ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, State, respondent no. 6, respondent no. 7, respondent no. 8, respondent no. 9 and respondent no. 10. 2. The petitioner, who was elected as Chairman of the Managing Committee of Purnea District Central Co-operative Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bank’) has moved this Court for quashing of the order dated 15.12.2016/10.03.2017 passed by the respondent no. 3 in Review Petition Case No. 389 of 2016 contained in Memo No. 217/RL dated 10.03.2017 by which the nomination of the petitioner for election to the post of Chairman has been rejected and the respondent no. 7 has been declared to be elected to such post. 3. The matter has been heard at length on a number of occasions and in view of the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 yesterday, the matter was also heard on such preliminary objection. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent on. 7 submitted that the writ petition suffers from suppression of material facts. In support of his contention, he referred to the letter written by the Managing Director of the Bank to the Branch Manager, Araria Branch dated 28.11.2012, asking him to show cause with regard to issuing of ‘No Dues Certificate’ in favour of the Gayari Sisouna Primary Agricultural Credit Society (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PACS’) as on 12.11.2012, despite there being dues against it. Learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to letter of the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Purnea Division, Purnea dated 10.08.2013, written to the petitioner enclosing the audit report dated 28.06.2013 by the District Audit Officer, Co-operative Societies, Purnea in which it was stated that on 12.11.2012, there were dues against the PACS. Learned counsel further drew the attention of the Court to the letter of the Managing Director of the Bank addressed to the District Returning Officer (Co-operative Societies)-cum-District Magistrate, Purnea dated 05.09.2013, by which he has sent his report through the District Magistrate for being sent to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar, Patna as was asked for. Learned counsel submitted that in paragraph no. Learned counsel submitted that in paragraph no. 22 of the writ petition, it has been stated about filing of writ petition against the order passed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies on 30.07.2013 in Election Dispute Case No. 04 of 2013, but no details have been given with regard to the said case as also what was the final result of the writ petition. Learned counsel submitted that all these facts being in the knowledge of the petitioner and not brought on record in the present writ petition, there is suppression on the part of the writ petitioner and the writ petition should be dismissed on this ground alone. For such proposition, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.D. Sharma v. SAIL reported as (2008) 12 SCC 481, the relevant being at paragraphs no. 34, 35, 38, 39 and 52. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the point of maintainability and submissions made by the respondent no. 7 are misconceived. Learned counsel submitted that the writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 15.12.2016/10.03.2017, and since the report of the District Audit Officer dated 28.06.2013 has not been referred to in the impugned order, he was not required to bring the same on record and thus, there cannot be any question of suppression on his part. Learned counsel further submitted that his main point for consideration before this Court is the fact that even when on 10.11.2016, the next date was fixed for 07.02.2017, in the presence of all concerned, on 05.12.2016 the respondent no. 7 had filed a petition before the Registrar in Review Petition No. 389 of 2016, which was directed to be put up on 15.12.2016, but no notice was ever given to the petitioner relating to such preponing of the date and on such date i.e., 15.12.2016, a full hearing was done and order was reserved with liberty to the parties to submit written argument and when this order of 15.12.2016 was known to the petitioner, he submitted a written argument in which categorically it has been stated that the preponing of the date from 07.02.2017 to 15.12.2016 was never communicated or known to the petitioner. He submitted that in view of the fact that the challenge is purely on a legal basis, the facts which are not required to be pleaded or which have not been noticed in the order impugned, are not required to be brought on record, and in any view of the matter, it cannot amount to suppression of material facts which would entail the dismissal of the writ petition itself. For such proposition, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana reported as A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2181, the relevant being at paragraph no. 13. 6. Having considered the rival contentions, this Court finds no merit in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent no. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 of material facts not having been pleaded or brought on record in the writ petition, the same was not required, as the order impugned does not refer to such documents. Thus, in the considered opinion of the Court, there cannot be any case of suppression of material facts so as to dismiss the writ petition and, thus, the preliminary objection is rejected. 7. Having disposed off the initial point of maintainability, the matter was again considered on merits, especially in view of learned counsel for the petitioner renewing his prayer for interim stay. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned dated 15.12.2016/10.03.2017 passed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar, Patna in Review Petition Case No. 389 of 2016, arising out of Election Dispute Case No. 04 of 2013 and Election Dispute Case No. 18 of 2013, as contained in Memo No. 217/RL dated 10.03.2017, is unsustainable in law. It was submitted that initially the respondent no. 7 had filed Election Dispute Case No. 04 of 2013 and thereafter the respondent no. 8 had also filed Election Dispute Case No. 18 of 2013, in which the petitioner as well as the respondent no. 9 were respondents and the case was finally dismissed by order dated 10.05.2016/28.06.2016. Learned counsel submitted that thereafter the Review Petition Case No. 389 of 2016 was filed by the respondents no. 7 and 8 in which the impugned order has been passed. Learned counsel submitted that the Review Petition itself was not maintainable, for the reason that respondent no. 9 were respondents and the case was finally dismissed by order dated 10.05.2016/28.06.2016. Learned counsel submitted that thereafter the Review Petition Case No. 389 of 2016 was filed by the respondents no. 7 and 8 in which the impugned order has been passed. Learned counsel submitted that the Review Petition itself was not maintainable, for the reason that respondent no. 9, who was a party in the original Election Dispute cases, was not made party in the Review Petition and thus, the Review Petition suffers from non joinder of necessary party, on which ground alone the review petition should have been dismissed at the threshold. Learned counsel submitted that even the power of review, which may be available to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies under Section 48(7) of the Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), the same is subject to the parameters of Review under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’). Learned counsel submitted that under the garb of Review, the Registrar has reheard the matter and has changed his opinion on merits, which is beyond jurisdiction and patently illegal. In support of such contention, learned counsel submitted that the sole issue on which the Review Petition has been allowed is that on 12.11.2012, when a No Dues Certificate was issued in favour of the PACS of the petitioner, whether it was in fact having no dues or the certificate was erroneous, in the original order passed in the Election Dispute Cases dated 10.05.2016/28.06.2016, this issue with regard to the controversy of No Dues Certificate having been issued by the Branch Incharge, has been considered and the Registrar has held in favour of the petitioner holding that Mr. Indra Kant Yadav was empowered by the Managing Director of the Bank to issue such certificate, but quite surprisingly, in the order impugned, a completely opposite view has been taken and it has been held that the same was incorrect. Learned counsel further submitted that this is not the scope of review as it is limited to the grounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code, which are not satisfied in the present case. Learned counsel further submitted that this is not the scope of review as it is limited to the grounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code, which are not satisfied in the present case. Learned counsel further submitted that once a No Dues Certificate has been issued, rightly or wrongly, and the same not being challenged or found to be forged or fabricated, the matter as to whether such certificate was rightly or correctly issued, cannot be the subject matter of an Election Dispute as has been consistently held by this Court. For such proposition, he relied upon a decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Dhyan Yadav vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. dated 08.02.2016 in C.W.J.C. No. 10137 of 2015, in which has been categorically held that the issue of being a defaulter has to be contested before the proper forum by filing an appropriate application with such prayer, and the same not have been done, the election petitioner cannot take a short route to question the election of the writ petitioner in an election dispute by taking recourse to the disqualification clause present in Rule 23(1) of the Bihar Cooperative Societies Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) and further, an order of disqualification has to be passed in a duly constituted proceeding and not in an election dispute and until such time any such opinion is recorded by the appropriate authority in a duly constituted proceeding, the returned candidate cannot be ousted. He submitted that the Court has held that the election petition itself was not maintainable for it raises an electoral dispute while seeking an answer on disqualification of membership and that the election petitioner was knocking a wrong forum for the nature of grievance raised. Learned counsel submitted that this view has further been reiterated in the judgment dated 29.02.2016 in the case of Shiv Shankar Mahton vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. in C.W.J.C. No. 7948 of 2015. He submitted that such decisions have attained finality. Learned counsel further drew the attention of the Court to the fact that by the impugned order, not only the election of the petitioner has been set aside on such ground of disqualification due to him not representing a Society which had no dues, the Registrar has gone further and declared the respondent no. Learned counsel further drew the attention of the Court to the fact that by the impugned order, not only the election of the petitioner has been set aside on such ground of disqualification due to him not representing a Society which had no dues, the Registrar has gone further and declared the respondent no. 7 to be duly elected, being the runner up, exercising power under Section 13(1)(b) of the Bihar State Election Authority Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2008 Act’). Learned counsel submitted that for doing so, the Registrar had to first come to a finding that the votes obtained by the petitioner were obtained through corrupt practice. He drew the attention of the Court to Section 14 of the 2008 Act, which defines corrupt practice and submitted that the present situation is not covered under such provision. Learned counsel submitted that even if the petitioner had been disqualified, the electors who had voted for him, their votes cannot be cancelled or not taken into account, as there is no fault or laches on their part and the only option available was to direct holding of fresh election. Learned counsel submitted that there is no discussion or finding recorded relating to corrupt practice used by the petitioner and also no discussion with regard to the number of votes pulled by any of the parties, and, thus, holding the respondent no. 7 as elected, is perverse, impermissible and patently illegal. 