Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 428 (HP)

Dorjee Gyaltson @ Abhuji v. Private Office His Holiness the Dalai Lama

2017-04-27

AJAY MOHAN GOEL

body2017
JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. 1. By way of this appeal, the appellants/plaintiffs have challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No. 157-D/05, dated 18.08.2007, vide which learned appellate Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellants, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-II, Dharamshala in RBT CS 223/99/97, dated 08.07.2005, whereby learned trial Court dismissed the suit for declaration filed by the present appellants/plaintiffs before it. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present case are that the appellants/plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiffs”) filed a suit for declaration before the learned trial Court to the effect that land comprised in Khata No. 177 min, Khatauni No. 336 min, Khasra No. 1976/1902, measuring 1-61-20 hectares as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93, situated in Up Mahal McLeodganj, Upper Dharamshala, District Kangra was recorded in ownership and possession of defendant No. 2. According to the plaintiffs, an agreement dated 30.10.1990 was entered into between defendant No. 2 and late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya, as per which, land measuring 5 ½ marlas, i.e., about 100 sq. mtrs. was agreed to be conveyed to Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi. According to the plaintiffs, defendant No. 2 had already parted the possession of 5 ½ marlas of land and a three storeyed building known as “K.T. International Guest House” stood constructed upon the same by Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and it was plaintiff No. 1, who had spent most of the money out of love and affection for his wife Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya, though ownership of the said property was maintained in the name of Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi. According to plaintiffs, Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi was married to plaintiff No. 1 on 09.06.1983 under the Special Marriage Act, which was duly registered before the District Marriage Officer, Agra. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No. 1 and Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi lived as husband and wife till the death of the latter and plaintiff No. 2 was their adopted son. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No. 1 and Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi lived as husband and wife till the death of the latter and plaintiff No. 2 was their adopted son. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi was residing in the ground floor of K.T. International Guest House, which was still occupied by the plaintiffs. Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi was suffering from T.B. and other complications and after a prolonged illness, she expired on 07.09.1996 at Dehradun. After her death, certain officials from the office of defendant No. 1 started demanding complete vacation of the suit property, i.e., K.T. International Guest House building on the ground that Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi had bequeathed the said Guest House building to defendant No. 1 as per Will dated 25.03.1995, purported to have been executed by Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi in favour of defendant No. 1. According to the plaintiffs, Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi had never executed any such Will and she in fact was ailing for quite some time and on 25.03.1995 was undergoing treatment in Tibetan Delek Hospital, Dharamshala as an indoor patient and was not fit either physically or mentally to have had executed the so called Will dated 25.03.1995. It was further the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No. 1 was himself present in the hospital looking after his wife and that he was asked to sign a document which was written in English and that he was told that it was customary for Tibetans to gift or bequeath some part of their moveable assets as a token of offering to His Holiness the Dali Lama and that his wife was asked to agree to the said tradition. Further, according to the plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 1 was conversant with Tibetan language and could speak and understand Hindi, but he had absolutely no knowledge and education in English. However, believing that document concerned was only an offer or donation of some part of cash to revered His Holiness the Dalai Lama, plaintiff No. 1 signed the same. Further, according to the plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 1 was conversant with Tibetan language and could speak and understand Hindi, but he had absolutely no knowledge and education in English. However, believing that document concerned was only an offer or donation of some part of cash to revered His Holiness the Dalai Lama, plaintiff No. 1 signed the same. According to the plaintiffs, after they obtained copy of Will dated 25.03.1995, they realized that officials of defendant No. 1 had misrepresented to plaintiff No. 1 and his late wife and got the same prepared fraudulently at the time when his wife was lying seriously sick in the hospital and they (defendant No. 1) took