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2017 DIGILAW 460 (CAL)

Premjit Guha Thakurta v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation

2017-05-11

HARISH TANDON

body2017
JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. The regularisation plan vide D/Case No. 5-R/XVI/2015-16, dated 3rd February, 2016 issued by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation in favour of the private respondent is a subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition. 2. The petitioners are the owners of the respective flats at Premises No. 120, Vidyasagar Sarani, now known as P-100, Vidyasagar Sarani, Kolkata-700 063 on the strength of their respective registered deeds of conveyance. The said building was constructed after obtaining a sanction of a building plan dated 27th March, 2006 up to five storied and the portion of the ground floor is shown as a car parking space. Admittedly, some of the petitioners did not purchase the car parking space at the time of purchasing their respective flats. The petitioners who purchased the car parking space have not come up with the specific case that their car parking space has been converted for any other purposes. One of the car parking space was subsequently sold to another person who in turn sold the same to the private respondent in the Month of February, 2014. Subsequently the said car parking space was sought to be controverted into a shop room by making illegal and unauthorised construction and a representation was made to the respondent No. 3, Executive Engineer (Civil), Building Department, Borrow-13, 14 & 16 on 12th July, 2016. The said representation was not responded by the said respondent and the petitioner was advised to seek information under section 6 of the Right To Information Act, 2005. The information was furnished by the competent authority disclosing that a revised plan had been issued in respect of the said owner and the said construction is made in terms thereof. It thus transpires that the corporation has permitted the conversion of a car parking space to be used for shop. 3. According to the petitioner, such conversion is impermissible under Section 416, 423 & 424 of the Act nor the permission can be granted to do the missionary work under Rule 3 (2) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 2009. 4. The allegation made in the writ petition are responded by the respondent No. 5 & 6 as the corporation choose to file the opposition. The fact which emerges from the said opposition that an area measuring 212 sq.ft. 4. The allegation made in the writ petition are responded by the respondent No. 5 & 6 as the corporation choose to file the opposition. The fact which emerges from the said opposition that an area measuring 212 sq.ft. on the ground floor was originally shown as a cover car parking space and was sold to one Sudipta Roy Chowdhury by the owner. Subsequently, the corporation permitted the change of user from covered parking space to a shop in the year 2012 and the said owners thereafter sold the said shop room to the petitioner. An application was made before the competent authority not only to mutate the name of the aforesaid respondents but also to permit him to change the user of the said shop room into a Doctor's consultation chamber. 5. A notice was issued under Section 416 (5) of the KMC Act, 1980 and an order was passed on 19.02.2016, permitting the change of user from shop to a Doctor's chamber and the necessary construction required therefor subject to the payment of the fees. A regularization plan was sanctioned and the construction have been done strictly in conformity therewith. In reply, the petitioner reiterated and restated the facts averred in the writ petition and therefore, this Court need not narrate the same in extenso. 6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the car parking space cannot be allowed to be converted into a shop room or the Doctor's chamber in view of the provisions contained under Section 416, 423 & 424 of the Act. However, it is submitted at the Bar that the circular issued by the Mayor-in-Council being circular no. 6 of 1995-96 dated 2nd May, 1996 wherein it is clearly indicated that under no circumstances the change of user of the car parking space can be regularised for any other purposes. In this regard, It is thus submitted that the permission to change the user from car parking to a shop or Doctor's chamber is in contravention to the said circular and, therefore, the regularization plan is required to be struck down or cancelled. 7. On the other hand, the respondent no. 5 & 6 submits that the deed of conveyance executed in their favour clearly indicates the existence of a shop room and the conversion for the purpose of Doctor's chamber is legal and within the authorities of the corporation. 7. On the other hand, the respondent no. 5 & 6 submits that the deed of conveyance executed in their favour clearly indicates the existence of a shop room and the conversion for the purpose of Doctor's chamber is legal and within the authorities of the corporation. It is further submitted that the conversion from a cover car parking space to the shop was allowed way back in 2012 and there is no challenged to the said decision in the instant writ petition. It is thus submitted that the circular issued by the Mayor-in-Council cannot in any way stand in the way of granting permission to change the user from shop to a Doctor's chamber. 8. The learned advocate representing the corporation, however, submits that the construction of a Doctor's chamber is strictly in conformity with the regularization plan sanctioned by the competent authority within their powers and the jurisdiction which cannot be said to be illegal. It is further submitted that there is no fetter in the Act or the Rules standing in the way of the corporation authorities in allowing the conversion under Section 416, 423 & 424 of the Act and, therefore, the petitioners' grievance has no legal basis. 