Chakkiriyoda Koyamma v. Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep
2017-02-28
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The issue in this case revolves around an extent of 0.01.25 hectares of land comprised of in Sy.No.74/12 of Kalpeni Island which is claimed to be originally owned by a family by name, Chackiriyoda Tharwad. The petitioners assert to be members of the said Tharwad and they are challenging the assignment of the aforementioned extent of land in favour of one of their relatives, namely, the third respondent herein. The challenge has been mounted on various grounds, as will be presently stated, which finally lead to Ext.P10 order being issued by the first respondent, which is impugned in this writ petition. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Sri. V.B. Harinarayan, the learned Senior Counsel Shri. Balakrishna Iyer assisted by Adv. Shri. P.B.Krishnan for the third respondent and the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2. 3. The genesis of this controversy is the claim of the 3rd respondent over the afore shown extent of land which lead to various proceedings and litigations. The family and the third respondent thereafter entered into a settlement. A copy of which has been produced in this writ petition as Ext.P4, as per which, the third respondent and her daughter were offered life interest over the property so as to enable them to continue in possession till their life. While so, it appears that the third respondent made an application before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kalpeni, for issue of Patta in her name, presumably on the assertion that she continues in possession. This lead to Ext.P4 proceedings being issued by the Settlement Officer, wherein, it is seen that two senior members of the Tharwad, namely, Ms. Mariyomma Chackiriyoda and Mr. Abdulrahiman Chackiriyoda conceded that Patta over the property can be issued in favour of the third respondent. Obviously, Ext.P4 would indicate that the proceedings for the rough Patta was completed on the basis of consent of the Tharwad and by way of an amicable settlement. Normally speaking, the matter should have ended here and the parties ought to have obtained a quietus to the controversies and their disputes with such proceedings. 4.
Obviously, Ext.P4 would indicate that the proceedings for the rough Patta was completed on the basis of consent of the Tharwad and by way of an amicable settlement. Normally speaking, the matter should have ended here and the parties ought to have obtained a quietus to the controversies and their disputes with such proceedings. 4. However, certain other members of the Tharwad impugned Ext.P4 essentially on the ground that the two members of the Tharwad, who are mentioned in the said proceedings to have agreed to the arrangement favouring the 3rd respondent, had no authority to represent the Tharwad or to concede the issuance of Patta, since according to them the properties of the Tharwad is inalienable in law. They filed a suit, namely, O.S.No.2/91 before the Musiff's Court, Andrott, which was however dismissed for the reason, inter alia, that the plaintiffs therein did not have the locus to represent the Tharwad. This judgment was taken up in appeal as A.S.No.4/1994 before the Sub Court, Lakshadweep, which also ended in being dismissed, leading to a Second Appeal before this Court as S.A.No.52/1996, which culminated in Ext.P5 judgment. 5. It is obvious from Ext.P5 judgment that this Court had virtually confirmed the orders of the courts below, but, by way of mere concession, granted the appellants therein, who are the petitioners herein, an opportunity to file a statutory appeal against Ext.P4 before the competent authority. This was how the petitioners approached the appellate authority under the statute, namely, the Deputy Collector, Kavarathi. The said appellate authority considered all the contentions of the parties and issued Ext.P6 order holding that Ext.P4 is not capable of being impeached in law and confirming it holding that it was validly issued in terms of the settlement arrived at by the third respondent with the competent Karnavers of the Tharwad. The petitioners challenged this order before the first respondent, who is the second appellate authority, which lead to Ext.P10 order being issued. As indicated above, it is this order which is being challenged in this writ petition. 6. The primary contention of the petitioners against Ext.P10 is that the property of the Tharwad is incapable of alienation and that therefore, Ext.P4 order of the Settlement Officer is incompetent and unsustainable in law.
As indicated above, it is this order which is being challenged in this writ petition. 6. The primary contention of the petitioners against Ext.P10 is that the property of the Tharwad is incapable of alienation and that therefore, Ext.P4 order of the Settlement Officer is incompetent and unsustainable in law. They contend so on the ground that if the properties of the Tharwad are in-alienable, then, Ext.P4 order granting Patta of such extent to other members of the Tharwad exclusively would also be in error in law. The petitioners further contend that those persons who are shown in Ext.P4 who had acceded to such assignment were not competent to represent the Tharwad and that, therefore, Ext.P4 had no legs to stand on. All these issues are considered by the first respondent while issuing Ext.P10 order. The irony is that the petitioners who claim to represent the Tharwad in these proceedings also could not substantiate how they have the locus to do so. Interestingly, when the petitioners maintain that the persons mentioned in Ext.P4 could not have represented the Tharwad, they are unable to show as to how they obtained the competence or the locus to do so, because, admittedly, they are junior members of the Tharwad. This has been clearly recorded by the first respondent in paragraph 7 of Ext.P10. The first respondent also concluded, rightly in my view, that Ext.P4 is irreproachable because that was an order which was issued by consent of the parties and with the permission of the Karnavers of the Tharwad. It cannot be found that Ext.P4 is in the nature of an alienation by the members of the Tharwad, because, it was issued under the provisions of law for assignment of land which was found to be in the possession of the third respondent. Ext.P10 order also says that, even though the rough Patta, namely, Ext.P4 was issued as early as on 20.07.1989, the statutorily challenge against this was mounted only 13 years later and on such basis the first respondent concluded that the appeal was filed much beyond the time granted by the statutes. 7. I cannot see that there is anything irregular, illegal or unconstitutional in Ext.P10 order issued by the first respondent.
7. I cannot see that there is anything irregular, illegal or unconstitutional in Ext.P10 order issued by the first respondent. I see that he has considered all the contentions of the parties quite in extenso and that he has tried to answer every one of these contentions in a logical and reasonable manner which has been recorded in the said order. There is no doubt that he has exercised jurisdiction that is vested in him and, therefore, the scope of an enquiry against the impugned order by this Court will be limited to see whether he has exercised the jurisdiction inside the perimeters within which it is bounded. I cannot see that Ext.P10 has been issued beyond or in excess of such jurisdiction. On the contrary, I am of the firm opinion that the impugned order has been issued well within the boundaries of jurisdiction vested with the first respondent and does not, therefore, suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, capriciousness or any other illegalities. 8. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that Ext.P10 is a validly issued order, issued by the first respondent in valid exercise of powers and jurisdiction available to him and therefore, totally sustainable under the provisions of the relevant Act and regulations. 9. In the result, I dismiss this writ petition confirming Ext.P10 order of the first respondent. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs and the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.