ORDER : K. Harilal, J. 1. The revision petitioner herein is the counter petitioner in R.C.P. No.27 of 2011 on the files of the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram and the appellant in R.C.A. No.3 of 2013 on the files of the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-I, Thiruvananthapuram. The parties are referred to as in the RCP. 2. The aforesaid petition was filed by the petitioner/respondent herein seeking eviction of the counter petitioner/revision petitioner herein from the plaint schedule property under section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). According to the petitioner/respondent herein she is the owner of the petition schedule building and the ground floor and car shed of the same were let out to the counter petitioner by virtue of Exts.A2 and A3. The counter petitioner is a builder by profession doing construction work and when he required more space for smooth functioning of the business, he had taken the 1st floor of the building also by virtue of Ext.A3. Further the petitioner/respondent herein contended that the building in which she is residing at present is very old and has become decrepit. According to her, the present building is not sufficiently strong and spacious and is unfit to reside. She is in need of the petition schedule building for the residence of herself and her family. Besides the counter petitioner has kept the rent in arrear for the last six months. 3. The counter petitioner resisted the petition and contended that the bonafide need projected in the petition is only a ruse for eviction and the building in which the petitioner/respondent herein has been residing is suitable and convenient for residence. It is also contended that since she is in possession of another building, the petitioner/respondent herein is not entitled to get the benefit under the first proviso to section 11 (3) of the Act. According to the counter petitioner, the income from the business in the petition schedule building is the main source of income for his livelihood and that suitable building are not available in the locality to shift his business from the petition schedule building. Hence the counter petitioner prayed for dismissal of the petition. 4. On the aforesaid rival pleadings, both parties adduced evidence which consisted of oral testimony of PW1, CPW1 and Exts.A1 to A5 and B1 to B2(d). Hence the counter petitioner prayed for dismissal of the petition. 4. On the aforesaid rival pleadings, both parties adduced evidence which consisted of oral testimony of PW1, CPW1 and Exts.A1 to A5 and B1 to B2(d). After considering the aforesaid evidence, the Rent Controller allowed the petition as prayed for. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the counter petitioner had preferred the aforesaid appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. After re-appreciating the evidence on record, the appellate authority also confirmed the findings of the rent controller as such and dismissed the appeal. Thus the concurrent findings, whereby the courts below found that the need highlighted in the petition is a bona fide one and the same is not hit by the first proviso and the counter petitioner is not entitled to get the protection under the second proviso of section 11(3) of the Act, are challenged in this revision. 6. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner as well as the respondent. 7. Though this revision petition has been filed raising various grounds, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner are mainly focused against the findings on the bona fide need and more particularly, the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act. The learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner contends that absolutely there is no evidence to prove that the building wherein the petitioner/respondent has been residing is in a dilapidated condition. According to the learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner, the said building is suitable for her residence and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it could be reasonably presumed that the bona fide need projected is only a pretext for eviction. Secondly it is contended that the ownership and possession of the building wherein the petitioner/respondent herein has been residing at present is admitted and the said admission would constitute and prove the ingredients required under the first proviso to section 11(3). So long as the petitioner/respondent herein is holding and residing in the present building, the bar under the first proviso would hit the bona fide need even if found true, unless special reasons are established under the said proviso. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent herein advanced arguments to justify the concurrent findings of the courts below. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent herein advanced arguments to justify the concurrent findings of the courts below. As regards the bona fide need and the proviso under section 11(3) of the Act, the learned counsel drew our attention to the oral testimony of PW1 and submits that nothing brought out to discredit her oral account which would depict the oldness and unsuitability of the building wherein she is residing at present. It is also contended that ownership and possession of the present building, wherein the petitioner/respondent herein is residing, cannot be taken as a ground to attract the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act as the oldness and unsuitability of that building is the basis of the bona fide need. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner fairly submitted that the counter petitioner is not disputing the landlord-tenant relationship. So also, the counter petitioner has deposited the entire arrears of rent. The learned counsel for the respondent agrees with the said submission. Therefore, the examination of illegality and impropriety of the concurrent findings of the court below are confined to the findings under section 11(3) of the Act only. 10. It is the specific case of the petitioner/respondent herein in her pleadings that now she is in need of the building for residing herself with family as the building presently using for residence has more than 100 years old and is unsuitable for residence. 