advantage of the fact that they (plaintiff No. 1 and his wife) were illiterate and were unable to understand and read the contents of the alleged Will. According to the plaintiffs, thumb impressions of Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi were obtained when she was in a state of delirium and was unable to understand as to what was going on. On these bases, it was contended by the plaintiffs that the Will was not a validly executed document and was prepared collusively, fraudulently and by misrepresentation and that plaintiffs were not bound by the said Will. On these bases, plaintiffs filed the suit praying for a decree of declaration that they were legal heirs and successors to the estate of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and were entitled to inherit the moveable property known as K.T. International Guest House and that defendant No. 1 had no right or title in the suit property and any Will or bequest purported to have been executed in favour of defendant No. 1 was not legal or valid and that Will, if any, was the result of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion and collusion and not binding upon the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also prayed that decree of permanent injunction be passed against defendant No. 1 restraining defendant No. 1, its officials, agents and servants etc. from proclaiming defendant No. 1 as owner of suit property in any manner. 3. The suit so filed by the plaintiffs was contested by the defendants. Defendants No. 1 and 3 filed a joint written statement, whereas defendant No. 1 filed a separate written statement. from proclaiming defendant No. 1 as owner of suit property in any manner. 3. The suit so filed by the plaintiffs was contested by the defendants. Defendants No. 1 and 3 filed a joint written statement, whereas defendant No. 1 filed a separate written statement. Defendants No. 1 and 3 resisted the suit on the grounds that Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi was not the wife of plaintiff No. 1 and no marriage in fact had taken place between Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and plaintiff No. 1. As per defendants No. 1 and 3, International Guest House was constructed by Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and it was denied by the said defendants that plaintiff No. 1 had spent any amount on the construction of the said Guest House on account of alleged love and affection for his alleged wife. It was further mentioned in the written statement by defendants No. 1 and 3 that the name of owner of International Guest House was Kalsong Tsomo and not Maya Devi, as she never used the name “Maya Devi”. The factum of marriage of plaintiff No. 1 with Kalsong Tsomo was denied. Correctness of marriage certificate was also denied. The factum of plaintiff No. 1 and Kalsong Tsomo having lived together as husband and wife till the death of Kalsong Tsomo was also denied. The factum of plaintiff No. 2 being adopted son of late Kalsong Tsomo was also denied. Defendants No. 1 to 3 denied that plaintiffs were natural legal heirs to the estate of Kalsong Tsomo or that after the death of Kalsong Tsomo, they were entitled to inherit the said property. It was further the stand of defendants No. 1 and 3 that after the death of Kalsong Tsomo, ownership and possession of International Guest House passed over to defendant No. 1, who had rented out the same to defendant No. 3. It was further the case of defendants No. 1 and 3 that the contention of the plaintiffs that no Will was executed by Kalsong Tsomo was incorrect. According to the said defendants, in fact plaintiff No. 1 was a marginal witness to the Will so executed by Kalsong Tsomo dated 25.03.1995. Defendants No. 1 and 3 denied that Kalsong Tsomo was ailing on 25.03.1995 or was not in a fit condition physically or mentally to have had executed any Will. According to the said defendants, in fact plaintiff No. 1 was a marginal witness to the Will so executed by Kalsong Tsomo dated 25.03.1995. Defendants No. 1 and 3 denied that Kalsong Tsomo was ailing on 25.03.1995 or was not in a fit condition physically or mentally to have had executed any Will. Said defendants also denied that plaintiff No. 1 was called to sign a document, which purportedly was by way of a custom to gift some part of the property to the revered Guru, as alleged. According to defendants No. 1 and 3, Kalsong Tsomo was mentally and physically fit at the time when she executed the Will, to which plaintiff No. 1 was one of the signatories, as marginal witness. According to defendants No. 1 and 3, Kalsong Tsomo had put her thumb impression over the Will after fully understanding the contents of the same and thereafter marginal witness plaintiff No. 1 had appended his signatures and the Will in issue was duly registered. The factum of thumb impression of Kalsong Tsomo having been obtained when she was in a state of delirium and was not in a position to understand as to what was going on, was also denied. It was also denied that the Will was not a validly executed document or that the same was prepared as a result of collusiveness, fraud or misrepresentation. On these bases, defendants No. 1 and 3 denied the claim of the plaintiffs. 