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2017 DIGILAW 440 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Jagjivan

2017-02-21

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The state has filed the present appeal against the judgment and order dated 31st March 2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra at Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2004. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the respondent - accused by taking advantage of the loneliness of the prosecutrix on 13th August 2004 has forcibly and against her will committed offence punishable under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code. That on 13th August 2004 at about 18:30 hours, deceased Meenaben, daughter of complaint - Jashuben, resident of Devcharadi, who was deaf and dumb, aged about 17 years, went to attend natures call, at that time the accused committed rape on her against her will and wish and committed offence of rape punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. After lodging of the complaint, the investigating officer has investigated the first information report. He has conducted the thorough investigation by executing the panchnama of scene of offence by recording statement of witnesses and by sending the prosecutrix and accused to medical examination. The arrest panchnama also came to be drawn and after taking every such step, as required under investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Magistrate. On investigation, it appears that the case was triable by the sessions in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. and therefore, the case was committed to sessions, which has come up for consideration before learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra and was registered as Sessions Case No. 33 of 2004. 3. It appears from the record that after committal order, on 21st February 2005 Exh. 12, the charge came to be framed against the respondent - accused for the offence punishable under Section - 376 of I.P.C. and the respondent - accused having denied the offence being committed by him, the case was put-up for further investigation. 4. With a view to prove the case, against the respondent - accused, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence and the same in following manner are reproduced as under:- Oral Evidence :- Sr. No. Exhibit Name Remarks 1 Exh.17 Dr. Kishorkumar Dhanjibhai Mangukia Doctor 2 Exh.22 Dr. Ashwinkumar Rameshbhai Rathod Doctor 3 Exh.26 Dr. Harun Abdulsattar Mor Doctor 4 Exh.29 Mrs. Jashuben Mavjibhai Bhavjibhai Koli Witness 5 Exh.32 Mr. No. Exhibit Name Remarks 1 Exh.17 Dr. Kishorkumar Dhanjibhai Mangukia Doctor 2 Exh.22 Dr. Ashwinkumar Rameshbhai Rathod Doctor 3 Exh.26 Dr. Harun Abdulsattar Mor Doctor 4 Exh.29 Mrs. Jashuben Mavjibhai Bhavjibhai Koli Witness 5 Exh.32 Mr. Ramjibhai Sundarbhai Koli Witness 6 Exh.34 Mr. Thakarsibhai Nanjibhai Patel Witness 7 Exh.36 Mr. Ratilal Gordhanbhai Koli Witness 8 Exh.40 Mr. Chhanabhai Ratnabhai Gangani Witness 9 Exh.44 Mr. Manjibhai Sukhabhai Patel Witness 10 Exh.45 Mrs. Kusumben Jamnadas Pala Witness 11 Exh.46 Ms. Minaben Mavjibhai Koli Victim 12 Exh.47 Mr. Mavjibhai Bhavjibhai Koli Witness 13 Exh.48 Mr. Ghanshyam Mavjibhai Koli Witness 14 Exh.49 Mr. Vashrambhai Bababhai Koli Witness 15 Exh.50 Mr. Jorubha Manubha Gohil, P.S.O. Dhrangadhra Taluka Police Station P.S.O. 16 Exh.51 Mr. Nasirkhan Anvarkhan Pathan, P.S.I. Dhrangadhra City Police Station & I/c. P.S.I., Dhrangadhra Taluka Police Station P.S.I. 17 Exh.52 Mr. Mahavirsinh Hitendrasinh Vaghela, P.S.I., Ghrangadhra Taluka Police Station P.S.I. Documentary Evidence:- Sr. No. Exhibit Description 1 Exh.1 Copy of Chargesheet 2 Exh.2-3 Muddamal receipts 3 Exh.4-11 Purshis 4 Exh.12 Copy of Chargesheet 5 Exh.13 Deposition and further statement of the accused. 6 Exh.14-16 Purshis 7 Exh.18 Forwarding letter regarding medical examination of the victim 8 Exh.19 Mark-8/8, Injury Certificate of Minaben Mavjibhai 9 Exh.20 Forwarding letter regarding medical examination 10 Exh.21 Mark-8/9, Injury Certificate of accused – Jagdishbhai 11 Exh.23 Forwarding letter regarding expert's opinion on victim 12 Exh.24 Mark-8/7, Injury Certificate of Minaben 13 Exh.25 O.P.D. Case papers (Minaben Mavjibhai) 14 Exh.27 Mark-8/1, Radiologist Report of Jagdishbhai Bhopabhai 15 Exh.28 Mark-8/2, Radiologist Report of Minaben Mavjibhai 16 Exh.30 Copy of F.I.R. 17 Exh.31 & 39 Purshis 18 Exh.33 Copy of Panchnama 19 Exh.35 Copy of Panchnama 20 Exh.37-38 Copies of Panchnama 21 Exh.41 Letter informing about identification parade's date and time 22 Exh.42 Accused produced for identification parade 23 Exh.43 Identification parade 24 Exh.53 Receipt of forwarding letter of muddamal sent to the laboratory. 25 Exh.54 Ravangi note regarding muddamal sent for examination to the forensic laboratory. 26 Exh.55 Report of laboratory regarding muddamal examination 27 Exh.56 F.S.I. Report with forwarding letter 28 Exh.57 Report of Dr.Bhargav R. Jadav regarding Eyes, Ear and Throat of victim. 25 Exh.54 Ravangi note regarding muddamal sent for examination to the forensic laboratory. 26 Exh.55 Report of laboratory regarding muddamal examination 27 Exh.56 F.S.I. Report with forwarding letter 28 Exh.57 Report of Dr.Bhargav R. Jadav regarding Eyes, Ear and Throat of victim. 