JUDGMENT : G.R. Udhwani, J. 1. The petitioners are before this court challenging the disinclination of the Labour Court to entertain the application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act ("the Act" for short) principally on the ground that in absence of challenge to the termination of services of the workmen, jurisdiction under section 33C(2) of the Act is not exercisable. The petitioners had called upon the Labour Court by application under section 33C(2) of the Act to compute and direct the employer to pay to them the amounts under the heads like overtime, leave encashment, bonus, weekly off and notice pay. As all the petitions raise common question of law, the same are taken up together and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Before dealing with the facts of the case, the legal position in regard to interpretation of section 33C(2) of the Act is germane to be noticed at this stage. It must be borne in mind that the principal function of the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the Act is to compute the entitlements of the workmen to money or other benefits which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Entitlement under section 33C(2) of the Act must not be in dispute and if entitlement itself requires adjudication, section 33C(2) of the Act cannot be invoked. This legal position has been explained by the Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. The Workmen and Anr., AIR 1974 SC 1604 in paragraphs No. 12 to 15 thus: "12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under section 33(C)(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In (Thief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In (Thief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar & Ors., (1968) ILLJ 6 SC it was reiterated that proceedings under section 33(C)(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the Position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. 13. In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff's right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function or an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under section 33(C)(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a proceeding under section 33(C)(2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely 'Incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'Incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a per-version, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. But that is merely 'Incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'Incidental' to an execution proceeding would be a per-version, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under section 33(C)(2) that court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions-say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as 'Incidental' to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not 'Incidental' to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under section 33(C)(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject-matter of an industrial dispute which requires a reference under section 10 of the Act. 14. The scope of section 33(C)(2) was illustrated by this Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagapalan etc., (1963) I ILLJ 89 SC. Under the Shastri Award, Bank clerks operating the adding machine were declared to be entitled to a special allowance of Rs. 10/- per month. Four clerks made a claim for computation before the Labour Court. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks came within the category referred to in the award and further contended that the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) had no jurisdiction to determine whether the clerks came within that category or not. 10/- per month. Four clerks made a claim for computation before the Labour Court. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks came within the category referred to in the award and further contended that the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) had no jurisdiction to determine whether the clerks came within that category or not. Rejecting the contention, this Court held that the enquiry as to whether the 4 clerks came within that category was purely "incidental' and necessary to enable the Labour Court to, give the relief asked for and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the Shastri Award, which not only declared the right but also the corresponding liability of the employer bank. This was purely a case of establishing the identity of the claimants as coming within a distinct category of clerks in default of which it would have been impossible to give relief to anybody falling in the category. When the Award mentioned the category it, as good as, named everyone who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which was necessary, became limited only to the clerks' identity and did not extend either to a new investigation as to their rights or the Bank's liability to them. Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the Award and the Labour Court did not have to investigate the same. Essentially, therefore, the assay of the Labour Court was in the nature of a function of a court in execution proceedings and hence it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine, by an incidental enquiry, whether the 4 clerks came in the category which was entitled to the special allowance. 15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the court at page 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fail outside the scope of section 33(C)(2). It was pointed out that a workman who is dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under section 32(C)(2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was pointed out that a workman who is dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under section 32(C)(2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was observed "His dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed him, a claim that the dismissal is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under S. 33(C)(2)". By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under s. 33(C)(2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was un-justified, But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under section 33(C)(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as 'incidental' to the computation. Moreover, if we 161 assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under section 33(C)(2). And yet if the jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many time comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under section 33(C)(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern." 3. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under section 33(C)(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern." 3. Bearing in mind the above legal position, if the facts of the case are taken into consideration at this stage, it is noticed that in the application under section 33C(2) of the Act which was numbered as recovery application, no assertion as to the source of entitlement of the applicant to leave encashment, overtime, bonus, weekly off and notice pay has been made. Only substantial assertion is that the workman should be paid the said amount. In response, entitlement of the workmen to the claims has been denied. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners sought to sustain the application on the ground that there is no specific denial to the claims made by the petitioners by the employer and though the employer was called upon to produce the documents or material in support of the petitioners' claim, no such material has been produced. On the aforesaid ground the application cannot be sustained since as indicated above it can only be sustained if the entitlement to the claim is asserted by relying upon certain legal or contractual source which may make the employee entitled to the said relief. In a case where the very entitlement is not established or where the facts underlying such entitlement are in dispute, jurisdiction under section 33C(2) of the Act would not be available to the Labour Court. 5. It is true that in the instant case, the Labour Court expressed its disinclination to exercise the jurisdiction on the misconceived ground that the termination order was not under challenge and it is also true that such ground of disinclination to exercise the jurisdiction is not germane to section 33C(2) of the Act inasmuch as what all the provision require is computation of amount or other benefits capable of being computed in terms of money and for that termination need not be challenged if the computation sought for relates to the entitlements prior to such termination. In the instant case, the claim related to the period prior to the date of termination of services. In the instant case, the claim related to the period prior to the date of termination of services. However, at the same time when it is noticed from the application of the petitioners made under section 33C(2) of the Act that for the entitlement to the claim, the source thereof is indicated, remand to the Labour Court after annulling its order on the aforesaid score would be a futile exercise. Under the circumstances for the reasons stated above and not for the reasons recorded by the Labour Court, recovery applications are liable to be dismissed with only rider that if the petitioners are able to show their entitlement to the claims made under section 33C(2) of the Act, it will be open for them to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the Act otherwise, it will also be open for them to raise industrial dispute in accordance with law on the subject matter of the recovery applications. 6. In above view of the matter, no substance is found in the petitions and the petitions are rejected with the above observations. Petition Dismissed.