JUDGMENT : Mr. Suman Shyam, J. (CAV) - Heard Mr. S. N. Sarma, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Zahid, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner. Also heard Ms. A. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4. None appears for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3. 2. By filing the instant writ petition, a challenge has been made to the order dated 14.09.2009 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Government of India, Dibrugarh, inter alia, directing the writ petitioner to pay simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum to the respondent No.4 on the gratuity amount for the period from 07.12.2003 to 27.09.2008 i.e. the period during which the gratuity had been withheld by the petitioner. 3. The facts of the case giving rise to the present writ petition, briefly stated, are as follows :- I. The petitioner is the owner of the Tengapani Tea Estate situated in the district of Tinsukia, Assam and is, inter alia, engaged in the business of plantation and manufacturing of tea. For the purpose of running the said Tea Estate, a large number of workers and employees had been engaged by the petitioner and the conditions of service of such employees are governed by the provisions of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 and the Assam Plantation Labour Rules, 1956. II. The respondent No.4 was an employee in the petitioner's Tea Estate who was due for retirement from service with effect from 06.10.2003. However, despite attaining the age of superannuation, respondent No.4 had insisted that he be allowed to continue in service for further period. According to the petitioner, the respondent No.4 was not entitled to any extension of service and therefore, by issuing several communications he was asked to collect his retirement dues including the provident fund dues and gratuity amount. However, instead of responding to the said letters issued by the management of the Tea Estate, the respondent No.4 had approached the Labour Court at Dibrugarh by filing an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 raising a industrial dispute. III. In the aforesaid application filed by the respondent No 4, which was registered and numbered as Misc. III. In the aforesaid application filed by the respondent No 4, which was registered and numbered as Misc. Case No.1/2007, it was, inter- alia, prayed that a direction be issued upon the management of the Tea Estate to release the provident fund and gratuity amount and also for a direction upon the management to withdraw the criminal case pending before the Court of SDJM, Tinsukia. IV. During the pendency of the said application, an of court settlement in respect of the dispute involved in Misc. Case No.1/2007 was arrived at by and between the parties which had led to both the parties filing a memorandum of settlement before the Labour Court. In terms of the agreement recorded in the memorandum of settlement, an award was passed by the Labour Court on 16.09.2008 concluding the proceedings initiated by the respondent No.4 before the Labour Court. V. In terms of the award dated 16.09.2008, the petitioner had paid an amount of Rs.92,462/- as gratuity settlement and a further amount of Rs.3,42,753/- as provident fund settlement by issuing Cheque bearing No.004288 dated 27.05.2008 and Cheque No.448448 dated 31.07.2008, respectively. Besides the above amount, a sum of Rs.2250/- was also paid to the respondent No.4 as bonus -cum-ex gratia for the year 2003-04. VI. After receiving the said amount from the management, the respondent No.4 had approached the Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by filing an application dated 28.12.2008 with a prayer for payment of interest on the gratuity amount of Rs.92,462/- for delay in payment of gratuity for the period of about five years, i.e. from 06.10.2003 to the date of application which was calculated as Rs.64,157.34 (approx.). VII. After hearing the parties, the Controlling Authority had passed the impugned order dated 14.09.2009 allowing the prayer made by the respondent No.4 thereby awarding interest on account of delay in payment of gratuity. Aggrieved by the order dated 14.09.2009, the petitioner (management) is before this Court by filing the present writ petition. 4. By referring to the provisions of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Mr. Aggrieved by the order dated 14.09.2009, the petitioner (management) is before this Court by filing the present writ petition. 4. By referring to the provisions of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Mr. S. N. Sarma, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, submits that the appropriate Government for the purpose of the instant case would be the State Government of Assam since the Tea Estate in question is located in the district of Tinsukia, Assam and the conditions of services of its employees are also governed by the provisions of the Plantation Labour Act and the Assam Plantation Labour Rules, 1956. Mr. Sarma submits that the respondent No.3 is an authority under the Central Government and has not been appointed as the controlling authority by the State Government of Assam. In such view of the matter, according to Mr. Sarma, the respondent No.3 did not have the jurisdiction or competence to entertain the application filed by the respondent No.4 under the provisions of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 5. By referring to the contents of the memorandum of settlement entered into by and between the parties, Mr. Sarma submits that one of the grievance expressed