ORDER : This petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned charge-sheet filed against him in P.R.C.No.P.No.5 of 2010 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jayakondam, Ariyalur District. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the second respondent and the petitioner herein had a love affair for over two years prior to 15.10.2009. On 26.08.2009, the petitioner and the second respondent herein had exchanged garlands at Chidambaram Nataraja Temple without tying thali. On the same night, around 10.00 p.m., the petitioner had asked the second respondent to meet him in the hut behind her house. At that time, the petitioner had invited the second respondent to have sexual intercourse to which she had refused. Hence, the petitioner told her that they had already married and promised not to deceive her. Believing the petitioner's promise, the second respondent had accepted for the sexual intercourse. After that both of them had sexual relationship on many occasions. On 12.10.2009, the family members of the petitioner came to know about the relationship and hence both the petitioner and the second respondent had eloped to Chennai. When the whereabouts of the petitioner and the second respondent came to be known, the accused 2 to 4 who are the family members of the petitioner herein had invited the second respondent herein to return back and promised that they will marry her to the petitioner. However on 14.10.2009, when the second respondent had returned back to her village along with the petitioner, the accused 2 to 4 had used obscene words against the second respondent and had sent her alone from the place. Hence, the second respondent had given a complaint which came to be registered for the offences under Sections 417, 376, 394(b) and 506(i) IPC on 31.05.2010 which is impugned in the present petition. 3. Heard Mr. K.S. Arumugam, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. C. Iyyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the alleged sexual intercourse between the petitioner and the second respondent was with the consent of the second respondent and therefore, the offence under Section 376 IPC does not arise. Heard Mr. K.S. Arumugam, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. C. Iyyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the alleged sexual intercourse between the petitioner and the second respondent was with the consent of the second respondent and therefore, the offence under Section 376 IPC does not arise. The learned counsel submitted that the second respondent had voluntarily participated after exercising her intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the act and hence it cannot be said that the petitioner had raped the second respondent herein. 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand submitted that the petitioner herein had made the second respondent to believe that she was legally wedded to him and under such false pretext, he had performed the act which would squarely attract the ingredients of an offence under Section 376 IPC. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the fact as to whether there were consensus or not is the subject matter of trial and that the proceedings need not be quashed by exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 6. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsels. 7. In the present case in hand, apart from the defacto complainant, one common friend of both the petitioner and the second respondent namely, Rajesh and another witness, Rajasugan, who was the friend of the petitioner herein were examined by the Investigating Officer and the statements were recorded under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. On a perusal of the statements made by the witnesses, there are serious discrepancies with regard to the facts narrated by the defacto complainant. According to the defacto complainant, the petitioner herein had made her to believe that she was married to him and forced her to have sexual intercourse. She had further stated that when the parents of the petitioner had come to know of the affair they had eloped to Chennai and subsequently, on the invitation of the petitioner's parents, she was brought back to her village and en-route, she was dropped from the car with threats made by the accused 2 & 4. She had further stated that when the parents of the petitioner had come to know of the affair they had eloped to Chennai and subsequently, on the invitation of the petitioner's parents, she was brought back to her village and en-route, she was dropped from the car with threats made by the accused 2 & 4. However, the other two witnesses, who are known to the petitioner and the second respondent had stated that after the second respondent had eloped with the petitioner to Chennai, the parents of the petitioner had come to Chennai and spoken with both of them with promise to get them marry and brought them to their native place. Pursuant to that there was negotiation for conducting the marriage between them which proved futile since the petitioner had refused to marry the second respondent. These contradictions are quite serious in nature. 8. The major offence for which the petitioner has been charged is under Section 376 IPC. The act of sexual intercourse has not been spoken out by any of the witnesses except the defacto complainant. The other two witnesses had made vague statements that the petitioner had raped the second respondent herein. Though this occurrence is said to have taken place on 15.10.2009, the complaint came to be registered after more than 7 months. The second respondent herein had admitted that she had given her consent for the sexual intercourse, though she claims that the consent was on the belief that she was married to the petitioner and he had promised not to deceive her. The second respondent had further stated that even after the first act on 14.10.2009, both of them had sexual intercourse on various subsequent days. Apparently, all these sexual acts were with the consent of the second respondent herein. It is only based on this statement of the second respondent, that the charge-sheet came to be filed against the petitioner for an offence under Section 376 IPC. 9. The fact that the sexual act had occurred with the consent of the second respondent is not in dispute. The only defence is that the prosecution has taken that the second respondent had made to believe that the petitioner herein was the husband, when she was actually not so, since he had not tied thali around her neck. 9. The fact that the sexual act had occurred with the consent of the second respondent is not in dispute. The only defence is that the prosecution has taken that the second respondent had made to believe that the petitioner herein was the husband, when she was actually not so, since he had not tied thali around her neck. It is also not in dispute that both the petitioner and the second respondent were majors at the time of occurrence. 10. In view of the fact that the second respondent was a major at the time of the alleged occurrence, it cannot be said that she did not have knowledge about the consequences of having physical relationship with the petitioner herein. The fact that the second respondent had subsequently had a sexual relationship on several occasions itself shows that she had given her consent freely, voluntarily and consciously. When such a consent has been given by a person who is major, the circumstances elicited under Section 375 IPC may not be attracted. 11. The fourth circumstance envisaged under Section 375 IPC is when the girl with her consent and when the man knows that he is not her husband and that she had given her consent because she believes that she is lawfully married to him. In the present case, both of them had exchanged garlands in a temple, taken photographs and had indulged in sexual acts on various occasions. Such acts, with the consent of the second respondent herein, cannot be said to be given under misconception of fact. The second respondent, in view of her age, can only be construed to have had the knowledge of the consequences for the consent given. 12. On identical circumstances in a judgment in Uday Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2003 SC 1639 , when a defence was taken that the consent given on misconception of fact amounted to rape, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had dealt with the issue by observing as follows : 21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. 23. Keeping in view the approach that the Court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was however aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact. 13. It is further seen that it is not the case of the prosecution or the grievance of the complainant that the petitioner herein never intended to marry her. There is no evidence to prove conclusively that the petitioner never intended to marry her. Under these circumstances also, it cannot be said that it was the intention of the petitioner to have a physical relationship with the second respondent herein and subsequently deceive by not marrying her. In the absence of such intention, I am unable to comprehend as to how the ingredients for the offence under Section 375 IPC could be attracted. As a result, it can only be held that the offence under Section 375 IPC has not been made out as against the petitioner herein. In view of the consent given by the second respondent and in the absence of any evidence to show that the petitioner intended to have physical relationship and subsequently deceive her, Section 417 IPC is also not made out. Insofar as Sections 294(b) and 506(i) IPC are concerned, the case of the prosecution as well as the averments made in the complaint by the second respondent, implicates the other accused namely, A2 to A4 alone for having committed these offences. Hence it can only be concluded that these offences under Sections 294(b) and 506(i) IPC are also not made out as against the petitioner herein, who is the first accused. 14. Hence it can only be concluded that these offences under Sections 294(b) and 506(i) IPC are also not made out as against the petitioner herein, who is the first accused. 14. In view of the foregoing observations, this Court is of the view that the entire proceedings is not based on any legal footing or on sufficient evidences to make out the major offence under Section 376 IPC and hence the proceedings in PRC.No.5 of 2010 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jayakondam, Ariyalur District stands quashed, insofar as it relates to the petitioner/A1 is concerned. 15. In the result, the criminal Original Petition stands allowed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.