JUDGMENT Debabrata Dash, J. This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur in R.F.A. No. 21 of 2013 reversing the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Berhampur in Civil Suit No. 56 of 2009. The trial Court had decreed the suit by confirming the possession of the suit house by the appellant-plaintiffs as tenants and restraining the respondent-defendants from interfering or disturbing the peaceful enjoyment or the plaintiffs with respect of the same, without taking recourse to law in duly evicting the appellant-plaintiffs from the suit house. The respondent No. 2-defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree had carried the First Appeal; wherein the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court have been set aside, resulting dismissal of the suit filed by the appellant as the plaintiffs. 2. For the sake of convenience in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial Court. 3. The suit of the plaintiffs is with the prayer for passing a decree for declaration in their favour confirming possession over the suit house and their tenancy in respect of that as also for permanent injunction directing the defendants and restraining them from interfering or disturbing in any manner with their enjoyment and possession without resorting to the process of law. It is stated that in or about the year 2006, the defendants had inducted the plaintiffs as tenants in respect of the suit house on monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand) and the plaintiffs have been paying the agreed house rent to defendant No. 2 regularly. It is further stated that such induction of the plaintiffs as tenants in respect of the suit house was upon an oral agreement and mutual understanding. It is their case that the defendants had taken a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the plaintiffs towards security, refundable at the time of vacation of the suit house without interest. The plaintiffs thus, claim to be in lawful occupation of the suit house as tenants. It is alleged that the defendants have been trying to unlawfully evict the plaintiffs by using force and in that light have been giving threats. 1,50,000/- from the plaintiffs towards security, refundable at the time of vacation of the suit house without interest. The plaintiffs thus, claim to be in lawful occupation of the suit house as tenants. It is alleged that the defendants have been trying to unlawfully evict the plaintiffs by using force and in that light have been giving threats. For the purpose, it is said that they have managed to get the assurance of the law enforcing agency in view of their political background, when they also have both money and muscle power. Thus, the plaintiffs apprehending eviction at the hand of the defendants without taking recourse to law and without through the legal procedure have filed the suit claiming the reliefs as aforesaid. 4. The defendants in their written statement while traversing the plaint averments have averred that Harekrushna Panda, the father of the plaintiff had approached defendant No. 1 to let out the suit house to him and allow him to occupy the same as tenants on payment of monthly rent. It is also stated that an agreement had come into being between defendant No. 1 and Harekrushna Panda on 10-10-2004 for a period of eleven months. And pursuant to the same he was inducted as a tenant on payment of rent of Rs. 2,000/- per month and deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with the defendant No. 1 as security, refundable on expiry of the term of the lease. Thus, it is stated that these plaintiffs have never been the tenants in respect of the suit house and it was their father who was a tenant in respect of the suit house at an anterior point of time. It is next stated that after expiry of eleven months, the period for which Harekrushna had initially been granted with the lease, on further request of Harekrushna, he was merely permitted to stay for some month more. However, Harekrushna thereafter stopped paying rent. So, the possession of Harekrushna from that time onwards is said to be illegal and unlawful and thus the plaintiffs who were remained in possession are said to be having no right to possess the suit house and occupy any more. 4A. On the above rival pleadings, the trial Court had framed as many as six issues:- ISSUES '1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. 4A. On the above rival pleadings, the trial Court had framed as many as six issues:- ISSUES '1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiffs have got any cause of action to file such suit? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of declaration and confirmation of their possession over the suit house as tenants? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to an order for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering or disturbing their peaceful enjoyment over the leased suit house? 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party? 6. To what other relief(s) the plaintiffs are entitled? 5. Taking up issue Nos. 3 and 4 together for decision, upon analysis of evidence with reference to the rival case it has been held that the plaintiffs have stepped into the shoes of their father upon his death as tenants and have thus been in occupation of the suit house. It has next been stated that in view of such possession of the suit house by the plaintiffs which has been continuing since the time of their father who had been originally inducted as tenants on payment of rent, the plaintiffs cannot be evicted without following taking recourse to law. So to that extent the suit had been granted by the trial Court. 