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2017 DIGILAW 438 (ALL)

ATUL SHARMA v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-02-07

A.P.SAHI, SANJAY HARKAULI

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition has been filed claiming benefits of the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 2013 Act) on the ground that in the present case though the land has been acquired under the U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 1965 Act), the petitioners are entitled to all benefits under 2013 Act inasmuch as if such benefit is denied the same would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if such benefits are available in relation to acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 1894 Act) then in that event in view of Section 55 of the 1965 Act the same analogy should be applied as the Awas Vikas Parishad is empowered to acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. The acquisition in this case is an outcome of notification under Section 28 and 32 of the 1965 Act that were published on 15.4.1980 and 15.7.1982 respectively. The award was pronounced on 23.9.1986. It is alleged by the petitioner that even though the compensation was deposited with the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Lucknow on 7.3.1987 the same has not been paid to the petitioners or their predecessors till date. The father of the petitioner had assailed the acquisition by filing the W.P. No. 7791 of 1987 where the interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo was passed. The respondents wanted to negotiate the said acquisition and a decision is alleged to have been taken on 6.7.1988 wherein a condition was imposed that the petitioner will withdraw his W.P. No. 7791 of 1987. The father of the petitioners who had filed the writ petition passed away on 30.9.1991. According to the petitioners a decision was taken to exempt certain area of the land by the Board in its meeting on 29.10.2001 and accordingly while proceeding to dispose of W.P. No. 7791 of 1987 this Court directed for consideration of such decision relating to exemption. The decision rendered by the State Government refusing to accede to the said request was challenged in W.P. No. 710 (MB) of 2009 that has been ultimately dismissed by us on 3.2.2017. 3. The decision rendered by the State Government refusing to accede to the said request was challenged in W.P. No. 710 (MB) of 2009 that has been ultimately dismissed by us on 3.2.2017. 3. Sri Sudhir Kumar Singh contends that by virtue of the provisions of Section 55 of the 1965 Act whatever benefits are available, the acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the same would automatically be available to all such acquisitions under the 1965 Act. He submits that since the 2013 Act refers to the provisions of 1894 Act and the acquisitions made thereunder, and is a beneficial piece of legislation for farmers then by adopting the analogy of the latest Apex Court decisions, the provisions of the 2013 Act should also be read as extending benefits to the acquisitions made under the 1965 Act. In the event such an interpretation is avoided the same would result in discrimination and will violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The contention, therefore, is that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and its implications are also clearly available to acquisitions made under the 1965 Act under Section 28 and Section 32 thereof read with Section 55.. 4. Sri Singh has then invited the attention of the Court to the decision in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and another, AIR 1998 SC 1028 , to urge that in that case also where the matter relating to payment of higher compensation arose, the same was interpreted in favour of the tenure holders so as to include the subsequent amendments that were brought about in the 1894 Act to pay higher compensation. He, therefore, submits that discrimination was clearly the issue that was resolved therein and it was held that the compensation payable for acquisitions under the 1894 Act would be directly applicable with all its subsequent amendments in relation to acquisitions under the 1965 Act. It is in this manner that the legislation was interpreted to be a beneficial piece of legislation and was, therefore, extended in order to avoid discrimination. Such analogy should also be applied in the present context of the applicability of the 2013 Act. 5. It is in this manner that the legislation was interpreted to be a beneficial piece of legislation and was, therefore, extended in order to avoid discrimination. Such analogy should also be applied in the present context of the applicability of the 2013 Act. 5. He has then invited attention of the Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and others, AIR 2002 SC 3494 paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 in particular to contend that here also the Apex Court had ruled adopting the reasonings of Jainul Islam’s case to hold that by virtue of Section 55 of the 1965 Act amendments that were brought about in 1894 Act will also be treated to be incorporated for the purpose of extending benefits of higher compensation. He submits that such a construction would be leaning in favour of the constitutionality of the provisions of 1965 Act or else as in the present case it would result in repugnancy. He submits that different principles of compensation cannot be adopted for the purpose of extending such benefits which issue was also dealt with in the Nagpur Improvement Trust case in para 54 thereof. 