JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. This petition challenges the order dated 2.12.2014 passed by the learned Ist Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S.No.1842 of 2010. By the said order, the learned trial court rejected the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. for amendment of the plaint. 2. The petitioner as plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of contract and other ancillary reliefs impleading the opposite parties as defendants. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit plot no.4626 having an area of A0.59 decimal was recorded in the name of late Nityanada Tripathy, defendant nos. 1 and 2 in the Consolidation R.O.R. published in the year 1984. The parties were in possession of their respective shares. The defendant no.1 was in possession of an area Ac.0.19 2/3 decimals from the northern side of the suit plot. To press his legal necessity, he evinced an intention to sell the same to the plaintiff, who is the owner of contiguous chaka. The defendant no.1 executed an agreement for sale, received a part consideration and delivered possession in favour of the plaintiff on 20.3.1997. He was ready and willing to perform his part contract. When defendant no.1 had not executed the sale deed, he instituted the suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs. While the matter stood thus, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. to amend the plaint. In the proposed amendment, the plaintiff sought to incorporate the plea that possession of the land was delivered to him. He is in possession of the suit land and acquired title by way of adverse possession. An alternative prayer has been sought for declaration that the plaintiff has acquired right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. The defendant no.1 filed objection. The learned trial court held that the proposed amendment will change the nature and character of the suit and rejected the same. 3. Mr. Sahu, learned counsel for the petitioner argued with vehemence that pursuant to agreement to sell, defendant no.1 has received a part consideration. He delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff merged the suit plot with his plot. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and with the hostile animus to defendant no.1 for more than a statutory period and, as such acquired title by way of adverse possession. He delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff merged the suit plot with his plot. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and with the hostile animus to defendant no.1 for more than a statutory period and, as such acquired title by way of adverse possession. The proposed amendment is formal and will not change the nature and character of the suit. The learned trial court committed a manifest illegality in rejecting the application for amendment. 4. Per contra, Mr.Patnaik, learned counsel for opposite party no.1 submitted that the plaintiff has instituted the suit for specific performance of contract. In the proposed amendment, he sought the prayer for declaration of title by way of adverse possession. The plea is inconsistent. He relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal (Deceased) through his Lrs. Kachru and others Vrs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and another, AIR 1996 SC 910 . 5. The seminal question hinges for consideration is whether the plaintiff can seek a declaration that he has acquired title by way of adverse possession in a suit for specific performance of contract ? 6. In Annamalai Chettiar and another v. Muthiah Chettiar and another, ILR (1965) Mad 254, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held thus: "In the case of an executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed the position is different. The purchaser who gets possession in such cases is in possession in a derivative character and in clear recognition of and in acknowledgement of the title of the vendor. The animus of the purchaser throughout is that he is in possession of the property belonging to the vendor, and that the former's title has to be perfected by a duly executed registered deed of sale under which the vendor has to pass on and convey his title. xxx xxx xxx In the instant case the possession of the respondent was in pursuance of and under the agreement of sale, right from the inception, and therefore, clearly permissive in character besides being in recognition and acknowledgement of the title of the owner. xxx xxx xxx In the instant case the possession of the respondent was in pursuance of and under the agreement of sale, right from the inception, and therefore, clearly permissive in character besides being in recognition and acknowledgement of the title of the owner. xxx xxx xxx ……….in the conception of adverse possession there is an essential and basic difference between a case in which the other party is put in possession of the property by an outright transfer, both parties stipulating for a total divestiture of all the rights of the transferor in the property, and a case in which, there is a mere executory agreement of transfer both parties contemplating a deed of transfer to be executed at a later point of time. In the latter case the principle of estoppel which applies between mortgagor and mortgagee or a lessor and lessee clearly applies, estopping the transferee from contending that his possession, while the contract remained executory in stage, was in his own right and adversely against the transferor. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper, referable to a contract, it cannot be adverse. xxx xxx xxx ……if a person is in actual possession and has a right to possession under a title involving a due recognition of the owner’s title his possession will not be regarded as adverse in law, even though he claims under another title, having regard to the well recognised policy of law that possession is never considered adverse if it is referable to a lawful title. The purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse.” 7. The aforesaid decision was cited with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in Baruna Giri and others and Rajakishore Giri and others, AIR 1983 Orissa 107. This Court held that even after the contract to sell, title clearly resides in the vendor, and even though the proposed vendee has taken possession, his possession under the contract and is, therefore, clearly permissible. Where, therefore, the origin of possession of the proposed vendee is proved to be permissive it will be presumed to be so un-less and until something happened to make it adverse. Where, therefore, the origin of possession of the proposed vendee is proved to be permissive it will be presumed to be so un-less and until something happened to make it adverse. Unless the proposed vendee asserts any hostile or overt act to show that he disclaimed the title of the vendor, his possession would not be adverse. The mere fact of long possession is not sufficient to alter the character of permissive possession into an adverse one. 8. The plea of title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the later does not begin to operate until the former is renounced as held by the apex Court in the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others, (2007) 6 SCC 59 . In Mohal Lal (supra), the appellant had come into possession of the suit-lands pursuant to an agreement of sale dated March 8, 1956. He paid part consideration of Rs.500/-and obtained possession of the lands. Subsequently, the respondent purchased the lands by sale deed dated March 23, 1960. In the meanwhile, the appellant’s for specific performance of the contract for sale was dismissed and became final. The respondent filed the suit for possession. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, it was reversed and dismissed. In second appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court. The matter went to the Apex Court. The question arose before the apex Court as to whether the appellant was entitled to retain possession of the suit property. Two pleas had been raised by the appellant in defence; one was that having remained in possession from March, 8, 1956, he has perfected his title by prescription. Secondly, he pleaded that he was entitled to retain his possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The apex Court held thus : “As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Secondly, he pleaded that he was entitled to retain his possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The apex Court held thus : “As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor of his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi nec clam nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” 9. In view of the decisions cited supra, the inescapable conclusion is that the petition, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.