JUDGMENT : Rakesh Srivastava, J. On 7.4.2014, the petitioner - plaintiff filed a suit for damages and permanent injunction against the defendant - respondent no.3. Along with the institution of the suit the petitioner moved an application (6 Ga) under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "CPC") seeking temporary injunction so as to restrain respondent no.3 or her men or agents, or her representatives or any person claiming through her or under her from causing damage or breaking Northern walls and pillars of the three storeyed residential house of the petitioner bearing no.SS-II-D-I/1517, LDA Colony, Kanpur Road, P.S. Krishna Nagar, Lucknow. The petitioner also filed an application for issue of commission seeking inspection of the property in dispute. The trial Court issued notice to respondent no.3 and also appointed court Amin to inspect the property in dispute. In pursuance of the order passed by the trial Court, the court Amin submitted his report dated 17.4.2014. Respondent no.3 appeared in the suit by filing vakalatnama and also filed objection against the Amin's report. Respondent no.3, however, did not file any objection to the application for grant of temporary injunction (6 Ga) moved by the petitioner along with the suit. It is alleged that respondent no.3 adopted delaying tactics by filing vakalatnama of another advocate. On 31.5.2014, when the case was called out no one appeared on behalf of respondent no.3. The trial Court passed an ex parte injunction order in favour of the petitioner. 2. Aggrieved by the order dated 31.5.2014 respondent no.3 filed a Civil Revision No.0000192 of 2014 (Smt. Rita v. Smt. Shikha Wadhwa) under section 115 CPC before the Court of District Judge, Lucknow. The petitioner raised an objection against the maintainability of civil revision. On 16.8.2014, the District Judge passed an order and held the revision maintainable. It was held that the order dated 31.5.2014 was an ex parte order, and as such the appeal against the said order was not maintainable. The petitioner raised an objection against the maintainability of civil revision. On 16.8.2014, the District Judge passed an order and held the revision maintainable. It was held that the order dated 31.5.2014 was an ex parte order, and as such the appeal against the said order was not maintainable. Relevant portion of the order dated 16.8.2014 to which the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court is quoted below :- bl rjg voj U;k;ky; dh i=koyh esa izfroknh i{k ds mifLFkr vkus ij mldks vkifRr dk volj iznku djus ds i'pkr fo}ku voj U;k;ky; vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk izkFkZuki=] izi= la[;k&x&6] fnuakd 31-05-2014 dks Lohdkj djus dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k gSA ysfdu mDr vkns'k fn0 31-05-2014 esa ;g mfYyf[kr gS fd fn0 31-05-2014 dks vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk izkFkZuki= ij lquokbZ ds le; izfroknh i{k dh vkSj ls dksbZ mifLFkr ugha jgk gSa vkSj oknh i{k dks ,di{kh; :i ls izkFkZuk i= x&6 ij lquokbZ ds i'pkr~ izkFkZuk i= vkns'k fn0 31-05-2014 ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA vr% ;|fi bl Lrj ij fo}ku voj U;k;ky; ds izd=xr vkns'k dh xq.koRr dk ijh{k.k fd;k tkrk vkisf{kr ugha gS] ijUrq mDr vkns'k fnukafdr 31-05-2014 fo}ku voj U;k;ky; dh i=koyh ds vuqlkj ,di{kh; :i ls izfroknh i{k dh vuqifLFkfr esa ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa iz'uxr vkns'k vihy ;ksX; ugha gS cfYd blds fo:) flfoy iqujh{k.k xzkg; ,oa la/kk;Z gSA vkns'k flfoy iqujh{k.k vaxhdkj dh tkrh gS] iathd`r dh tkos] i=koyh xq.koRrkiw.kZ lquokbZ ds fy, fn0 08-09-2014 dks is'k gksA 3. Subsequently, on 22.9.2014, the civil revision preferred by respondent no.3 was allowed by the District Judge. The order dated 31.5.2014 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court to pass a fresh order on merit after giving opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. The order dated 31.5.2014 and the judgment and order dated 22.9.2014 are under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Shri Brijesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that against an order granting temporary injunction passed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, the respondent no.3 had a remedy of filing an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) CPC and as such, the revision under section 115 CPC of the Code was not maintainable and the same was liable to be dismissed as such. 5. 5. Shri Desh Mitra Anand, learned counsel for respondent no.3, on the other hand, has submitted that the order dated 31.5.2014 was an ex parte order against which revision was maintainable. 6. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Section 104 of the Code says that : "104. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders : * * * (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules:" 8. Order 43 Rule 1 says that : "1. An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely- * * * (r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2-A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order 39;" 9. Order 39 Rule 1 and 4 of the Code being relevant are being quoted below :- "Order 39 Rule 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.- Where in any Suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise- (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other Order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, dispute in the suit] as the court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders." 4. Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order : [Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interest of justice : Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving to a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting aside has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party.] 10. Order 39 which deals with Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders is divided into two parts: (1) temporary injunctions and (2) interlocutory orders. Rule 1 to 5 fall under the head temporary injunctions whereas Rules 6 to 10 fall under the head interlocutory orders. Rule 1 provides for cases in which temporary injunction may be granted, Rule 2 provides for grant of injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. Rule 2-A deals with consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction. Rule 3 provides for the procedure to be followed by the Court before granting injunction. Rule 3-A casts a duty on the Court to finally dispose of the application for grant of temporary injunction within the time mentioned in the said rule in cases where injunction is granted without notice to the opposite parties. Rule 4 provides that an order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside and Rule 5 provides that an injunction directed to a corporation is binding on its officers. 11. The expression "interlocutory" means provisional, interim or temporary, but not final. Similarly the term "temporary" in the expressions "temporary injunction" means provisional and interim, and, therefore orders of temporary injunction cannot by their very nature be final. 11. The expression "interlocutory" means provisional, interim or temporary, but not final. Similarly the term "temporary" in the expressions "temporary injunction" means provisional and interim, and, therefore orders of temporary injunction cannot by their very nature be final. From a plain conjoint reading of Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule (1) (r) it is apparent that, notwithstanding the characteristics of 'interim', 'provisional' or 'temporary' nature of the orders, an appeal lies from any order passed under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2-A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order 39. They have been expressly made appealable, if they are passed under Rules 1, 2, 2-A, 4 and 10. An ex parte order of injunction made under Order 39 will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. Thus, an ex parte order of temporary injunction, whether provisional, temporary or interim rendered under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is appealable. 12. The question as to whether an appeal under Rule 1 (r) of Order 43 against an ex parte order of injunction is maintainable is no more res integra. 13. In the case reported in AIR 1970 All 376 , Zila Parishad, Badaun and Others. v. Brahma Rishi Sharma a Full Bench of this Court held that against an ex parte order issuing injunction, an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) CPC was maintainable. Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the said report being relevant are being reproduced below :- "11. Two things deserved notice at threshold. Firstly, The language of Rule 1 (r) is unhedged and broad. Secondly, courts should lean in favour of an interpretation which expands rather than shrinks a remedial right. A remedial provision of law is generally construed liberally. Rule 1 (r) creates a remedial right of appeal for protection of substantial and substantive rights. 12. An ad interim injunction may be granted under Order 39 or Section 151 in some cases. No appeal lies against an order under Section 151, be it ex parte or otherwise. An ex parte order of injunction made under Order 39 will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. There is no other provision under which such an order can be made. Rule 1(r) of Order 43 does not say that an appeal shall lie from a final order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39. An ex parte order of injunction made under Order 39 will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. There is no other provision under which such an order can be made. Rule 1(r) of Order 43 does not say that an appeal shall lie from a final order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39. No adequate reason is shown for interpreting the word 'final' before 'order' in Rule 1 (r). Courts do not ordinarily make additions in enactments. That is a legislative function. ***** 14. Three things follow from these provisions. The law does not require the issue of notice when an ex parte injunction is made, although courts, as a matter of caution, issue a notice. The service of the ex parte order of injunction itself is adequate notice. Again, Rule 4 shows that an order of injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of the adversary party. Such application may be given when the order is ex parte or even after it has been made absolute. Until it is discharged or varied or set aside on such an application, either written or oral, the ex parte order operates with full vigour and stands on its own feet, provided it has not expired earlier. Thirdly, the provisions of Order 39 do not classify orders of injunction into (1) an ex parte order of injunction and (2) a final order of injunction. Courts have coined this dichotomy for the sake of convenience of speech and expressions. In the eye of law an 'ex parte' order is as much an order under Rule 1 or 2 as a 'final' order. Both orders last for the period each is granted or till each of them is discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4. The temporal life of each may be shorter than the life of the suit. 15. An injunction Interferes with substantial and substantive rights of a person. The object of Rule 1(r) of Order 43 is to provide a remedy for improper or invalid interference with his rights. If we restrict this rule to only final orders of injunction, the object of the rule will not be fully achieved. 