6. The lower appellate Court on being moved by the defendants in first appeal has come to the conclusion that since Harekrushna Panda was the tenant in respect of the suit house and had given rent uptill the year 2009, the plaintiffs though are the legal heirs of Harekrushna and as such have also been in occupation of the suit house; they cannot be assigned with the position as that of tenants as on the date of the suit. So, it is said that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants. And therefore, it is stated that they do neither have the locus nor the cause of action to file the suit. Practically, in view of such finding, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court have been set at naught and that has resulted the dismissal of the suit. 7. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law as has been stated in ground (A) of the memorandum of appeal. Practically, in view of such finding, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court have been set at naught and that has resulted the dismissal of the suit. 7. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law as has been stated in ground (A) of the memorandum of appeal. 'Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court denying the tenancy of the plaintiffs refusing to hold tenancy in respect of the suit house in favour of the plaintiffs, if perverse and vitiated by the error of record when D.W. 1, the respondent No. 2 himself has admitted the said fact regarding creation of tenancy and existence of the relationship as such between plaintiffs and defendant No.1?' 8. Mr. P. K. Das, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the view taken by the lower appellate Court that Harekrushna being the original tenant and as such being in occupation of suit house till his death, his legal heirs upon his death do not get the recognition as tenants is wholly erroneous. Therefore, he contends that the substantial question of law in any case has to receive its answer in support of the conclusion reached by the trial Court that the plaintiffs being the legal representatives of the deceased tenant who had been initially inducted by the defendants have stepped into the shoes of the original tenant and as such when they are continuing to occupy the said lease hold premises; the defendants have no right to disturb their possession or dispossess them without taking recourse to law and without the authority of law. His further submission is that when law is well settled that a tenant even after expiry of the period of lease continuing to remain in occupation of the lease hold premises as before either as tenant holding over or tenant at sufferance, he is required to be evicted from the premises by taking recourse to law and as such cannot be thrown out overnight, the lower appellate court is not right in upsetting the final decision of the trial Court in that regard. He further submits that when a person is in settled possession even as an encroacher, the original owner cannot forcibly drive him out by force and he has to follow the process of law for the purpose of getting vacant possession of the immovable property. Mr. He further submits that when a person is in settled possession even as an encroacher, the original owner cannot forcibly drive him out by force and he has to follow the process of law for the purpose of getting vacant possession of the immovable property. Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 in reply contends all in favour of the findings and judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. According to him, no fault can be found out in the eye of law with the lower appellate Court that the plaintiffs are not the tenants under the defendants as they claim and assert. So, the lower appellate Court's finding that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendants is unassailable. Therefore, he contends that when the suit is founded upon the claim based on relationship and that as such is not recognisable in the eye of law, the lower appellate Court cannot be said to have committed any such mistake/error in finally non-suiting the plaintiff. According to him, the answer to the substantial question of law has thus to be recorded in the negative that the plaintiffs are not the tenants under the defendants nor there exists any such relationship in the eye of law. So, when their status is not as had been so found by the trial Court; the lower appellate court when has rightly rectified that legal error and the suit as laid has been rightly dismissed on the face of the settled law that possession of land by a wrongful possessor although is referable to title as of owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner. 9. In order to address the rival submissions in finally answering the substantial question of law as framed as the cost of repeatation, let me first of all refer to the case as set out in the written statement filled by the contesting defendant. In the written statement it has been stated that one Harekrushna Panda, son of Rama Chandra Panda approached the defendant No. 1 requesting him to let out the suit house on rental basis and the defendant No. 1 agreed to give the suit house on rental basis. Accordingly, monthly rent of Rs. In the written statement it has been stated that one Harekrushna Panda, son of Rama Chandra Panda approached the defendant No. 1 requesting him to let out the suit house on rental basis and the defendant No. 1 agreed to give the suit house on rental basis. Accordingly, monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/- was agreed to be paid for such occupation of the suit house by said Harekrushna. An agreement of lease to that effect was executed on 10-10-2004 for a period of eleven months. It is further stated that Harekrushna has deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with defendant No. 1 towards security, refundable on expiry of lease or termination of the same. It is also stated that said Harekrushna identified the plaintiffs as his daughters. So it is stated that