4. Defendant No. 2 by way of a separate written statement contested the case as was set up by the plaintiffs. Said defendant also denied that Kalsong Tsomo’s other name was Maya Devi or that plaintiff No. 1 spent money for the construction of the suit property. According to defendant No. 2, plaintiff No. 1 was never married to Kalsong Tsomo and Kalsong Tsomo spent her own money on the construction of the Guest House. 5. By way of replication, the plaintiffs reiterated their stand taken in the plaint. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether Smt. Kalsong Tsomo @ Maya Devi is legally wedded wife of plaintiff No. 1? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the natural heirs and successors of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and are entitled to succeed and inherit the suit property? OPP 3. Whether Smt. Kalsong Tsomo @ Maya Devi is legally wedded wife of plaintiff No. 1? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the natural heirs and successors of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and are entitled to succeed and inherit the suit property? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff No. 2 is adopted son of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo @ Maya Devi and plaintiff No. 1? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP 5. Whether Smt. Kalsong Tsomo @ Maya Devi executed a Registered Will dated 25.03.1995 in favour of the defendant No. 1? If so, its effect? OPD1 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 7. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to file the present suit? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit by his act and conduct? OPD 9. Whether the provision of O.32 R.1 CPC is not complied with? OPD. 10. Relief. 7. On the basis of evidence adduced by the respective parties in support of their respective claims, the following findings were returned by learned trial Court on the issues so framed: “Issue No. 1: No. Issue No. 2: No. Issue No. 3: No. Issue No. 4: No. Issue No. 5: Yes. Issue No. 6: Yes. Issue No. 7: No. Issue No. 8: No. Issue No. 9: No. Relief: The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed as per operative portion of this judgment. Relief: The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed as per operative portion of this judgment. 8. Learned trial Court thus dismissed the suit so filed by the plaintiffs by holding that Kalsong Tsomo was not the legally wedded wife of plaintiff No. 1 and that plaintiffs were not the natural heirs and successors of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiff No. 2 was not the adopted son of late Smt. Kalsong Tsomo alias Maya Devi and plaintiff No. 1 and that Smt. Kalsong Tsomo had executed a valid registered Will dated 25.03.1995 in favour of defendant No. 1. While arriving at the said conclusion, it was held by the learned trial Court that perusal of Marriage Certificate Ex.PY demonstrated that marriage under the Special Marriage Act took place on 09.06.1983 between Dorjee Gyaltson and one Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi. While arriving at the said conclusion, it was held by the learned trial Court that perusal of Marriage Certificate Ex.PY demonstrated that marriage under the Special Marriage Act took place on 09.06.1983 between Dorjee Gyaltson and one Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi. Learned trial Court held that letter issued by District Marriage Officer, Agra Ex. PX revealed that marriage was solemnized between Dorjee Gyaltson and Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi on 9.6.83. It further held that report of Local Commissioner Ex. PZ demonstrated that marriage was solemnized between Dorjee Gyaltson and Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi. Learned trial Court held that opening line of Ex. DW2/A demonstrated that the name of the testator was “Kalsong Tsomo” and it was written therein “ Kalsong Tsomo, daughter of late Tsultrim Dakpa, aged 60 years, Kalsong Tsomo International Guest House, Jogibara Road, Macleodganj Dharamshala.” Learned trial Court held that onus to prove the fact that Kalsong Tsomo and Kalsong Chammo was one and the same person was upon the plaintiffs. It further held that plaintiff No. 1 contended that his marriage was solemnized with Kalsong Tsomo on 9.6.1993, but Ex. Py revealed that marriage of Dorjee Gyaltson was solemnized with one Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi. Learned trial Court held that there was nothing on record to demonstrate that Kalsong Tsomo was ever known as Maya Devi. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that plaintiffs could not take any benefit from Ex. PY as well as Ex. PX and the report of the Local Commissioner Ex. PS, which demonstrated that marriage was solemnized in the year 1983 between plaintiff No. 1 and Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi and not between him and Kalsong Tsomo. Learned trial Court further held that even as per plaintiff No. 1, his marriage was solemnized with Kalsong Tsomo in the year 1983. Learned trial Court held that admittedly the land in issue was purchased by Kalsong Tsomo in the year 1977. It further held that when marriage even as per plaintiff No. 1 was solemnized between him and Kalsong Tsomo in the year 1983, it could not be understood as to how plaintiff No. 1 was stating that he had met the expenses for purchase of land which was purchased by deceased Kalsong Tsomo and was being possessed by her since the year 1977. It was further held