ORDER 1. Aggrieved by order dated 10.5.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Mahidpur, District Ujjain in C.M.A.No.13/2013 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner to set aside order dated 14.10.2010 passed by the Civil Judge, Class-I, Mahidpur, Ujjain in M.J.C. No.15/2009 dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Order 9 rule 13 of CPC to set aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 12.12.2008 passed in COS No.47-A/2008 by Civil Judge, Class-I, Mahidpur has been dismissed and also with dismissal of the petition to review dated 21.9.2015 passed in M.J.C. No.29/2013 to review the order dated 10.5.2013 passed in CMA No. 13/2013 by Additional District Judge, Mahidpur, District Ujjain, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit No.COS No.47-A/2008 for specific performance stating that the petitioner was agreed to sale the suit land bearing Survey No.0.052 hectare situated at Village Gogapur, Tahsil Mahidpur District, Ujjain to him. The petitioner appeared before the Court and contested the suit. He denied execution of any such sale agreement as alleged by the plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein) and submitted that he has taken a loan by mortgaging the suit land. He repaid the loan with interest according to the petitioner, he was diligently prosecuting the case. He filed his written statement and after recording of evidence of the plaintiff he also filed his affidavit of examination-in-chief. But thereafter, unfortunately his son met with an accident. His condition was serious, therefore the petitioner was extremely busy for his treatment for the next two years. He had to shift Ratlam due to compelling family circumstances. He could not attend the trial and also did not receive any information from the lawyer. The Court declared him ex parte and decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 12.12.2008. 3. The petitioner approached the Court to set aside the ex parte decree by filing an application under Order 9 rule 13 CPC which was registered as MJC No.15/2009 and was dismissed vide order dated 14.10.2010. The petitioner preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No.13/2013, which also met with the same fate. The petitioner again tried to convince the Court by filing a Review Petition No.MJC 29/2013 but the Court declined to interfere in the earlier order and dismissed the review petition vide order dated 21.9.2015. The petitioner preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No.13/2013, which also met with the same fate. The petitioner again tried to convince the Court by filing a Review Petition No.MJC 29/2013 but the Court declined to interfere in the earlier order and dismissed the review petition vide order dated 21.9.2015. Frustrated with both the orders of the Additional District Judge dated 10.5.2013 (CMA 13/13) and 21.9.2015 (MJC 29/13) dismissing the first appeal and the review petition, the petitioner has come before this Court by filing the present petition. 4. Submissions of the petitioner are that : (i) He was diligently contesting the suit. He filed written statement denying the execution of the alleged sale agreement. He also filed affidavit of examination-in-chief. But, unfortunately his son met with a serious accident. The petitioner got involved and engrossed with his treatment for the next two years. He had to shift Ratlam due to compelling family circumstances and could not attend the trial. (ii) He did not receive any information from the lawyer. (iii) He is a rustic villager and in not aware of the law. (iv) He is a marginal farmer with a small agriculture land, which is the only source of his livelihood. (v) In the matter of setting aside an ex parte decree, a liberal approach should be adopted particularly when the party against whom a suit is file, is from very poor family and is having very small holding. 5. On these grounds the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction and hence, prayed for quashing of the same. 6. Regarding IA No.8574/2015, an application for condonation of delay, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the objection raised by the office that the petition is barred by 809 days is not correct. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the present petition is within time as the same is not only preferred against the order passed in the CMA No. 13/2013 dated 10.5.2013 but also against the order dated 21.9.2015 passed in Review Petition No.29/2013. It is the contention of the petitioner that as per the doctrine of merger, the order passed in CMA No.13/2013 merges with the order dated 21.9.2015 passed in Review Petition No.29/2013 and if the limitation is computed from 21.9.2015 then the present petition, which is filed on 27.10.2015 is well within time. It is the contention of the petitioner that as per the doctrine of merger, the order passed in CMA No.13/2013 merges with the order dated 21.9.2015 passed in Review Petition No.29/2013 and if the limitation is computed from 21.9.2015 then the present petition, which is filed on 27.10.2015 is well within time. 7. Inviting my attention towards the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner further submitted that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the period during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence and in good faith another civil proceedings, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded. According to the petitioner, he in bona fide belief, approached the first appellate Court and filed a review petition disposal of which lasted for more than two years. He was very much hopeful to get success in the review petition but unfortunately he could not get expected result. Therefore, the period spent in prosecuting the review petition i.e. from 10.5.2013 to 21.9.2015 shall be excluded from the computation of the limitation and then also the petition comes within limitation. 8. In alternate, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if the Court finds that the petition is barred by limitation then the delay should be condoned. For this purpose, the petitioner has adopted the same line of argument as stated in para 4 above. It is submitted that the petitioner was diligently contesting the case but due to accident of his son and his engagement with his treatment and further shifting to Ratlam from the village and lack of information from the counsel, he could not appear before the trial Court. As the sufficient cause had been shown for non appearance, the ex parte decree should have been set aside. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim and others, reported in AIR 1928 Calcutta 418 and Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, reported in (1975)1 SCC 74, in which the Court has considered the effect of allowing an application for review to vacate the decree originally passed. The Court held that the decree subsequently made on the review; whether it modifies, reverses or confirms the decree originally passed is a new decree superseding the original one. The Court held that the decree subsequently made on the review; whether it modifies, reverses or confirms the decree originally passed is a new decree superseding the original one. Therefore, no appeal can lie from the decree originally passed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has been contended that in this proposition of law, the order of the first appellate Court dismissing his appeal preferred against the order of dismissal of his application filed to set aside the ex parte decree had lost its effectiveness and the same merges with the order passed in the review petition. In view of these judgments, the limitation starts from the date of the order passed in the review petition i.e. 21.9.2015 and in that case, the petition is within limitation, but the contention of the petitioner is misconceived. 11. Law laid down in both the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable when the review is allowed but in the present case the review petition filed by the petitioner is disallowed. In the case when the review is disallowed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court says in Manohar Shankar Nale and others v. Jaipalsing Shivlalsing Rajput and others [ AIR 2008 SC 429 ], that the Doctrine of merger does not apply when review petition is dismissed. Paras 11,15 and 18 of the judgement are relevant here, which reads : “11. It is also incorrect to contend that in a case of this nature, namely where a review petition was dismissed, the doctrine of merger will have any application whatsoever. It is one thing to say that the respondent was entitled to file an application for review in terms of section 114 read with Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it is another thing to say that the decree passed in favour of the respondent merged with the order dismissing the review application. Matter might have been different, if the review application had been allowed either wholly or in part in terms whereof an application for execution of the decree could have been filed only in terms of the modified decree. It is not the contention of the respondent that any order of stay was passed in the review application. There was, thus, no bar in proceeding with the execution case. 15. It is not the contention of the respondent that any order of stay was passed in the review application. There was, thus, no bar in proceeding with the execution case. 15. The order of purported stay passed by this Court in terms of its Order dated 21.3.1988 is also of no assistance to the plaintiff-decree holder. The special leave petition was filed only against the Order dated 1.7.1985 refusing to review its judgment and decree dated 2.9.1983. The stay of operation of the Order dated 1.7.1985 for all intent and purport was meaningless as the review petition already stood dismissed. 18. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the executing Court as well as the High Court committed a manifest error in opining that the execution petition was not barred by limitation. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside with costs. Counsel fee quantified at Rs.5,000/-.”� 12. Thus, the argument regarding merger of the order dismissing the miscellaneous appeal with the one passed in the review petition fails. 13. For exclusion of time spent in judicial proceedings, it is necessary to establish that the matter is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Necessary requirements to attract the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act are considered in Zafar Khan and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others [ AIR 1985 SC 39 ]. Para 11 of the judgment reads : 11. In order to attract the application of section 14(1), the parties seeking its benefit must satisfy the Court that : (1) that the party as the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence; (ii) that the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and (iii) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It may be assumed that the earlier proceeding under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a civil proceeding for the purpose of section 14. It may be assumed that the earlier proceeding under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a civil proceeding for the purpose of section 14. It may as well be assumed in favour of the appellants that they were prosecuting the same with due diligence and in good faith, as they relentlessly carried the proceeding up to the High Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. The first of the aforementioned three cumulative conditions can be said to have been satisfied. 14. In para 14, the Court considered the requirement of lack of jurisdiction and also explained the ‘other cause of like nature’. The Court has held that “Cause of like nature” has to be read ejusdem generis with expression "defect of jurisdiction". Para 14 reads thus : “14. The next limb of the submission was that as in the former proceeding restitution was refused on the ground that in the proceeding under the 1953 Act the land in dispute was allotted to the respondents and the allotment had become final, it can safely be said that the proceeding failed on account of a cause of like nature such as defect of jurisdiction and the appellants would be entitled to exclude the time spent in that proceeding while computing the period of limitation in the suit. It is true that where the expression as A whole reads from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it, the expression cause of a like nature' will have to be read ejusdem generis with the expression ‘defect of jurisdiction.’ So construed the expression 'other cause of a like nature' must be so interpreted as to convey something analogous to the preceding words 'from defect of jurisdiction.' The defect of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter as the Court is incompetent to entertain the proceeding. The proceeding may as well fail for some other defect. Not all such defects can be said to be analogous to defect of jurisdiction. The proceeding may as well fail for some other defect. Not all such defects can be said to be analogous to defect of jurisdiction. Therefore the expression 'other cause of a like nature' on which some light is shed by the Explanation (C) to section 14 which provides "misjoinder of parties or causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of like nature with defect of jurisdiction," must take its colour and content from the just preceding expression, 'defect of jurisdiction.' Prima facie it appears that there must be some preliminary objection which if it succeeds, the Court would be incompetent to entertain the proceeding on merits, such defect could be said to be of the like nature' as defect of jurisdiction. Conversely if the party seeking benefit of the provision of section 14 failed to get the relief in earlier proceeding not with regard to anything connected with the jurisdiction of the Court or some other defect of a like nature, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section 14. Where therefore, the party failed in the earlier proceeding on merits and not on defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. See India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh [ (1971) 2 SCR 397 : ( AIR 1971 SC 2313 )].”