JUDGMENT : K.M. JOSEPH, J. 1. There is delay of 9 days in filing this appeal. In the circumstances, the delay is condoned. The Application for condonation of delay will stand allowed. 2. Appellants are the writ petitioners. The writ petition was filed calling in question order dated 05.03.2015. The same was issued by respondent No. 3 (Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Nigam, Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar). 3. Respondent No. 2, namely, Nagar Nigam, Rudrapur, issued an Advertisement on 13.02.2015 calling for sealed tenders for supply of various electrical items. The last date was 16.02.2015. The appellants duly submitted the tender for supply of 145 pieces of 7 meters long Glass reinforced Polymer Conical Shape (hereinafter referred to as the “GRP”) having cast irong flange having bottom outer diameter 194 mm with thickness of 4 mm and top outer diameter 101 mm with thickness of 8 mm having glass content 60-72% alongwith double arm bracket of 1000 mm long with integral junction box consisting of MCB, bakelite sheet and suitable size connector as per cable size. Appellants were found to be L-1. It is the case of the appellants that they being found L-1, the second respondent awarded the contract by Annexure No. 4 dated 04.03.2015. It is the case of the appellants that they entered into contract with Bajaj Electricals for supply of items, which is valued at Rs. 46,76,250/-. It is while so that the appellants were served with the impugned order, which the appellants called in question by filing the writ petition. In the writ petition, the following prayers were sought: “(A) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 5.3.2015 annexed as Annexure no. 1 to the petition, whereby the respondent no. 3 has unilaterally issued order of cancelling the supply order awarded to the petitioner) and may further quash the consequential re-tender advertisement dated 22.03.2015 (Annexure no. 2) published in daily Rashtriya Sahara dated 22.03.2015 and further quash any actions taken pursuant to the said re-tender advertisement. (B) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus consequently directing the Respondents to execute the contract pursuant to the approval of contract by the second Respondent and the supply agreement executed by second respondent on 4.3.15 (Annexure no. 4) between the petitioner and the second Respondent.” 4. Pleadings were settled. (B) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus consequently directing the Respondents to execute the contract pursuant to the approval of contract by the second Respondent and the supply agreement executed by second respondent on 4.3.15 (Annexure no. 4) between the petitioner and the second Respondent.” 4. Pleadings were settled. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition along with another writ petition, which related to similar award for supply of other materials. The learned Single Judge, essentially, took the view that, even though the offer was accepted and the work order was issued, it had not blossomed into a contract. It was found that there is no merit in the case of the appellants. It was also found that the appellants had not complied with the essential conditions. 5. We have heard Mr. Arvind Vashistha, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, learned counsel on behalf of the appellants; Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 & 3; and Mr. H.M. Bhatia, learned Brief Holder for the State. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would complain that the work order was given to the appellants on 04.03.2015; it was cancelled on 05.03.2015; and the appellants were not given any opportunity of showing cause. It is, further, submitted that reliance is placed on a report, which is dated 20.03.2015, i.e. much after the impugned order cancelling the contract was passed. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would point out that this is a case, where the contract involved two stages, namely, technical stage and financial stage. True it is that the appellants passed muster in the technical stage and, finding the appellants to be L-1, allotment order was given. A complaint, however, according to the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3, was addressed on 24.02.2015, which, it may be noted, was the day on which the technical bid stage was crossed, by a person pointing out that the appellants had not given guarantee within the meaning of the conditions prescribed. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the evaluation, which is done and found at Annexure No. 2 produced along with the counter affidavit. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the evaluation, which is done and found at Annexure No. 2 produced along with the counter affidavit. In regard to the appellants, it is shown that the appellants had not given any guarantee for the poles and that it was given for some other product. It is further contended before us that the certificate, which was granted in terms of Clause 8 of the conditions, which are produced as Annexure No. 1 along with the counter affidavit, was in respect of galvanized high mast and its accessories, but there was no certification in respect of GRP Poles, which was the product in respect of which the appellants’ bid was accepted. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3 would also submit that, in this matter, there is no question of invoking the doctrine of natural justice and, in this connection, he drew our attention to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited vs. Devkishan Computed Private Limited and others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446 . Therein, the Apex Court, inter alia, referred to the judgment in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , and held as follows: “19. It is also well to remember the admonition given by this Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 in cases like the present, as under:- “21. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, the following conclusion is relevant: 22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made ‘lawfully’ and not to check whether choice or decision is ‘sound’. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: ‘the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached’; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/ contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.”” 8. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3 would also submit that, even if an opportunity had been given, the case of the appellants would not have been advanced, as the appellants had not given the guarantee and giving an opportunity at that stage would have given rise to others also claiming an opportunity to rectify their defects. 9. Mr. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3 would also submit that, even if an opportunity had been given, the case of the appellants would not have been advanced, as the appellants had not given the guarantee and giving an opportunity at that stage would have given rise to others also claiming an opportunity to rectify their defects. 9. Mr. Arvind Vashistha, learned Senior Counsel, would point out that the action of the respondents involved violation of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & others, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . He would draw our attention to the impugned order and would submit that, in the impugned order, what is stated is that, for technical reasons, the contract is being cancelled. He would also emphasise the fact that, though the cancellation order is dated 05.03.2015, it was actually communicated to the appellants only on 17.03.2015 as it was dispatched only on 11.03.2015. 10. In regard to this last complaint, the response of Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 & 3, is that there was a strike in the office and it is on that basis that the order could be communicated on 17.03.2015. He would also contend that this case does not attract the principle laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case (supra), as it has also given technical grounds which are elaborated in the counter affidavit. 11. We may notice that the learned Single Judge has actually proceeded to lay considerable emphasis on the fact that there is no written contract entered into. He also referred to the case-law, which indicates that a person, who has quoted lowest rate, may not have a legal right to have the contract awarded in his favour. We may, incidentally, notice that this may not be a case, which could be treated on par with a case, where the appellant was merely L-1. Apart from being L-1, the offer of the appellants was accepted. After acceptance of the offer of the appellants being L-1 in regard to the products in question, what remained was the execution of the contract. Apart from being L-1, the offer of the appellants was accepted. After acceptance of the offer of the appellants being L-1 in regard to the products in question, what remained was the execution of the contract. We do not think that it could be said as a universal principle that, after the bid of the L-1 is accepted and what remained was the execution of the contract, it would be open to the employer, who issues the tender, to act arbitrarily in the matter and contend that, because they have not executed the contract, the authority, if it is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution, can act arbitrarily. Even proceeding on the basis that being an authority under Article 12 and being under the bounden duty to act fairly, even in contractual matters, we must notice two aspects. The first aspect is that judicial review with reference to principle of arbitrariness must also be judged with reference to the context in which the question is raised. Judicial review of administrative action by authorities falling under Article 12 can arise in a vast array of circumstances. In some, judicial review would be more extensive than others. In contractual matters, with which we are concerned, it may be taken to be settled by a long line of decisions that the courts would be more deferential to the views of the authorities and would allow more free play in the joints to the authorities. We may, in this regard, only notice the judgment of the Apex Court in Rishi Kiran Logistics Private Limited vs. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust and others, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 233 , wherein the Apex Court has exhaustively referred to the judgment in Meerut Development Authority vs. Assn. of Management Studies, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 171 ; besides the decision in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 . It has been, inter alia, laid down in this judgment as follows: “24. In Meerut Development Authority v. Assn. of Management Studies; (2009) 6 SCC 171 , the decision related to disposal of public property by an instrumentality of the State. In the said context, the Court inter alia held as follows: “26. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. In Meerut Development Authority v. Assn. of Management Studies; (2009) 6 SCC 171 , the decision related to disposal of public property by an instrumentality of the State. In the said context, the Court inter alia held as follows: “26. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated it must be unconditional; must be in the proper form, the person by whom tender is made must be able to and willing to perform his obligations. The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. However, a limited judicial review may be available in cases where it is established that the terms of the invitation to tender were so tailor made to suit the convenience of any particular person with a view to eliminate all others from participating in the biding process. 27. The bidders participating in the tender process have no other right except the right to equality and fair treatment in the matter of evaluation of competitive bids offered by interested persons in response to notice inviting tenders in a transparent manner and free from hidden agenda. One cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the tender except on the above stated ground, the reason being the terms of the invitation to tender are in the realm of the contract. No bidder is entitled as a matter of right to insist the authority inviting tenders to enter into further negotiations unless the terms and conditions of notice so provided for such negotiations. 28. It is so well settled in law and needs no restatement at our hands that disposal of the public property by the State or its instrumentalities partake the character of a trust. The methods to be adopted for disposal of public property must be fair and transparent providing an opportunity to all the interested persons to participate in the process. 29. The authority has the right not to accept the highest bid and even to prefer a tender other than the highest bidder, if there exist good and sufficient reason, such as, the highest bid not representing the market price but there cannot be any doubt that the Authority's action in accepting or refusing the bid must be free from arbitrarinesses or favouritism.” 25. A lucid enunciation on the scope of judicial review of administrative action, that too in tender matters can be found in Tata Cellular v. Union of India ( 1994 (6) SCC 651 ), where following discussion is worthy of extraction: “70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the state. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. *** 74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself. *** 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: (1) Whether a decision making authority exceeded its powers? (2) Committed an error of law, (3) Committed a breach of rules of natural justice, (4) Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, (5) Abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationally, namely Wednesbury unreasonableness. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationally, namely Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact in R.V. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exp Brind (1991) 1 AC 694, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should “consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention.” *** 81. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned: (1) It is open to the court to review the decision maker's evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment (1980) 41 P&CR 255; the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non resident's bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The divisional court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, L.J. said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex. P. Johnson (1989) 88 LGR 73 the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down.” 12. On this basis in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex. P. Johnson (1989) 88 LGR 73 the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down.” 12. We have already referred to paragraph 19 of the judgment in Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited vs. Devkishan Computed Private Limited and others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446 . Therefore, we must pose and answer the question as to whether public interest is affected among other things. 13. In this case, the facts would reveal that the appellants’ offer was accepted. Ordinarily, it should have blossomed into a contract, as we notice that, being a public authority, it cannot act arbitrarily and, without any rational reasons, refuse to enter into a contract. Therefore, we may not entirely agree with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in this regard. 14. But, in this case, we have to examine the matter with reference to the principles that what ultimately is expected of an authority is whether it has acted fairly. The question as to whether it has acted fairly is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case and, in this case, in regard to the products with which we are concerned, namely, poles 7 meters long GRP, in respect of which there is no guarantee given by the appellants. The guarantee was specifically called for. Though there was some debate as to whether guarantee could be treated as equivalent to warranty, the fact remains that guarantee was expected from the party. The Committee, at the stage of technical scrutiny, for some reason, though noted that the appellant had not given a guarantee, proceeded to consider the matter as if the appellant was technically qualified. It is true that, ordinarily, this matter should have engaged the attention of the employer at that stage. But the employer is also expected to act fairly in the matter of adherence to the pre-announced norms, which would qualify a contractor in regard to his products. Furnishing of guarantee cannot be said to be meaningless or a directory. A guarantee is essentially a promise in regard to the product, which is being furnished. A guarantee would assist the employer to pursue its goals in the matter of procuring