ORDER 1. The appellant/original plaintiff Smt.Kubra Bee has filed this second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 20.11.2015 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Seoni, Camp Court Lakhnadon in Civil Appeal No.78-A/2014 affirming the judgment and decree passed on 12.12.2012 passed by the Civil Judge Class-I, Lakhnadon, District Seoni in Civil Suit No.14-A/2011, whereby the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of her share in various disputed lands bearing different survey numbers of village Kahani of Tahsil Ghansour, District Seoni, possession and perpetual injunction has been dismissed. 2. Admittedly, late Hafees Khan was owner of the disputed agricultural lands. Late Hafees Khan was having two wives. His first wife Haseem Bee was mother of three daughters Kubra Bee (plaintiff), Fateema Bee and Kaneeja Bee and later on Fateema had migrated to Pakistan and Kaneeja Bee had died. Defendants No.1 to 18/present respondents are children begotten from second wife Ameena late wife of Hafees Khan. Appellant's mother Haseem Bee had died before filing of suit. The pedigree mentioned by the plaintiff in her plaint was admitted by the defendants. The plaint for plaintiff Kubra Bee was filed by his son Akeel Ahmed claiming himself as special power of attorney holder on pleadings that the disputed lands bearing Survey Nos.140/2, 144, 145, 148/2, 149, 216/2, 218/2 and 219, whose changed new survey numbers are 351, 339, 361, 340, 363, 338 and 350 are disputed, which were previously owned by late Hafees Khan, father of the plaintiff, but the defendants No.1 to 9 after committing conspiracy and by not disclosing names of all heirs of late Hafees Khan got only their names recorded in the revenue record and are cultivating the disputed lands. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of her share in disputed ancestral agricultural lands. It was also pleaded in the plaint that previously there were cordial relations among the plaintiff and defendants No.1 to 9 and other defendants and the defendants accepted the shares of all parties in disputed lands and were assured the plaintiff about her share and were timely sending the share of plaintiff in the cultivated crops over disputed lands and grains and mangoes and other fruits, but just about two years ago, defendants No.1 to 9 stopped sending plaintiff’s share to her. Thereafter, plaintiff Kubra Bee demanded partition of her father's ancestral agricultural lands and at many times she orally requested that half share of her mother be given to her, but defendants No.1 to 9 were adopting delaying tactics. Even the claim of the plaintiff was admitted in reply to the notice sent prior to filing of the suit. The ancestral lands of her father were never partitioned among her and all other legal heirs. Thus, the reliefs of declaration to the effect that plaintiff is entitled for her mother’s half share in disputed lands and entitled for getting its vacant possession after partition and for perpetual injunction after partition that the defendants or their agents should not interfere in possession and use of share of the plaintiff in the disputed lands were sought by plaint. 3. In joint written statement filed by the defendants No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 10, the pedigree given by the plaintiff was admitted, but substantially denying the plaintiff’s main pleadings, it has been pleaded that about 30-40 years ago, all share-holders in disputed lands have received land or cash amount in accordance with their necessities and convenience and in consonance with above, disputed lands were partitioned and mutated in revenue records. Thereafter, disputed lands are recorded in the names of defendants in revenue record and the recorded owners are being continued in possession of relating lands. Actually, plaintiff Kubra Bee after her marriage lived in her in-laws' house and in such circumstances, the elders of both parties got adjusted the share of plaintiff Kubra Bee and her other real sisters by providing them cash amount and in accordance with the family settlement and mutual consent, the disputed lands were handed over to the children of Hafees Khan's second wife Ameena Bee and this settlement is being continued for about last fifty years. The plaintiff has not properly valued the suit and alleged special power of attorney holder and relating affidavit are forged and fabricated. It was prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiff be dismissed. 4. The plaintiff has not properly valued the suit and alleged special power of attorney holder and relating affidavit are forged and fabricated. It was prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiff be dismissed. 4. The trial Court framed issues on pleadings of the parties and after recording evidence of the parties and hearing recorded its findings in its judgment that the disputed agricultural lands are joint ancestral property of plaintiff and defendants; it was not found proved that the plaintiff is title-holder of her alleged share in disputed lands; it was not found proved that the mutation of defendants in relation to disputed lands in revenue record had been caused by fraudulent means; it was also not found proved that the plaintiff is entitled for receiving her share after partition; it was found that the plaintiff has properly valued her suit and paid proper court-fee. Consequently, plaintiff’s suit was dismissed. The appeal filed by the plaintiff Kubra Bee also remained unsuccessful, hence this second appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff vehemently contended that each of the lower Courts has mainly dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on the grounds that plaintiff Kubra Bee did not give her evidence before the trial Court and her special power of attorney holder Akeel Ahmed, who is son of the plaintiff could not have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances prevalent in the life time of father of the plaintiff Hafees Khan and the appellate Court also erred in dismissing plaintiff’s application about pleading amendment in plaint filed under Order 6 rule 17 of the CPC before it. It has been further contended that the lower Courts have erred in placing reliance on referred citations and their inferences recorded in their judgments are perverse and not based on proper and legal appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. 6. Each of the lower Courts has observed that on behalf of plaintiff Kubra Bee, plaint was filed by her special power of attorney holder Akeel Ahmed and in this reference, case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another v. Indusind Bank Ltd. and others [2005(1) MPLJ 421], has been referred, wherein the apex Court has held :- “Order 3 rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, empowers the holder of power of attorney to acts on behalf of that principal. In our view, the word acts employed in Order 3 rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code confines only in respect of acts done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term acts would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other others, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some acts in pursuance of power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter, which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross examined.� 7. In light of the above mentioned citation, the deposition given by Akeel Ahmed (PW1) has been considered by each of lower Courts, who reached to the conclusion that Akeel Ahmed (PW1) is not having the personal knowledge of all facts relating to partition. 8. Similarly, in case of Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another [ (1999) 3 SCC 573 ], it has been held that where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. 9. It has been rightly observed by the Courts below that if plaintiff Kubra Bee was unable to remain present before the Court due to old age and illness, then she could have been examined on commission after filing an appropriate application before the trial Court. Discussing all the facts and circumstances in detail, each lower Courts reached to the conclusion that Akeel Ahmed (PW1) as special power of attorney holder was not having personal knowledge of important facts and he was not competent to give evidence on behalf of his mother. Akeel Ahmed (PW1) clearly admitted in his cross-examination that in between years 1956-57 to 2008-09, no any party filed any claim or objection regarding disputed lands. Similar was the position of other plaintiff's witnesses Anees Ahmed (PW2) and Hameed Khan (PW3). Akeel Ahmed (PW1) clearly admitted in his cross-examination that in between years 1956-57 to 2008-09, no any party filed any claim or objection regarding disputed lands. Similar was the position of other plaintiff's witnesses Anees Ahmed (PW2) and Hameed Khan (PW3). Anees Ahmed (PW2) admitted in his cross-examination that he cannot say that how much land among disputed lands is in whose possession and he also admitted that in his affidavit regarding examination-in-chief, he has stated the fact that plaintiff Kubra Bee was receiving share in crops only on the basis of facts intimated to him by Akeel Ahmed. Similarly Hameed Khan (PW3) also exhibited his ignorance relating to important facts. From facts came in cross-examination (paras No.6 and 7) of Hameed Khan (PW3), it is clear that he is not having any knowledge regarding disputed lands and even had not seen the disputed lands. It was clear that no any plaintiff's examined witness was having any knowledge about the partition occurred after death of Hafees Khan. If partition had not occurred, then no question of receiving share in crops or fruits could arise for the plaintiff. The learned first appellate Court has recorded a new finding in its judgment that the plaintiff's suit for partition and declaration of title was time barred also. 10. If the alleged special power of attorney executed by plaintiff Kubra Bee in favour of Akeel Ahmed (PW1) was not proved before the Court, thus each of the lower Courts recorded finding that Akeel Ahmed was not competent to depose for the plaintiff and the appellate Court also recorded its finding that it was not proved that the disputed lands were undivided ancestral properties of the parties. 11. It is significant to mention here that no any provision of Mohammedan Law has been referred in the pleadings and arguments advanced by the appellant/original plaintiff regarding undivided ancestral property, whereas all the parties are Muslims and the concept of ancestral property or coparcenary property like Hindu Law is foreign in Mohammedan Law. Similarly, no provision of Mohammedan Law was referred by the learned counsel under which wife of a deceased Muslim would have fifty percent share in her late husband's immoveable property. Similarly, no provision of Mohammedan Law was referred by the learned counsel under which wife of a deceased Muslim would have fifty percent share in her late husband's immoveable property. Akeel Ahmed (PW1) clearly admitted in his cross-examination that the defendants are possession-holders of disputed lands since last three generations and no copy of any revenue record was filed by the plaintiff before the trial Court from the years 1956-57 to 2008-09. 12. It appears that each of the lower Courts has based its reasoning on referred citations of Hon'ble apex Court and this Court and it appears that the Courts below have properly discussed the oral and documentary evidence filed by the parties and it appears that the concurrent findings recorded by each lower Court about dismissal of plaintiff's suit does not appear to be having any perversity. 13. In the result of above discussion, I have not found any substance on which the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below could be said to be contrary to law or procedure, consequently I have not found any substance or circumstance in the matter giving rise to any question of law rather than substantial question of law. Consequently, this appeal being devoid of any merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. There shall be no order as to the costs.