JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. This petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against Award dated 8.9.2010 passed by the Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla in Ref. No. 97 of 2007, whereby the learned Tribunal below allowed the reference made to it by the appropriate Government and held respondents No. 1, 7 and 9 entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity in service without backwages. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerge from the record are that the respondents-workmen (hereafter, ‘workman’) were engaged on daily wage basis in the petitioners’ Department (hereinafter, ‘employer’) on different dates. Workmen further claimed that they had completed 240 days in each calendar year but their services were disengaged on various dates, in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter, ‘Act’), without any notice or compensation. It is further case of the workmen that their juniors were retained in service and their services were disengaged, again in violation of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly they raised industrial dispute, and on failure to reach any amicable settlement, matter was referred under Section 10 of the Act to the Tribunal below by the appropriate Government, for adjudication of following term of reference: ^^D;k Jh jes’k pUn rFkk vkB vU; Jfed ¼layXu lwph vuqlkj½ nSfud oSrfud csynkjksa dks U;kstd vf/k’kklh vfHk;Urk] flapkbZ ,oa tu LokLF; e.My] ukgu] ftyk fljekSj }kjk ukSdjh ls fudkyk tkuk mfpr ,oa U;k;laxr gS\ ;fn ugha rks mDr Jfed fdu lsok ykHkksa o {kfriwfrZ dk ik= gS\** 3. Workmen, by way of filing statement of claim before the Tribunal below stated that they were engaged on daily wages in the Irrigation and Public Health Division, Nahan and they completed 240 days in a calendar year. Yet their services were illegally terminated by the employer on various dates, in contravention of Section 25-F of the Act. Applicants further stated that they were neither given notice nor compensation and their juniors were retained in service. It is further alleged in the claim petition by the workmen that many persons were engaged after their retrenchment, which is in contravention of Section 25-H of the Act. It is further case of the workmen that at the time of engaging new hands, preferential right was of the workmen. Workmen further claimed that they were not gainfully employed during the period of their retrenchment. 4. It is further case of the workmen that at the time of engaging new hands, preferential right was of the workmen. Workmen further claimed that they were not gainfully employed during the period of their retrenchment. 4. Employer, while filing reply to the claim petition, took preliminary objections that the workmen abandoned job on 9/1986, 4/1987, 12/1987, 2/1988, 5/1988, 8/1988, 11/1988, 12/1995 and 4/1993, respectively and did not raise industrial dispute before the appropriate forum within limitation and it was only after 14-21 years as such matter was clearly covered by award dated 25.2.2006 passed by the learned Tribunal below in Reference No. 215/02 titled Yashwant Singh vs. Executive Engineer, I&PH Division Sundernagar. Employer further claimed that the petition of the workmen was not maintainable in view of the judgment of this Court in case titled Nagar Parishad Bilaspur vs. Bone Ram and another, reported in 2005 (1) SLC 29, wherein it has been laid down that where a workman remained absent from work for more than two years without leave or any communication to employer and there is no representation or protest against termination or retrenchment, conduct of workman speaks that he abandoned his job and as such his services stood automatically terminated. Employer further claimed that since the workmen had abandoned their jobs on various dates, as given in the reply itself, the petition was liable to be dismissed. On merits, the employer stated that the workmen worked as per their sweet will intermittently and left job on their own. Employer also appended muster rolls of the workmen in support of their claim. Employer further claimed that since the workmen abandoned their jobs at their own, there was no need to put them to notice or to pay compensation. Employer further claimed that the workmen never turned up after abandonment of their jobs and as such their petition was liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned Tribunal below, on the basis of pleadings, framed following issues: “1. Whether the termination of the petitioners by the Executive Engineer I&PH Nahan, is improper and unjustified without complying the provisions of ID Act, 1947 as alleged? OPP 2. If issue no. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief, the petitioners are entitled to and since when? . OPP 3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable as alleged? OPR 4. Relief.” 6. OPP 2. If issue no. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief, the petitioners are entitled to and since when? . OPP 3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable as alleged? OPR 4. Relief.” 6. However, subsequently, vide award dated 8.9.2010, learned Tribunal below accepted the claim petition of the workmen and answered the reference in the affirmative qua respondents No. 1, 7 and 9 only and dismissed the petition qua other workmen. Vide aforesaid award, learned Tribunal below ordered reinstatement of respondents No. 1, 7 and 9 in service forthwith, with seniority and continuity in service, however, workmen were not held entitled for back-wages. In the aforesaid background employer approached this Court, by way of instant petition. 