15. An injunction Interferes with substantial and substantive rights of a person. The object of Rule 1(r) of Order 43 is to provide a remedy for improper or invalid interference with his rights. If we restrict this rule to only final orders of injunction, the object of the rule will not be fully achieved. For instance, where a grievance of the party affected by the ex parte interim injunction is that the court granting it has also acted from bias against him it is meaningless to force him to go to that very Court in the first instance. It shall only prolong the suspension of his valuable rights. In many cases he may get no relief in the end. Similarly, where the order of injunction is founded on an Act challenged as unconstitutional, appeal may yield quicker relief. 16. The language and the object of Rule 1(r) of Order 43 and the scheme of Rules 1 to 4 of Order 39 show that an appeal also lies against the ex parte order of injunction. As soon as an interim injunction is issued and the party affected thereby is apprised of it, he has two remedies: (1) he can either get the ex parte injunction order discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4 of Order 39 and if unsuccessful avail the right of appeal as provided for under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), or (2) straightway file an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) against the injunction order passed under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. C.P.C. It is not unusual to provide for alternative remedies. For instance, when an ex parte decree is passed against a person, he has two remedies: Either he may go up in appeal against the ex parte decree or he may seek to get the ex parte decree set aside by the same court." And then while repelling the argument that an appeal was contemplated only from a final order disposing of an application for an interim injunction after contest, the Full Bench held as under :- "18. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. As already discussed above, once the Court, after producing the application and affidavit, comes to the conclusion that the case is a fit one in which temporary injunction should be issued ex parte the Court takes a final decision on the matter for the time being and the expression of this decision in our opinion is a final order for the duration it is passed such an order is contemplated by Rule 1 and 2 of Order 39, CBC. We have looked into the authorities referred to above, but they are not applicable to the facts of this case and they have little bearing on the precise point raised by the learned counsel for the respondents." 14. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 the Apex Court has held that against an ex parte order granting temporary injunction the aggrieved party had two options; either to approach the same court, who had passed ex parte order for any relief or to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. Paragraphs 13 of the report being relevant is being quoted below :- "13. It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the said rule is the repository of the power to grant orders of temporary injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary, or till further orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be appealable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex parte order for any relief." 15. In view of the settled legal position it was open to the respondent no.3 to either move an application before the trial Court for recall of the ex parte order dated 31.5.2014 or the respondent no.3 could have filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code. 16. In view of the settled legal position it was open to the respondent no.3 to either move an application before the trial Court for recall of the ex parte order dated 31.5.2014 or the respondent no.3 could have filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code. 16. Section 115 CPC as substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure U.P. Amendment Ordinance, 2003, provides that a superior court may revise an order passed in a case decided in an original suit or other proceeding by a subordinate court where no appeal lies against the order. The remedy of revision under section 115 CPC is thus available against orders against which statutory appeal is not provided. An appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC against an ex parte injunction order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC. Therefore, on a plain reading of section 115 CPC, revision against the order dated 31.5.2014 was not maintainable. Accordingly, the order dated 31.5.2014 and the judgment and order dated 22.9.2014 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 17. In the light of discussions made above, this petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The order dated 31.5.2014 and the judgment and order dated 22.9.2014 passed in Civil Revision No.0000192 of 2014 (Smt. Rita v. Smt. Shikha Wadhwa) are set aside. 18. No order as to costs.