by the respondent No.4 before the Labour Court was pertaining to non-payment of gratuity. By entering into the memorandum of settlement, all the disputes by and between the parties were finally settled covering all issues raised before the learned Labour Court where after, the respondent No.4 had also accepted the payments without raising any protest. On the basis of the memorandum of settlement, the Labour Court had also passed a compromise award dated 16.09.2008 finally resolving all the disputed issues by and between the parties. Therefore, submits Mr. Sarma, in view of the specific language employed in the memorandum of settlement notifying that the dispute by and between the parties stood fully and finally settled, it was not open for the respondent No.4 to once again approach a different authority making a claim for payment of interest over the gratuity amount. The learned senior counsel submits that the respondent No.4 having elected to pursue his remedies before the Labour Court and the matter having been finally resolved on the basis of a compromise decree, the subsequent claim of the respondent No 4 for payment of interest would be barred under the principles of waiver and estoppel. The learned senior counsel submits that the respondent No.4 having elected to pursue his remedies before the Labour Court and the matter having been finally resolved on the basis of a compromise decree, the subsequent claim of the respondent No 4 for payment of interest would be barred under the principles of waiver and estoppel. 6. By referring to the materials available on record, Mr. Sarma has further submitted that the management had issued a number of communications including the letters dated 31.10.2003, 12.11.2003 and 20.11.2006 asking the respondent No.4 to collect his gratuity but despite receipt of such letters, the respondent No.4 did not turn up to collect the gratuity amount. On the contrary, the respondent No.4 had continued to illegally occupy the company's residential accommodation even after his date of retirement thereby compelling the management to file appropriate legal proceedings against him for vacating the residential quarter. Under the Company Rules, submits Mr. Sarma, the Management was entitled to recover rent at penal rate for the period of illegal occupation of the residential quarter by the respondent No.4 and the pendency of the litigations between the parties concerning the aforementioned issues had created obstacles in disbursement of the provident fund and gratuity dues in favour of the petitioner. In any view of the matter, submits Mr. Sarma, the respondent No.4 having himself defaulted in collecting the provident fund dues and gratuity from the employer, cannot now turn around and claim interest on the said amount, that too, by surpassing the compromise settlement entered into by and between the parties. In support of his aforementioned arguments Mr. Sarma has relied upon and referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court :- 1. (2001) 6 SCC 596 Wazir Chand v. Union of India and others. 2. (1998)1 SCC 650 P. Virudhachalam and others v. Management of Lotus Mills and another. 3. (2006)2 SCC 641 National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan and another. 4. AIR 1960 SC 692 Vijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Workmen. 7. Resisting the arguments made on behalf of the writ petitioner, Ms. A. Choudhury, learned counsel for respondent No.4, has forcefully contended that the petitioner Tea Estate is owned by a company in the name of "Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. Ltd." which is a group company of the "Kothari Group" having operations in different parts of the country. 7. Resisting the arguments made on behalf of the writ petitioner, Ms. A. Choudhury, learned counsel for respondent No.4, has forcefully contended that the petitioner Tea Estate is owned by a company in the name of "Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. Ltd." which is a group company of the "Kothari Group" having operations in different parts of the country. The said company owns tea gardens in Assam and West Bengal and therefore, has branch offices in more than one State. Under the circumstances, submits Ms. Choudhury, it cannot be said that the Government of Assam is the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. According to Ms. Choudhury, it is the Central Government which would be the appropriate Government as per 2(a)(i)(b) of the Act of 1972 and therefore, it is the respondent No.3 alone who would be the Authority competent within the meaning of Sections 7 and 8 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to entertain the application filed by the respondent No.4. 8. Referring to the provisions of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Ms. Choudhury submits that the right to receive gratuity is a statutory right of a workman which cannot be denied to him except in accordance with law. Similarly, if there is any undue delay in payment of gratuity beyond the prescribed period of 30 days, then as per Section 7(3-A) of the Act of 1972, the employer would be liable to pay interest. Ms. Choudhury submits that Section 14 of the Act of 1972 makes it clear that the provisions of the Act would override other enactments. Since the right to receive interest is statutorily conferred upon the workman,hence, such right, according to Ms Choudhury, cannot be waived nor can the same be denied merely because there was a compromise settlement of the disputes arrived at by and between the parties in another proceeding. In support of her aforesaid argument, Ms. Choudhury has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and another v. All India Allahabad Bank Retired Employees Association, reported in (2010)2 SCC 44 . 9. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also gone through the materials available on record. 10. 9. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also gone through the materials available on record. 10. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties it is apparent that the challenge to the impugned order has been made primarily on two counts - Firstly, that the respondent No.3 is not the competent authority having jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondent No.4 since only an authority appointed by the Government of Assam would have jurisdiction to entertain the matter, and secondly, in view of the settlement entered into by and between the parties in connection with Misc. Case No.1/2007, the claim for payment of interest subsequently raised by the respondent No.4 was barred by the principles of waiver and estoppel. So as to appreciate the first objection raised by the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer to the provision of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which is quoted herein below :- "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) "appropriate Government" means,- (i) in relation to an establishment- (a) belonging to, or under the control of, the Central Government, (b) having branches in more than one State, (c) of a factory belonging to, or under the control of, the Central Government, (d) of a major port, mine, oilfield or railway company, the Central Government, (ii) in any other case, the State Government;" 11. The Tea Estate is not a legal entity nor is it a juridical person so as to be able to institute the present writ petition. However, the respondent has not questioned the maintainability of the writ petition on such ground. Therefore, the company, which owns the Tea Estate has to be treated as the actual petitioner in the present case. It appears from the materials on record that Ms. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. Ltd. is the owner of the Tengapani Tea Estate. It is not in dispute that the office of the said company is located at Kolkata and it has a branch office at Tinsukia. It appears from the materials on record that Ms. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. Ltd. is the owner of the Tengapani Tea Estate. It is not in dispute that the office of the said company is located at Kolkata and it has a branch office at Tinsukia. If that be the so, by the application of Section 2(a)(i)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, it is evident that it is the Central Government which would be the "appropriate government " to appoint a Controlling Authority so as to entertain an application filed under Section 7 of the Act of 1972. Such being the position, the contention of Mr. Sarma that the respondent No.3 did not have the jurisdiction or authority to entertain the application does not merit acceptance by this court. 12. Coming to the next question raised in the writ petition, what must be noted herein is that the issue involved in Misc. Case No.1/2007 was pertaining to the claim of the petitioner for payment of provident fund dues and gratuity amount to which he was entitled to under the law. It is in the context of the claim made by the respondent No.4 in the application filed in Misc. Case No.1 of 2007 that the parties had entered into a settlement which was reduced in writing in the form of a memorandum of settlement. The terms and conditions contained in the memorandum of settlement is extracted herein below for ready reference :- "Terms of Settlement : 1. That it was agreed between the parties that Sri N. N. Gogoi would collect his retirement dues i.e. P.F. and Gratuity and bonus for the year 2003-2004. 2. That the Management has agreed to allow Sri N. N. Gogoi to stay in the company quarter till 30th November 2008 and Sri N. N. Gogoi has agreed to vacate the quarter on or before 30th November 2008 which he was supposed to vacate immediately after retirement. 3. 2. That the Management has agreed to allow Sri N. N. Gogoi to stay in the company quarter till 30th November 2008 and Sri N. N. Gogoi has agreed to vacate the quarter on or before 30th November 2008 which he was supposed to vacate immediately after retirement. 3. That it was agreed between the parties that Sri N. N. Gogoi would be paid an amount of Rs.92,462 (Ninety Two Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Two) as gratuity settlement and an amount of Rs.3,42,753 (Three Lac Forty Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Three) only as for P.F. settlement and accordingly one cheque being No.004288 dated 27.05.2008 for gratuity settlement and another being cheque No.448448 dt 31.07.2008 for P.F. settlement is being paid to Sri N. N. Gogoi, the workman and he has accepted. Also a cash money of Rs.2250 (Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty) only is being paid to him as bonus cum ex-gratia for the year 2003-2004. 4. That this settlement fully and finally settles the issue raised before the Hon'ble Labour Court (Misc Case No.1/2007). 5. That both the parties would submit this full and final settlement before the Hon'ble Labour Court, Dibrugarh for treating the issue as raised under the aforesaid Misc. Case No.1/2007 as amicably settled by and between the parties outside the court." 13. A plain reading of the memorandum of settlement, more particularly clauses 4 and 5 thereof, would go to show that the settlement arrived at by and between the parties was only in respect of the issues raised in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2007. It must be noted here-in that the claim for payment of interest due to delay in payment of gratuity was neither raised in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2007 nor was the same dealt with in the memorandum of settlement. 14. Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 lays down the procedure for determination of the amount of gratuity. Section 7(3) provides that the employer shall arrange to pay the gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes due and payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. Sub-Section (3-A) of Section 7 creates an obligation upon the employer to pay interest if there be any delay in payment of gratuity. Section 7 of the Act of 1972 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- "7. Sub-Section (3-A) of Section 7 creates an obligation upon the employer to pay interest if there be any delay in payment of gratuity. Section 7 of the Act of 1972 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- "7. Determination of the amount of gratuity.- (1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. (3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3-A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground.] (4) (a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or mattes specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. (c) The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer. (d) The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. (e) As soon as may be after a deposit is made under clause (a), the controlling authority shall pay the amount of the deposit- (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is not the employee, to the nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or] heir of the employee if the controlling authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity. (5) For the purpose of conducting an inquiry under sub-section (4), the controlling authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a court, while trying a suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (6) Any inquiry under this section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.] (8) The appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the controlling authority." 15. From the scheme of Section 7 of the Act of 1972 it is, thus, apparent that the duty to pay gratuity is cast upon the employer and such duty is required to be discharged within thirty days from the date on which it becomes due and payable. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that the respondent No 4 had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, with effect from 06.10.2003. The prayer for extension of service made by the respondent No 4 was also rejected by the management. Therefore, in view of the categorical mandate of sub-section 3 of section 7 of the Act of 1972, it was incumbent upon the Management to pay the Gratuity amount due to the respondent No 4 with thirty days from his date on which it had become due i.e. the date of his retirement, which had admittedly not been done in the present case. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Sarma, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made an attempt to justify the withholding of the gratuity on the twin grounds that a criminal proceeding seeking vacation of the quarter occupied by the respondent No 4 was still pending where the Company had a right to recover penal rent and secondly that the respondent No. 4 himself did not come forward to receive the amount despite letters having been issued to him by the Management. 17. It must be remembered that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is a beneficial piece of legislation, the object of which is to regulate the payment of gratuity to the industrial workers and is a complete code containing the various provisions governing the rights and obligations of the employer and employee in that regard. Section 7(3) of the Act of 1972 prescribes the time frame within which the payment of gratuity is to be made. Section 14 of the Act lays down that the provisions of the Act of 1972 would over-ride any other act, instrument or contract which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The duty to make payment of Gratuity within the time frame prescribed by the Act is a statutory duty, the performance of which cannot be denied or delayed by the Management in a manner inconsistent with the Act of 1972. 18. As has been mentioned above, in the present case, the payment of gratuity was withheld by the Management owing to the pendency of the criminal proceeding against the respondent No 4. However, having regard to the scheme of the Act of 1972, the mere fact that a co-lateral proceeding seeking vacation of the Quarter occupied by the employee with a claim for recovery of penal rent was pending at the relevant point of time cannot be said to be a valid ground to withhold the gratuity amount due and payable to the employee as per the provisions of the Act of 1972. 19. 19. Assuming that the respondent No. 4 did to turn up to receive the gratuity despite receipt of the letters dated 31.10.2003, 12.11.2003 and 20.11.2006 even in that case there is no explanation as to why the permission as per proviso to section 7 (3-A) of the Act of 1972 had not been taken by the Management from the competent authority for delaying the payment of gratuity on the ground that such delay was on account of the fault of the employee. Taking note of such lapses on the part of the petitioner, the respondent No3 had issued the direction to pay interest by the impugned order dated 14.09.2009. 20. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra ) relied upon by Mr. Sarma, the Supreme Court had held that the " doctrine of election" is a branch of " rule of estoppels" in terms of which, a person may be precluded by his action or conduct or silence, when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. In that case the question that arose for decision of the Supreme Court was as to whether, while defending an action initiated under the provision under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, it was open for the insurer to raise a defence under sub-section (2) of section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was in that context that the Supreme Court had observed that a right to defend a claim petition arising under one statute cannot be held to be applicable in a claim petition arising under different statute unless there exists express provisions there for. It was further held that a party to a lis , having regard to different provisions of the two acts, cannot enforce liabilities of the insurer under both the Acts. However, as noted above, the fact situation in that case was completely different and therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel, in the opinion of this Court, would have no application in facts of the present case. 21. Mr. Sarma has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wazir Chand (supra) to contend that penal rent can be charged by the Management in case of un-authorised occupation of the quarter. 21. Mr. Sarma has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wazir Chand (supra) to contend that penal rent can be charged by the Management in case of un-authorised occupation of the quarter. But the issue in this proceeding is not whether penal rent can be charged or not but it is whether, the withholding of the gratuity of the respondent No. 4 under the circumstances noted above would invite interest under section 7(3-A) of the Act of 1972. 22. In a Constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Supdt. Of Taxes v Onkarmal Nathmal Trust reported (1976) 1 SCC 766 , it has been observed that waiver is either a form of estoppel or election. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct means that where one, by word or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter, a different state of thing as existing at that time. It has been further observed that there is no common law estoppel founded on a statement of future intention and the doctrine is applied to cases where a promisor has been estopped from acting inconsistently with a promise not to enforce an existing legal obligation. 23. The right of a workman to receive gratuity, including interest due to delayed payment thereof, is a benefit under the Act of 1972. Therefore, in order to succeed in the plea of waiver, it must be established that the respondent No.4 had waived such benefit at the time of signing of the memorandum of settlement and had elected to surrender his claim against the employer for recovery of interest due to delayed payment of gratuity. But from a reading of the memorandum of settlement, it appears that not to speak of forgoing the interest claim, the respondent No.4 was not even aware of such a benefit available to him under the statute. The question of waiver of a benefit which was not within the knowledge of the respondent No.4, therefore, cannot arise in the eye of law. Moreover, there is no promise on the part of the respondent No.4 not to claim any benefit not covered under the terms of settlement. The question of waiver of a benefit which was not within the knowledge of the respondent No.4, therefore, cannot arise in the eye of law. Moreover, there is no promise on the part of the respondent No.4 not to claim any benefit not covered under the terms of settlement. Even assuming that the parties to the memorandum of settlement were aware of the benefit available under section 7 (3-A) of the Act of 1972, even in that case, by operation of section 14 of the Act of 1972, such a clause would not be enforceable against the respondent No.4, the same being inconsistent with the provisions of Act of 1972. 24. There can be hardly any doubt regarding the fact that an Award passed by the Labour Court in a proceeding under section 33-C of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 based on a memorandum of settlement would be final and binding upon both the parties. But such finality can be attached to only those issues which were expressly included in the memorandum of settlement. Since the issue regarding payment of interest due to delay in payment of gratuity was not an issue included in the memorandum of settlement, hence, the respondent No. 4 cannot be precluded from instituting appropriate proceeding for recovery of such benefit which was available to him under the statute. I, therefore, find sufficient force in the submission of Ms. Choudhury that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, notwithstanding the award dated 16.09.2008, the right of the respondent No. 4 to claim interest as per section 7 (3-A) of the Act of 1972 would survive. 25. Since there is no dispute regarding the quantum in this case, hence, there is no necessity for this court to go into the said aspect of the matter. 26. For the reasons stated herein above, I am of the view that the writ petition is devoid of any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. There would be no order as to cost.