7. Mr. Ramesh Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, vehemently argued that the award passed by the learned Tribunal below is illegal, perverse and against the facts of the case and same was based upon misreading and misconstruction of evidence on record. Mr. Thakur, further stated that the workmen have miserably failed to prove their case and learned Tribunal below did not appreciate this aspect of the matter and further the reply filed by the employer was also not considered by the learned Tribunal below, hence, the award is liable to be set aside. It is further argued by Mr. Thakur that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court that in case, where there is considerable delay in raising dispute, without explaining such delay, no dispute exists and in this case workmen have raised dispute after 19-20 years hence, the claim petition is liable to be dismissed. It is further contended by Mr. Thakur that since the workmen had abandoned their jobs on their own, as such there was no violation of any of the provisions of the Act and workmen have no case at all. It is also argued by Mr. Thakur that no seniority or continuity in service could have been allowed in favour of the workmen, since they have abandoned their jobs at their own. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Thakur, prayed for setting aside the award of the learned Tribunal below. 8. Mr. O.P. Sharma and Mr. Anil Kumar God, Advocates, have supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal below. Mr. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Thakur, prayed for setting aside the award of the learned Tribunal below. 8. Mr. O.P. Sharma and Mr. Anil Kumar God, Advocates, have supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal below. Mr. O.P. Sharma, vehemently argued that that the impugned award was based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties as such liable to be upheld. While advancing his arguments, Mr. Sharma stated that the employer has admitted the fact that juniors of the workmen have been retained in service. Mr. Sharma, further contended that the appropriate Government, after considering all the aspects, had made reference to the learned Tribunal below, which in turn, after appreciating all the facts, allowed the same. In this background, Mr. Sharma prayed that the writ petition be dismissed and award passed by learned Tribunal below be upheld. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 10. In the instant case, since all the workmen, save and except workmen No. 1, 7 and 9, failed to appear in the witness box, in support, of their respective claims, learned Tribunal below, while placing reliance upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in 1999(2) Current Civil Cases, 171 (SC), Ishwar Bhai C. Patel vs. Harihar Bohara & another, dismissed their claim. 11. Perusal of impugned award passed by learned Tribunal below clearly suggests that workmen No. 1, 7 and 9, successfully proved on record that they had completed 240 days preceding their alleged termination and learned Tribunal below rightly held their termination to be illegal, unjustified and in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. 12. True it is, that record nowhere reveals that aforesaid workmen led on record documentary evidence in support of their claims that they had completed 240 days prior to their alleged termination, but, interestingly, employer, while refuting claim of the aforesaid workmen, placed man days charts, Exts. RE-I, RE-VI and RE-IX, perusal whereof clearly suggests that all the aforesaid workmen had completed 240 days, in the preceding twelve months, prior to their alleged termination, as such, learned Tribunal below rightly held their termination in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Hence, this Court sees no force in the arguments of Mr. RE-I, RE-VI and RE-IX, perusal whereof clearly suggests that all the aforesaid workmen had completed 240 days, in the preceding twelve months, prior to their alleged termination, as such, learned Tribunal below rightly held their termination in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Hence, this Court sees no force in the arguments of Mr. Thakur, that there was no evidence before the learned Tribunal below, which could enable it to uphold the claim of the aforesaid workmen. 13. As far as another contention raised by Mr. Thakur is concerned, that since there was considerable delay in raising demand by the workmen, learned Tribunal below ought to have dismissed their claim, on the ground of delay and laches, has no substance. Though, it clearly emerges from the pleadings as well as impugned award that aforesaid workmen had raised dispute after a considerable time, but that can not be a ground for learned Tribunal below to reject the claim, specifically in view of the fact that it was bound to answer the specific term of reference, made to it by the appropriate Government, under Section 10(2) of the Act. Objections, if any, with regard to raising demand after considerable delay, could be taken by the employer before framing of term of reference. Term of reference framed in the instant case for adjudication nowhere suggests that the learned Tribunal below was required to decide with regard to delay in raising demand. Rather, learned Tribunal below was called upon to answer reference that whether removal of the workmen by the employer was legal and justified. 