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2017 DIGILAW 433 (ALL)

AHMAD MOID v. STATE PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL

2017-02-07

RAVINDRA NATH MISHRA II, SUDHIR AGARWAL

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JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Smt. Renu Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Sri P.K. Srivasta, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Shobhit Mohan Shukla, Advocate for respondent Nos. 2 to 5. 2. Petitioner was imposed punishment of dismissal vide order dated 22/24.7.1989 and his appeal was also rejected vide order dated 24.9.1994, hence he filed Claim Petition No. 1251 of 1995 before U.P. Public Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”), but has lost his matter thereat also since claim petition has been dismissed vide judgment dated 16.5.1997. This has brought petitioner here challenging aforesaid orders in this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed before us that petitioner was denied adequate opportunity of defence inasmuch copy of inquiry report was not supplied before passing order of punishment. She placed reliance on Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, 1993 (4) SCC 727 . 4. However, we find that aforesaid judgment will not help petitioner for the reason that here order of punishment was passed in July, 1989 while Supreme Court has made aforesaid law effective from 29.11.1990, the day on which judgment in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991(1) SCC 588 , was passed and it has been clearly held that orders passed before that date shall not stand vitiated merely on the ground that copy of inquiry report was not supplied. Therefore, aforesaid plea is not available to petitioner. 5. It is next contended that Appellate order is not speaking and, therefore, is bad. 6. We find no substance in the submission for the reason that punishment order was passed by Managing Director of U.P. Export Corporation Ltd. and appeal was maintainable before Board of Directors which consists of several persons. If a collective decision has been taken by a body of several persons, in such case no detailed and reasoned order need be passed since it is the ultimate decision collectively taken by entire body which is to be recorded in minutes and communicated to concerned employee. 7. A similar argument came up for consideration before this Court in Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta v. The Visitor/President of India, 2006 (1) AWC 608 . 7. A similar argument came up for consideration before this Court in Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta v. The Visitor/President of India, 2006 (1) AWC 608 . In para 11 of the judgment, questions, which were considered by Division Bench, have been formulated as (a), (b) and (d), are reproduced as under: “(a) Whether the orders passed by the Executive Council and the Visitor are unsustainable in the eyes of law as they do not record separate reasons. (b) Whether it was necessary for the Executive Council to have recorded a finding of guilt in respect of the charges found proved by the Enquiry Officer in its resolution dated 16/17th May, 1989 by imposing punishment, even after the enquiry report was accepted earlier under the resolution of the Executive Council dated 28/29th March, 1989, where under the Executive Council had specifically held that the charges against the petitioner were proved and the enquiry report was accepted.” (d) Whether in the facts of the present case, this Court would exercice its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner.” 8. Referring to the provisions whereby decision was to be taken by Executive Council of University, the Court in paras 23, 25 and 31 held as under: “23. From the provisions, which have been quoted herein above, it is apparently clear that the decision to dismiss a teacher of the University from service on the ground of misconduct, is to be taken after following the procedure prescribed under Clause (c) of the said statute by the Executive Council. The said Section does not require recording of reasons for such a decision. Even otherwise, where a collective decision by a body of person is required to be taken (like in the facts of the present case), it is neither practically possible nor legally required that opinion of all the members participating in the delibeartions must be recorded, inasmuch as the decision of such bodies are collective in nature, and only the decision as a whole, is required to be recorded in writing and not the deliberation which had to be such a decision. The deliberations which took place in the meeting of the Excutive Council, are, therefore, not necessarily to be recorded in its decision.” “25. The deliberations which took place in the meeting of the Excutive Council, are, therefore, not necessarily to be recorded in its decision.” “25. In these circumstances, the first contention that the order of the Executive Council as well as of the Visitor, being not supported by reasons in writing is unsustainable in the eyes of law, and therefore, rejected.” “31. This Court has no hesitation to record that decision taken in the meeting of Executive Council cannot be faulted with and does not call for interference in the writ proceedings. Issue No. (b) is answered accordingly.” 9. The Division Bench clearly said, when there is collective decision of a larger decision making body, consisting of several persons, unless law specifically requires, ultimate resolution passed by such Body is sufficient and it is not necessary that deliberations which took place in the meeting of Body, should also form part of the record or part of the decision. In absence of any such provision, collective decision taken by a body, in our view, has not to be assailed on the ground that decision of such collective body communicated to concerned employee is not a speaking and reasoned order. 10. In our view, where a decision is to be taken by a collective Body of an institution, whether at the first stage or appellate stage, as the case may be, it is the collective intention expressed by all those persons constituting the Body. In such circumstances, requirement of individual reasons to be given by them is neither possible nor permissible and also not required unless it is specifically provided in statute, which to the experience of the Court, we have never found where power to take a decision has been given to a Body constituting several persons. In fact, we are, clearly of the view that decision of a Body constituting several persons is open to challenge on limited grounds, i.e. quorum of meeting was not complete; there was no deliberation in meeting in respect of decision; or there is participation of disqualified person(s) in meeting; or, may be on the ground that there was no agenda for consideration of subject-matter on the date of meeting. None of these grounds have been taken in the present case to assail punishment order. None of these grounds have been taken in the present case to assail punishment order. Therefor merely because punishment order did not contain any reason, the same cannot be said to be bad in law for the reasons we have already discussed above. 11. No other point has been argued. 12. We do not find any error apparent on the face of record warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Dismissed. 14. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.