JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has preferred present appeal feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 11.09.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court in Sessions Case No. 61 of 2003. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the complainant Saiyadali Mahamadali Momin, resident of Sidhpur is doing agriculture work and also trading in agriculture produce. He is also working partner of Taskal Hotel, Mumbai. It is further the case of the prosecution that on 2.5.2003, the complainant along with his driver Yunusbhai had gone to Devgiri Maharaj's farm house in his Jeep No. GJ-24-A-1101 near Kanodar and when he was returning to Sidhpur at about 7:30 PM, at that time on the highway between Dhariwada and IOC, one jeep bearing No. GJ-9-X-810 came overtaking the jeep of the complainant and after stopping the same, two persons from the jeep came down and also asked the complainant to come out of the Jeep. When the complainant denied of coming out, some altercations took place and other two to three persons came out of the jeep and managed to get into the jeep of the complainant. The complainant was knowing one of them who had pointed the revolver with him on the head of the complainant and told him not to utter a word. He took the driver's seat. Other persons who had Gupti and sword placed them on belly and neck of the driver and the complainant respectively. It is further the case of the prosecution that thus the said accused persons took the complainant and his driver from one place to another and asked for money i.e. Rs. 45 lac. However, the complainant agreed to give Rs. 2 lac on account of the dire consequences. Out of which, anyhow the complainant managed to give Rs. 1,50,000/-. He could not give the remaining amount and on 21.5.2003, the complainant gave complaint in this regard before the Police Inspector, LCB Patan. 3. In respect of the aforesaid incident, the complaint came to be filed before the Sidhpur Police Station on 21.5.2003 for the offences punishable under Sections 395, 365, 120(B), 342 of the IPC read with Section 25(1)(b)(a) of the Arms Act. This complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer Shri K.K. Desai and completed all the formalities. 3. In respect of the aforesaid incident, the complaint came to be filed before the Sidhpur Police Station on 21.5.2003 for the offences punishable under Sections 395, 365, 120(B), 342 of the IPC read with Section 25(1)(b)(a) of the Arms Act. This complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer Shri K.K. Desai and completed all the formalities. He has recorded the statement of driver Yunusbhai as well as has executed the panchnamas, panchnama of scene of offence as well as recorded the statement of witnesses Nanji Mangji and several other panchnamas and after conducting investigation and after recording the statement of witnesses, since the case is prima-facie made out, the Investigating Officer has filed chargesheet in the Court of learned JMFC at Sidhpur on 22.7.2003 and since the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, on 23.7.2003, learned Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 209 was pleased to commit the case to the Session at Patan and learned Judge thereafter has registered the case as Sessions Case No. 61 of 2003. Since the accused persons denied the offence being committed, the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 23, and accused have claimed to be tried, resultantly the statements came to be recorded at Exh. 24 to 27. The prosecution has examined as many as 28 witnesses and have also produced the documentary evidence to prove the case and after closure purshis, having been given the further statement of accused persons came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal procedure and pursuant to which, since the accused persons have denied to have committed the offence, the case was put up for trial. 4. 4. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the case and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under:- Exh Panch witness 32 PW-1 Yunushbhai Abdulbhai Mansuri – Driver 33 PW-2 Devpuri Sardarpuri Goswami 34 PW-3 Imdadali Mustufahussain Saiyed 35 PW-4 Aalambhai Dhirabhai Shaikh 84 PW-26 Saiyadali Mahmadali Momin 36 PW-5 Sadruddin Savabhai Sunsara 41 PW-6 Farukhamid Abdulrahim Nandoliya 42 PW-7 Sherali Daudbhai Momin 44 PW-8 Mahemudkhan Rahematkhan Khokhar 45 PW-9 Sultanali Mahmadali Sunsara 59 PW-10 Mehulkumar Dhirumal 60 PW-11 Sultanali Husainali Marediya 61 PW-12 Fatekhanali Abdulkhan Baloch 63 PW-13 Somaji Harchandji 64 PW-14 Ibrahim Ahmedhussain 66 PW-15 Mohd Ashif Usmanbhai 67 PW-16 Akbarbhai Mahmadbhai 69 PW-17 Dolaji Takhaji 70 PW-18 Madarji Mansangbhai 71 PW-19 Nasrulla Kajumiya 73 PW-20 Mahadevbhai Govindbhai Prajapati 75 PW-21 Chandrakant Gopaldas Limbachiya 76 PW-22 Abdulkadar Ahmedbhai Shaikh 79 PW-23 Bharatji Heduji Thakor 80 PW-24 Jaherali Valibhai Momin 82 PW-25 Riyazali Nazarali Momin 87 PW-27 Sherkhan Samsekhan 89 PW-28 Karamshibhai Kurshibhai Desai LIST OF DOCUMENTS: Exh. Particulars 37 Panchnama of scene of offence 38 to 40 Panchnama of scene of offence as per complainant 43 Panchnama of scene of offence as per witness 46 Panchnama of recovery of Jeep and panchnama of body of accused – Ashrafkhan 47 to 58 Panchnama of scene of offence as per accused 62 Panchnama of room where the complainant and witness was kept under confinement by accused 65 Panchnama of recovery of Jeep No. GJ-9X-810 68 Panchnama of recovery of Jeep 71 to 74 Panchnama of muddamal articles 77 Panchnama of body of accused Lohani Jahangirkhan Aabadkhan 78 Panchama of muddamal article 81 Panchnama of signature and muddamal article 85 Complaint of Saiyadali Mahamadali Momin 88 Depute Order 91 Special report filed by PSI, LCB, Patan regarding serious offence 5. During the course of trial, the depositions have been analyzed by learned Sessions Judge and upon examination of the documentary evidence as well as oral evidence, the issues were framed and after considering the overall material on record, learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Patan, was pleased to pass impugned judgment and order dated 11.9.2004, whereby, in exercise of powers under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C., the accused persons are acquitted of the charges under Sections 365, 342, 506(2), 395, 397, 120(B), 384, 385, 386 of the I.P.C. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of challenge in the present Criminal Appeal filed by State. The present Criminal Appeal appears to have been admitted on 7.12.2007, which came up for final disposal. 6. Learned APP Shri L.R. Poojari, has contended that the prosecution has led the evidence and prosecution has examined as many as 28 witnesses with a view to prove the case of the prosecution. The documentary evidences also have been adduced on record to justify the case but the learned Judge has not properly appreciated said evidence in its true prospective as contended by Shri Poojari. 7. Shri Poojari, further contended that the complainant, who was victim of this incident has specifically conveyed in his deposition, the manner in which the offence is committed, and at least that part of the evidence ought to have been examined by the learned Judge minutely and the learned Judge has seriously erred in exercising the jurisdiction for acquitting the respondent accused. 8. Mr. Poojari, further contended that the incident in question is of serious nature and the factum of taking money is established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, when this fact is established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, there was no justifiable reason for learned Judge not to believe the version of complainant, who has specifically put up the case in his deposition. 9. Mr. Poojari, further contended that for passing the order of acquittal, there is no justifiable reason assigned by learned Judge and therefore, such an order is not required to be sustained in eye of law. Mr. 9. Mr. Poojari, further contended that for passing the order of acquittal, there is no justifiable reason assigned by learned Judge and therefore, such an order is not required to be sustained in eye of law. Mr. Poojari then contended that when serious offence is committed by respondent accused, which ought to have been likely to be looked into by learned Judge and therefore, there appears to be an error in exercising the jurisdiction materially in passing the order of acquittal. When the entire narration of evidence supports the prosecution, as narrated hereinabove, which cannot allow an order to be sustained in eye of law and therefore, Mr. Poojari has ultimately requested to reverse the order and convict the accused appropriately for commission of crime, for which they have been tried. No further submissions have been made. 10. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Maulik Soni for Mr. N.K. Majmudar, learned advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Yagnesh S. Joshi for Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4, original accused have contended that while passing the order of acquittal, learned Judge has assigned proper and convincing reasons, which cannot be said to be improper or illogical and looking to the evidence on record, no illegality has been committed by learned Judge in passing the order of acquittal. 11. Learned advocate for respondents has contended that learned Judge has thoroughly examined the evidence on record and also examined the unnatural conduct of complainant himself and therefore, when the prosecution has not established the case beyond reasonable doubt from the material on record, it cannot be said that any error is committed by learned Judge. 12. Learned advocates appearing for respondents further drawn the attention of the Court that panchnamas have been drawn by the Investigating Officer and by referring to those panchnamas of scene of offence as well as of recovery of car, learned advocates has stated that there is no incrementing material found which can connect the case of prosecution against respondents accused and therefore, considering these weak pieces of evidence, it cannot be said that any error is committed by learned Judge. 13. 13. Learned advocates appearing for respondents further contended that even the stamp paper, which has been tried to be utilized to prove the case, is also not found to be proper as has been analyzed by learned Judge and main witness who can be said to be the star witness of the incident, is the driver, who was examined by the prosecution, but this very material witness has not supported the case of prosecution and therefore, considering these totality of circumstance, deposition of driver Yunus, who was examined as Prosecution witness No. 1, no corroboration is available to the case of prosecution. 14. Learned advocates appearing for respondents further drawn attention of the Court to deposition of complainant, which clearly indicates self contradiction in nature and therefore, when complainant himself has not correctly/cogently supported the case of prosecution, there appears to be no error committed by learned Judge. The learned Judge while passing the order impugned, which is assailed in present appeal, has also considered not only the deposition of driver but has examined the complainant himself and looking to over all evidence on record, i.e. panchnama of scene of offence, panchnama of premises abutting to the well house as well as panchnama of house in which the complainant was kept under confinement. These panchnamas reflecting no incriminating circumstance, whereby it can be inferred cogently that any offence is committed. Therefore by considering these pieces of evidence, learned advocate appearing for respondents has contended that there is no error committed by learned Judge. 15. Learned advocate appearing for respondents then taken us through the reasons assigned by learned Judge, more particularly the reasonings, which are incorporated in para-18 of the judgment, in which, the serious unnatural conduct of the complainant is visualized by learned Judge and ultimately came to the conclusion that there was no corroboration of evidence and case of prosecution and prosecution has failed to establish its case and therefore, there appears to be no error committed by learned Judge and therefore, a request is made to dismiss the Appeal filed by State as having no merits. 