9. On the conspectus of the above facts, the point which emerges for consideration is whether the circulars issued by the Mayor-in-Council is merely an executive instruction or has a statutory force. The concept of ownership of a flat in an integrated building or a multi-storied building is of recent origin past seven decades. The Government realised the scarcity of the land in an urban area and feels necessary to accommodate large peoples migrating from rural area for their livelihood and better economic need. The State of West Bengal constructed a multi-storied building providing shelter to large section of the people on rental basis. Some section of the society who strengthen themselves economically but cannot built their own house on the plot of land because of steeping rise of the price of land and the costs of construction. The ownership of a flat was the most economical viable option and building the harmony in the community and sharing common rights with the others. Some section of the society who strengthen themselves economically but cannot built their own house on the plot of land because of steeping rise of the price of land and the costs of construction. The ownership of a flat was the most economical viable option and building the harmony in the community and sharing common rights with the others. At the advent of the law relating to the apartment owner as well as Housing Development, the purchase of the flat was a centre of attraction to a middle income group and to advance such encouragement amendments were brought in the Municipal Act in separately assessing the annual valuation for the purpose of property tax treating each owners of the flat as an individual unit and treating them as an assessee. The rights of each individual flat owners flows from the respective deeds executed by the owners/developers and right is being heritable and transferable. The car parking space provided in an integrated building is not an easement right nor appurtenant to each flats. It is an individual unit required to be transferred by the owner if the flat owner intended to purchase the same upon consideration. No law has been framed as yet which includes the car parking space of the area be it cover or otherwise to be common and commonly enjoyed by each flat owners of the integrated building. 10. Admittedly, in the instant case, majority of the petitioners did not buy the car parking space initially shown in this sanctioned building plan but appears to have been using and utilizing such spaces without any authority and/or permission. There is no embargo on the owners/developers to individually sale the cover car parking space to a third party who has not purchased any flat in the said building. Indubitably, one of the car parking space was sold to Mr. Sudipta Roy Chowdhury who latter applied for its conversion into a shop room. The assessment registrar maintained by the corporation shows that the change of user was permitted as per back as on 17th October, 2012 containing an area on 212 sq.ft. The said order is not challenged in the instant writ petition. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid facts were not known to them as the same was brought to their notice only in an affidavit-in-opposition. The said order is not challenged in the instant writ petition. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid facts were not known to them as the same was brought to their notice only in an affidavit-in-opposition. Even thereafter the petitioners did not amend the writ petition and proceeded on the basis of the averments originally pleaded therein. The explanation which the petitioners sought to be offer is that the notice under Section 416 (5) of the Act was issued on the alleged conversion of the car parking space to a Doctor's chamber without indicating that such conversion was permitted as per back as on 17.10.2012. It is undisputed that during the hearing, the corporation was apprised of the said fact and noticing that such conversion was permitted in the year 2012, the conversion is sought from shop to a Doctor's chamber. The corporation did not pass an order for demolition of the structure but permitted such change of user in exercise of power under Section 416 of the Act. The said section runs thus: "S.416. Prohibition on change of use of building:- (1) No person shall, without any written permission of the Municipal Commissioner or otherwise than in conformity with the conditions, if any, of such permission-- (a) use or permit to be used for the purpose of human habitation any part of a building not originally erected or authorized to be used for such purpose; (b) change or allow the change of the use of any building for any purpose other than that specified in the sanction under section 396; (c) change or allow the change of the use of any building erected before the commencement of this Act contrary to the use for which such erection was originally sanctioned; (d) convert or allow the conversion of a tenement under a particular occupancy or use group to a tenement under another occupancy or use group : Provided that no such permission shall be given if the new occupancy or use group is otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this Act or the rules and the regulations, made thereunder or of any other law in force for the time being. (2) If, in any case, such permission is given, no change of occupancy or use group shall be allowed before any necessary alterations or provisions have been made to the satisfaction of the Municipal Commissioner and in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules and the regulations made thereunder or of any other law in force for the time being. (3) Any change of use made before the commencement of this Act, except in so far as such use is permitted under 1 [section 385] of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (West Ben. Act XXXIII of 1951), shall be deemed to be an authorized change and shall be dealt with under the provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding any other action that may be taken against any person whether owner or occupier or both, contravening any provision of this section, the Municipal Commissioner may