by the learned trial Court that plaintiff No.1 had failed to establish on record that he and deceased Kalsong Tsomo lived as husband and wife since 1983 till her death. Learned trial Court held that plaintiff had not examined any witness to prove this fact. It was also held by learned trial Court that whereas as per plaintiff No. 1, the age of his deceased wife at the time of her death was 40-42 years, but this version of his was also contrary to evidence on record, as the age of deceased in Will Ex. DW2/A was mentioned as 60 years, whereas that in prescription slips Ex. PW1/A to Ex. PW1/H was mentioned as 54 and 55 years. Learned trial Court also held that according to plaintiff No. 1, he was married with deceased owner of the suit land, who was also known as Maya Devi, whereas records demonstrated that plaintiff No. 1 was married with one Smt. Kalsong Tsomo @ Maya Devi and there was no evidence on record from where it could be inferred that deceased Kalsong Tsomo was also known by the name of Maya Devi. On these bases, it was concluded by the learned trial Court that plaintiff No. 1 had miserably failed to prove that deceased Kalsong Tsomo was his legally wedded wife. Learned trial Court also held that even the factum of plaintiff No. 2 being the adopted son of plaintiff No. 1 and deceased Smt. Kalsong Tsomo was not established on record as there was no deed regarding his adoption and further not even an iota of evidence was produced on record by plaintiff No. 1 to substantiate that plaintiff No. 2 was ever adopted by deceased Kalsong Tsomo. Learned trial Court held that there was nothing on record to demonstrate that plaintiff No. 2 was actually being given or taken in adoption by his parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with an intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption. It further held that this fact was also not proved even if it was presumed that plaintiff No. 2 was an abandoned child and his parentage was not known. It further held that this fact was also not proved even if it was presumed that plaintiff No. 2 was an abandoned child and his parentage was not known. Similarly, it was held by the learned trial Court that as plaintiffs were not able to substantiate that deceased was the legally wedded wife of plaintiff No. 1 and that she had adopted plaintiff No. 2, therefore, they could not be permitted to be the natural heirs and successors of deceased Kalsong Tsomo. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that as plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 were not natural heirs and successors of deceased Kalsong Tsomo, therefore, they had no right, title or interest over the suit property and they were not entitled to any relief of injunction against the defendants. It was further held by the learned trial Court that there was sufficient material placed on record by the defendants to prove that the Will in issue was not shrouded by any suspicious circumstance and that Will Ex. DW2/A dated 25.03.1995 was valid and genuine document and the same was duly executed by deceased Kalsong Tsomo in favour of defendant No. 1. Learned trial Court held that plaintiff No. 1 was one of the attesting witnesses to Will Ex. DW2/A. It further held that the Will was executed on 25.03.1995, i.e., in the month of March and it had come in the statement of PW-2 that his Holiness Dalai Lama has visited Delek Hospital in the month of May 2005, i.e., two months after the execution of the said Will. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to prove that the Will in issue was got executed from its testator by exercising undue influence, coercion or fraud. Learned trial Court also held that defendants had in fact successfully proved the execution of the Will and had also removed suspicious circumstances pointed out by the plaintiffs. Learned trial Court took in to account statement of DW-2 Sh. S.C. Pandit, the author of the document, who had categorically stated that the Will in issue was executed by Kalsong Tsomo of her own free volition and that the Will in issue was read over and explained to her and after admitting the contents thereof to be true, she appended her thumb impression on the same. S.C. Pandit, the author of the document, who had categorically stated that the Will in issue was executed by Kalsong Tsomo of her own free volition and that the Will in issue was read over and explained to her and after admitting the contents thereof to be true, she appended her thumb impression on the same. Learned trial Court took note of the fact that testimony of DW-3 also substantiated the factum of the same having been executed by late Kalsong Tsomo of her own free volition. On these bases, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the learned trial Court. 