11. Going by the counter filed by the counter petitioner, he has not disputed the oldness of the building but contended that the building is not more than 100 years old, as averred by the petitioner. Thus we find that the oldness of the building stands undisputed and the number of years passed after the construction alone is disputed. Similarly, the counter petitioner has not disputed the case of the petitioner that the petition schedule building is a new one with several rooms. It is true that there is no expert or scientific opinion as regards the oldness or fitness of the building. But it has come out in cross- examination of the petitioner/respondent herein that the building wherein presently she is residing was constructed by her husband's great grandfather and the building is a tiled one. 12. It is true that there is no expert or scientific opinion as regards the oldness or fitness of the building. But it has come out in cross- examination of the petitioner/respondent herein that the building wherein presently she is residing was constructed by her husband's great grandfather and the building is a tiled one. 12. The point to be considered is whether her desire to shift her residence to the newly constructed building can be treated as a fanciful or an unreasonable desire. We are of the opinion that the petitioner's desire to live in the petition schedule building cannot be considered as a fanciful, whimsical or unreasonable desire, particularly when the oldness of the present building and the newness of the petition schedule building are not disputed. It is a matter of common knowledge and conduct that every person would be desirous of living in a new house having modern facilities rather than living in a very old tiled house, which requires frequent repairs. Generally, such desire can never be treated as an unreasonable or a fanciful desire and expert opinion or scientific proof as regards the unsuitability of the old building cannot be insisted with. 13. The above view is, further fortified by the decision of this Court in Venugopalan Nair P. (Dr.) v. Mohamedkunhi and Others ( 2010 (1) KLT 971 ), wherein this Court held that "the Rent Control Court is not expected to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the LandLord to identify one among the various tenanted rooms for conducting the proposed business. We are of the opinion that the Rent Control Court cannot sit in judgment over the desire of the landlord to live in his new house rather than living in the old tiled house. In this context the decision of the Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1999 SC 100 ) assumes significance and relevancy. Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid decision reads as follows: 14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause.(e) of S.14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause.(e) of S.14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 14. So, in view of the above said decision, the counter petitioner as a tenant cannot dictate as to how else the petitioner can adjust with the present old house, without getting possession of the new petition schedule building. In the above analysis, the courts below are justified in finding that the need put forward by the petitioner/respondent is a bona fide one. 15. Coming to the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act, the ownership and possession of the present house wherein she is residing at present is an admitted fact. But, unsuitability of the present building is the basis of the bona fide need put forward under section 11(3). We are of the opinion that the ownership and possession of an unsuitable or unfit building presently in occupation of the landlord, would not fall under the said proviso as the need arose from that reason and special reason for not occupying the present building is also implied in the need put forward. In such circumstances, suitable building other than building presently in occupation of the landlord and tenant is required to attract the first proviso to section 11(3). In the above view, in the instant case, the bona fide need put forward is not hit by the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act. In such circumstances, suitable building other than building presently in occupation of the landlord and tenant is required to attract the first proviso to section 11(3). In the above view, in the instant case, the bona fide need put forward is not hit by the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act. 16.Coming to the second proviso, it has come out in evidence that presently, the counter petitioner is not conducting the business of house construction and Ext.B series of account book shows business activities during the year 2008-2009 only. In the absence of current documents to prove the income derived from the business of house construction and sale, an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act also can be drawn against the counter petitioner. Besides, the counter petitioner himself admitted that he has no corporation licence for conducting the said business. No documents was produced to show the employees working under him, though he contended that the income from the business conducted in the petition schedule property is the main source of income of the counter petitioner and his employees. 17. Coming to second limb, though the petitioner during the cross-examination deposed that in the nearby locality there are so many vacant buildings are available for shifting the business, the counter petitioner failed to establish that no vacant rooms are available in the locality and thereby he failed to discharge the burden of proof. In short, the counter petitioner is not entitled to get protection under the second proviso to section 11(3) of the Act, and the courts below are justified in denying the protection under the second proviso. 18. There is no illegality or impropriety in the findings whereby the Rent Control Court passed eviction order, which stands confirmed in appeal. 19. In the result, this rent control revision petition is dismissed. The learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner/revision petitioner seeks for a breathing time to vacate the petition schedule shop room. The said request was vehemently opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent. 20. 19. In the result, this rent control revision petition is dismissed. The learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioner/revision petitioner seeks for a breathing time to vacate the petition schedule shop room. The said request was vehemently opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent. 20. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the counter petitioner/revision petitioner can be granted time to vacate the premises, but on terms: (i) The revision petitioner herein shall file an affidavit within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of this order, expressing his unconditional readiness and willingness to surrender the petition schedule shop room on or before 31st December, 2017 before the Rent Control Court or Execution Court, as the case may be. (ii) The revision petitioner herein shall deposit the entire arrear of rent, if any, within one month before the Rent Control Court or Execution Court, as the case may be, and he shall continue to pay the rent without default. The petitioner/respondent is allowed to realise the said deposit from the court. (3) In the event of failure to comply any of the conditions stated above, the respondent herein will be at liberty to proceed with the execution.