levy on such person in accordance with such scale as may be [determined by regulations] a fine not exceeding in each case rupees one hundred per square metre per month for the area under unauthorized use throughout the period during which such contravention continues. (5) The Municipal Commissioner may, if he deems fit, order that the unauthorized use be stopped forthwith: Provided that before making any such order, the Municipal Commissioner shall give a reasonable opportunity to the person affected to show cause why such order should not be made. (6) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Municipal Commissioner under subsection (5) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against the order to the Municipal Building Tribunal appointed under section 415. (7) Where an appeal is preferred under sub-section (6), the Municipal Building Tribunal may stay the enforcement of the order on such terms, if any, and for such period as it may think fit: Provided that the fine levied under sub-section (4) shall not be waived. (8) Save as otherwise provided in this section, no Court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding for injunction or other relief against the Municipal Commissioner to restrain him from taking any action or making any order in pursuance of the provisions of this section. (9) Every order made by the Municipal Building Tribunal on appeal and subject to such order, the order of the Municipal Commissioner under subsection (5) shall be final and conclusive. (9) Every order made by the Municipal Building Tribunal on appeal and subject to such order, the order of the Municipal Commissioner under subsection (5) shall be final and conclusive. (10) Where no appeal has been preferred against an order made under sub-section (5) or where an order under that sub-section has been confirmed on appeal, whether with or without modification, the person against whom such orders has been made shall comply with the same within the period specified therein, or, as the case may be, within the period, if any, fixed by the Municipal Building Tribunal on appeal, and on the failure of such person to comply with such order within such period, the Municipal Commissioner may require any police officer or any employee of the Corporation to seal up such area after evicting all persons therefrom to prevent its further unauthorized use." 11. It is manifest from the said provision that the change of use of any building for any purposes other than specified in the sanction building plan can only be permitted on written permission of the Municipal Commissioner and such permission cannot be given in contravention with the provision of the Act or Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. Sub-section 5 of the said section empowers the Municipal Commissioner to pass an order for a stoppage of the unauthorised use forthwith after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected person. It is not in dispute that a show cause notice was issued under sub-section 5 of the said section upon the aforesaid respondents and the permission to change the use was granted by regularising plan. There is no corresponding Rules framed specifying the manner and methodology for granting permission or refusing to grant permission. The power conferred upon the authority should be exercised in a reasonable and rational manner as opposed to whimsical and arbitrary manner. The discretionary power should be exercised to uphold and advance the purpose and object of the Act and the provisions contained therein and any misuse or abuse or arbitrary action should be safeguarded. It is no longer res integra that the discretion exercised by the authority should not be interfered with unless it appears to be arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and in contravention to any provision of the relevant law. 12. It is no longer res integra that the discretion exercised by the authority should not be interfered with unless it appears to be arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and in contravention to any provision of the relevant law. 12. It is no longer res integra that issuance of circulars/guidelines is not controlled by the statutory provision but in effect, is advisory in character having no legal right conferred upon the third party. The reference can be made to a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur And Ors. reported in (2013) 5 SCC 427 wherein it is held: "27. Executive instructions which have no statutory force, cannot override the law. Therefore, any notice, circular, guidelines, etc. which run contrary to statutory laws cannot be enforced. [Vide B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1966 SC 1942 ], Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1967 SC 1910 ], State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753 : AIR 2006 SC 1806 ] and Mahadeo Bhau Khilare (Mane) v. State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 5 SCC 524 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 194]." 13. It is, therefore, evident from the above decision that unless the circulars have a statutory force, no right is accrued on the third party to seek mandamus commanding the authorities to act on the basis of such circulars. 14. Furthermore, this Court do not delve to go more deeper into the aspect for the simple reason that there is no foundation in the pleading relating to the binding effect of those circulars or non-adherence of those circulars may invite the quashing and setting aside the discretionary order. 15. As indicate above, the change of user was permitted from a car parking space to a shop on 17.10.2012 which is not challenged in the instant writ petition. The user of the shop room as a Doctor's consultation chamber does not appear to be so grave as both the uses intended for commercial purposes. 16. This court, therefore, does not find any infirmity in the decision of the corporation, more particularly, in view of the facts indicated herein above. 17. The writ petition is thus dismissed. 18. However, there shall be no order as to costs.