6. He has then relied on the analogy that has been drawn for extending the benefits of the 2013 Act in certain contingencies to the aid of tenure holders where time and again such sovereign act of acquisition has been interpreted in a way so as to lean in favour of the tenure holders treating it to be a beneficial piece of legislation. The ultimate object according to him is to ensure free and fair compensation without any discrimination caused to tenure holders and any benefit by virtue of any Act made by the Parliament should also be extended to such acquisitions which are made under the said Act. He has invited the attention of the Court to the concurrent list to contend that both the Centre and the State have the power to legislate on the subject and, therefore, in order to avoid any conflict or discrimination in award of compensation, the 1965 Act should be construed to attract the provisions of the 2013 Act in all acquisitions where no possession has been taken or compensation has not been paid in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In the present case also he submits that the same condition exists and the Awas Vikas Parishad having defaulted, the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 7. Replying to the said submissions Sri Ratnesh Chandra learned counsel for the Awas Vikas Parishad has urged that in view of the decisions in the case of U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam (Supra) it is clear that under the provisions of then existing law the interpretation given clearly was that Section 55 incorporates the provisions relating to acquisition under the 1894 Act and, therefore, it is a legislation by incorporation. The second aspect dealt with in Jainul Islam’s case was that if amendments were brought about in terms of Section 23-A of the 1894 Act, the same shall also be read in favour of the tenure holders to be included by way of incorporation, as not doing so would amount to discrimination. He, therefore, submits that in view of the incorporation of the provisions of the 1894 Act in Section 55 such an interpretation was upheld and which has been followed later in the decisions that have been supplied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. He however, submits that Section 55 so far, has not been amended so as to apply any provisions of the 2013 Act. Secondly by virtue of the provisions of Section 105 of the 2013 Act, Schedule 4 of the same has not been amended so as to include the 1965 Act. The Parliament was conscious and aware of the existence of State Acts and other Acts but only a few were included in the 4th schedule. The Parliament being conscious of all the provisions that were existing then had not chosen to include the 1965 Act within the schedule and, therefore, there cannot be any presumption of adopting the provisions of the 2013 Act by way of incorporation. Consequently, he submits that there is no repugnancy, and even otherwise 2013 Act has left it open to the States to extend any such benefit over and above than that available in the 2013 Act which, therefore, minimizes any scope for argument on repugnancy. He has invited the attention of the Court to Section 103 of the 2013 Act to contend that the provisions of 2013 Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other Act. He has invited the attention of the Court to Section 103 of the 2013 Act to contend that the provisions of 2013 Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other Act. Thus, the question of repugnancy does not arise as the 2013 Act is clear and does not trench upon any of the provisions of the 1965 Act so as to declare it repugnant to the provisions of 2013 Act. 9. He also submits that Section 114 of the 2013 Act which is the repeal and savings clause clearly repeals the 1894 Act. However, such repeal would not affect the continued applicability of the provisions of the 1894 Act in so far as they relate to acquisition and will continue to be read on the statute of the 1965 Act. 10. Thus, the Parliament itself has provided for all such safeguards in the 2013 Act in order to prevent any inconsistencies or the repugnancy. Consequently, any benefit in relation to acquisition under the 1965 Act prior to 1.1.2014, which is the date of enforcement of 2013 Act, the applicability of the 2013 Act cannot be pressed into service on the analogy as advanced by the petitioners. 11. Section 55 of the 1965 Act is extracted herein under for ready reference : “55. Power to acquire land.— (1) Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for this purpose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act. (2) If any land in respect of which betterment fee has been levied under this Act is subsequently required for any of the purposes of this Act, such levy shall not be deemed to prevent the acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894).” 12. We have considered the submissions raised and we find that so far as the provisions of the 1965 Act are concerned Section 55 clearly incorporates the provisions of acquisition within its fold in relation to the mode of acquisition under the 1894 Act. We have considered the submissions raised and we find that so far as the provisions of the 1965 Act are concerned Section 55 clearly incorporates the provisions of acquisition within its fold in relation to the mode of acquisition under the 1894 Act. Thus, in the absence of any amendment to Section 55 the provisions of the 2013 Act cannot be ifso facto read into or be enforced so as to include or construe any amendment in the 1965 Act. This is further supplemented by the non-inclusion of the 1965 Act in Schedule 4 of the 2013 Act. The question of pressing into service the provisions of the 2013 Act automatically merely because of the 1894 Act as mentioned in Section 55, therefore, does not arise. 13. The second question is that the State continues to enjoy the legislative competence of enacting any such law under Entry No. 42 of list III of the 7th schedule of the Constitution of India. The provisions of Section 103, 104 and 107 of the 2013 Act are designed to avoid any repugnancy. The relevant provisions of the 2013 Act are extracted herein under: “103. The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. 104. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the appropriate Government shall, wherever possible, be free to exercise the option of taking the land on lease, instead of acquisition, for any public purpose referred to in sub-section (l) of Section 2. 105. (l) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. 105. (l) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notifications, as the case may be. (4) A copy of every notification proposed to be used under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament. 107. Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State from enacting any law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under this Act which confers higher compensation than payable under this Act or make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than provided under this Act. 114. (1) The land Acquisition Act, 1894 is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeals.” 14. 114. (1) The land Acquisition Act, 1894 is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeals.” 14. The issue of any inconsistency, conflict or repugnancy has to be analysed vis-a-vis Article 254 of the Constitution of India that reads as follows : “254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause ( 2 ), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.” 15. The law relating to acquisition is within the competence of the Parliament as well as the State legislature as provided for in the Concurrent list III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. Entry 42 that governs the field of legislative competence is extracted herein under: “42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property” 16. The law relating to acquisition is within the competence of the Parliament as well as the State legislature as provided for in the Concurrent list III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. Entry 42 that governs the field of legislative competence is extracted herein under: “42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property” 16. The provisions of the 1894 Act existed when the said Act of 1965 was enacted and consequently Section 55 of the 1965 Act incorporated the procedure relating to land acquisition as contained in the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act came into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The issue of repugnancy which has been raised is on the ground of resulting discrimination for extending benefits of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act which is clearly relating to the acquisition being treated and deemed to have lapsed in the event possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others, (2014) 3 SCC 183 and Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others, (2016) SCC online SC 929. This stated discrimination is being made the basis of the argument of repugnancy between the 1965 Act and the 2013 Act with the aid of the law of discrimination as explained in the case of Jainul Islam (supra). The denial of any benefit under the 2013 Act is, therefore, being urged as applying different sets of law for such benefit that has a common element as the issue of not taking possession and non-payment of compensation are of a cognate and allied character. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that while interpreting the benefits arising out of the amendments in Section 23A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Supreme Court in Jainul Islam’s case (supra) clearly came to the conclusion that even if the said provision was not specifically incorporated, it had to be read in favour of the tenure holders as it was a beneficial piece of legislation. The same analogy is, therefore, being pressed into service before us for construing the applicability of the 2013 Act and it’s provisions in acquisitions under the 1965 act inspite of the fact that the 1965 Act has neither been amended nor it is included in the schedule of the 2013 Act. 17. The same analogy is, therefore, being pressed into service before us for construing the applicability of the 2013 Act and it’s provisions in acquisitions under the 1965 act inspite of the fact that the 1965 Act has neither been amended nor it is included in the schedule of the 2013 Act. 17. It is also urged that the absence of exclusion of the applicability of the 2013 Act under Section 105 read with the 4th Schedule of the 2013 Act implies tha the Parliament did not intend to exclude the applicability of the Act in acquisitions under the 1965 Act. 18. The question is as to whether this can be understood as a repugnancy or a conflict or inconsistency giving rise to any discrimination as pleaded on behalf of the petitioners. In order to understand as to what is repugnancy in the sense as understood under Article 254 of the Constitution of India and its connotations several decisions have been rendered by different Courts including the Apex Court of our country and in order to appreciate the same we are referring the ratio of these judgments that illustrates this point. The first decision is of the Calcutta High Court in the case of G. P. Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore Roy Chaudhary, AIR 1939 Cal 628. While referring to the law as expounded by some of the Courts of the common-wealth countries the Court in paragraphs 10 to 14 has ruled as under: “10. Meaning of “repugnancy.” - It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct’ conflict between them, as when one says “do” and the other “don’t,” there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. For reasons which we shall set forth presently, we think that this is to narrow a test: there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say “don’t” but in different ways. For example, one law may say “No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time” and another law may say, “No per. For example, one law may say “No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time” and another law may say, “No per. son shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in [quantities of less than ten gallons at a time.” Here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified. This was the type of repugnancy that arose for consideration in Attorney general for Ontario v. Attorney General for Dominion of Canada, (1896) AC 348. The Canada Temperance Act, 1886, (a Dominion Act) contained one set of prohibitions, while the Ontario Act, 53 Viet. c. 56 (a Provincial Act), contained another and a rather different set. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that where the prohibitions of the Dominion Act were or might be in actual operation the Provincial Act was or would be inoperative by reason of repugnancy; but where the former were not in actual operation (by reason of their not having been locally adopted), there could be no repugnancy (pp. 369, 370 loc cit.). The question of repugnancy or inconsistency has arisen and been considered in several Australian cases, with reference to Section 109, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act which provides that when a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail and the former shall to the extent of the inconsistency be invalid. (A summary of the cases will be found in Wynes’s Legislative and Executive Powers in Australia; and in Street on Ultra vires.) In the earlier cases Federated Saw Mills &c. Employees v. Moore 8 C.L.R. 465; Australian Boot Trade Employees v. whybrow, 10 C.L.R. 266; Federated Engine Drivers &c. of Australia v. Adelaide Chemical and Fertiliser Co. 28 C.L.R. 1 the test of inconsistency adopted was whether it was possible to obey both the competing laws. But in the case in Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn. 28 C.L.R. 1 the test of inconsistency adopted was whether it was possible to obey both the competing laws. But in the case in Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn. 37 C.L.R. 466 where the conflict was between an award of the Conciliation Court providing for a working weak of 48 hours and a New South Wales Act providing for payment of overtime for any work in excess of 44 hours, it was recognized that the test was to narrow. Isaacs J. observed that two statutes imposing respectively twenty and twenty, five lashes for robbery might in a sense be both obeyed by infliction of forty five lashes and he therefore propounded a more satisfactory test thus: If however a competent Legislature expressly or impliedly evinces its intention to cover the whole field, that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another Legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field: (page 490 loc. Cit.) 11. It is unnecessary to mention all the subsequent Australian cases where this test was adopted we content ourselves with citing only Ex parte Molean Re Firth (1930) 43 C.L.R. 472 where Dixon J. observed that inconsistency depends on the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment completely, exhaustively, or exclusively what shall be the law governing the particular conduct or matter to which its intention is directed. When a Federal Statute discloses such an intention it is inconsistent with it for the law of a State to govern the same conduct or matter. 