9. In appeal, learned appellate Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. While upholding the findings returned by the learned trial Court, it was held by the learned appellate Court that the dispute between the parties was qua the estate of deceased Kalsong Tsomo, who was owner of the suit property and case of the plaintiffs was that they were natural heirs of the deceased and on said basis, they were entitled to inherit the suit property. Learned appellate Court after taking into consideration order Ex. PY held that a perusal of the same demonstrated that marriage of Dorjee Gyaltson had taken place with Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi and there was no evidence led on record by the plaintiffs that Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi was the same lady who was also known as Kalsong Tsomo. Learned appellate Court also held that Ex. PX also demonstrated that the marriage was solemnized between Dorjee Gyaltson and Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi on 9.6.83. On these bases, it was held by the learned appellate Court that this meant that marriage of plaintiff No. 1 was solemnized with one Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi, whereas Kalsong Tosomo, daughter of Tsultrim Dakpa was altogether a different lady. Learned appellate Court held that had Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi been the same lady, i.e., Kalsong Tosomo, then plaintiffs would have had led evidence to substantiate this fact. Learned appellate Court thus held that in fact plaintiff No. 1 had failed to prove that deceased Kalsong Tsomo, daughter of Tsultrim Dakpa was his legally wedded wife. Learned appellate Court held that had Kalsong Chammo alias Maya Devi been the same lady, i.e., Kalsong Tosomo, then plaintiffs would have had led evidence to substantiate this fact. Learned appellate Court thus held that in fact plaintiff No. 1 had failed to prove that deceased Kalsong Tsomo, daughter of Tsultrim Dakpa was his legally wedded wife. It was further held by the learned appellate Court that plaintiffs had also not been able to prove that plaintiff No. 2 was in fact adopted by deceased Kalsong Tsomo as was the case put forth by the plaintiffs. Learned appellate Court held that plaintiff No. 1 in his deposition had nowhere stated as to when plaintiff No. 2 was adopted by the deceased and who actually were the parents of plaintiff No. 2, who might have given plaintiff No. 2 in favour of the deceased. It was further held by the learned appellate Court that as both the plaintiff No. 1 and the deceased were foreign nationals, therefore, the adoption deed was required to be registered and in fact learned trial Court had rightly concluded that plaintiff No. 1 was neither husband of the deceased nor plaintiff No. 2 was her adopted son. It was further held by the learned appellate Court that as far as execution of Will Ex. DW2/A was concerned, the same stood duly proved on record on the basis of the testimony of DW-2, Shri S.C. Pandit, who had deposed on oath that on 25.03.1995, one Phurbu Dorji had come to him and had taken him to Delic hospital, where Kalsong Tsomo was admitted and she had told him that she wanted to bequeath her property in favour of defendant No. 1. Learned appellate Court held that the said witness further deposed that he had noted down all the contents which were told to him by the deceased and thereafter he prepared the Will in his office and thereafter he again went to the deceased in the hospital where plaintiff No. 1 was also present. Learned appellate Court also held that in fact said witness had deposed that he had read over the contents of the Will in vernacular to the deceased and the witnesses and part of the contents which the deceased could not understood in Hindi, the same were interpreted to her by Phurbu Dorji in Tibetian language. Learned appellate Court also held that in fact said witness had deposed that he had read over the contents of the Will in vernacular to the deceased and the witnesses and part of the contents which the deceased could not understood in Hindi, the same were interpreted to her by Phurbu Dorji in Tibetian language. Learned appellate Court also held that this witness had categorically deposed that the deceased had admitted the Will to be correct and only thereafter she appended her thumb mark in the presence of the witnesses, who had subsequently signed the same in his presence and in presence of the deceased. Learned appellate Court also held that said witness had deposed that the deceased was understanding everything at that relevant time. It was further held by the learned appellate Court that there was nothing averse in the cross-examination of the said witness. It also held that the statement of Phurbu Dorji, Advocate, who entered into the witness box as DW-3 and who was also a marginal witness to Will Ex. DW2/A also substantiated that the Will in fact was executed by the testatrix in the mode and manner as was stated by DW-2. Learned appellate Court held that DW-3 had deposed in the Court that after the Will was scribed by Subhash Pandit, Advocate, he read over the contents of the same to the deceased in Hindi and part whereof was not understood by her, he (DW-3) interpreted the same in Tibetian language to her. Learned appellate Court also held that even DW-3 deposed that the deceased appended her thumb impression on the Will in his presence and in the presence of other marginal witnesses after understanding the contents of the same. On these bases, it was held by the learned appellate Court that it stood proved on record that there was no suspicious circumstance surrounding the Will and in fact the Will had been executed by its testatrix voluntarily at a time when she was of sound mind. On these bases, it was held by the learned appellate Court that it stood proved on record that there was no suspicious circumstance surrounding the Will and in fact the Will had been executed by its testatrix voluntarily at a time when she was of sound mind. Learned appellate Court further held that the contention of plaintiff No. 1 that he had spent money for the construction of K.T. International Guest House was also not worth believing, as the said witness had failed to depose as to what were the total expenses incurred in the course of the construction of the said building and from where the material of construction was procured by him and to whom the payment etc. was made. Learned appellate Court also held that plaintiff No. 1 had failed to place on record the details of money allegedly spent by him. On these bases, while upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the learned appellate Court dismissed the appeal so filed before it by the plaintiffs. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed this Regular Second Appeal, which was admitted by this Court on 05.10.2010 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the two Courts below have fallen in error in holding that marriage certificate Ex. PY does not stand connected with the testatrix? 2. Whether the execution of Will, in question, is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and finding to the contrary given by the two Courts below is not sustainable?” 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 12. I will deal with both the substantial questions of law independently. Substantial Question of Law No. 1: 1. Whether the two Courts below have fallen in error in holding that marriage certificate Ex. PY does not stand connected with the testatrix? 13. The alleged marriage certificate of plaintiff No. 1 with deceased Kalsong Tsomo is on record as Ex. PY. A perusal of the same demonstrates that this marriage certificate pertains to one Dorjee Gyaltson, son of Arik and Kasong Chammo alias Maya Devi, daughter of Thapa Gultin. PY does not stand connected with the testatrix? 13. The alleged marriage certificate of plaintiff No. 1 with deceased Kalsong Tsomo is on record as Ex. PY. A perusal of the same demonstrates that this marriage certificate pertains to one Dorjee Gyaltson, son of Arik and Kasong Chammo alias Maya Devi, daughter of Thapa Gultin. Now, as far as the deceased lady is concerned, who is owner of the property in issue known as K.T. International Guest House, which stands bequeathed to defendant No. 1 by way of Will Ex. DW2/A, her name is not Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi, but her name is Kalsang Tsomo. In fact, a perusal of the plaint itself demonstrates that the plaintiffs themselves have mentioned the name of the deceased lady as Kalsong Tsomo and not Kalsong Chammo. Besides this, a perusal of Will Ex. DW2/A demonstrates that name of the executor of the said Will is Kalsang Tsomo, daughter of Shri Tsultrim Dakpa, resident of Kalsang Tsomo International Guest House. Concurrent findings which have been returned by both the learned Courts below to the effect that plaintiff No. 1 has not been able to prove that the executor of Will Ex. DW2/A is the same lady whose name finds mention in marriage certificate Ex. PY, are based on the contents of Ex. PY. Both the learned Courts below have held against plaintiff No. 1 that the said plaintiff has not been able to prove that Kalsong Tsomo, i.e., owner of K.T. International Guest House and Kalsong Chammo whose name finds mention in marriage certificate Ex. PY is one and the same person. In my considered view, the findings so returned by both the learned Courts below in this regard are in fact correct findings. It is a matter of record that the name of lady which finds mention in the marriage certificate is “Kalsong Chammo @ Maya Devi”, whereas name of the lady which finds mention in Will Ex. DW2/A is “Kalsang Tsomo”. As there is no material on record from which it can be inferred that both these ladies are one and the same person, therefore, the findings which were returned to this effect by both the learned Courts below cannot be said to be perverse findings. In fact, it is evident from the evidence on record that plaintiff No. 1 was not able to connect Ex. PY with the testatrix. In fact, it is evident from the evidence on record that plaintiff No. 1 was not able to connect Ex. PY with the testatrix. No close relative of the testatrix has been examined by the plaintiffs to prove that it was she whose name finds mention in the marriage certificate Ex. PY. Therefore, in this view of the matter, it cannot be said that both the learned Courts below had fallen in error in holding that marriage certificate Ex. PY was not connected with the testatrix. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No. 2 : 2. Whether the execution of Will, in question, is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and finding to the contrary given by the two Courts below is not sustainable? 