quality products. Furnishing of guarantee cannot be said to be meaningless or a directory. A guarantee is essentially a promise in regard to the product, which is being furnished. A guarantee would assist the employer to pursue its goals in the matter of procuring quality products. In such circumstances, the non-furnishing of the guarantee as such for the GRP Poles would, in our view, be fatal to the case of the appellants and did furnish a ground to the respondents to re-visit the matter as it was done. That apart, a Committee was constituted, which, according to Mr. Vipul Sharma, was an independent authority. The Committee has also found as follows: “Facts of Enquiry in the matter of Electrical Items Purchase by MNA Nagar Nigam Rudrapur as per letter No. sa.Ni.Anu./2014-15 dated 11 March 2015. S.N. Points of Investigation … … M/s Garg Electric Jaspur. … 1 2 3 4 1. GRP Shown certificate of Bajaj Electrical Ltd. Having certificate in the field of galvanized High mast and its accessories, transformation and their towers etc. but not having certification in GRP Poles. 2. Guarantee Clause Only for 4x24 watt fitting & choke for One Year. 3. ISO Having ISO 14001:2004 not in the manufacturing of GRP Pole but for Galvanized Pole. Points to be ponder. 1. As per Technical Specification the firms mentioned in colomn No. 2, 3 & 4 have authorization of Bajaj Electric Limited and as per certification it is very clear that Bajaj is dealing with Galvanized structure not in GRP Structure / Pole. So as per GTP these firms have no certificate regarding GRP poles/Structure. 2. In case of Perfect Electric & Engineering Rudrapur, they have authorization of Jindal Sons (Authorised by M/s EPP) but they does not possess ISO 14001/18001 certification. Hence all the firms lagging behind of the required GTP. So it is advisable to take further decision accordingly. (V.K. PANDEY) Executive Engineer.” 15. True it is that we agree with the counsel for the appellants that it is prepared only on 20.03.2015, though the decision to cancel was taken on 05.03.2015. But, according to the respondents, it was taken to reassure itself that it was on the right track in the matter of cancelling. (V.K. PANDEY) Executive Engineer.” 15. True it is that we agree with the counsel for the appellants that it is prepared only on 20.03.2015, though the decision to cancel was taken on 05.03.2015. But, according to the respondents, it was taken to reassure itself that it was on the right track in the matter of cancelling. What is more important is that the respondents had referred to a complaint, which was received as early as on 24.02.2015 by another contractor pointing out that the appellants should not have been qualified and, therefore, the authorities took a decision to cancel the contract and it is also brought to our notice that the contract has not been awarded to anybody else; but the decision taken was to go in for re-tender. 16. We would think that the principle laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case (supra) may not apply in this case. It is not a case, where a different reason is given. In Mohinder Singh Gill’s case (supra), the Apex Court frowned upon the practice of public functionaries trying to make good an order, which could not be supported on the reasons given in the order, by giving additional reasons in the pleadings. This cannot be treated as such a case as what is stated in the impugned order is that, for technical reasons, it is being cancelled. The reasons have been set out in the counter affidavit. 17. True it is that the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants did contend that, purporting to act on the basis of the acceptance order, orders were placed with Bajaj Electricals and, therefore, they have a case, where the Court should interfere. According to Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3, the Court cannot place reliance on this and the documents, which are produced, as they are disputed. 18. Having regard to the broad parameters within which judicial review is to be conducted in contractual matters of this nature, we would think that there were reasons for the authorities to retrace its steps in the matter and not to take the matter further on the basis of the acceptance and, instead, to cancel the award. We must also bear in mind that there is no overwhelming public interest, which would tilt the scales in favour of the appellants. We must also bear in mind that there is no overwhelming public interest, which would tilt the scales in favour of the appellants. As noticed already, the respondents have decided to go in for re-tender. 19. If an opportunity had been given to the appellants before the cancellation took place, the case of the appellants is that the appellants could have made good the defects. We do not think that, having regard to the conditions, which were provided and which appear to be mandatory in nature, such an argument should be accepted. 20. There is also a case for Mr. Arvind Vashistha, learned Senior Counsel, that the requirement as to guarantee is vague insofar as it does not exactly stipulate for the period of time for which it is to remain in force. We would think that such a contention may not be accepted. Appellants had bid with eyes wide open, which provided for such a contingency. That apart, a reasonable interpretation should also be placed; in that, guarantee would be for a reasonable period of time. There is no case for the appellants that the appellants have given the guarantee for the product in question for any length of time. 21. In the totality of circumstances, we would think that the appellants have not made out a case for interference with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.