JUDGMENT BISWANATH RATH, J. - The Civil Revision Petition has been filed assailing the impugned order dated 17.2.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bhubaneswar in Civil Suit No.7638 of 2015 thereby rejecting an application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. at the instance of the defendants-petitioners for rejection/return of the plaint. 2. Short background involved in the case is that the opposite party in the writ petition as plaintiff filed the Civil Suit bearing No.7638 of 2015 on the file of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bhubaneswar. The suit is for recovery of money and injunction against the defendants therein. Upon service of notice, the defendants therein at the first instance moved an application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. for rejection/return of the plaint on the premises that the institution of the suit suffers on account of jurisdiction of the Court. In filing the aforesaid application, the defendants contended that from the pleadings made in the plaint at the instance of the present opposite party, it appears that the claim of the plaintiff therein is based on an agreement executed between the plaintiff and the defendants on 14.4.2012. Referring to the franchise agreement dated 14.4.2012 particularly for the agreement between the parties to resolve their disputes through the Courts at New Delhi alone as contained at the end of the clause 6.4 of the franchise agreement, the defendants contended that no suit should be entertained by the Courts outside the jurisdiction of the Courts at New Delhi. Bringing further facts that for violation of the conditions by the plaintiff and thereby causing immense and wrongful loss to the defendants and entering into wrongful gain to the plaintiff, an F.I.R. is lodged under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation of cheating, conspiracy and criminal breach of trust against the opposite party/plaintiff and her accomplice. The defendants contended that they have also in the meantime instituted a suit for recovery against the plaintiff, which is now pending in the High Court of Delhi in its original side and thus, claimed that the present suit is a counter blast to obstruct the proceedings already instituted against the plaintiff. The defendants contended that they have also in the meantime instituted a suit for recovery against the plaintiff, which is now pending in the High Court of Delhi in its original side and thus, claimed that the present suit is a counter blast to obstruct the proceedings already instituted against the plaintiff. It is in these premises, by filing the aforesaid application the defendants claimed for rejection/return of the plaint for being filed in appropriate Court. 3. The plaintiff-present opposite party filing objection challenged the grounds taken in the application on the premises that for the pleadings made therein, the stand taken with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court is out and out false and thus contended that the Court at Bhubaneswar has the only jurisdiction to consider the prayers made therein. It is also contended that under no circumstance, the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. could have been entertained by the Court taking up the suit. 4. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bhubaneswar held that for the claim of the plaintiff involved in the suit, the Court at Bhubaneswar has the jurisdiction and thereby rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. The Trial Court further considering the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C., observed that the averments made in the plaint are the only consideration for the purpose and no further documents or averments in the W.S. can be taken up for consideration for the purpose. 5. Assailing the impugned order, Sri Padhi, learned Sr. 5. Assailing the impugned order, Sri Padhi, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the plaint averments itself disclosed the existence of the franchise agreement between the parties and the averments made in the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. was made only taking the help of the franchise agreement referred to and relied on by the plaintiff, in filing the plaint and making the claim therein, it is contended that the trial Court failed to appreciate the pleadings made in the plaint itself taking out the jurisdiction of the Court for the agreement between the parties in the franchise agreement agreeing to settle that the dispute only in the Courts at New Delhi. Sri Padhi, learned Senior Advocate further contended that reading of the impugned order discloses that even though the application at the instance of the defendant was filed under the under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. but the trial Court has considered application taking it to be an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C. alone. Sri Padhi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners therefore, contended that the trial Court remained fundamentally incorrect in considering the application at the instance of the defendants. Referring to the decisions as reported in (I) AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1766 (1) (2) AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1239 (1) (1) (3) AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2402 (4) AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2432 and a decision of this Court as reported in 1986 (I) OLR 337, Sri Padhi, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioners contended that the petitioners’ case have also the support of law of land establishing the impugned order becomes illegal and consequently, prays for interference in the impugned order and thereby allowing the Civil Revision Petition. 6. Sri Sahu, learned Counsel for the sole opposite party in opposing the stand taken by Sri Padhi, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that for the plaint averments and the dispute involved therein, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bhubaneswar has the jurisdiction to take up the suit at the instance of the opposite party. 