14. In Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff & Officers’ Assn. reported in (2004) 10 SCC 460, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “22. We shall now analyse the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing on either side with reference to the pleadings, documents, records and also with reference to the judgments cited. The Reference is limited to the dispute between the Appellant-Company and the 'workmen' employed by it. 23. We have already referred to the order of Reference dated 17.2.1993 in paragraph supra. The dispute referred to by the order of Reference is only in respect of workmen employed by the appellant- Company. The Reference is limited to the dispute between the Appellant-Company and the 'workmen' employed by it. 23. We have already referred to the order of Reference dated 17.2.1993 in paragraph supra. The dispute referred to by the order of Reference is only in respect of workmen employed by the appellant- Company. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal, being a creature of the Reference, cannot adjudicate matters not within the purview of the dispute actually referred to it by the order of Reference. In the facts and circumstance of the present case, the Tribunal could not have adjudicated the issues of the salaries of the employees who are not workmen under the Act nor could it have covered such employees by its award. Even assuming, without admitting, that the Reference covered the non-workmen, the Tribunal, acting within its jurisdiction under the Act, could not have adjudicated the dispute insofar as it related to the 'non- workmen'. 95. The Industrial Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dispute inasmuch as it pertains to the conditions of service of non-workmen. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate that parties cannot by their conduct create or confer jurisdiction on an adjudicating authority when no such jurisdiction exists. We have already noticed that the Division Bench has erred in holding that there is community of interest between the workmen and the non-workmen and holding further that the workmen could raise a dispute regarding the service conditions of non-workmen.” 15. Otherwise also, learned Tribunal below, taking note of the fact that dispute was raised after considerable time, has denied back wages to the aforesaid workmen, while placing reliance upon judgment passed in 2010 (1) SLJ SC 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla. 16. Hence, this Court after carefully perusing impugned award, which is based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, has no hesitation to conclude that there is no illegality or infirmity in the same. 17. This Court, is in agreement with the arguments having been made by the learned counsel representing the workmen that this Court has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate findings of fact returned by the learned Tribunal below, while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has a limited scope of appreciating findings of fact. 17. This Court, is in agreement with the arguments having been made by the learned counsel representing the workmen that this Court has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate findings of fact returned by the learned Tribunal below, while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has a limited scope of appreciating findings of fact. In this regard, reliance is placed upon judgment passed in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. 18. As far as judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. is concerned, there can not be any quarrel with the settled proposition of law that the Courts while examining correctness and genuineness of the Award passed by Tribunal has very limited powers to appreciate the evidence adduced before the Tribunal below, especially the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below and same can not be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court can not act as an appellate Court. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment having been relied upon by the learned counsel representing the workmen, clearly suggests that error of law, which is apparent on the face of record, can be corrected by writ Court but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the aforesaid judgment that if finding of fact is based upon no evidence that would be recorded as error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that in regard to findings of fact recorded by Tribunal, writ of certiorari can be issued, if it is shown that in recording said findings, tribunal erroneously refused to admit admissible evidence or erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which influenced impugned findings. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment: “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 19. In the instant case, learned counsel representing the employer was unable to point out any error of law committed by the Tribunal while allowing claim of the workmen. Similarly, learned counsel representing the employer was unable to point out any illegality committed by the learned Tribunal below, while recording findings of fact, as such, this Court sees no perversity or illegality in the award passed by the learned Tribunal below. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below is upheld. Pending applications are disposed of.