9. The Court would only like to record that on 22.03.2017, it was noted in the order that learned counsel for the petitioner was pressing for interim order but only on account of prayer made by learned counsel for the respondent no. 7, the case was adjourned for 24.03.2017 and thereafter on 24.03.2017, learned counsel for the petitioner had assisted the Court and thereafter even learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 had argued the matter at length but due to paucity of time, the case was adjourned and was again taken up on 29.03.2017, on which day also learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 was heard at length, but again, due to paucity of time the case had to be adjourned. Today also, after learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 was heard at length, but again, due to paucity of time the case had to be adjourned. Today also, after learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 had been heard at length at the beginning of the proceedings and thereafter when learned counsel for the petitioner had concluded his arguments on merits and prayed for interim stay, the Court again asked learned counsel for the respondent no. 7, whether he would like to assist the Court further and argue anything more than what he had already done on 24.03.2017, 29.03.2017, and also today, he not only refused but walked out in a huff from the Court. The Court would like to record its deep anguish and disappointment on the conduct of learned counsel for the respondent no. 7, as, on his plea on 22.03.2017, seeking adjournment for two days, the matter was adjourned for 24.03.2017 and on that day, he had assisted the Court at length on the entire merits of the matter and even on 29.03.2017, he had extensively argued and even today he had supplemented his argument and despite that, conducting himself in the manner he has done, is most unfortunate. However, the Court, in the interest of the Institution would not like to dwell on this aspect. The Court may also indicate that a bulky counter affidavit, running into 116 pages, has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 7 on 23.03.2017 itself and relying on the same learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 had argued the matter on three days. In such background, the stand taken today by learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 clearly indicates that he had nothing more to add to what he had already argued, and the same is obviously with the sole objective to somehow delay the matter. The Court would not permit such delaying tactics and thus, has proceeded to consider the matter on merits. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 9 submitted that he is a neutral person, as he has been a respondent all along, and shall assist the Court on the merits of the main matter. He and learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 prayed for time to assist the Court for final disposal of the matter. However, with regard to the prayer for interim relief, they very fairly submitted that the Court may pass order as it may deem appropriate. He and learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 prayed for time to assist the Court for final disposal of the matter. However, with regard to the prayer for interim relief, they very fairly submitted that the Court may pass order as it may deem appropriate. 11. Having considered the matter, the Court, as far as the respondent no. 7 is concerned, has no hesitation to hold that a direction to declare him elected in an election dispute case, is not permissible, both in law as well as on facts. Such view stands fortified by the decisions of the Court in the cases of Ram Dhyan Yadav (supra) and Shiv Shankar Mahton (supra), which have since attained finality. Accordingly, the same is set aside. 12. Coming to the main issue of rejecting the nomination of the petitioner, in view of there being consistent decisions of the Court, which have attained finality on the issue, that the Registrar cannot upset the election on the ground of disqualification due to being a defaulter until such time there is an order of the competent authority holding a returned member of the Society as defaulter under the provisions of the Act, his election cannot be interfered with in an election dispute, this Court is inclined to grant interim stay of the remaining portion of the order impugned by which the nomination of the petitioner has been rejected leading to his ouster from the post of Chairman of the Managing Committee of the Bank. 13. The Court, for the purposes of considering the case for interim order, has also been persuaded by the unrebutted and admitted position that in the presence of the parties on 28.10.2016, the next date was fixed for 10.11.2016, and on that day the matter was adjourned for 07.02.2017, but behind the back of the petitioner, on a petition filed by the respondent no. 7 on 05.12.2016, the date was preponed to 15.12.2016, and on which day the matter was heard ex-parte and order reserved, with the only liberty to the parties to file their written statement. Moreover, the contention of there being no notice of preponement of the date from 07.02.2017 to 15.12.2016, which has specifically been pleaded by the petitioner in his written argument before the Registrar and also in the present writ petition, has not been rebutted in the counter affidavit of the respondent no. 7. 14. Moreover, the contention of there being no notice of preponement of the date from 07.02.2017 to 15.12.2016, which has specifically been pleaded by the petitioner in his written argument before the Registrar and also in the present writ petition, has not been rebutted in the counter affidavit of the respondent no. 7. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, there shall be ad interim stay of the remaining part of the order impugned by which the nomination of the petitioner has been rejected. 15. As prayed for by learned counsel for the respondents no. 8 and 9, the matter be listed on 18th April, 2017 among the top five cases, with a view to its final disposal. 16. Learned counsel for the State may return the sealed records to the office of the respondent no. 3, but the seal shall not be broken till the disposal of this case.