JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.4.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 133 of 2000 by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, whereby present respondents-original accused came to be acquitted from the charges levelled against them. 2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution are that on 24th May, 2000, an FIR was filed before 'C' Division Police Station, Bhavnagar, by one Bhagvanbhai Dehurbhai inter alia stating that he was residing at Ratanpur and doing the business of milk. On the day of incident, he was travelling at about 7.30 a.m. in his tempo to Bhavnagar for pasteurizing milk near Gangajaliya lake. At that time, his cousin-brother Vibhabhai Khimabhai(the deceased) and cousin-sister also came there for pasteurizing milk. It was alleged in the complaint that when they were standing near their vehicle and his sister Jashiben was also standing beside the tempo near the godown of vegetable market, one unknown person appearing to be a labourer was changing his clothes and hence, the deceased asked him not to change clothes at that place as ladies were standing nearby and therefore, there were hot exchange of words and that man used filthy language on the deceased. In the meantime, 3-4 other persons appearing to be labourers also reached there. Out of these persons, two persons caught hold of the deceased and one person named as Shetty took out a knife and inflicted two blows on his chest and another person who stood behind the deceased armed with iron pipe has inflicted a blow, as a result of which, the deceased fell down. The complainant took the deceased to the Government hospital. The complainant on coming to know of the names of assailants through one Haribhai rickshaw-wala present at the shop of Rambhai named the accused as Rajesh @ Raju Savjibhai Chauhan, Sanjay Haribhai Tebhani, Chandu @ Shetti Babu Vegad, Hakabhai @ Hoko Jayanti Parmar. The FIR was registered as C.R. No. I-120 of 2000 with Bhavnagar 'C' Division Police Station. Investigating Officer in pursuance to the said FIR has carried out investigation and upon completion of investigation, as there appeared a prima facie case against the accused, a charge sheet came to be filed against them. The FIR was registered as C.R. No. I-120 of 2000 with Bhavnagar 'C' Division Police Station. Investigating Officer in pursuance to the said FIR has carried out investigation and upon completion of investigation, as there appeared a prima facie case against the accused, a charge sheet came to be filed against them. 2.1 As the case in question was triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate vide order dated 21/7/2000 committed the case to Court of Sessions where it was numbered as Sessions Case No. 133 of 2000. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has framed charge against the accused at Exh. 6 on 12.5.2004. The charge was read over and explained to the original accused to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.2 The prosecution with a view to prove and establish the case against the respondents accused has led the oral as well as the documentary evidence. Initially, the prosecution has examined the oral evidence in the following manner:- P.W. No. Name of witness Exhibit No. 1 Manubhai Jivrajbhai Chavda 33 2 Nirmalsinh Shivubha Jadeja 36 3 Buddhadev Manilal Dave 38 4 Ketanbhai Premshankarbhai Raval 39 5 Chandrakant Vaghela 41 6 Narshangbhai Bhikhabhai Rathod 44 7 Dr. Basantkumari Narayan Bahera 42 8 Haribhai Kanabhai 45 9 Bhagvanbhai Dehurbhai 49 10 Govindbhai Bhikhabhai Boriya 51 11 Dr. Basantkumari Narayan Bahera 42 8 Haribhai Kanabhai 45 9 Bhagvanbhai Dehurbhai 49 10 Govindbhai Bhikhabhai Boriya 51 11 Dr. Tushar Hasmukhbhai Adesara 55 12 Kantibhai Kalabhai 59 13 Jashiben Devabhai 62 14 Popatbhai Ravjibhai Patel 63 15 Mahavirsinh Navalsinh Sarvaiya 66 The prosecution has also led the documentary evidences in the following manner:- Description Exhibit No. Inquest panchnama 17 Yadi to Medical Officer 19 Marnotar form 20 Receipt for entrusting the dead body by Constable 21 Report for serious offence 22 Yadi for doing map of scene of offence 23 Map of place of offence 24 Forwarding note of muddamal sent to FSL, Junagadh 26 Yadi forwarding opinion by FSL 28 Yadi sending original serological opinion 29 Panchnama of scene of offence 32 Panchnama of arrest of accused 34-35 Panchnama of clothes and blood sample of the deceased 39 Discovery panchnama 40 P.M. Note 43 Original complaint 50 Station diary 52 X-ray plates 56 Medical certificate 57 Case record 58 Yadi for carrying test identification parade 61 FSL report 65 Biological Physical Report of FSL 68-69 Serological opinion 70 2.3 Having adduced the evidence, a closing pursis has been given by the prosecution and then accused persons have been given an opportunity to tender further statements under Sec. 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter issues came to be framed and ultimately, after analysing the evidence on record and after conducting the entire trial, learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in exercise of power under section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. has granted benefit of doubt and acquitted the respondents accused for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 34 of IPC read with section 135 of Bombay Police Act. It is this judgment and order of acquittal against the respondents accused which is giving rise to present appeal by the State. The appeal came to be admitted as back as on 4-2-2008 and now it has come up for final hearing. 