16. Having heard learned advocates appearing for respective side and having gone through the evidence on record, we found following circumstance, which cannot be unnoticed. (i) Learned Judge has very categorically considered the deposition of complainant and found that the complainant has not come with clean hands. 16. Having heard learned advocates appearing for respective side and having gone through the evidence on record, we found following circumstance, which cannot be unnoticed. (i) Learned Judge has very categorically considered the deposition of complainant and found that the complainant has not come with clean hands. Learned Judge upon appreciation of his deposition, has specifically found that the complainant is lying in a deposition before the Court. (ii) Learned Judge has also noticed that driver, who can be said to be an independent witness, has also not supported the case of prosecution, on the contrary, his version goes against the version of complainant. (iii) In addition thereto, examination of panchnamas, which were drawn by Investigating Officer, apart from the fact that panchas have turned hostile but at the same time, no incriminating circumstances are reflected from those panchnamas and therefore, when the material is not supporting the case of the prosecution, we have examined the reasons which have been assigned by the learned Judge while dealing with the case, are not found to be perverse. (iv) Upon perusal of the reasons, which are assigned by learned Judge, unnatural conduct of the complainant is specifically considered and looking to history of the complainant, the story put forward by the complainant is not possible to be believed and this specific conclusion has been arrived at by learned Judge in para-18 of the judgment impugned is very relevant to ultimate conclusion. (v) Learned Judge has also noticed that the complainant is well-built person, still has not opposed his confinement nor has made any attempt to release himself for quite long period of 10 to 15 minutes near village: Vasna when the Jeep stopped and therefore, looking to this conduct on the part of complainant, it cannot be said that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (vi) It has also been noticed by learned Judge that stamp paper which has been said to be used was of Rs. 50/- on which, signature of accused was figuring whereas the stamp paper which has been produced on record was of Rs. 20/-, thus, it was noticed that said stamp paper found to be not legal and therefore, it appears from the record that complaint appears to have been filed after thoughtful consideration aimed at some different intention. 50/- on which, signature of accused was figuring whereas the stamp paper which has been produced on record was of Rs. 20/-, thus, it was noticed that said stamp paper found to be not legal and therefore, it appears from the record that complaint appears to have been filed after thoughtful consideration aimed at some different intention. (vii) It is also revealed from the record that the incident in question appears to have occurred on 2.5.2003, whereas, the First Information Report came to be lodged on 21.5.2003 and this delay has not been explained anywhere in the record and therefore, considering this set of circumstance, prevailing on record, we do not see any illegality committed by learned Judge in the judgment impugned and as such we are of the view that learned Judge has rightly exercised the jurisdiction in passing the order of acquittal. 17. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid evidences. We have carefully gone through the decision delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and reasons assigned therein and we also found no distinguishable circumstance, which may lead us to disturb the order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Session Judge. 18. From the aforesaid material on record and the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Judge, we see no circumstance distinguishable to disturb the findings arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the order of acquittal. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence and therefore, we found that the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. 19. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 19.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 19.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994. 19.3 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: (17) In the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731 this Court observed; 21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; 8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; 8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 19.4 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: 14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of P.Ws. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 20. Looking to the reasoning assigned by learned trial Court and looking to fact that learned Judge has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion, which we see no reason to interfere. We are of the considered view that there is no extra ordinary circumstance, which would warrant us to interfere by order passed by learned Judge and accordingly, we find that appeal being merit-less, same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 21. In view of the above position prevailing on record and in view of the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and accordingly appeal filed by the State being merit-less, deserves to be dismissed. 22. In the result, Criminal Appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 11.09.2004 passed in Sessions Case No. 61 of 2003 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Patan is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Records and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith.