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2017 DIGILAW 463 (UTT)

Raj Kumar Bansal v. State

2017-08-28

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : The petitioner has filed the writ petition for the following relief’s :- “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the common judgment and order dated 30.03.2007 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Dehradun in Appeal No. 14/2006 and 23/2006 (annexure no. 2 to the writ petition) and the undated orders passed by the alleged Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun issuing the two permits to respondent no. 3, as contained in Annexure no. 5 and 6 to the writ petition may also be quashed; (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 5 to call back the permit nos. 1879 and 1880 from the respondent no. 3 and cancel the same forthwith; (iii) Any other writ, order or direction as may deem fit and proper may also be passed; (iv) Costs of the writ petition may also be awarded to the petitioner.” 2. It is not in controversy and rather admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is an existing operator and is operating his buses on the basis of valid permits, granted to him for the route called as, “Dehradun-Vikas Nagar-Dakpathhar-Kalsi” route. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that out of the total sanctioned permits which are 70 in number on the said route, at present there are about 80 regular stage carriage routes which are operating on the route in question 3. Contention of the petitioner is that respondent no. 3, who is in the spree of polarizing of the permits on the route in question, had persuaded the respondents (respondent nos. 1 and 2) to grant an additional three permits on the route in question. According tot the learned counsel for petitioner, for granting the said permit, it was the respondent no. 3, who had motivated the authorities to submit a report on 19.04.2004 for sanctioning three additional permits, looking to the requirements on the route in question. 4. The petitioner’s contention is that according to the existing permit already operating on the route in question, there was no necessity to grant an additional permit and that too at the behest of the respondent no. 4. The petitioner’s contention is that according to the existing permit already operating on the route in question, there was no necessity to grant an additional permit and that too at the behest of the respondent no. 3, who is in spree of having permits on the route in question and intends to oust business competition and also because of the fact that any notified route which is permitted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 cannot be made as a racing ground as being detrimental to the intentions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 and for the public. 5. It is on this premise; learned counsel for the petitioner contends that he has filed his objection against the report submitted by the ARTO on 19.07.2004, whereby he recommended for the grant of additional three permits on the route in question. On the objection, thus filed, the same was considered in the meeting of the RTA dated 15.05.2006 and by an order of RTA dated 15.05.2006. Apparently what the petitioner wants to contend is that when the RTA after considering the objection has called for a fresh report, it would tantamount to override the initial report submitted on 19.04.2004 as recommended by the ARTO for the grant of three additional permits and thus the report dated 19.04.2004 stands overridden by the so-called order dated 15.05.2006 passed by the RTA. 6. Admittedly, the report which has been sought for was on the application submitted for the grant of permit by respondent no. 3. The contention of Mr. Amar Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 is that the action of the RTA by passing an order dated 15.05.2006 by sitting over the report of 19.04.2004 and calling for a fresh report was prejudicial to his interest because the decision taken on 19.04.2004 since was only a step forward for considering the application for the grant of permit, it cannot be taken as to be the decision, nor it could be magnified by the RTA by passing the order dated 15.05.2006 by calling upon a fresh report and thus he contends that since it was a step forward in considering his application, the report dated 19.04.2004 could not have been subject to adjudication before the RTO. 7. 7. Hence, he was aggrieved and he preferred an Appeal being Appeal No. 14/2006 under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (S.T.A.T). 8. The Appeal No. 14/2006 preferred by the respondent no. 3 came up for consideration before the S.T.A.T., who vide its order dated 01.02.2007 had partly allowed the appeal and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun to consider the application, submitted by the petitioner for the grant of additional permit. It is against this order that writ petition being No. 57 of 2007, came up for consideration before this Court. This writ petition was considered by the learned coordinate bench of this Court against impugned order of remitting the matter to the S.T.A.T. The relevant part of the impugned order passed by the coordinate bench of this Court is quoted herein below: “…………..For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 1-2-2007 passed by S.T.A.T. is hereby set aside. Both the Appeal Nos. 14 of 2006 and 23 of 2006, S.K. Srivastava Vs. R.T.A. Dehradun stand restored. The learned Tribuna shall decide the appeals afresh preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order.” 9. The S.T.A.T., while considering the appeal, filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3, passed an order on 30.03.2007, whereby the appeal was allowed and the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun was directed to reconsider the Resolution No. 5 dated 15.05.2006. 10. It is on the revival of the proceedings by the order passed by this Court the order dated 30.03.2007 has been passed by S.T.A.T., whereby the appeal preferred by respondent no. 3 has been allowed, which is now impugned in the present writ petition. The consequential effect, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the result of allowing the writ petition dated 30.03.2007 would be that the report submitted by ARTO dated 19.04.2004, for granting of additional three permits would revive and he further submitted that rather based on the said report, submitted to the respondent no. 3 on the route in question which has already been granted would revive. 11. Though the said permit as granted is shown to have expired on 19.03.2013 but the learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is subject to the extension and that has already been granted and is still operative. 12. 3 on the route in question which has already been granted would revive. 11. Though the said permit as granted is shown to have expired on 19.03.2013 but the learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is subject to the extension and that has already been granted and is still operative. 12. Primarily, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument on the issue that (i) By the grant of an additional three permits, no purpose or intention as contemplated in Motor Vehicles Act, which would be beneficial to the public at large would be achieved. (ii) By the grant of additional three permits to respondent no. 3, who is an existing operator, would likely to be affected because his scope of business would be reduced. (iii) By grant of three additional permits notified route will be converted into a racing ground. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grant of permit based on the report dated 19.04.2004 to respondent no. 3, is a malafide exercise because respondent no. 3 is somehow managing the affairs by playing the frauds on the authorities by having permits over the route in question and thus avoiding business competition. 14. In response to it, Mr. Amar Shukla, Advocate for the respondent no. 3 contends that in view of the pronouncements laid down, an existing operator cannot object the grant of permit to other because under the Constitution mandate, each and every citizen has got a right to have an engagement. Mr. Shukla further submits that the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by grant of permit he is likely to be effected by the grant of permit on the route Dehradun-Vikas Nagar-Kalsi via Prem Nagar is absolutely unacceptable argument, the reason being the petitioner is a permit holder of the route called as Dehradun-Vikas Nagar-Dakpathhar so only a segment of it is an overlapping route. The concept of overlapping is otherwise also an unavoidable act and that cannot be taken as to be the basis for creating an impediment in granting the permit to a permit holder, who applies under the Act. 15. The concept of overlapping is otherwise also an unavoidable act and that cannot be taken as to be the basis for creating an impediment in granting the permit to a permit holder, who applies under the Act. 15. In response to the question of fraud as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in para 16 which remains un-replied in the counter affidavit, this Court apparently feels that para 16 though it pleads fraud, but the fraud as such has not been established and if the respondent has escaped to give a reply, it will not vitiate the process of granting the permit which was otherwise done after getting the report on 19.04.2004 and which has undergone the test of process upto this Court where the authorities, who were engaged in granting the permit were conscious of the application of granting the additional three permits on the route in question and have supported cause. 16. If at all there was a fraud committed then at least sufferer would be the state and it is the agency and at least not the petitioner, who is already an existing operator. Hence the theory of fraud as pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner will not have much bearing on the grant of permit over the route in question. 17. The issue pertaining to the permits being granted and the right of an existing operator being affect, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an existing operator could only be the aggrieved person against the grant of an additional permit on the route in question to the notice of the authorities and hence under the philosophy that a notified route cannot be made as a racing ground, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has got no right to questioning the impugned order before this Court. 18. This Court feels that looking to the population growth, the requirements of development, the convenience of public at large, and a common experience of overloaded buses, being plied on busy routes if the authorities, who are responsible to take a decision while coming to a conclusion with regard to the requirement of additional permits. 18. This Court feels that looking to the population growth, the requirements of development, the convenience of public at large, and a common experience of overloaded buses, being plied on busy routes if the authorities, who are responsible to take a decision while coming to a conclusion with regard to the requirement of additional permits. It is absolutely a prerogative of the authority to come to a conclusion, looking to the circumstances as to what number of permits have been required over the route in question for which, at least the petitioner, who is an existing operator cannot have any say in the matter nor the policy decision of authorities could be questioned in writ jurisdiction, unless statutorily barred. 19. In support of his contention, Mr. Amar Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has placed reliance on a judgment reported in 1992 (1) SCC 168 in the case of Mithilesh Garg and Others Vs. Union of India Others which primarily canvassed the proposition so far it relates to the rights of an existing operator questioning the decision of an authority under the Act either granting or refusing to grant a permit. It is held out “the right of the existing operator to file an objection and the provisions to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away” because on a concise reading of Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act, the existing power has been taken away, as it defeats the statements and the objections. The reasons of the Act which deals with the liberalization of grant of permits under the New Motor Vehicles Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court, further laid down in accordance with Section 71(1) of the Act that the only restrictions which the Regional Transport Authority will exercise, while considering for granting the permit would be that they will have to with regards to the object of the Act and the intention contended under Section 80(2) of the Liberalization of the Transport Policy of the State. Thus from that view point, at least petitioner cannot have any right over the matter in question. Para 6 and 9 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:- “6. The petitioners are existing stage-carriage operators on different routes. They hold permits granted by the Regional Transport Authorities concerned. Thus from that view point, at least petitioner cannot have any right over the matter in question. Para 6 and 9 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:- “6. The petitioners are existing stage-carriage operators on different routes. They hold permits granted by the Regional Transport Authorities concerned. Mithlesh Garg, petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1345/89 has stated that he holds a stage carriage permit and plies his vehicles on the Meerut-Parikshitgarh-Hasifabad-Laliana and allied routes under the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. According to him prior to the enforcement of the Act, 23 permit-holders were operating on the said route but thereafter under Section 80 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut has issued 272 more permits in respect of the same route. Similar facts have been stated in the other writ petitions. As mentioned above the petitioners are permit holders and are existing operators. They are plying their vehicles on the routes assigned to them under the permits. They are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statutory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors. We see no justification in the petitioners' stand. More operators mean healthy-competition and efficient transport system. Over-crowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, persons clinging to the bus-doors and even sitting on the roof-top are some of the common sights in this country. More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstery, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter-public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronize the operator who is providing the best service. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. The apprehensions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession, is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed-out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport system in a state is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal. The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy competition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade. This Court in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 578 posed the following questions for its determination: “Whether the proprietor of a cinema theater holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a 'No-Objection Certificate', granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave.” 9. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and Ors. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 728 held that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) entitles any member of the public to carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles. Mukerjea, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: “Within the limits imposed by State regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under Clause (6) of that article.” It is thus a guaranteed right of every citizen whether rich or poor to take up and carry on, if he so wishes, the motor transport business. It is only the State which can impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the right under Article 19(1)(g) so far as the motor transport business was concerned. The said restrictions have been taken away and the provisions of Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the Statute Book. The Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business. The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the Parliament has undone. When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g) there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners.” 20. The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the Parliament has undone. When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g) there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners.” 20. An identical proposition has been laid down by the judgment reported in 1970 (1) SCC 575 “The Nagar Rice & Flour Mills and Ors. Vs. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. and Ors. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment reported in 1976 (1) SCC 671 “Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others” in its paras 48, 50 and 52 has laid down the same proposition with regards to the rights of an existing operator, questioning the decision making process of the RTA in granting the permits on a route in question. Para 48, 50 and 52 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:- “48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No Objection Certificate. 50. While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger' and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger' and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2 which they have under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions imposed by law'. 52. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the negative and on that ground, without entering upon the merits of the case, dismiss this appeal with costs.” 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has places reliance on another judgment reported in 2003 (2) Allahabad Weekly Cases page 1106 in the case of Mukesh Kumar Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Ghaziabad where, the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad, in its para 7 while placing reliance in a judgment “Surender Rao Vs. RTA Gorakhpur” reported in AIR 1992 All. 211 has laid down that the existing operators cannot oppose a grant of permit nor can they challenge the order granting permit. “7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Surendra Rao v. R.T.A. Gorakhpur, 1992 (2) AC 849: AIR 1992 All. 211 , and has referred to para 4 of the said decision. He has submitted that while existing operators cannot oppose the grant of permit nor can they challenge the order granting permit, it has also been observed in para 4 of the said judgment that the area of the route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers en route thereby exposing both the person and property of the public to great danger.” 22. It has also been observed in para 4 of the said judgment that the area of the route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers en route but the Division Bench as well as in Surender Rao (Supra) case has held out that an issue which falls to be within the ambit of consideration of the authority itself and not a decision making process for the existing operators. Para 4 of the judgment in Surender Rao (Supra) is quoted hereunder: “4. That Act provides for liberal grant of permits and excluded the participation of existing operators in the proceedings pertaining to grant of permits. In view of the provisions of the Act an existing operator can neither oppose the grant of permits on the ground that his rights under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India will be affected, for these Articles do not confer any right of monopoly on him, nor can he challenge the order of the transport authorities granting permits on the ground that his income will be adversely affected by induction of more operators on his route. The policy of the liberal grant of permits contained in the Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, (1991) JT SC 447 : ( AIR 1992 SC 443 ). But while granting permits the transport authorities lave to take into consideration relevant factors, some of which have been highlighted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of its judgment in the aforesaid case of Mithilesh Garg. In view of the provisions of S. 71(2) of the Act authorities have also to keep in mind while granting permits that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven are not contravened. The area or route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers route and thereby exposing both the person and property of the public to great danger. Transport authorities while granting permits exercise quasi judicial powers and have to apply their minds to each applicant before granting him permit. They are not to exercise their statutory powers of granting permits in a mechanical manner. Transport authorities while granting permits exercise quasi judicial powers and have to apply their minds to each applicant before granting him permit. They are not to exercise their statutory powers of granting permits in a mechanical manner. In this connection the relevant extract of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) as is contained in paragraph 14 of the judgment is reproduced below at page 452 (of AIR) : "The petitioners have further contended that the conditions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, conditions of hilly routes fuel availability and pollution control are some of the important factors which the Regional Transport Authority is bound to take into consideration while taking a decision on an application for grant of permit. These are the matters which are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities. The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds. It is not disputed that the Regional Transport Authority has the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons. It is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits. The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy." 23. Lastly, Mr. Amar Shukla, Advocate for the respondent no. 3 placed reliance on Full Bench judgment as reported in AIR 2006 Kerala 177 in the case of Binu Chacko Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Pathanamthitta & Anr. which in its paras 25 and 26 has laid down that the existing operator will not fall to be within the definition of the person aggrieved as contemplated under Section 89 and thus he has got any right to file an appeal or seek a recourse against the grant of permit which is absolutely a decision making process which is lying within the purview of the policy decision of the State authority and thus, the petitioner has got no right to questioning the grant of additional three permits. “25. “25. Section 71 of the Act postulates the R.T.A. to bear in mind only two aspects in considering applications for stage carriage permits: (i) R.T.A. shall have regard to the broad objects of the Act and (ii) must be satisfied that the time table furnished does not contravene the provisions of the Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven. Jurisdiction vested in the STAT to examine the correctness of orders passed refusing permit, etc. under Section 89 is an appellate power whereas the jurisdiction vested in the same Tribunal under Section 90 to pass orders in respect of improper or illegal orders of STA and RTA is revisional. Appeal is available only to a person aggrieved by the refusal to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted; the revocation of suspension of the permit, or any variation of the conditions thereof, the refusal to transfer the permit, etc. any vehicle or by any other order which may be prescribed, but there is no right of appeal against the grant of a permit, renewal of a permit, etc. Corresponding provision in the old Act relating to right of appeal was Section 64. One important legislative change which compels attention is the absence of provisions similar to Section 64(1)(f), (h) and (hh), obviously in tune with the liberalised policy which is the redeeming feature of the Act. The correlation between an application made to STAT by a person aggrieved and the jurisdiction of the STAT to exercise the revisional power under Section 90 of the Act in respect of improper or illegal orders has to be borne in mind. Section 90 does not confer power on the STAT to pass orders under that Section merely for the reason that the order of the STA or RTA is improper or illegal. The jurisdiction will be exercised only when an application is filed by a person aggrieved. To hold otherwise will be to render the words "person aggrieved" in Section 90 of the Act redundant and otiose. 26. In this context, we would like to point out the difference in approach permitted by law while exercising the power of revision under the statute and the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To hold otherwise will be to render the words "person aggrieved" in Section 90 of the Act redundant and otiose. 26. In this context, we would like to point out the difference in approach permitted by law while exercising the power of revision under the statute and the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The scope of the expression "person aggrieved" occurring in Section 90 of the Act shall conform to the scheme of the enactment whereas for the purpose of judicial review a different yardstick may be warranted so as to meet the ends of justice.” 24. Another ground which was pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the appeal of the respondent was not maintainable. The term aggrieved used in Section 89 has got a wider connotation and more particularly when it involves a question of considering on an application for granting of the permit at the behest of an applicant and that too is a circumscribe on the basis of an objection submitted by the petitioner. If any order is passed in negative against the respondent creating an impediment in the grant of permit that will make the respondent to be within the ambit of aggrieved person and his appeal under Section 89 would be maintainable. 25. In that view of the matter, this Court feels that since the petitioner being an existing operator and already operating his vehicles on a route called as “Dehradun-Vikas Nagar-Dak Pathhar”, which is an overlapping route to the route in question i.e. Dak Pathhar-Vikas Nagar via Kalsi via Prem Nagar which will constitutes to be an overlapping route under the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioner is not at all an aggrieved person and hence his contention that the orders have been rendered ex party by the authorities as well as by this Court in the earlier writ petition No. 57 of 2007 is of no avail. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost.