JUDGMENT Ritu Raj Awasthi, J. -- Mr. Rohit Jaiswal, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondents no.1 to 8 and 15. Respondents no.1 to 8 and 15 are legal heirs of original landlord, as such, contesting respondents are duly represented. 2. Respondents no.9 to 14 are the legal heirs of original tenant Ramzan and they were the defendants in regular suit filed by the respondents and their interest is same as of the appellant, as such, no notice is required to be issued to them. Notices to them are hereby dispensed. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for respondents no.1 to 8 and 15. 4. This second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 27.10.2016, passed by Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Court No.1, Lucknow in Regular Civil Appeal No.4400115 of 2008; Smt. Ramzan (dead) and another Vs. Kishan Lal Sahu (dead) and another as well as against the judgment and decree dated 16.04.2008 passed by IIIrd Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.35, Lucknow in Regular Suit No.202 of 1992; Ram Charan Sahu (dead) and another Vs. Smt. Ramzan and others. 5. As per given facts, one Kunni Shah had let out the land situated in Mohalla Beharipur, Saadatganj, Lucknow on the monthly rent of Rs.2/- with permission to raise the construction to one Mr. Ramzan-deceased father of the appellant. Late Ramzan had raised permanent construction of one room and tin shed over the land in question for carrying out the business of straw and woods etc. 6. The legal heirs of Kunni Shah (original landlord) i.e. Om Prakash Sahu and others filed a suit for ejectment against late Ramzan, who was subsequently substituted by his legal heirs in regular suit. The appellant-defendants had filed their written statement. The suit filed by the respondents was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 16.4.2008. Thereafter the appellant filed first appeal before the learned District Judge which was transferred to the Court of Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Court No.1, Lucknow and was decided by the impugned judgment and decree. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the learned Trial Court has grossly erred in presuming the service of notice on the defendants and thereafter proceeding to decide the suit in favour of plaintiffs. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the learned Trial Court has grossly erred in presuming the service of notice on the defendants and thereafter proceeding to decide the suit in favour of plaintiffs. It is submitted that under Section 27 of General Clauses Act the service on defendants was not sufficient and the findings of learned Trial Court in this regard are patently wrong and illegal. It is also contended that the alleged construction over land in question was raised with due permission from the original landlord i.e. Kunni Shah and, as such, the defendants were entitled to get the benefit of Section 29-A of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Learned Trial Court has not properly considered the evidence placed on record to prove that said construction was made with the permission of the landlord. It is also contended that learned first appellate court has not framed points of determination and, as such, committed manifest illegality in deciding the appeal on merit. 8. Mr. Shesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the learned Trial Court has granted the relief of demolition in the suit filed by respondents although no Court fees was paid for the decree of demolition. 9. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the records. 10. The suit filed before the learned Trial Court was subsequently amended and certain reliefs were also added as it was alleged that during pendency of the suit the appellant-defendants had raised certain construction over the land in question. 11. Learned Trial Court while deciding the suit had framed certain issues, translation of which are reproduced as under: - "1. Whether at present the property in dispute is an open land or there is any construction over it, as has been stated in the plaint. 2. Whether on property in dispute, defendant no.1 and husband and father of defendant no.3 have raised any permanent construction on their expenses, with the consent of father of plaintiff, due to which the protection of Section 29-A of U.P. Act No.13, year 1972 is available to the defendants? 3. Whether the plaintiff has a right to get demolished the construction made by the aforesaid defendant (s) on the spot in question and to get removed the tin shed kept over it? 4. 3. Whether the plaintiff has a right to get demolished the construction made by the aforesaid defendant (s) on the spot in question and to get removed the tin shed kept over it? 4. Whether the valuation of the suit has been done lesser and the received court fees is insufficient? 5. Whether the tenancy of the defendants has been ended by the legal notice which is served upon them jointly? 6. Whether the plaint is defective due to non-joining of necessary parties, as has been stated in Section 14 of the written statement? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any other relief? 8. Whether Sri Ram Charan Sahu had right to execute the will or not? 9. Whether any construction has been made by the defendants at the southern side of the property in dispute during pendency of the case, as has been stated in para 8 (A) of the plaint? 10. Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the matter?" For consideration of submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, issue nos.1 to 3 and 5 are relevant. 12. Learned Trial Court while deciding issue no.1 has come to conclusion that it is the admitted fact as the appellant-defendants have admitted that they are in possession over the land in question on the basis of a tenancy and have raised certain construction, as such, issue no.1 is decided in favour of the plaintiff. 13. So far as issue nos.2 and 3 are concerned, learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence on record has come to conclusion that the appellants have failed to furnish any cogent evidence to show that the alleged construction was raised with due permission from the landlord. In this regard the learned Trial Court has opined that DW-1 and DW-2 are the interested witnesses and therefore cannot be relied. So far as DW-3-Munna Lal is concerned, he has failed to establish that the alleged construction was raised with prior permission from the landlord. He has admitted in his cross-examination that at the time when the tenancy over the land in question was initiated it was an open land and construction has been raised subsequently. He has not been able to show that any permission in this regard was obtained from the then landlord Kunni Shah. He has admitted in his cross-examination that at the time when the tenancy over the land in question was initiated it was an open land and construction has been raised subsequently. He has not been able to show that any permission in this regard was obtained from the then landlord Kunni Shah. There is nothing on record to indicate that any such permission was granted by Kunni Shah or his legal heirs to permit the appellant-defendants to raise such construction. The First Appellate Court in this regard has discussed the issue in question in detail and has given its own finding and thereby has agreed with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court. The findings recorded by learned Trial Court as well as learned first appellate court in this regard are based on cogent reasons and do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality, therefore, the contention raised by the appellant's counsel has no force. 14. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there was no sufficient service of notice of termination of tenancy is concerned, the learned Trial Court while deciding issue no.5 in this regard has recorded in its finding that notice to the legal heirs of original tenant late Ramzan was sent by registered post. The learned Trial Court has rightly observed that in case notice is served to one of legal heirs of original tenant the service of notice to other legal heirs would be deemed sufficient. Learned Trial Court in its finding has recorded that the appellant-defendants have admitted that name of all the legal heirs of original tenant were not incorrect, in fact, the name of two brothers and one sister were wrongly mentioned. Learned Trial Court while deciding issue no.5 has examined the person who had sent registered postal notice to the appellant-defendants and has acknowledged the receipts received by the postal department. The learned Trial Court has rightly come to conclusion that since the acknowledgment receipt received from the postal department had the endorsement that notice has been refused, the service of notice on respondents shall be deemed sufficient. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings recorded by learned Trial Court in this regard. 15. The learned Trial Court has rightly come to conclusion that since the acknowledgment receipt received from the postal department had the endorsement that notice has been refused, the service of notice on respondents shall be deemed sufficient. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings recorded by learned Trial Court in this regard. 15. Section 27 of General Clauses Act provides where any Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. 16. In the findings recorded by learned Trial Court, it has come that the address mentioned in the notice is the same as mentioned in the suit with respect to land in question. The appellant-defendants have admitted their possession over the land in question and the notices were sent by registered post, as such, it is but evident that they were duly served. Learned first appellate court has given its own reasons while coming to conclusion that the findings recorded by learned trial court are just and proper, as such, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings recorded by Courts below. 17. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent-plaintiff had made prayer for decree of demolition without paying any Court fees in this regard and as such the said relief cannot be granted by learned Trial Court is concerned, suffice is to observe that the learned Trial Court while decreeing the suit has issued the decree for ejectment and has directed the appellant-defendants to hand over the possession of the land in question after removing the construction raised by them. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the orders passed by learned Trial Court. 18. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the orders passed by learned Trial Court. 18. In view of above, I am of the considered view that the Courts below have duly considered the contentions raised by parties' counsel and by giving their findings have decided the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff and the appeal filed by present appellant. There are concurrent findings of both the Courts below which do not require any interference by this Court. The second appeal being devoid of any substantial question of law is dismissed at the admission stage.