14. In my considered view, once plaintiffs have failed to prove the factum of the testatrix being related to them, this substantial question of law even otherwise does not requires to be examined. However, as this is a substantial question of law on which the present appeal stands admitted, therefore, this Court is deciding the said substantial question of law also. There is on record the statement of Scribe of the Will, who has entered the witness box as DW-2. Besides this, one marginal witness in whose presence the said Will was signed by the testatrix has also entered the witness box as DW-3. In fact, both these witnesses in unison have narrated the sequence in which the said Will was executed by the testatrix. It has come in the statement of DW-2 that he went to the deceased on the asking of DW-3 Purbo Dorjee and DW-3 has also stated on oath that the deceased had asked him to bring a Scribe for the purpose of scribing the Will. Further, both these witnesses in unison proved on record that thereafter DW-2 Sh. S.C. Pandit visited the deceased in the hospital, where deceased had given instructions to DW-2, who thereafter scribed the Will as per the said instructions. Both these witnesses have also proved on record that the contents of the said Will were read over by its Scribe, i.e., DW-2 Sh. S.C. Pandit to deceased in Hindi and thereafter part thereof which was not understood by the deceased in Hindi was interpreted to her by DW-3 in Tibetian language. Both these witnesses have also proved on record that the contents of the said Will were read over by its Scribe, i.e., DW-2 Sh. S.C. Pandit to deceased in Hindi and thereafter part thereof which was not understood by the deceased in Hindi was interpreted to her by DW-3 in Tibetian language. Further, both these witnesses have also deposed that after the entire Will was read over in Hindi and part of it interpreted in Tibetian language to the deceased, she put her thumb impression on the same after understanding the contents thereof in presence of Scribe and marginal witnesses and it was thereafter that marginal witnesses appended their signatures on the said Will. It has come in the statements of DW-2 and DW-3 that at the time when the said Will was executed by the testatrix, she was in sound disposing state of mind. Further, a perusal of the cross-examinations of both these witnesses demonstrates that their credibility could not be impeached by the plaintiffs. It is settled law that initial onus of removing suspicious circumstances, if any, surrounding a Will is upon the propounder, but once this initial onus is discharged by the propounder, then the onus shifts upon the other party. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pentakota Satyanarayana and others Vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and others, (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 67 has held that though the initial onus to prove the ‘Will’ is on the propounder of the ‘Will’ but thereafter it shifts to the party alleging undue influence or coercion in execution of the ‘Will’. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Kumar (dead) by LRs Vs. Vinod Kumar and others (2012) 4 Supreme Court Cases 387, has recapitulated the said legal position and relevant paras of the said judgment are quoted herein below:- “28. In one of the earliest judgments in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, the three Judge Bench noticed the provisions of Sections 45, 47, 67 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Sections 59 and 63 of the 1925 Act and observed: (AIR pp. 451-52, paras 18-21) " 18.……….. In one of the earliest judgments in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, the three Judge Bench noticed the provisions of Sections 45, 47, 67 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Sections 59 and 63 of the 1925 Act and observed: (AIR pp. 451-52, paras 18-21) " 18.……….. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word "conscience" in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive." (emphasis supplied) 29. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive." (emphasis supplied) 29. The ratio of H. Venkatachala Iyengar's case was relied upon or referred to in Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb , Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, Surendra Pal v. Saraswati Arora, Seth Beni Chand v. Kamla Kunwar, Uma Devi Nambiar v. T.C. Sidhan, Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty, Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao and S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma. 30. In Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur the Court analysed the ratio in H. Venkatachala Iyengar case and culled out the following propositions: (Jaswant Kaur case, SCC pp. 373- 74, para 10) “1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasizes that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 17. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 17. In the present case, propounder of the Will successfully discharged the said onus on the strength of the testimonies of DW-2 and DW-3, however, thereafter the onus which was shifted upon the plaintiffs to prove that the Will in fact was shrouded with suspicious circumstances could not be proved by the plaintiffs, as has been concurrently held by both the learned Courts below. In my considered view, the findings returned to this effect by both the learned Courts below are duly borne out from the records of the case and it is apparent and evident from the evidence that Will Ex. DW2/A was duly executed by deceased Kalsong Tsomo out of her own free volition and at the time when the said Will was executed by her, she was in sound disposing state of mind. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 18. In view of the discussion held above, as there is no merit in the present appeal, the same is dismissed, so also miscellaneous applications, if any. No order as to costs.