JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition is under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India whereby and where under the award dtd.11.11.2016 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Sambalpur in I.D. Case No.14 of 2013 has been assailed by the Management by which the Labour Court, while holding the order of termination as illegal and unjustified, directed for reinstatement of workman in service with full back-wages with further direction to take her back into service and pay the wages from 01.08.2011 to 16.09.2011 and back wages from 17.09.2011 till the date of reinstatement in service, failing which the first party - management shall pay interest @ 10% per annum till full realization of wages from the date of publication of award. 2. The brief facts of the case of the second party - workman is that she was working as peon under the first party-management since 12.10.2003 with the satisfaction of the authorities. The management was paying her wages on monthly basis and she was assigned duties in the establishment and as such she was a workman and was in continuous service till she was orally refused to work w.e.f. 17.09.2011. The illegal action of the management amounts to retrenchment and before doing that the statutory provision as contained in Section 25-F as also Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not been followed. The workman has raised a dispute, conciliation having failed, reference having been made to adjudicate the terms of the reference regarding her termination, the Labour Court vide order dtd.11.11.2016 has passed an award directing her reinstatement in service by holding the termination as illegal and unjustified with a direction to pay full back wages till the date of reinstatement in service. 3. 3. The contention raised by the workman is that the Labour Court has not committed any error in passing the award, rather the award is in conformity with the statutory provision since before terminating her from service, the provision as contained in Section 25-F and 25-H has not been complied with, the Labour Court, after taking note of this aspect of the matter, on the basis of the evidence produced before it, came to conclusion that she has rendered continuous service of 240 days in a calendar year and as such before dispensing with her service the statutory provision contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act has not been followed, taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, the award has been passed, hence the same needs no interference by this court. 4. While on the other hand, the case of the management, who is the petitioner in this writ petition is that there is no industrial dispute between the management and the workman, as such she was never a workman under it to satisfy the definition of workman as per the I.D. Act. Her nature of job was purely temporary and on daily wage basis and terminable without any notice at any time. She was never recruited under any recruitment procedure and, therefore, the question of illegal termination does not arise. It is the case of the management that the workman was involved in anti-management activities creating disturbance in the peaceful atmosphere and threatening officers for her mala fide gains and for that an F.I.R. was also lodged against her vide Bhusan P.S. Case No.20 of 2012 for the offence U/ss.143, 341, 342, 294 / 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The workman was never refused to come to her work but she voluntarily abandoned herself without any intimation and moreover she was never paid on monthly basis as claimed by her. The case of the management is that the Labour Court, before passing the award, has not appreciated these aspects of the matter and ignoring the same, the award has been passed, hence the same needs interference by this court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the Management – petitioner and perused the documents available on record. The case of the management is that the Labour Court, before passing the award, has not appreciated these aspects of the matter and ignoring the same, the award has been passed, hence the same needs interference by this court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the Management – petitioner and perused the documents available on record. The labour court in order to adjudicate the issue, has formulated the following issues:- (I) Whether the action of M/s. Bhusan Steel Ltd., narendrapur, District-Dhenkanal in terminating the services of Smt. Basanti behera, Peon w.e.f. 17.09.2011 is legal and / or justified? (II) If not, what relief Smt. Behera is entitled to?” The Labour Court, while answering issue no.(i) which pertains to the action of the management in terminating the service of the workman, with effect from 17.09.2011 as to whether it is legal or justified, has examined the workman as W.W.1, one Anihela Nayak as W.W.2 and three numbers of documents which have been marked as Ext.1, Ext.2 and Ext.3, these are the nomination issued by the Collector, Dhenkanal as Project affected family, copy of house keeping time chart issued by the Administrative Department of the management (with objection) and Ext.3 is the copy of health record in Form 31-A (with objection). During course of recording of evidence of W.W.2 and M.W.1, a list of 20 numbers of documents have been filed by the workman, giving copy to the other side with objection which includes the photo copies of publication of news in Odiya Daily Newspaper ‘Dharitri’, letters of the workman addressed to the Collector, Dhenkanal and to the Managing Director, Bhusan Steel Ltd. In the backdrop of these documents the Labour Court, while answering the issue, has put reliance upon these exhibits as also the F.I.R. registered against the workman on 03.01.2012, has came to conclusion that the second party is a workman within the meaning of I.D. Act. We are in agreement with the said finding taking into consideration the definition of workman which stipulates ‘workman’ as any person employed in an industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. Besides that there must be a relationship of employer and employee between them and once the said relationship is established, it cannot be said that the said person is not the workman within the meaning of I.D. Act. Besides that there must be a relationship of employer and employee between them and once the said relationship is established, it cannot be said that the said person is not the workman within the meaning of I.D. Act. It is also provided under the Industrial Disputes Act under the provision of Section 25-F that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one month’s prior notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment. The workman has to be paid compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service at the time of retrenchment. There is no dispute about the fact that if the workmen are being retrenched without following the provision as contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 it will be illegal for the reason that before retrenchment the provision as provided U/s.25-F is mandatorily to be followed. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay and Others Vrs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, reported in AIR 1960 SC 610 wherein at paragraph 6 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that on a plain reading of Section 25-F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied xxxxxxx. Having regard to the fact that the words used in plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that section 25-I covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in section 25-F (b) xxxxxxxxxx. Therefore we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued Section 25-F(b). That being so, failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Limited Vrs. Niranjan Das, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 509 (para 2 to 4) and Pramod Jha and Others Vrs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 619 . Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Limited Vrs. Niranjan Das, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 509 (para 2 to 4) and Pramod Jha and Others Vrs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 619 . In case the workman is working under the management, before dispensing with the services, the provision of Section 25-F is mandatorily to be followed and if the said provision is not being followed, the order of termination is said to be illegal and is not sustainable in the eye of law. We after going through the factual aspect which is on record, have found that before dispensing with the services of the workman, the management has never asked for any explanation from the workman during her service period. The labour court, after considering this aspect of the matter as also considering the fact that she was in continuous service for 240 days in the previous calendar year, has came to a definite finding that there is violation of provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, hence passed the award holding therein that terminating the service of the workman w.e.f. 17.9.2011 is illegal and unjustified and therefore passed the order of reinstatement. There is no dispute about the fact that the management has got power to dispense with the service of its workman, but the same can only be done by following the due procedure of law and the said procedure is provided under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act and when the retrenchment is without following the said procedure, the normal consequence would be reinstatement in service. The Labour Court, after taking note of all these aspects, has passed the award. 6. Now it is to be seen that in the light of this factual aspect whether this court can interfere with the award assuming the power of appellate court. In this regard certain authorities of Hon’ble Apex Court needs to be referred. Judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. In this regard certain authorities of Hon’ble Apex Court needs to be referred. Judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good and in this respect reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” There is no dispute about the settled proposition that this court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of appeal to defer the finding given by the Tribunal or any authority judicial or quasi-judicial based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it and further there is no mistake apparent on the face of the record but no such grounds has been canvassed before us. After taking into consideration the facts as discussed herein above and on the basis of the fact by which the award has been passed by the Tribunal, in our considered view there is no need to make any interference with the same. Accordingly, we find no merit in the writ petition, in the result, the same is dismissed.