JUDGMENT : Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. C.A.N. 10399 of 2016 is an application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act praying for a direction upon the writ petitioner Authority/opposite party to pay the last drawn wages to the applicant month by month as an interim relief during the pendency of the writ petition being W.P. 14389(W) of 2016 filed by the opposite party. 2. The application has been hotly contested by the writ petitioner Authority by filing an affidavit-in-opposition to which the workman/applicant has also used his reply. 3. Suffice will it be for the present purpose to mention that the 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal by an Award dated March 30, 2016 had directed the writ petitioner authority to re-instate the workman/applicant in service with effect from March 3, 1981 along with other ancillary benefits. 4. This Award is under challenge in this writ petition on various grounds. One of the grounds of challenge is that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass this Award or even to hear out this matter as in an earlier round of writ petition against the earlier Award, a Division Bench of this Court had directed the learned Trial Judge to re-hear the matter and sent the matter back to him. The writ petitioner authority very strongly argued that the Tribunal lacking in jurisdiction could never have passed an Award and as such, the Award must be treated as a non-est and a nullity. If the Award is a nullity, the applicant cannot maintain any application under Section 17B of the said Act. 5. In support of their contention, Mr. Talukdar, the learned advocate for the writ petitioner has referred to certain cases primarily on the proposition of law that where there is lack of jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the issue and such an order or a degree is a nullity and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. In case of Zuari Cement Limited v. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Hyderabad & Ors, reported in (2015) SCC 690, the Supreme Court re-iterated a very well-settled principle of law that even the consent of the parties does not confer jurisdiction upon a Court which it really lack of. 6. These are very well settled principles of law from which there cannot be any deviation. 6. These are very well settled principles of law from which there cannot be any deviation. However, a most important aspect of the matter has to be considered while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioner has made collateral challenge to the Award on merits as well and has, along with the prayer for a declaration that the Award is non-est also prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus for setting aside the Award. 7. It is pertinent to mention that when the matter went back to the Tribunal, the writ petitioner did not raise any objection. They did not draw the attention of the Tribunal that the matter had been sent back to a learned Single Judge of this Court and the Tribunal had no authority. While I fully agree that consent does not confer jurisdiction, it has also to be applied that in the backdrop of the well-settled equitable principle that equity does not come in aid of a person who allows a proceeding to continue and then turns around and questions the validity of the order and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass the Award. In the case of Zuari Cement Limited (supra), the High Court was found to be in error in directing the appellant to approach the ESI Court for claiming relief of exemption. The parties in that case did not acquiesce in the proceedings. They had earlier acquiesced in the proceedings and in that context, the Supreme Court stated that such acquiescence was immaterial. 8. This is not a case of a party's consenting to jurisdiction. This is a case where the statutory authority stood by the entire proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal and when the Award had been passed against them, they had challenged it on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The writ petition makes no reference to when they could discover that the Industrial Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench. In the absence of any such averment, it must be presumed that they were keenly aware of the position because in the presence of the learned advocate for the concerned authority this order was passed. 9. The third alternative still is that both the parties laboured under a genuine mistake. In the absence of any such averment, it must be presumed that they were keenly aware of the position because in the presence of the learned advocate for the concerned authority this order was passed. 9. The third alternative still is that both the parties laboured under a genuine mistake. Even if that be so, the sufferer of an award cannot be allowed to be wiser at the first instance. 10. Moreover, at the stage of disposing of an application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the validity of the Award cannot be gone into. The only pre-condition for exercising jurisdiction under Section 17B is the existence of an Award for re-instatement of a workman, the challenge made by the employer either before the High Court or the Supreme Court and the non-employment of the workman during the period. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, we will be compelled to put a word in the legislation itself, i.e. a valid Award of re-instatement. 11. It may be mentioned that a similar question had cropped up in Emco General Plastic Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 2015-III-LLJ 304 wherein a Division Bench of this Court had held that from the language in Section 17B of the Act, it is clear that once the workman fulfils the conditions of the said section, the High Court does not have any discretion to refuse the workman's claims for payment of wages last drawn by him during the pendency of the challenge to the Award. The right of a workman under Section 17B has no connection with the merit of the Award of the Labour Court/Tribunal. The Division Bench specifically held that if the Court is to accept the contention of the employer that the Award is perverse or a nullity and, therefore, the workman is not entitled to receive 'full wages last drawn by him" under Section 17B of the Act, it will be required to re-write, re-cast and re-frame Section 17B of the Act which is clearly beyond the Court's jurisdiction. 12. Moreover, the provision contained in Section 17B of the Act was inserted by way of an amendment effected in the year 1982. 12. Moreover, the provision contained in Section 17B of the Act was inserted by way of an amendment effected in the year 1982. The purpose behind such amendment, as it appears from the statement of its objects and reasons, is very clear that when the Labour Courts pass awards of re-instatement, these are often contested by an employer in the High Court or in the Supreme Court. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the Award causes hardship to the workman concerned. Therefore, it was proposed to provide payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned under certain conditions. Thus, this provision was made for the benefit of the workman during the pendency of the proceeding in this Court. 13. An authority without raising any objection to the proceeding and after suffering an Award cannot be allowed to frustrate the statutory protection of a workman claiming that the Award is a nullity. I make it clear that this is not a case of the parties' consenting to confer jurisdiction on a Tribunal so that the exercise of jurisdiction will be a nullity. It is a case where a party did not raise any objection and then assailing the Award as being against the order passed by the Division Bench. If the writ petitioners were aware of order of the Division Bench, it must be presumed to have been sitting on the fence. 14. I, thus, find merit in the application filed by the workman-applicant. The pre-conditions for granting the wages last drawn by him have been satisfied. The application being C.A.N.10399 of 2016 is allowed on contest. 15. I direct the writ petitioner authority to pay to the workman-applicant the wages last drawn by him from July 30, 2016 till the disposal of the writ petition or any further order whichever is earlier. The writ petitioner is directed to start making the payment for the month from the month of April, 2017. The wages for the month of April, 2017 shall be paid by May 15, 2017. The wages for the subsequent months shall be paid by 15th of the month next succeeding. So far as the arrears of the wages are concerned, i.e. from July 30, 2016 to March 31, 2017, the writ petitioner shall liquidate the same in four equal monthly instalments. The wages for the subsequent months shall be paid by 15th of the month next succeeding. So far as the arrears of the wages are concerned, i.e. from July 30, 2016 to March 31, 2017, the writ petitioner shall liquidate the same in four equal monthly instalments. The first of such instalments shall be paid by May 31, 2017 and the subsequent such instalments shall be paid by the last day of the month next succeeding. 16. There shall be no order as to costs. Re: W.P. 14389(w) of 2016 17. Since the records of the writ petition are available in Court, with the consent of the parties, the writ petition is allowed to be moved as a listed motion treating the same as on day's list. 18. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. 19. The writ petition should be decided on affidavits. 20. Let an affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition be filed within four weeks from date. Let an affidavit-in-reply thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter. 21. Let this matter appear for hearing in the combined monthly list of July, 2017. 22. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties and after going through the writ petition, I am of the view that the petitioner has been able to make out a prima facie case for the grant of an interim order. The balance of convenience and inconvenience also lies in favour of passing an interim order inasmuch as refusal to pass an interim order shall affect the petitioner more than the grant of it is likely to cause prejudice to the respondents, particularly in view of the order passed under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. 23. As such, there shall be a stay of operation of the Award impugned till the disposal of the writ petition or until further order whichever is earlier provided the petitioner complies with the direction given by this Court while disposing of the application under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act being C.A.N. 10399 of 2016. 24. However, it is made clear that a solitary lapse on the part of the writ petitioner shall entitle the workman to pray for vacating the interim order and to seek for execution of the Award in accordance with law. 25. Urgent Photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties at an early date.