The said mutation proceeding was decided in favour of defendant respondent No. 1 and 2 on 3.7.1988. At that stage, his counsel advised him to file a civil suit, hence he has instituted the present suit for the relief mentioned above. 5. The defendants contested the suit. Defendant No. 3 Phool Badan took a stand that defendant No. 3 Ram Sakal was his uncle. He denied the claim of the plaintiff that Ram Sakal died issueless. After his death, he had ¼th share and he has sold his share for a consideration of Rs. 12360/- vide sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 in favour of defendant No. 1 and 2 and also handed over possession to them. It was also stated by him that Ram Chandra was married with Darpee Devi and defendant claimed to be their son. He also denied the fact that Darpee Devi had died. It was also stated that plaintiff had knowledge about the sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 from very inception but he has filed suit after 15 years which is beyond limitation. 6. The trial Court framed seven issues in the suit. Issue No. 2 was whether the suit is barred by limitation. The trial Court decided issue No. 2 regarding limitation and issue No. 3 about maintainability of the suit, as preliminary issue. Both the issues were decided against the plaintiff-appellant and consequently the suit was dismissed by the trial Court. 7. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff-appellant preferred regular first appeal being appeal No. 20 of 2010 in the Court of District Judge, Ballia. The civil appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed by the appellate Court vide judgment and order dated 16.3.2015 on the ground that issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and as such it cannot be decided as preliminary issue and remanded the matter to the trial Court. The defendant filed First Appeal From Order No. 1211 of 2015 before this Court which was disposed of on 14.5.2015 and the matter was remanded to the appellate Court for fresh decision. The appellate Court has dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment and order. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 was a void document. The defendant filed First Appeal From Order No. 1211 of 2015 before this Court which was disposed of on 14.5.2015 and the matter was remanded to the appellate Court for fresh decision. The appellate Court has dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment and order. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that sale-deed dated 14.10.1983 was a void document. The appellant came to know about the sale-deed dated 14.10.1983, first time in the year 1988 and from 1988 he was contesting mutation proceedings in respect of the sale-deed and on basis of wrong legal advice, he could not file suit earlier as he was bona fidely pursuing remedy in the revenue Court. He further submits that in view of the fact that appellant was pursuing said proceedings, he is entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and suit cannot be held to be time barred. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon judgments of the Supreme Court in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Hanuman Seva Trust, 2006 (5) SCC 658 , Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Philliar Temple v. M Sabjybtaka (D) and others, 2015 (5) SCC 674 , and of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kedar Singh, 1991 AIR (Alld) 317 and Smt. Kalawati Devi v. Anirudh Prasad, Writ -C No. 66900 of 2014, decided on 16.1.2015. 9. Sri Rajeev Misra, learned counsel appearing for caveator-respondent No. 1 & 2, submits that from paragraph No. 12 of the plaint itself, it is established that plaintiff had knowledge regarding the sale-deed on 26.10.1983 when defendant No. 3 had refused to cancel the sale-deed. He further contends that question of limitation can be decided as a preliminary issue as under Order 7 Rule 11-D, C.P.C., plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation. He has reliance upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede And Company, 2007(5) SCC 614 and judgments of this Court in Aziz Uddin v. Smt. Laxmi Devi and others, 2014(4) ADJ 667 , Mrs. Kumud Bhargava v. Sudhir Bhargava and others, 2014(11) ADJ 736 (DB) and Maqbool Ahmad Khan v. Smt. Bhama Devi, 2013(100) ALR 296). 10. Kumud Bhargava v. Sudhir Bhargava and others, 2014(11) ADJ 736 (DB) and Maqbool Ahmad Khan v. Smt. Bhama Devi, 2013(100) ALR 296). 10. Sri Misra further submits that in view of the fact that there is clear admission of the plaintiff-appellant that he had knowledge of the sale-deed in the year 1983, hence the trial Court was justified in dismissing his suit and the appellate Court has rightly affirmed it. Learned counsel lastly urged that no substantial question of law is involved in the present matter. 11. I have heard Sri R.S. Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rajeev Mishra appearing for the caveator and perused the record. 12. Admittedly, the plaintiff-appellant instituted the suit in the year 1998 for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 14.10.1983, i.e. after 15 years. The trial Court framed seven issues which read as under: **1- D;k fookfnr dckyk fnukad 14&10&1983 ealwc gksus ;ksX; gSA ;fn gkW rks izHkko\ 2- D;k nkok oknh dky ckf/kr gS\ 3- D;k nkok oknh iks"k.kh; gS\ 4- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS\ 5- D;k iznRr U;k; 'kqYd vi;kZIr gSA 6- D;k nkok oknh nQk&34 fof'k"V vuqrks"k vf/kŒ dk nks"k gSA 7- vU; vuqrks"k\** 13. Issue No. 2 of the issues was in respect of limitation. The trial Court took issue No. 2 as a preliminary issue and dismissed suit of the plaintiff. The trial Court recorded a finding that plaintiff had knowledge of the suit as claimed by him in the year 1988, then the suit ought to have been filed by him within three years, hence the suit was barred by limitation. The appellate Court has affirmed the finding of the trial Court and did not accept submission of the plaintiff-appellant that he was bona fide pursuing the matter and on legal advice he did not file the suit, therefore, the delay should be condoned. The appellate Court has also recorded a finding that plaintiff had filed objection in mutation proceedings on 30.11.1988, hence the plaintiff had full knowledge about execution of the sale-deed at that point of time and for the said reason, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, are not attracted and accordingly dismissed the appeal. 14. As regards the submission of the appellant that he is entitled for benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the said submission is misconceived. 14. As regards the submission of the appellant that he is entitled for benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the said submission is misconceived. Section 14 provides as under : “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.” 15. From simple reading of the said section, it is clear that object of Section 14 is to exclusion of the time during which the plaintiff was pursuing another civil proceeding in Court without jurisdiction of first instance or of appeal or revision. In the present case, inspite of knowledge of the sale-deed of 1983, the plaintiff was pursuing mutation proceedings under Section 34 of the Revenue Act which is summary proceeding. It is well established law that in mutation proceedings, the revenue Court does not have power to set aside a sale-deed. The plaintiff was aggrieved by execution of the sale-deed by the third respondent. Even he has filed objection in the year 1988 and continued to pursue the said proceeding till it was decided against him, hence, in my view, the appellate Court has rightly denied benefit of Section 14 in the facts and circumstances of this case. 16. The Supreme Court in Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd.’ case (supra), has held that if from the facts of the plaint it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation, then the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11,C.P.C. Paragraph 33 of the said decision is extracted hereinunder : “33. The respondent sought rejection of the plaint by filing application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC contending that the suit was barred by limitation on the face of it. The respondent sought rejection of the plaint by filing application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC contending that the suit was barred by limitation on the face of it. It was contended before the High Court as also before us that the plaint has been cleverly drafted to give it the appearance of a simple suit for injunction to enforce the terms of clauses 15 and 20 of the agreement which incorporated negative covenants prohibiting mining operation by anyone else except the appellant Hardesh, or without its permission. It was submitted before us that the law is well-settled that the dexterity of the draftsman whereby the real cause of action is camouflaged is a plaint cleverly drafted cannot defeat the right of the defendant to get the suit dismissed on the ground of limitation if one the facts, as stated in the plaint, the suit is shown to be barred by limitation....” 17. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Aziz Uddin’s case (supra) and similar view has been taken by another Division Bench in Mrs. Kumud Bhargava’s case (supra). 18. As regards the judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. case (supra), from the facts of the said judgment, it is clear that said judgment is based on the facts of that case and the Court has found that in each case allegations made in the plaint have to be seen. In the present case, the plaintiff himself has admitted in paragraph 12 of the plaint that he got knowledge on 26.10.1983. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has admitted that said averment of paragraph 12 of the plaint was not amended or corrected. 20. It appears that before the Courts below, a plea was raised that for the first time the plaintiff came to know about execution of the sale-deed in the year 1988. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiff had knowledge in 1988 while the suit was filed in 1998 i.e. after ten years. 21. 20. It appears that before the Courts below, a plea was raised that for the first time the plaintiff came to know about execution of the sale-deed in the year 1988. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiff had knowledge in 1988 while the suit was filed in 1998 i.e. after ten years. 21. So far as the submission of the counsel for appellant that the appellant has pursued the said remedy on wrong legal advice and has relied upon judgment of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation’s case (supra), is concerned, in the said case there was only seven days’ delay in filing the F.A.F.O. and the Court has noticed that Corporation had submitted all its relevant papers before expiry of the limitation and seven days’ delay occurred due to mistake of its counsel or counsel’s office. In view of the said facts, the said case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 22. After careful consideration of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, on perusal of the impugned judgments of the appellate Court and trial Court, this Court is of the view that no substantial question of law in terms of Section 100, C.P.C., arises in this case. There is clear finding of fact by both the Courts below that suit was barred by limitation. 23. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any ground to interfere under Section 100,C.P.C. 24. The appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.