JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present Criminal Appeal is filed by the State under Section 378(1) of Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment and order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Patan on 14.03.2006 in Sessions Case No. 596 of 2002, which was tried for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Taraben wife of accused respondent had filed complaint on 19.07.1999 against the accused by asserting that she had married prior to about one year from the date of incident. On 18.07.1999 at about 5:00 O' Clock, when the deceased Taraben was in the house, the accused has beaten her and by poring Kerosene she was set at ablaze. On account of these burn injuries, she was admitted to the hospital, but unfortunately, after six days she succumbed to the injuries and died. This has resulted into filing of the complaint. The detail narration is visible from F.I.R. at Exhibit-51 and to avoid burden of recording, not to reproduced at length. The Investigating Officer has investigated the First Information Report and after taking all steps for the investigation, the Investigating Officer has recorded statement of witnesses and has also executed various panchnama and all necessary steps as are required have been undertaken and ultimately charge-sheet came to be filed before the concerned Magistrate. 2.1 Since the case was triable by the court of Sessions in exercise of power under Section 209 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the case was committed to the Sessions Judge and the same was registered as Sessions Case No. 596 of 2002. The said case came up for adjudication before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Patan. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by judgment and order dated 14.03.2006, has passed an order, whereby, by giving benefit of doubt, the respondent accused came to be acquitted for the offences for which he has been tried. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the case and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under:- Sr. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the case and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under:- Sr. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1 Bajuben Bhuragi Thakore 15 2 Gagaji Dharamsinhgi Thakore 16 3 Bajuben Punagi Thakore 17 4 Punagi Kalagi Thakore 44 5 Sonagi Kalagi Thakore 45 6 Wagagi vagagi Thakore 46 7 Dr. Devendrakumar Nagindas Parmar 7 8 Dr. Dheerajkumar Jivanlal Soni 11 9 Majojkumar Thakarshi Thakkar 18 10 Bharatkumar Raychandbhai Thakkar 20 11 Sadagi Ravaji Thakore 21 12 Dhelagi Kangigi Thakor 23 13 Babugi Devshigi Thakor 47 14 Rupagi Ditagi Chauhan 50 15 Laxamanbhai Ratabhai Devda 53 16 Ranjitsinh Hathisinh Jadeja 54 LIST OF DOCUMENTS: Sr. No. Exhibit No. Description 1 7 Medical Certificate of Taraben Bhuraben. 2 8 Yadi of P.S.O. Radhanpur, Head Constable, Samjibhai 3 13 P.M. Note 4 14 Certificate of cause of death 5 19 Panchnama of plastic discovered by accused Thakkarsinh Karsanghsinh 6 22 Panchnama of scene of offence 7 24 Yadi of P.S.O., Head Constable Rupagi Ditaji Bandvad 8 25 Yadi of P.S.O. To C.T.A. Executive Magistrate for taking D.D. 9 26 Yadi of Executive Magistrate, Radhanpur for taking D.D. 10 27 Yadi of P.S.O. Radhanpur 2, P.I., Mehsana 11 28 Panchnama of Body of deceased Taraben Bhurabhai. 12 29 Panchnama of body of accused 13 30 Inquest panchanama 14 31 Wireless message for addition of Section 15 32 Report for additional section 16 33 Dying declaration of deceased executed by Executive Magistrate, Radhanpur 17 34 Dying declaration of deceased executed by Executive Magistrate mehsana 18 35 Yadi of inquest panchnama executed by executive magistrate, mehsana 19 36 Yadi of Mehsana civil duty 20 37 Receipt for giving dead body 21 38 Yadi sent for making map of scene of offence 22 48 Panchanma of scene of offence 23 51 Complaint of Thakore Taraben Bhurabhai 24 55 Note of sending of middamal 25 56 Forwarding letter of muddamal 26 57 F.S.L. Report 27 58 Forwarding letter of Muddamal 28 59 F.S.L. Report 29 60 Dying declaration form 30 61 Report of F.S.L. Mobile, Mehsana 31 63 Special report for serious offence 32 64 Yadi of police officer, Radhanpur 2.2 The further statement came to be recorded of the respondent accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure and since the respondent accused has denied the offence being committed the case was put up for adjudication. It is in this context, after appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge ultimately passed an order of acquittal which is subject matter of present Criminal Appeal. 3. Ms. Hansa B. Punani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge has committed a grave error in exercising jurisdiction by giving benefit of doubt to the respondent accused. Ms. Punani has submitted that there are voluminous material available on record pointing out the guilt of the respondent accused, but the evidence has not been properly appreciated and without any justifiable reason the benefit of doubt is given. It has also been contended that there is a specific assertion about the incident in question that how and in what manner it has occurred and this version has been substantiated by other witnesses, who have been examined by the prosecution. The prosecution witness No. 4 who was examined at Exhibit-16, who is uncle of the deceased, has categorically stated and supported the case of prosecution and has stated before the Court that the narration of occurrence was given by deceased herself to him and that evidence which is material to the case of prosecution has not been properly appreciated by the Court. 4. Ms. 4. Ms. Punani, learned APP, has further submitted that looking to the overall deposition of investigating officer, the case is getting substantiated as narrated in the complaint, the respondent accused himself has brought kerosene and this material piece of evidence has not been properly appreciated by the learned Judge. From cross examination of the deposition of the investigation officer, who was examined as prosecution witness No. 16, Ms. Punani, has submitted that the ill treatment meted out to the deceased is very much reflected and there are several witnesses who have given the statement about the frequent ill treatment and physical torture to the deceased and therefore, by contending this Ms. Punani, has submitted that the learned Judge has committed grave error in exercising jurisdiction. From the medical evidence and from the postmortem note particularly Ms. Punani, has submitted that the cause of death, which has been mentioned in column No. 23 is also on account of extensive burns and there is adequate material to substantiate the role played by respondent accused and therefore, since medical evidence is also supporting the case of prosecution, there was hardly any justifiable reason available to the learned Judge to grant benefit of doubt. Therefore, on overall set of circumstance, Ms. Punani, learned APP has requested the Court to correct the error committed by the learned Judge in passing the order of acquittal. 5. To oppose the stand taken by Ms. Punani, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned advocate appearing for the respondent accused has vehemently contended that the learned Judge has passed just and proper order which is in consonance with the material on record. 6. Mr. Thakore, learned advocate for the respondent accused has submitted that there is no any perversity nor any irregularity in appreciating the evidence on record and the reasons assigned by the learned Judge are justifiable and in consonance with the evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse. 7. Mr. Thakore has drawn our attention to the dying declaration which has been recorded on 19.07.1999 at about 6:35 A.M. in the morning which is reflected at page 225 of paper book compilation, wherein in column No. 12 it has been specifically asserted by the deceased that burn injuries has been sustained accidentally and there is nothing reflected in this dying declaration pointing out the guilt of respondent accused. It has been reflected that when dying declaration is recorded by the Executive Magistrate there is a Doctor's endorsement at 7.35 A.M. recorded that patient was in full conscious state of mind and therefore, there is no reason why this dying declaration cannot be believed and therefore, learned Judge has rightly appreciated this peace of evidence, which according to Mr. Thakore is justified in the eye of law. 8. Mr. Thakore has further submitted that there is a serious attempt of roping the respondent accused is made by the complainant and at two stages the dying declaration was taken of the deceased Taraben, has not attributed nor involved the respondent accused at any point of time and it is only after at a belated stage surprisingly the complaint came to be filed and therefore, this attempt on the part of the prosecution is rightly appreciated by the learned Judge, who granted benefit of doubt to the respondent accused and by referring to the certificate also issued by the Medical Officer of referral hospital which is at page 171 of paper book compilation, the initial history which was given by deceased Taraben in the hospital, is also about the accidental burns and there is no reflection of any guilt of respondent accused and therefore, from these overall material brought to the notice of the Court, Mr. Thakore has contended that there is no error committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in passing the impugned order. 9. One another circumstance has been pointed out by Mr. Thakore, learned advocate, that the prosecution witness No. 3, the mother, who was examined at Exhibit-15, has not supported the case of the prosecution and from cross examination of the mother of deceased has reflected that there appears to be some exchange of monetary consideration and having not been satisfied this complaint appears to have been submitted and therefore, all these circumstances are rightly been considered by the learned Judge and given benefit of doubt. 10. In addition thereto, Mr. Thakore, has also drawn our attention to the version of Dheerajkumar Jivanlal, examined as prosecution witness No. 2 at Exhibit 11, who also is not supporting the case of prosecution and therefore, when the evidence which is prevailing on record is not substantiating the case it is not correct to say by the learned APP that there is error committed by the learned Judge. 11. 