JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—Heard learned counsel for the appellant. Defects have been removed. 2. By way of this appeal at the behest of the New India Assurance Company (hereinafter referred to as “Insurance Company”), several grounds are raised. (i) That the accident occurred due to head on collision and therefore holding the driver of the vehicle insured by Insurance Company as solely negligent is bad in law. (ii) That the claimant who was riding as a pillion rider alongwith two other persons was not wearing helmet and therefore he has violated the provisions of Section 128 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1988’) and therefore he is negligent to that effect. (iii) That the prescriptions were not proved and the Tribunal illegally and arbitrarily awarded Rs. 50,000/- under the head of medical expenses. 3. This Court has perused the judgment of the Tribunal. It would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 4. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 5. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 5. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 6. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 7. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 8. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 8. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 9. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 10. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 11. While considering the aspect of contributory negligence the Tribunal has given its findings as follows: “(10) The learned counsel for O.P. No. 1 submitted that no accident occurred with Truck No. HR-58B/0796. While the learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the accident occurred due to the negligence of said truck. 11. While considering the aspect of contributory negligence the Tribunal has given its findings as follows: “(10) The learned counsel for O.P. No. 1 submitted that no accident occurred with Truck No. HR-58B/0796. While the learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the accident occurred due to the negligence of said truck. The F.I.R. was lodged against the driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0796 and the charge-sheet after investigation was submitted against the driver of vehicle Subodh Kumar Awasthi. The claimant has also filed the certified copy of the site plan, paper No. 34C/2 which shows that the accident had occurred on the road as alleged by the claimant. In 2011(1) TAC 1015 (MP) the Hon’ble Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that “Spot map prepared by police cannot be ignored - Spot map is required to be treated as a crucial piece of evidence which speaks truth about accident.” (11) The O.Ps. have not adduced any evidence that the vehicle Truck No. HR-58B/0976 was not involved in the accident. O.P. No. 1 has also not produced the driver of the offending vehicle in rebuttal of the evidence of the claimant. In view of the aforesaid discussions it is held that on 29-7-2014 at 3-45 P.M. the accident occurred by vehicle Truck No. HR-58B/0976. The learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the accident occurred due to sole negligence of driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0976 which was being driven by its driver rashly and negligently. While the learned counsel for O.P. No. 1 submitted that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the rider of motorcycle. In this regard the evidence of P.W.1 claimant is to be looked into. P.W.1 has stated that the Truck No. HR-58B/0976, driven by its driver in rash and negligent manner, came from in front and dashed the motorcycle. He was sitting on pillion seat of motorcycle. He sustained grievous injuries in his right leg and other parts of the body. Perusal of the site-plan paper No. 13 shows that the accident occurred at place shown by letter (x). The accident occurred from the front side. The driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0976 came on middle of the road. Hence it is being held that the accident occurred due to sole negligence of driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0976. Due to which the claimant sustained grievous injuries and his right knee was operated.” 12. The accident occurred from the front side. The driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0976 came on middle of the road. Hence it is being held that the accident occurred due to sole negligence of driver of Truck No. HR-58B/0976. Due to which the claimant sustained grievous injuries and his right knee was operated.” 12. Hence, this Court does not find, in the absence of any evidence showing that the driver was negligent it cannot be said that the scooterist or motorcyclist who was driving an small vehicle compared with the truck was negligent, the Tribunal has not committed any error in coming to the conclusion that driver of the truck did not take proper care and caution while driving the vehicle. In the light of all these, the submission of the counsel that the motorcyclist who was driving the vehicle and had contributed in accident having taken place is devoid merits and is rejected. 13. It is necessary to consider the second submission that claimant contributed to accident having taken place as he did not put on helmet. In this regard Section 128 of the Act, 1988 reads as follows: “128. Safety measures for drivers and pillion riders.— (1) No driver of a two-wheeled motor cycle shall carry more than one person in addition to himself on the motor cycle and no such person shall be carried otherwise than sitting on a proper seat securely fixed to the motor cycle behind the driver’s seat with appropriate safety measures. (2) In addition to the safety measures mentioned in sub-section (1), the Central Government may, prescribe other safety measures for the drivers of two-wheeled motor cycles and pillion riders thereon.” Section 128 of the Act, 1988 nowhere makes it mandatory for a pillion rider to put on helmet. Hence, the submission that there was breach of policy as there were three persons sitting on motorcycle cannot be accepted as it was a vehicle not insured with appellant but was third party for which premium was accepted. This submission is also devoid of merits and is rejected. 14. The ground namely that compensation was excessive is also seen, the Tribunal while considering all the aspects and while considering the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011 (1) TAC 785 (SC), has considered the functional disability and that is how the amount has been awarded. 14. The ground namely that compensation was excessive is also seen, the Tribunal while considering all the aspects and while considering the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011 (1) TAC 785 (SC), has considered the functional disability and that is how the amount has been awarded. It cannot be said that the Tribunal has awarded any excess then what could have been awarded. 15. Hence, this appeal is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The amount deposited with this Court shall be transmitted to the Tribunal for onward disbursement to the claimants.