29 Exh.58 Handicap identity card of victim Minaben Mavjibhai 30 Exh.59 Copy of Birth Certificate of victim Minaben Mavjibhaix 31 Exh.61 Copy of School Leaving Certificate of victim Minaben Mavjibhai 32 Exh.62 Copy of Birth Certificate of Sureshbhai Arjanbhai 33 Exh.63 Copy of School Leaving Certificate of Parmar Sureshbhai Arjanbhai 34 Exh.64 Copy of Rationing Card of Sureshbhai Arjanbhai 5. After leading the evidence, the prosecution has given closure purshis and thereafter, with a view to give further opportunity, a further statement of the respondent - accused came to be recorded under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. and having denied the offence being committed by the respondent - accused, the case was then further proceeded for adjudication for framing of issues, which are reflected in paragraph No. 5 of the judgment. After considering the evidence and after looking at the documentary evidence and upon appreciation of the depositions of relevant witnesses including medical evidence, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra by judgment and order dated 31st March 2006 was pleased to acquit the respondents - accused persons for the offence punishable under Sections 376 of I.P.C. in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 232 and 235 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. It is this judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which is a subject matter of present criminal appeal. The criminal appeal appears to have been admitted by order dated 12th December 2007. During the course of appeal, it further appears that on 13th October 2015, the Division Bench of this Court called-upon for R. & P. and the matter was listed on 30th November 2015. 7. Ms. Hansa B. Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State has contended that there is a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra in passing the order of acquittal. In fact, Ms. 7. Ms. Hansa B. Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State has contended that there is a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra in passing the order of acquittal. In fact, Ms. Punani has contended that the victim - prosecutrix was deaf and dumb and was not in a position to resist as also not in a position to speak-out and therefore, the mother and father has specifically lodged the complaint, which ought to have been appreciated looking to the evidence on record. Learned APP has contended that there is a medical evidence substantiating the case of the prosecution and therefore, also no order of acquittal could have been passed. For contending this, learned APP required and taken us to evidence of Dr. Kishorkumar Dhanjibhai Mangukia, who was examined as PW-1 at Exh. 17 and by referring to this, Ms. Punani, learned APP has contended that there was definite abrasion marks on the body of the respondent - accused and therefore, has contended that simply against this there are no specific injury marks on the prosecutrix, the case cannot be believed and therefore, there is a serious error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra in passing the order of acquittal. Learned APP has further contended that the injury certificate is also specifically indicating that the rape has been done on the prosecutrix and for that purpose, Ms. Punani, learned APP has relied upon the injury certificate produced by the prosecution at Exh. 19 and has contended that the case is sufficiently corroborated by the medical evidence as well. 8. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further contended that the another Doctor Ashwinkumar Rameshbhai Rathod, who was examined as PW-2 at Exh. 22, has also substantiated the case of the prosecution and therefore, when there are enough circumstance prevailing on record, which suggests that any set has been done upon the respondent - accused, the benefit ought not to have given by passing the impugned order by acquitting the respondent - accused. She has further drawn our attention to the another witness in the form of Dr. Harun Abdulsattar Mor, who was examined as PW-3 at Exh. 26 and also drawn our attention to the evidence of mother, who was examined as PW-4 at Exh. 29 and by referring to this evidence more particularly cross-examination of the mother's evidence, Ms. She has further drawn our attention to the another witness in the form of Dr. Harun Abdulsattar Mor, who was examined as PW-3 at Exh. 26 and also drawn our attention to the evidence of mother, who was examined as PW-4 at Exh. 29 and by referring to this evidence more particularly cross-examination of the mother's evidence, Ms. Punani, has contended that serious error is committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in passing an order of acquittal. Ms. Punani, has further contended that an identification parade has also been conducted in regular form and undisputedly the victim has identified the respondent - accused person and therefore, when the specific identification is also emerging from the record of the respondent - accused, no benefit ought to have been given. In addition thereto, Ms. Punani, learned APP contended that an evidence of Teacher Kusumben Jamnadas Pala examined as PW-10 at Exh. 45 has also substantiated the case of the prosecution and therefore, since ample material is adduced by the prosecution to substantiate the case, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge appears to have not rightly appreciated the evidence and therefore, this error of exercise of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected by reversing the order of acquittal. Ms. Punani, has also drawn our attention to the other evidence recorded by the Court in the form of evidence related to PW-11 as well as PW-12 and ultimately contended that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, are not germen to law and the conclusion arrived at appears to be perverse. Ms. Punani, has contended that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge are not sufficient enough to justify the order of acquittal and therefore, has requested the Court not to allow this impugned judgment and order to be sustained in the eye of law. No other averments have been made by the Ms. Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State. 9. Mr. Param Buch, learned advocate for Mr. Hriday Buch, learned advocate for the original complainant has assisted the learned APP and has adopted the contentions, which have been taken by the learned APP Ms. Punani and no further submissions have been made and has adopted the entire stand taken by the learned APP. 10. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Hriday Buch, learned advocate for the original complainant has assisted the learned APP and has adopted the contentions, which have been taken by the learned APP Ms. Punani and no further submissions have been made and has adopted the entire stand taken by the learned APP. 10. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Kirit Patel, learned advocate appearing for the respondent - accused has contended that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra has properly appreciated the entire evidence adduced on record by the prosecution and detail judgment is delivered by assigning cogent reasons and therefore, he submitted that since every evidence is examined at length by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, no interference in acquittal appeal is called for. 11. Mr. Kirit Patel, learned advocate for the respondent - accused has further drawn our attention and contended that from the reading of medical evidence, there appears to be no injury whatsoever on the prosecutrix, which would suggest the charge, which is levelled against the accused is correct and in the absence of any medical evidence, the conclusion, which has been arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge appears to be just and proper and for that purpose Mr. Patel, drew our attention specifically to the version of PW-1 i.e. Dr. Kishorkumar Dhanjibhai Mangukia, who was examined as PW-1 at Exh. 17, wherein a specific assertion is coming-out from the cross-examination that not only the prosecutrix has not given any history nor given any name, but at the same time there appears to be no injury marks or any marks of force being applied on the body and therefore, in the evidence of this doctor-witness, the case is not getting substantiated. In cross-examination it has further been revealed that from the body of accused, the abrasion marks are reflecting, but in the absence of any specific history not being recorded, this circumstance rightly been not believed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Mr. Patel, specifically drawn our attention to the medical certificate issued by the doctor, who has been examined about the physical condition of the victim, which clearly suggest that there are no marks of any force or injury over the entire body and therefore, by referring to this evidence in the form of Exh. 19, Mr. Sessions Judge. Mr. Patel, specifically drawn our attention to the medical certificate issued by the doctor, who has been examined about the physical condition of the victim, which clearly suggest that there are no marks of any force or injury over the entire body and therefore, by referring to this evidence in the form of Exh. 19, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent - accused has submitted that the case is not established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the order of acquittal rightly been passed. In addition thereof, he further drawn our attention to the evidence of Dr. Rathod, who was examined as PW-2 at Exh. 22, in which also a specific assertion is coming-out that in the history, there is no name referred by the prosecutrix and whatever has been submitted is submitted by the mother after almost four days from the date of incident i.e. on 7th August 2004. The evidence of Dr. Harun Abdulsattar Mor, is also pressed into service by prosecution as PW-3, who has specifically opined as contended by Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-accused, that on the basis of radiological examination, the age of the prosecutrix is appearing to be 15 years and more, but upto 17 years. But, this witness has specifically admitted in cross-examination that since this age suggestion is without physical examination of the prosecutrix and it is based upon mere reading of radiology report and variation is almost possible. It has also been pointed-out specifically by the learned advocate for the respondent - accused about the evidence of mother Jashuben Mavjibhai Koli, who was examined as PW-4 at Exh. 29 and on reading of this evidence, it has come-out that complaint appears to have been filed after taking advice of some of the persons of the village. It is also emerged from this evidence that the respondent - accused appearing to be a nephew of Sarpanch of the village. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-accused has contended that from the overall reading of this version of mother of prosecutrix, it appears that she has not credibly substantiated the case of prosecution. It is also emerged from this evidence that the respondent - accused appearing to be a nephew of Sarpanch of the village. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-accused has contended that from the overall reading of this version of mother of prosecutrix, it appears that she has not credibly substantiated the case of prosecution. From the cross-examination, it is emerging that the incident in question has occurred at a place away from the village and if this evidence is to be compared with the panchnama of scene of offence, which has been executed, the version is not getting substantiated. A specific panchnama of scene of offence is executed, which is reflecting in paper-book compilation Exh. 33 in which no notable marks of any such incident are reflecting nor any article is recovered from that and therefore, it appears that the case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent - accused has contended that on account of some animosity, the respondent-accused being nephew of Sarpanch has been roped into serious offence like this and therefore, he has drawn our attention to the explanation, which has been given by the respondent - accused in the form of statement under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. and has specifically contended that it is somebody else might have done. But in the present case, the respondent - accused and the narration of this explanation, which is reflecting on page Nos. 63 and 65 of compilation of paper-book, he contended in further statement, which has amply make it clear that he has wrongly been roped in by the prosecution. 12. To compare this evidence as a whole, our further attention was drawn by Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-accused to the evidence of father i.e. PW-12 Mr. Mavjibhai Bhavjibhai Koli, who has been examined at Exh. 12. To compare this evidence as a whole, our further attention was drawn by Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-accused to the evidence of father i.e. PW-12 Mr. Mavjibhai Bhavjibhai Koli, who has been examined at Exh. 47 and who in his cross-examination has specifically asserted that for the purpose of lodging the complaint to Dhrangadhra Taluka Police Station, the victim is not being taken along with him and therefore, since the complaint has been given later on and it appears to have been given after consulting some of the persons of village, further in absence of any cogent evidence of the prosecution, he contended that even apart from this even if any other view is possible, then also the possible view cannot be substituted qua that of the view taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Therefore, he requested the Court to confirm the judgment and order impugned in this appeal by dismissing the present appeal filed by the prosecution. 13. In view of the aforesaid situation prevailing on record and after overall appreciation of contention raised by the respective sides and keeping in view the evidence on record, we are of the considered opinion that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra are based upon appreciation of evidence and we see no error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in recording the judgment of acquittal. We have independently gone through the evidence as narrated above and upon examination of such, we are of the opinion that there is no extraordinary circumstance, which permit us to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence and therefore, we found that the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. The reasons, which are assigned are inconsonance with the evidence on record and therefore, looking to the self-imposed limitation of appellate jurisdiction sitting in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we are of the view that no error is committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and the judgment and order deserves to be confirmed and accordingly the same is hereby confirmed. 14. To arrive at this conclusion, we are further mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by the apex Court in catena of decisions. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 14.1 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 14.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:- i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:- i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994. 14.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 14.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mistery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 14.5 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mistery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 ." 15. In view of the aforesaid position prevailing on record as well as in view of the proposition of law laid down by apex Court in catena of decisions, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge requires no interference and we find no merits in the appeal filed by the State and the same deserves to be dismissed. 16. Sessions Judge requires no interference and we find no merits in the appeal filed by the State and the same deserves to be dismissed. 16. In the result, present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 31st March 2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2004 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhrangadhra at Surendranagar is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.