11. Mr. Thakore, learned advocate, thereafter has submitted that there is no other circumstance worth the name to establish the guilt of respondent accused beyond any reasonable doubt and therefore, two initial versions of deceased Taraben recorded by the Executive Magistrate, are sufficient enough to grant benefit of doubt which has rightly been given by the learned Judge. Therefore, considering these overall set of circumstance, Mr. Thakore has submitted to dismiss the appeal. 12. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record. We have considered and re-appreciated the evidence to examine the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge and for that purpose we have gone through the certificate issued by Medical Office of referral hospital, which is at page No. 177, in which the initial history is also about the accidental burns, which has been sustained. Corresponding to this initial history, we have also peruse the dying declaration, which has been recorded by the Executive Magistrate, which is at page 225 of the paper book compilation in which paragraph No. 12 it has been specifically recorded that deceased Taraben has sustained accidental burn injuries and this dying declaration is also recorded in full consciousness of the deceased and therefore, when these evidence reflecting on the record, we are not in a position to disturb the findings and conclusions arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 13. In addition thereto, we have also perused the reasons which are assigned by the learned Judge particularly in paragraph No. 27, the overall appreciation of entire evidence is narrated by the learned Judge in which it has been specifically concluded that the deceased has sustained burn injuries, as is narrated in dying declaration. 14. On further analysis of the evidence on record, we find that the Medical Officer - Dr. Dhirajkumar Soni, who under took the postmortem examination, has found that if any person is doing the food preparation, there may be possibility of no burning sign on palm and at the time when the deceased was taken to the hospital by the relatives, a specific history was given that at the time of food preparation accidental burns was received and therefore, from this material even the trial court has found that there appears to be a doubtful circumstance whether the accused persons are guilty of offence or not. It is further appearing from the version of mother of deceased, who is PW-3, who has also not pointed any finger towards the respondents. On the contrary, from her version, it appears that when the amount was determined and payable, the same has not been given by the respondents accused and therefore complaint came to be filed and from her cross-examination, it is revealed that there is a possibility of some circumstance which does not inspire any confidence in case of prosecution and that has been found by the trial court, to which we are unable to substitute our own views, as this material has been considered by the trial court. From the materials on record, it is further appearing that panchas have not supported the case of prosecution. No doubt, to some extent hostile witnesses' evidences can be gone into but, at the same time, other corroborating factors must reflect from the evidence. We have carefully considered the evidence on record in consonance with the reasons and the findings which have been adopted by the trial court. But from there appears to be no stinking distinguishable material which may compel us to take a different view and therefore, we are unable to disagree with the view taken by the trial court. Therefore also, the order does not call for any interference. 15. From the aforesaid material on record and the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Judge, we see no reason distinguishable to disturb the findings arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing an order of acquittal. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power of evaluate and even re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution, but at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence as a whole and therefore, the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. We see no reason to interfere with the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions. 16. We see no reason to interfere with the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions. 16. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 16.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere Page 15 of 27 with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 16.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 16.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside"." 16.4 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on reappreciation of evidence it found the testimony of P.Ws.. To be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 16.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 17. In view of the above position prevailing on record and in view of the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and accordingly appeal filed by the State being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 18. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 14th March 2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 596 of 2002 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2 Patan, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.