3. Learned APP, Mr. L.R. Poojari, appearing for the State has vehemently contended that a serious error has been committed by the learned trial Judge in passing the order of acquittal. There was no justifiable reason to grant even the benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Mr. 3. Learned APP, Mr. L.R. Poojari, appearing for the State has vehemently contended that a serious error has been committed by the learned trial Judge in passing the order of acquittal. There was no justifiable reason to grant even the benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Mr. Poojari has pointed out that there was a specific assertion not only in the complaint but from the evidence of other witnesses also, the case is substantiating, still however, benefit of doubt is given by the learned Judge without assigning any cogent reason. The conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge is based on surmises and conjectures and inferences have been drawn without any justification from the record and therefore, the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge being perverse to the record, no order of acquittal be allowed to be sustained in the eye of law on any hyper-technicality. Mr. Poojari has further contended that though the witnesses have been declared as hostile, their versions proportionately is supporting the case of the prosecution. In fact, it is evident from the record that each accused has played a specific role as is reflecting from the material on record and this is nothing but a clear case of section 302 of IPC which ought not to have been ignored by the learned trial Judge. Simply because the complainant has turned hostile, it cannot be said that no offence is committed. On the contrary, there is a voluminous record consisting of several documents which would suggest even the motive behind the commission of crime of the accused and therefore also, the conclusion of grant of benefit of doubt is not cogently supporting. Mr. Poojari has further contended that medical evidence is also clearly reflecting that case is proved against the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. The injuries have been established and proved. The stab wounds have been found. Even the pipe blow is also reflecting from the post mortem note and injuries stated on column No. 17 are corroborated by medical evidence and therefore, especially when the Medical Officer is deposing before the Court that injuries which have been caused on the deceased were serious in nature, no leniency could have been shown by the learned trial Judge under the guise that complainant not being supporting the case of the prosecution. In addition thereto, he has further contended that not only the medical evidence is supporting the case but even discovery of pipe as well as of knife at the instance of original accused No. 3 is also established. Mr. Poojari has referred to the discovery panchnama which is on page 253 of paper book compilation and has submitted that this discovery is established even though the panchas have turned hostile. In fact, the Investigating Officer has categorically referred about this discovery of knife and pipe and therefore, from the evidence of this police witness also, the case of the prosecution is getting supported and therefore, in no circumstances, such an order of acquittal on technicality cannot be allowed to be prevailed on record and therefore, he has requested the Court to set aside the same in the interest of justice. Mr. Poojari has further contended that though both the panchas have turned hostile, the evidence of Investigating Officer could have been examined in detail by the learned trial Judge especially when the injuries have been established and getting support from medical evidence and other witnesses and therefore, even if there is no direct evidence, the entire set of circumstances is getting support to prove the guilt of the accused and therefore, when the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has committed a serious error in exercising jurisdiction. Mr. Poojari has further contended that post mortem report is also clearly suggesting that there is a human blood found on the knife which has been recovered at the instance of original accused No. 3 and therefore, when the blood found on the knife which has been discovered is of the blood group of the deceased, no benefit of acquittal could have been given by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Poojari has further contended that even in the examination of Medical Officer at Sir T. General Hospital, Bhavnagar, the history which has been given is also that of assault with knife and pipe and the injuries which are reflected in the certificate are clearly establishing the guilt of the respondents accused and therefore, the learned trial Judge has erroneously granted benefit of doubt. Mr. Mr. Poojari has further contended that benefit of doubt cannot be given in such a casual and routine manner especially when prosecution has established enough material on record to justify the guilt and therefore, a serious error is committed by the learned trial Judge in appreciation of evidence led by the prosecution and therefore, this being a glaring example of non-application of mind on the part of the learned trial Judge, the impugned order of acquittal is not allowed to be