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2017 DIGILAW 438 (KER)

SONEY VARGHESE v. UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION

2017-03-01

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : It is not necessary to record all the facts and controversy involved in this case in detail in this judgment. This is because the issues that has been raised in this writ petition have already been considered in detail by another learned Single Judge and he has delivered a very detailed judgment, which is exhibited in this writ petition as Ext.P15. Suffice to say that the petitioners herein are seeking the same benefits available to the petitioners in Ext.P15 judgment. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Smt. Dennis Varghese, Shri. Millu Dandapani, the learned Standing counsel for respondents 2 and 3 and the learned ASGI appearing for the first respondent. 3. The short question of disputation in this case is whether the petitioners would be entitled to be treated similarly with the 4th and 5th respondents on the question as to the award of Academic Grade Pay (AGP). The petitioners assert that they were appointed in the years 2006 and 2007 respectively and that they were given an AGP of only Rs.7,000/-. They say that the 6th pay commission came into effect w.e.f. 01.01.2006 and that respondents 4 and 5, who had been appointed only in the year 2010, were given the AGP of Rs.8,000/-. They contend that this difference is still continuing and that they have not been stepped up to the scale of their juniors, namely, respondents 4 and 5 till date. 4. I see that all these issues have been considered in detail in Ext.P15 judgment. Relevant observations of this Court is available in paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, which is extracted as under: "13. After hearing both the sides, this Court finds that, the explanation offered from the part of the 2nd respondent, to treat the petitioners in a different manner and on a lesser advantageous position than the persons considered for selection to the post of 'Lecturers' notified as per Ext.P5, but later appointed as 'Assistant Professors', is not at all satisfactory and there is no tenable ground to deny them equal benefit and parity of pay, particularly with regard to the AGP payable. If the matter is considered by the 2nd respondent in the light of Ext.R2(a), the petitioners who are situated under similar circumstance, can be found as fully and more eligible for the benefit flowing therefrom to have their grievances redressed. If the matter is considered by the 2nd respondent in the light of Ext.R2(a), the petitioners who are situated under similar circumstance, can be found as fully and more eligible for the benefit flowing therefrom to have their grievances redressed. In the above circumstances, the impugned proceedings are set aside and the 2nd respondent is directed to consider the claim of the petitioners in the light of the above observations and also as to the eligibility to have the benefits flowing from Ext.R2(a), after hearing, which shall be done at the earliest, at any rate, within 'three months' from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The benefits, if any, flowing from such exercise shall be disbursed to the petitioners without any further delay. 14. It is also made clear that it would only be proper if the 2nd respondent considers whether any other similarly situated case is there and if so, to extend similar benefits to all the eligible persons concerned, so that they need not be driven to this Court for extending similar benefits; as a gesture of goodwill. Both the writ petitions stand allowed to the said extent. No cost." 5. As is obvious from the judgment extracted above, this Court had already directed that the second respondent is obliged to consider the case of similarly situated persons and to extent similar benefits to them so that they need not be forced to come to this Court claiming similar benefits again and again. In spite of these observations, it is unfortunate that the respondents have not taken any action to consider the case of similarly placed persons. 6. The learned Standing Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 says that they have not denied any benefits to the petitioners, but that they are not entitled to claim the benefits of Ext.P15 judgment because when that judgment was taken up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Court had been inclined to confine those benefits to the petitioners therein alone. He further says that subsequently, the Board of Governors of the second respondent had re-considered the whole issue and had constituted a Sub Committee to consider whether the benefits of Ext.P15 could be made available to all the persons. He further says that subsequently, the Board of Governors of the second respondent had re-considered the whole issue and had constituted a Sub Committee to consider whether the benefits of Ext.P15 could be made available to all the persons. He says that, however, the Sub Committee took a position that, in fact, the benefits given to the 4th and 5th respondents had been so given to them illegally and therefore, that the Governors have taken a decision to recall such benefits given to them. He says that this decision is now pending in a writ petition before this Court and is awaiting final judgment. This has been vehemently refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioners who asserts that these benefits were not given merely to respondents 4 and 5, but to several others who are much more junior to the petitioners. 7. From a summation of all the submissions made above, it is obvious that if benefits have been extended to respondents 4 and 5, then, the petitioners would also be entitled to the same benefits on the mandate of Ext.P15 judgment. However, if as has been contended by the learned Standing Counsel Shri. Millu Dandapani, that the Board of Governors have taken a decision to recall the benefits to respondents 4 and 5, then obviously, the petitioners also would not be entitled to claim any benefits on the strength of Ext.P15 judgment. However, since these are disputed questions of fact which this Court cannot enter into or consider acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I deem it appropriate that a competent authority of the second respondent take a comprehensive view and issue formal orders one way or the other keeping in mind or adverting to all the submissions made on either side as has been recorded above. 8. In the above circumstances, I dispose of this writ petition, directing the Director of the second respondent to immediately consider the claim of the petitioners, after affording an opportunity of being heard to them and issue appropriate orders thereon, as expeditiously as possible but not later than 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 9. 9. I make it clear that I have not considered any of the claims, contentions or assertions of either of the sides on its merits and that any observation in this judgment has been made only for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition and the Director would not be confined or trammelled by these proceedings or by anything contained in this judgment. I am clarifying this because, I deem it appropriate that the Director takes an independent view based on the materials before him and by adverting to all the judgments including Ext.P15 and that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court mentioned by the learned Standing Counsel. This writ petition is thus ordered.