� 15. The Court further held in para 15 of the judgment that : “15. The appellants failed in the earlier proceeding not on the ground that the authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application nor on the ground that there was any other defect of a like nature, but on merits inasmuch as the authorities and the High Court held that in view of the decision of the authorities under 1963 Act, the appellants are not entitled to restitution. That was the decision on merits of the dispute and the appellants' application was rejected. Therefore, the High Court rightly declined to grant benefit of the provision of section 14 of the Limitation Act to the appellants.” 16. That was the decision on merits of the dispute and the appellants' application was rejected. Therefore, the High Court rightly declined to grant benefit of the provision of section 14 of the Limitation Act to the appellants.” 16. While holding that prosecuting the previous proceedings in good faith is a pre-condition for application of section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deena (dead) through LRs v. Bharat Singh (dead) through LRs, reported in AIR 2002 SC 276, has held that the expression 'good faith' as used in section 14 of the Limitation Act means “exercise of due care and attention”. In the context of section 14 expression 'good faith' qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the Court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. The Court has held that dismissal of suit for non-joinder of proper parties does not attract section 14. 17. Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Pratap singh Chauhan v. M/s. Onida Savak Ltd. etc., reported in AIR 2003 Delhi 252, held that time spent in prosecuting winding up petition cannot be excluded in computing limitation when dismissal of winding up petition was on merit and not on ground of defect in jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. 18. In Bimal Kumar and another v. Shakuntala Debi and others [ AIR 2012 SC 1586 ], it is held that in a case where ex parte final partition decree passed in terms of compromise but the party set ex parte filing second suit for partition and to declare earlier ex parte decree as null and void, no order staying operation of earlier decree passed in suit or in appeal, the time spent in second suit or in appeal against its dismissal cannot be excluded. Para 35 of the judgment is relevant here, which reads : “35. In the case at hand, the compromise decree had the status of a final decree. The latter suit filed by the appellants was for partition and declaring the ex parte compromise decree as null and void. As has already been stated, there was no stay of the earlier judgment or any proceedings emanating therefrom. In the absence of any interdiction from any Court, the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree. The latter suit filed by the appellants was for partition and declaring the ex parte compromise decree as null and void. As has already been stated, there was no stay of the earlier judgment or any proceedings emanating therefrom. In the absence of any interdiction from any Court, the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree. It needs no special emphasis to state that there was no impediment or disability in the way of the respondents to execute the decree but the same was not done. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the initiation of execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation. Thus analyzed, the reasons ascribed by the learned single Judge are absolutely unsustainable. The period of limitation stipulated under Article 136 of the Act could not have been condoned as has been so presumed by the learned Single Judge. The reliance placed on the decision in Bharti Devi ( AIR 2010 Jhar 10 ) (supra), is totally misconceived inasmuch as in the said case, the execution proceeding was initiated for permanent injunction. No exception can be taken to the same and, therefore, reliance placed on the said decision is misconceived.”� 19. There is no dispute that the review petition was dismissed on merits and not due to lack of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to get any benefit on this ground. 20. The petitioner has not filed any document to support his contention that during the pendency of the original civil suit his son met with an accident or he engrossed with his treatment for next two years. He forced to left his village and shifted to Ratlam due to some compelling circumstances. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, financial condition of the petitioner has no relevancy and this also does not earns any credence that the council did not inform the petitioner about the proceedings of the case. Both the Courts below have found no force in these contentions. Before me also, nothing is there to believe that the petitioner was prevented to participate in the proceedings of the original civil suit for the aforesaid reasons or for any other sufficient cause. Therefore, neither good or sufficient cause to condone the delay or to set aside the order passed by the learned Court below is made out. 21. Before me also, nothing is there to believe that the petitioner was prevented to participate in the proceedings of the original civil suit for the aforesaid reasons or for any other sufficient cause. Therefore, neither good or sufficient cause to condone the delay or to set aside the order passed by the learned Court below is made out. 21. In the result, it is very much clear that the doctrine of merger is not applicable in the present case. The time spent in the proceedings of the review petition cannot be excluded in computing the limitation and no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner in the present petition. Therefore, the I.A. No.8574/2015 and also the present petition having lack of merits, deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed hereby.