6. Sri Sahu, learned Counsel for the sole opposite party in opposing the stand taken by Sri Padhi, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that for the plaint averments and the dispute involved therein, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bhubaneswar has the jurisdiction to take up the suit at the instance of the opposite party. Sri Sahu, referring to the pleadings made in the plaint urged that the agreement entered into between the parties remain in dispute and the cause of action involved in the dispute having been arising at Bhubaneswar, the place of institution of the suit, the suit was very much maintainable at Bhubaneswar. Mr. Sahu, learned Counsel referring to the provisions contained in the Order 7 Rule 10 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. also contended that the application under Order 7 Rule 11 in the circumstances was wholly not maintainable. Sri Sahu, learned Counsel for the opposite party further contended that considering an application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. the only consideration is the consideration of the pleadings/averments in the plaint and the Court considering such application is not required to travel the documents beyond the plaint and for the pleadings involved in the plaint, Sri Sahu, learned Counsel contended that the trial Court did no wrong in refusing to consider the documents outside the pleadings in the plaint. 7. Further referring to the decision as reported in (I) AIR 1985 (SC) 577 (2) AIR 2004 (SC) 1682 (3) (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 137 and a decision of this Court as reported in Vol. 61 (1986) CLT 318 Mr. Sahu, learned Counsel for the opposite party submitted that the order of the trial Court has the support of the aforesaid decision and therefore, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order leaving any scope for this Court in interfering in the same. 8. Considering the rival contentions of the parties and after going through the plaint averments involving the Civil Suit bearing No.7638/15 (M.S.) vide Annexure-4 to the Civil Revision Petition, this Court finds, the pleadings made in paragraph Nos.4,5 & 7 are all based on the contractual agreement dated 14.4.2012 executed between the parties. 8. Considering the rival contentions of the parties and after going through the plaint averments involving the Civil Suit bearing No.7638/15 (M.S.) vide Annexure-4 to the Civil Revision Petition, this Court finds, the pleadings made in paragraph Nos.4,5 & 7 are all based on the contractual agreement dated 14.4.2012 executed between the parties. In paragraph No.10 of the plaint, the plaintiff has an allegation that there is breach of the agreement dated 14.4.2012 by the defendant No.1 the present petitioner. Whole reading of the plaint also makes it clear that installation of the organization was purely on an outcome of the franchise agreement between the parties dated 14.4.2012. Further, whole reading of the plaint nowhere discloses existence of any agreement between the parties on 14.4.2015, so the statement made in the plaint appears to be false. It is on the other hand, submitted that the agreement relied therein is the agreement dated 14.4.2012 and form part of the documents accompanied with the plaint and find place in the list of documents relied on by the plaintiff. 9. Reading of the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C., this Court finds, the entire application at the instance of the defendant-petitioners is rested on the arriving at the condition between the parties agreeing therein to settle their disputes only in the Courts at New Delhi. The agreement dated 14.4.2012 is available at Annexure-3 of the writ petition which clearly contains at clause 6.4 that the licenser and the license i.e. the defendants and the plaintiff have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court at New Delhi alone. For the aforesaid observations, this Court finds, the charge of the learned Counsel for the opposite party Mr. N.K. Sahu, and the findings of the trial Court in dismissing the application at the instance of the defendant-petitioners that the Court deciding such application cannot travel beyond the pleadings of the plaint and the documents relied thereon, is unfounded and remains contrary to the materials available on record. In fact there was no document, no pleading beyond the plaint averments and it is all based on the agreement relied on by both the parties therein. In fact there was no document, no pleading beyond the plaint averments and it is all based on the agreement relied on by both the parties therein. Thus, this Court finds, the finding of the trial Court while rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. remains perverse. Looking to the conditions in the franchise agreement, both the parties particularly agreeing for resolving their disputes only through the Courts at New Delhi, it appears, the defendants have a justified claim through the application filed under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. This Court also finds, the trial Court considered the application of the defendant treating it to be an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C. alone, which is improper. 10. New coming to the citations cited by Sri Sahu, learned Counsel for the opposite party as indicated in paragraph No.7, this Court observes that after going through each of the judgment relied therein by the plaintiff-opposite party stands altogether on the different facts and as such none of the citations therein has any application to the case at hand. 11. Now coming to the citations at the instance of the petitioners, this Court finds, taking into consideration the condition in the agreement/contract between the parties, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case in between A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another, Appellants v. A.P. Agencies, Salem, Respondent as reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1239 (1) in paragraph Nos. 20 & 21 held as follows: “20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to as ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract, it would not, however ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract, it would not, however ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird and Co., AIR 1979 Mad 16 where the terms and conditions attached to the quotation contained in arbitration clause provided that : any order placed against this quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcutta and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us”, it was held that it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it did not mean to confer an exclusive jurisdiction on the Court at Calcutta and when a part of the cause of action had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdiction to entertain. The suit under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. From the foregoing decisions it can he reasonably deduced that where such an, ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like ‘alone’ ‘only’, ‘exclusive’, and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ’expressio unius est exclusion alterius’-expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case in between M/s. Angile Insulations, v. M/s. Davy Ashmor India Ltd. and another as reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1766 (I) in paragraph Nos. 5 & 6 held as follows : “5. It has therefore to be properly construed.” Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case in between M/s. Angile Insulations, v. M/s. Davy Ashmor India Ltd. and another as reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1766 (I) in paragraph Nos. 5 & 6 held as follows : “5. So, normally that Court also would have jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. But it will be subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. In this case, Clause (21) reads thus : “This work order is issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the above Court only.” A reading of this clause would clearly indicate that the work order issued by the appellant will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, be instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction within the jurisdiction of High Court of Bangalore only. The controversy has been considered by this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P: Agencies, Salem. (1989) 2 SCC 163 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ). Considering the entire case law on the topic, this Court held that the citizen has the right to have his legal position determined by the ordinary Tribunal except, of course, subject to contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which the dispute in respect of the contract shall be subject. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of Clauses (21) of the Contract pleaded in this case. On the other hand, this Court laid that where there may be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewith, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such Court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the status. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements. 6. In this view of the law and in view of the fact that the agreement under which clause (21) was incorporated as one such clause, the parties are bound by the contract. The contract had not been pleaded to be void and being opposed to S. 23 of the Contract Act. As seen, Clause (21) is unambiguous and explicit and that, therefore, the parties having agreed to vest the jurisdiction of the Court situated within the territorial limit of High Court of Karnatka, the Court of subordinate Judge, Dhanbad in Bihar State has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit laid by the appellant. Therefore, the High Court was right in upholding the order of the Trial Court returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. In the case in between M/s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra as reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2402 in paragraph No.9 held as follows: “9. In the present case the impugned order of the High Court and the order passed by the appellate Court arises out of the order passed by the Civil Judge, Bhubaneswar. We have to keep in mind there is difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction of any Court on account of some statute and the order where parties through agreement bind themselves to have their dispute decided by any one of the Court having jurisdiction. Thus, the question is not whether the Orissa Courts have the jurisdiction to decide the respondent’s suit but whether the respondent could have involved the jurisdiction of that Court in view of the aforesaid Cl. 34.A party is bound either by the provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has been jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has been jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. In case parties under their own agreement expressly agrees that their dispute shall be tried by only one of them then the party can only file the suit in that Court alone to which they have so agreed. In the present case as we have said through Cl. 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the Courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneswar. Such a suit would be in violation of the said agreement. In the case between M/s. Hanil Era Textiles Ltd., v. M/s. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., as reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2432 in paragraph No.9 held as follows : “9. Clause 17 says – any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai. The clause is no doubt not qualified by the words like “alone”, “only” or “exclusively”. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other Courts except Courts in Mumbai is excluded. Having regard to the fact that the order was placed by the defendant at Bombay; the said order was accepted by the branch office of the plaintiff at Bombay; the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay; and as per the plaintiff’s case the final payment was to be made at Bombay; there was a clear intention to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.” Considering the observations of this Court and findings on the factual aspect involving the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. and for the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to hereinabove, this Court finds, the impugned order is erroneous and contrary to law and under the circumstances, while allowing the C.R.P. No.9 of 2016 and setting aside the impugned order, this Court allows the application under Order 7 Rule 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of C.P.C. and directs the trial Court to return the plaint applying the provisions contained in the Order 7 Rule 10 of C.P.C. of the plaintiffs for plaintiffs’ filing plaint in appropriate Court of jurisdiction. 12. The Civil Revision Petition stands allowed. No cost. Petition allowed.