sustained in the eye of law. Mr. Poojari has taken us to various documents attached to paper book compilation and ultimately requested that this material error which has been committed by the learned trial Judge deserves to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order and requested the Court to allow the appeal by granting relief as prayed for. 4. To oppose this stand taken by learned APP, learned advocate, Mr. Mrudul Barot for the original accused, has vehemently contended that after thoughtful consideration and after evaluation of material on record and the evidence, the learned trial Judge has exercised the discretion and while coming to the conclusion, each of the material adduced by the prosecution has been examined and arrived at a specific finding. Mr. Barot has, therefore, contended that simply because another plausible view might be reflecting on the basis of same material, sitting in an appellate jurisdiction, particularly in an appeal against the order of acquittal, the plausible view cannot be substituted since the learned trial Judge has a chance to examine and see the demeanor of witnesses when they are deposing before the Court and therefore, in view of settled position of law, it is not open for the Court to reverse the finding on the basis of same material. Mr. Barot has further contended that even apart from this technical aspect of the matter, upon reading the entire evidence, not only the evidence does not support the case of the prosecution but is not sounding any confidence in favour of the prosecution. In fact, the detailed examination has taken place in which the very complainant has become hostile and therefore, when the main material witness is not supporting the case of the prosecution, there appears to be hardly any circumstance which can lead to a different conclusion and therefore, order in question does not call for any interference. Mr. In fact, the detailed examination has taken place in which the very complainant has become hostile and therefore, when the main material witness is not supporting the case of the prosecution, there appears to be hardly any circumstance which can lead to a different conclusion and therefore, order in question does not call for any interference. Mr. Barot has further contended that rickshaw driver who has been examined as P.W. No. 8 vide Exh. 45 on page 69 of paper book compilation cannot be said to be an eyewitness though he has an audacity to name the accused persons by attributing specific role and therefore, this piece of evidence does not sound any confidence in favour of the case of the prosecution. Mr. Barot has further contended that if the injuries which are reflecting on the post mortem note particularly in column No. 17 are compared with other material appearing on the evidence, same are self-contradictory in nature and therefore, it cannot be safely inferred that it is the respondents accused who have committed the commission of crime. Mr. Barot has further contended that there are three main witnesses upon which the entire case of prosecution rested namely, the complainant himself, Jashiben and Haribhai. Now if these three witnesses are to be examined and analysed, Mr. Barot has stated that the complainant is not supporting the case of the prosecution as he has been declared as hostile. Jashiben is equally not supporting the case of the prosecution as she has also been declared as hostile. So for as the evidence of Haribhai is concerned, same is not sounding any confidence. In fact, this very Haribhai, who is examined by the prosecution, is a chance witness on account of several circumstances. Firstly, he has not seen the incident from close proximity. He has seen the incident as per his version from more than 100 feet away and if the entire version of this witness is seen minutely, he has not actually seen the incident at all. He is said to have seen the incident from the 'nasta' shop. However, in the map prepared by the prosecution agency, no such 'nasta' shop is figuring. In fact, this Haribhai upon which the prosecution is heavily relying has conveyed that the deceased was attacked with two blows whereas post mortem note is reflecting only one injury with blow. He is said to have seen the incident from the 'nasta' shop. However, in the map prepared by the prosecution agency, no such 'nasta' shop is figuring. In fact, this Haribhai upon which the prosecution is heavily relying has conveyed that the deceased was attacked with two blows whereas post mortem note is reflecting only one injury with blow. When the incident has taken place, this very witness has not shifted to the place of occurrence from 'nasta' shop as alleged but this factum of injury is not getting any corroboration from medical evidence. Mr. Barot has further contended that barring this Haribhai, no other witness is supporting the case of the prosecution and therefore, when the prosecution is heavily rely upon the evidence of Haribhai, who is a chance witness and who has done lot of improvement in his version, it is not safe to convict the accused on the basis of such kind of solitary evidence. Even assuming that though the complainant has turned hostile, still, as per the say of Mr. Barot, if any support is reflecting to the case of the prosecution, then it can be compared with that of Haribhai. However, form the version of the complainant himself, no such corroboration is coming out and therefore, such a chance witness in the form of Haribhai cannot be relied upon to overturn the decision whereby benefit of doubt is given by the learned trial Judge. For this purpose, Mr. Barot is referring to a recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 3671 in the case of Baby alias Sebastian and another v. Circle Inspector of Police, Adimaly and contended that it is not safe to rely upon such kind of chance witness and therefore, considering this position prevailing on record, Mr. Barot has requested to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 5. Mr. Barot has requested to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 5. Mr. Barot has further contended that though knife is found with bloodstains of the deceased, as per the serological examination, which is reflecting on page 311, there is no further examination as to whether this bloodstain is matching with the blood of any other person alleged to have involved in the commission of crime and such incriminating material has not been put to the respondents accused in their further statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. and therefore, when this kind of incriminating material is not put to the accused in the course of defense, the same would be fatal to the case of the prosecution and simply because the blood is found, it cannot be said that any guilt is established. Mr. Barot has further contended that apart from this blood having been found on knife, even discovery itself is not proved which is required under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The elements of authorship and concealment are not proved from the evidence on record. Even from the evidence of Investigating Officer, the manner in which the discovery is to be established is not reflecting in the present case. In addition thereto, when the witnesses have turned hostile, the prosecution has not been able to establish the discovery in the form of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act which is a requisite and therefore, it cannot be inferred that any guilt of the respondents accused is established. On the contrary, this incriminating circumstance ought to have been put to the knowledge of the respondents accused which has not been done by the prosecution. For the purpose of proving discovery, what is required is well considered by the recent pronouncement of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jagdishsinh @ Munno Ranjitsinh @ Ranubha Jadeja Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2016 (4) G.L.R. 3122 . By referring to this decision, Mr. Barot has contended that the discovery itself is not established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, simply because the blood of a particular group is found, it cannot be assumed that any guilt is said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. By referring to this decision, Mr. Barot has contended that the discovery itself is not established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and therefore, simply because the blood of a particular group is found, it cannot be assumed that any guilt is said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Barot has further contended that there are several circumstances and the lapses which are left deliberately by the investigating machinery and therefore, there is hardly any cogent material on record establishing the guilt of the present respondents accused. Mr. Barot has further contended that the witness Haribhai is not having any credential looking to the entire evidence as a whole and further, even the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt the specific role of accused persons as to who gave which blow with which weapon. At one point of time, it is reflecting from the record that accused No. 3 gave two knife blows in the chest of the deceased whereas accused Nos. 1 and 4 have picked the deceased from backside and accused No. 2 was instigating accused No. 3 to finish the deceased whereas in other part of evidence, it is reflecting that accused No. 3 has given pipe blow on the head, accused Nos. 1 and 2 have caught hold the deceased and accused No. 4 has given knife blow and therefore, these versions are contradictory reflecting on the record and therefore, on the basis of such kind of weak piece of evidence, it is not safe to overturn the decision of granting benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Mr. Barot has further contended that the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge particularly reflecting in paragraph 8 of the judgment are sufficient enough to justify the order of granting benefit of doubt whereby the respondents accused are acquitted and these conclusions are based upon close analysis of evidence on record and therefore, when the learned trial Judge has dealt with in detail each and every evidence and arrived at the finding, that satisfaction cannot be said to be perverse as a sufficient plausible view is adopted by the learned trial Judge and therefore, the same is in consonance with the well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. This principle is well accepted by the learned trial Judge and has passed an order of acquittal and such a well reasoned order does not call for any interference and therefore, ultimately requested that it is not a fit case in which order in question is required to be disturbed by allowing the appeal filed by the State. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the evidence on record in co-relation with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge, we are of the opinion that no error appears to have been committed by the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge appears to have dealt with the evidence of Jashiben at Exh. 62 and has also considered the evidence of Haribhai at Exh. 45. However, after analysing the evidence of these material witnesses, a specific conclusion is derived by the learned trial Judge that the case is not getting substantiated by the evidence of these witnesses and on the other hand, the panchas have turned hostile and are not supporting the case of the prosecution. The learned trial Judge has also examined whether identification is established or not and for that purpose, the panch witnesses to test identification parade have also not supported the case of the prosecution, so much so that arrest panchnamas and recovery panchnamas are also not established as the panchas have not supported the case of the prosecution. Mr. Barot has tried to find out a truth by stating that simply because the panchas have turned hostile, the whole case cannot be closed down and for that purpose, a further examination has also taken place at the behest of the learned trial Judge in which the evidence of even complainant himself at Exh. 50 is not supporting the case of the prosecution. In fact, a co-relation is not getting from the medical evidence and therefore, in these background of circumstances, the learned trial Judge appears to have passed an order of acquittal by giving benefit of doubt. The aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge has independently been examined by us after going through the version of the complainant and medical evidence of Dr. Tushar Adesara and we have found that the story put up by the prosecution is not getting substantiated. The aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge has independently been examined by us after going through the version of the complainant and medical evidence of Dr. Tushar Adesara and we have found that the story put up by the prosecution is not getting substantiated. A specific case is put up against the respondents accused that accused No. 3 has given two knife blows in the chest of the deceased and if this basic version is analysed with the medical evidence in the form of evidence of Dr. Tushar Adesara as well as from the post mortem examination, there appears to be a contradiction. We have carefully considered the deposition of P.W. No. 9, Bhagvanbhai Dehurbhai, the complainant, who himself has turned hostile and this witness has deposed before the Court that the names of accused persons have been given by Haribhai Kanabhai and he has not seen the incident in question. 7. Yet another P.W. No. 13, Jashiben Devabhai, examined at Exh. 62, who is said to have remained present at the time of occurrence of incident, has also not supported the case of the prosecution and though a reference is made but she is one of the eye witnesses present at the spot, but her version that she has not seen the offender is establishing the fact that she is not an eye witness to the incident. 8. On the basis of police witness, Investigating Officer, P.W. No. 15, Mahavirsinh Navalsinh Sarvaiya examined at Exh. 66, no doubt the discovery at the instance of the respondents accused has been established. But this discovery cannot be said to be established in view of recent pronouncement of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Baby alias Sebastian (supra). This evidence of Investigating Officer in the context of aforesaid decision has not established the discovery as is required and that has been appreciated by the learned trial Judge. The discovery panchnama which has been drawn at Exh. 40 in the presence of Ketanbhai Raval and Narshangbhai Rathod has not been established by the prosecution through the evidence of this witness and therefore, though an attempt is made by the prosecution to utilise these witnesses referred to above, they have not cogently supported the case of the prosecution as has been found by the learned trial Judge. 9. 40 in the presence of Ketanbhai Raval and Narshangbhai Rathod has not been established by the prosecution through the evidence of this witness and therefore, though an attempt is made by the prosecution to utilise these witnesses referred to above, they have not cogently supported the case of the prosecution as has been found by the learned trial Judge. 9. Similarly, evidence of P.W. No. 8, Haribhai Kanabhai who has been examined at Exh. 45 in the form of cross-examination, cannot be probable enough to convict the respondents accused on this sole basis. The version given by this witness is not co-related with the medical evidence and therefore, it is not safe to rely upon to convict the respondents accused which has been found by the learned trial Judge and we endorse the same accordingly. 10. Yet another circumstance which is getting support from the record in favour of sustaining the order of acquittal is knife which has been recovered through accused No. 3 having blood stain. However, the said blood is that of the deceased only is not established beyond Exh. 70 and in addition thereto, this incriminating circumstance, which is required to be put to the notice of the respondents accused for their defense, does not appear to have been put before the respondents accused and therefore, this raises a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution and therefore, aforesaid material aspects which are prevailing on record appear to have been rightly appreciated by the learned trial Judge and accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case in which the benefit of doubt is to be disturbed or interfered with. 11. We have carefully gone through the decision delivered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jagdishsinh @ Munno (supra) and after going through the relevant paragraphs of the said decision and applying the same for examining the evidence of the Investigating Officer, we found that the discovery is not established as required under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 12. With a view to ascertain the missing truth from the case of the prosecution, we have also further considered the evidence appearing on record and compared it in the context of identification of the respondents accused. 12. With a view to ascertain the missing truth from the case of the prosecution, we have also further considered the evidence appearing on record and compared it in the context of identification of the respondents accused. We have also gone through the decision given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Iqbal and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2015) 6 SCC 623 and we found that identification cannot be said to a substantive piece of evidence. Here also, simply because the respondents accused appear to have been identified in Court, said evidence in the absence of any independent corroboration cannot be the sole basis for establishing the guilt. After considering several decisions, the gist of the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision referred to above is reflecting in paragraph No. 15. The same is considered and we are completely in agreement with the said proposition that the test identification is not a substantive piece of evidence. The incriminating evidence has to be established by the prosecution in substantive form to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, we are of the opinion that Mr. Barot has rightly relied upon the decision referred to above. 13. We have also perused yet another decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Baby alias Sebastian (supra) which is based upon the evidence of chance witness. We have carefully gone through the said decision referred to above and applying the said principle to the facts of the case on hand, we assessed the evidence of said witness Haribhai referred to above and his version appears to be that of a chance witness and therefore, in putting heavy reliance on this solitary piece of evidence which is not independently corroborated by other material, we are of the view that no error is committed by the learned trial Judge. We have carefully gone through the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge. We have also carefully considered and reassessed the evidence on record and we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. We do not have the support of any unimpeccable evidence of extraordinary in nature to take a different view of the situation and therefore, in absence thereof, we do not feel it necessary to disturb the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 14. We do not have the support of any unimpeccable evidence of extraordinary in nature to take a different view of the situation and therefore, in absence thereof, we do not feel it necessary to disturb the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 14. To arrive at this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that though the appellate court has vide discretion to examine the evidence on record independently but then also, after examining the evidence, we are of the view that no extraordinary distinguishable feature is appearing which may permit us to take a plausible view particularly when each of the material has been dealt with by the learned trial Judge. We are mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions. We may refer to some of the well defined propositions enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 14.1 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 14.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong." In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 14.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside"." 14.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, reported in 2015 (5) Scale 634 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied)."" 14.5 What aspects are to be borne in mind while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa vs. State by Police Inspector, Lokayukta, Chitradurga reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045. Paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 of the said decision read as under: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh: (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court."" 15. In view of the aforesaid position prevailing on record as well as in view of the proposition of law laid down by apex Court in catena of decisions, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge requires no interference and we find no merits in the appeal filed by the State and the same deserves to be dismissed. 16. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 20.4.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 133 of 2000, by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and proceedings be sent back to the trial court, concerned forthwith.