12. In Canada, of course, apart from a few exceptional provisions, such as those relating to agriculture and immigration, the Constitution Act itself does not confer any concurrent powers of legislation. There are only two legislative lists, but it has been settled by a long line of Privy Council decisions that there can be a domain in which provincial and dominion legislation may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires, if the field is clear, but that if the field is not clear and in such a domain the two legislations meet, then the dominion legislation must prevail: Grand Trunk Railway of Canada v. Attorney-General of Canada, (1907) A.C. 65 13. Once again threfore we are led to the same test as that propounded by Isaacs J.: “Is the field completely occupied by the dominant Legislature?” In England, the question of repugnancy has been considered chiefly in relation to byelaws and the general law of the land, a byelaw being treated as ultra vires if it is repugnant to the general law. In Gentel v. Rapps, (1902) 1 KB 160 meaning of repugnancy thus: is not repugnant to the general law merely because it created a new offence and says that something shall be unlawful which the law does not say is unlawful. It is repugnant if it makes unlawful that which the general law says is lawful. It is repugnant if it expressly or by necessary implication professes to alter the general Jaw of the land. I say by necessary implication’ because I have in mind the cases with respect to bye-laws prohibiting persons from travelling on railways without a ticket. In those cases bye-laws which impose the same penalty as the general law without making a fraudulent intention part of the description of the offence have been held to be bad, because the statute creating the offence says that there must be a fraudulent intention on the part of the person charged with travelling without a ticket and the bye-law therefore by implication alters the general law. Again, a bye-law is repugnant if it adds something inconsistent with the provisions of a statute creating the same offence; but if it adds something not inconsistent, that is not sufficient to make the bye-law bad as repugnant. 14. All these propositions are really reducible to the single test of the ‘occupied field,’ for in the first and the last illustrations, the ground not being covered by the general law, there is no repugnancy and in the others, the ground is already covered, so that the bye-law is repugnant. In Strickland v. Hayes, (1896) 1 QB 290 a bye-law which provided that no person shall use profane language in any street was held to be bad, because the general law, namely the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, dealing with precisely the same subject, required that annoyance should be caused by the language used in order that there might be an offence. In Thomas v. Sutters, (1900) 1 Ch. In Thomas v. Sutters, (1900) 1 Ch. D. 10 a bye-law that no person shall frequent or use any street for the purposes of betting was held to be good and not repugnant to the general law, the Metropolitan Streets Act, 1867, Section 23 of which provided that any three or more persons assembled together in any part of a street for the purpose of betting shall be liable to a penalty. The ground of the decision was in effect that the general law in this case did not occupy the same field as the bye-law; the one was concerned with the subject of street obstruction and the other with that of betting. In Gentel v. Rapps, (1902) 1 KB 160 a bye-law providing that no person shall use offensive language in a tramcar was held to be consistent with the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, which punished any person who in any street used offensive language to the annoyance of the residents or passengers, because the latter law (relating, as it did, to nuisances in streets) did not intend to deal with or affect the power to make bye-laws under special circumstances and dealing with particular places (namely bye-laws relating to nuisances in tramcars. The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs J. in the Australian 44 hour case Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn, 37 C.L.R. 466 if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore in. operative. Whether and to what extent in a given case, the dominant law evinces such an intention must necessarily depend on the language of the particular law” 19. The aforesaid observations have been later on reproduced, considered and explained by the Apex Court in at least three decisions which deserve mention, the leading being Ch. Tika Ramji and othrs etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1956 SC 676 , paragraphs 30 to 39. The aforesaid observations have been later on reproduced, considered and explained by the Apex Court in at least three decisions which deserve mention, the leading being Ch. Tika Ramji and othrs etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1956 SC 676 , paragraphs 30 to 39. The second decision is in the case of the State of T.N. and another v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute and others, 1995 (4) SCC 104 paragraphs 15 to 18 and the third decision is in the case of Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyarthavathiru Sundara Swamigalme v. Stae of Tamil Nadu and others, 1996 (3) SCC 15 , paragraphs 19, 20, 23 to 26. There are many more decisions to the same effect and it is not necessary for us to burden this judgment with anything further. 20. The basic principle that can be culled out from a perusal of these judgments is that the test of repugnancy is whether the law made by Parliament and that by the State Legislature occupy the same field and whether the Parliament intended to lay down a exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the act of the State Legislature. 21. The non-inclusion of the 1965 Act in the 4th Schedule to the 2013 Act in terms of Section 105 thereof does not necessarily mean that the 2013 Act was extended to be applied in acquisitions under the 1965 Act. The intent of the 2013 Act was to eclipse the anomalies and improve the conditions of payment of compensation to acquisitions made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only. Since the 1894 Act has been repealed, and the 1965 Act continues to exist without any amendment there does not arise any issue of repugnancy or inconsistency. This has to be viewed from another angle. The benefit of deemed lapse is by a fiction under a specific statute. A provision of fiction has to be strictly construed and it cannot be impliedly treated to be incorporated unless the 1965 Act also contemplates any such fiction. It is for this reason that an amendment will have to be expressly brought about in the 1965 Act if the provisions of 2013 Act have to be applied and not otherwise in relation to the procedure of acquisition. A provision of deemed lapse cannot be read into by way of interpretation into 1965 Act without specific amendment therein. 22. It is for this reason that an amendment will have to be expressly brought about in the 1965 Act if the provisions of 2013 Act have to be applied and not otherwise in relation to the procedure of acquisition. A provision of deemed lapse cannot be read into by way of interpretation into 1965 Act without specific amendment therein. 22. The other question is can this be construed the other way around by presuming an implied applicability of the 2013 Act merely because Section 55 of the 1965 Act incorporates the procedure of acquisition under the 1894 Act. We may put on record that the issue of lapse of an acquisition proceeding under Section 11-A of the 1894 Act was specifically held to be not applicable in acquisitions under the 1965 Act in Jainul Islam’s case. The same situation exists here where the issue of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is sought to be introduced and read into the 1965 Act. We cannot accept this proposition inasmuch as Section 55 of the 1965 Act has not been amended so as to include any provision relating to the acquisition resulting in any lapse as contained in the 2013 Act. Thus, such applicability cannot be implied when it has not been incorporated in the 1965 Act. 23. There is yet another reason namely the provisions of 2013 Act as contained in Section 24(2) are not inconsistent with any provision of the State Act that exists from before. Conversely the State Act also does not include any provision that may said to be inconsistent or in conflict with 2013 Act. The non-inclusion of the benefit of the clause of deemed lapse does not make the enactment inconsistent, conflicting or repugnant. 24. To understand this recourse can be had to the provisions quoted herein above in the 2013 Act that clearly provide that the 2013 Act and its provisions are in addition and not in derogation of any law for the time being in force. Consequently the States have been left to enact any law that may provide for any better facilities relating to acquisition over and above that has been provided for in the 2013 Act. This, therefore, also removes the elements of discrimination or arbitrariness. It is open to the State to provide better facility or benefit in matters of acquisition by bringing about any amendment in the 1965 Act. 25. This, therefore, also removes the elements of discrimination or arbitrariness. It is open to the State to provide better facility or benefit in matters of acquisition by bringing about any amendment in the 1965 Act. 25. Coming to the last limb of this argument namely the resultant discrimination in relation to acquisitions having been made prior to 1.1.2014, we may point out that when there is a legislation by incorporation then it is only that part of legislation which stands incorporated and continues to exist and not a new legislation which refers to the proceedings under the old legislation. The reason is what can be incorporated is that which exists. It is for this reason that Section 55 of the 1965 Act incorporated the then existing provisions of 1894 Act. The 1894 Act has now been repealed and is not in existence. Thus, it is only the provisions of 1894 Act that have been incorporated in Section 55 of the 1965 Act that will continue to exist for that purpose only to that limited extent. The same does not within its fold draw the elements of the 2013 Act which has never been intended to be incorporated or included in the 1965 Act or vice-versa. Thus, these are two sets of acquisitions under the different Acts and the question of applying Article 14 to invoke discrimination does not arise. 26. However, there is another shade of this discrimination which has to be avoided keeping in view the ratio of the Jainul Islam’s case. To that extent we hold that if any acquisition is made by the authority under the 1965 Act after 1.1.2014 then it’s actions or the assessment of compensation cannot be less than what has been contemplated in 2013 Act. The determination of the quantum of compensation, therefore, on principles will have to be applied in relation to acquisitions made by the Awas Vikas Parishad under the 1965 Act after 1.1.2014 as per the 2013 Act. 27. Consequently for all the reasons aforesaid the relief claimed in the writ petition with regard to the lapse of the proceedings cannot be availed of and the petition is accordingly dismissed.