plaintiffs were never the tenants and the suit house had never been given to them as monthly tenants. The defence is that though the father of the plaintiffs was their tenant in respect of the suit house since October, 2004, the plaintiffs were/are not the tenants. It has been further stated that after expiry of eleven months, the fixed period of lease, the defendant No. 1 became sick and so he requested the plaintiff's father to vacate the suit house. But Harekrushna then asked defendant No. 1 for some time to vacate the suit house. The request being acceded to, Harekrushna was permitted to stay over there for some months. Thereafter said Harekrushna stopped paying the rent. Having done so, Harekrushna also did not vacate the suit house. It has thus been averred that the possession of Harekrushna Panda and his family members became the possession as tenants on sufferance. Thus, their possession is said to be illegal and unlawful. It is further stated that they are bound to vacate the possession of the suit house to the defendant No. 2 and the plaintiffs have no right to continue with the possession of the suit house any more. With these pleadings, the defendant No. 2 although has prayed to dismiss the suit. It may be stated here that the defendants have not advanced any counter-claim for eviction of the plaintiffs from the suit house and for recovery of possession of the same in their favour. 10. With these pleadings, the defendant No. 2 although has prayed to dismiss the suit. It may be stated here that the defendants have not advanced any counter-claim for eviction of the plaintiffs from the suit house and for recovery of possession of the same in their favour. 10. As per the case of the defendants, these plaintiffs are now in possession of the suit house as legal representatives of Harekrushna who was initially inducted as a tenant in respect of the suit house and then later on after expiry of the period of lease was so permitted to continue with the possession for some time on payment of rent and thereafter he did neither pay the rent nor vacated. It is the very case of the defendants that Harekrushna at the time of his death was a tenant at sufferance. 11. The position of law is clear on the point that upon death of the original tenant subject to any provision to the contrary although negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy right devolves on the heirs of the deceased tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs and there is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefore. Thus, the notice terminating tenancy under section 106 of the T.P. Act stands as a mandate of law. It is, however, permissible to be so addressed and served upon one of the heirs of the original tenant, who paid rent and acted on behalf of all the heirs of the original tenant. It means even when the right of tenancy before its termination has been inherited by the legal heirs of the tenant, they are joint tenants on a single tenancy and one of them can represent the entire estate for which reason notice of termination of tenancy under section 106 of the T.P. Act served on one is capable of terminating the tenancy inherited by the joint tenants as on legal heirs of the original tenant. 12. The expression of 'tenants at sufferance' is merely a fiction to distinguish their unlawful possession from that of trespassers. The possession of a 'trespasser is lawful both in its inception and in its continuance, whereas the possession of a tenant at sufferance is rightful in its inception, but wrongful in its continuance. 12. The expression of 'tenants at sufferance' is merely a fiction to distinguish their unlawful possession from that of trespassers. The possession of a 'trespasser is lawful both in its inception and in its continuance, whereas the possession of a tenant at sufferance is rightful in its inception, but wrongful in its continuance. A distinction is drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease without the consent of the landlord, and tenant doing so with the landlord's consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The act of holding over in any event after expiration of the term does not necessarily create tenancy of any kind; if the lessee remains in possession after determination of the term and for all practical purposes, he becomes a tenant at sufferance. 13. 'In Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (7th Edn.) at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus; A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. The expression ' holding over' is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord's consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position that a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination to the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue to possession after the termination of the tenancy. His possession is juridical. The subtle difference resulting a definite distinction between tenant holding over and a tenant-at-sufferance as above has been noticed in case of Bhupal Prasad, reported in AIR 1996 SC 140 . Holding over stands equivalent to the retention of possession after determination of lease, but with the consent of the landlord whereas, on similar circumstances if the possession is without the consent of the landlord then the same stand out to be a tenant-at-sufferance Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act does let a statutory recognition to the concept of holding over.' 14. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, after expiry of the period of lease as has been stated by defendant No. 2 based upon the request of the original tenant Harekrushna, he was so permitted to continue in possession of the suit house i.e. the lease hold premises for some time. Thereafter while was remaining in possession, it is alleged that he did not pay the rent and continued to stay for sometime as such and even after that short period so permitted and after his death, the possession of the leasehold premises since then is remaining in the hands of the plaintiffs. Thereafter while was remaining in possession, it is alleged that he did not pay the rent and continued to stay for sometime as such and even after that short period so permitted and after his death, the possession of the leasehold premises since then is remaining in the hands of the plaintiffs. In such circumstances the status of the Harekrushna in remaining in possession of the leasehold premises after expiry of the period of lease has to be taken as that of a tenant holding over for the short term for which he was so permitted or till the time of default in paying the rent whichever is earlier as the consent being on payment of rent, the non-payment of rent and continuance in possession is to be deemed to be without consent. So, since the aforesaid time, Harekrushna became a tenant at sufferance remaining in possession of the leasehold premises i.e. the suit house without consent of the landlord. This possession has accordingly come to the hands of the plaintiffs who are none other than the legal heirs of Harekrushna. Thus in the eye of law these plaintiffs are tenants at sufferance and their possession of the suit house is now on that basis carrying said status. In view of the aforesaid, the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit house as the tenants is not correct in the eye of law and the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that there remains no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to the suit is correct in law. In view of aforesaid, although the plaintiffs may not have right to continue with the possession, their possession is juridical. The dispossession however can be only under due process of law and not by force. The aforesaid discussions and reasons, accordingly provide the answer to the substantial question of law that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit house as tenants at sufferance. Although they have no right to continue in possession of the suit house yet their possession has to receive protection of law until their eviction under due process of law and said possession cannot be taken by force even by the landlords. 15. The law in India, as it has developed, accords wit the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. 15. The law in India, as it has developed, accords wit the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144 : 51 IA 293, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 : (AIR 2003 SC 2508). In between, to quote a few out of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620 , the Apex Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The Court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohd. v. Lakshmi Das, AIR 1959 All 1 . 'Law respects possession eve if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossesses a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause.' In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. K. C. Alexander, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1165 , the Apex Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession along decides. The Court quoted Loft's maxim- ' possession contra omnes valet praetor eur cui ius sit possession is (he that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)'. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession along decides. The Court quoted Loft's maxim- ' possession contra omnes valet praetor eur cui ius sit possession is (he that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)'. In M. C. Chockalingam v. V. Manichavasagam (1974) 1 SCC 48 : ( AIR 1974 SC 104 ) the Court has further held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2097 ) it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property,even on the assumptions that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law.' 16. Applying the above settled position of law to the facts of the present case and the status of the parties vis-a-vis the suit house as ascertained therefrom, the view thus emerges that the possession of the suit house by the plaintiffs needs to be protected until they are evicted by taking recourse to law and it is not permitted in law to be interfered with or disturbed as the possession of the plaintiffs here is to the knowledge of the defendants and without any attempt of concealment having an element of 'aminus possidendi' even leaving aside for a moment the nature of possession as tenants at sufferance. Therefore, insofar as the ultimate result o the suit is concerned, the lower appellate Court on the basis of its finding is found to have erred in law by dismissing the suit in its entirety. In that event also, the decree passed by the trial Court ought to have been confirmed to the extent of protecting the possession of the plaintiffs in the hands of the defendants and from any such disturbance or interference therein until their eviction taking recourse to law. 17. Resultantly, this second appeal is allowed in part to the extent as indicated above, by decreeing the suit of the plaintiff granting injunction that the defendants are restrained from disturbing or interfering with the possession of the suit house by the plaintiff and from evicting them by force without taking recourse to law and with that authority. 17. Resultantly, this second appeal is allowed in part to the extent as indicated above, by decreeing the suit of the plaintiff granting injunction that the defendants are restrained from disturbing or interfering with the possession of the suit house by the plaintiff and from evicting them by force without taking recourse to law and with that authority. There shall however be no order as to cost in the facts and circumstances of the case. Appeal allowed.