JUDGMENT : G.R. Udhwani, J. 1. Rule. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 waives service of notice of rule. Respondent No. 2, Tribunal, being a formal party and having no cause, rule is not required to be served upon it. Considering small issue involved in the matter, the petition is being disposed of by this order finally by consent of the learned counsel. 2. Only issue this court confronted with is whether the Industrial Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by going into the merits of maintainability of the application for review under Rule 26A of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules ("the Rules" for short) in an application for condonation of delay moved by the petitioner. 3. The case of the petitioner in the Industrial Tribunal was that the reference in question was pending since 1997 and his interest was being represented through the learned advocate who expired on 6.2.2012. He was not aware about the demise of the counsel and after his demise, no notice was issued to the petitioner and subsequently, on 20.4.2012 the reference case came to be rejected and that he learnt about the rejection of the reference case from his co-employee and applied for and obtained the certified copy on 13.7.2012 and immediately thereafter within a period of 30 days moved an application for review under Rule 26A of the Rules with an application for condonation of delay. 4. The application was contested in the Industrial Tribunal by respondent No. 1 herein with principal contention; which is also pressed before this court, being that the delay can be condoned only if the order for which review is sought under Rule 26A, was an ex-parte order. It was contended that, in fact, all throughout during the pendency of the main proceedings at various stages the learned counsel for the petitioner did not appear and eventually the matter was decided and when the petitioner was represented by learned counsel, it was not an ex-parte order. The aforesaid submission found favour with the Tribunal which eventually held in such circumstances the award was not ex-parte. This has compelled the petitioner to move this court. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that while hearing the application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal ought not to have gone into the maintainability of the application for review. This has compelled the petitioner to move this court. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that while hearing the application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal ought not to have gone into the maintainability of the application for review. That, in fact, the application for condonation of delay was moved within 30 days of the knowledge about the death of the petitioner's counsel and delay if any, was explained by pointing out the aforestated facts which the Tribunal failed to appreciate. He would, therefore, urge to allow the application. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent employer would reiterate the arguments in the Tribunal that for the purpose of condonation of delay the court must consider the maintainability of the review application and that unless the order in question was ex-parte order, there was no question of condonation of delay. 7. The rival contentions call for the interpretation of rule 26 and rule 26A of the Rules. For beneficial reference, the rules are quoted hereunder: "26. Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte - If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to a proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte." 26A Setting aside ex-parte orders, awards and reports: (1) On an application made within thirty days from the date knowledge of an ex-parte order, award or report by the party concerned, the Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may, for sufficient cause, set aside, after notice to the opposite party, such order, award or report as the case may be; (2) The Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown, extend the period referred to in sub-rule (1); (3) An application under sub-rule (1) shall be supported by an affidavit." 8. It can be noticed that under rule 26 failure of a party to attend the matter or to be represented, without sufficient cause may result into ex-parte order. The necessary corollary that follows in rule 26 is that if there is sufficient cause of not attending the proceedings or of not being represented with the party, ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, passed would be liable to be set aside. The necessary corollary that follows in rule 26 is that if there is sufficient cause of not attending the proceedings or of not being represented with the party, ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, passed would be liable to be set aside. The use of two different phrases being (I) 'fails to attend' or '...to be represented' would imply two different meanings. In the first case, the party might have been represented but might have failed to attend the proceedings and in the later case the party might have failed to be represented in the proceedings after service of notice. Thus, if a party or its representative shows sufficient cause of not attending the proceedings on the specified date, the ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, would be liable to be set aside. Similarly, if the party or its representative shows sufficient cause for its failure to represent in person or through its representative, the ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, would be liable to be set aside. The ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, thus, can be passed for two different reasons under rule 26. 9. The ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, passed either for non-attendance of proceedings or for not being represented is contemplated to be set aside for sufficient cause after notice to the opposite party under rule 26A of the Rules within the specified period of 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the ex-parte order, award or report as the case may be, or within the extended period under sub-rule (2) of rule 26A for sufficient cause. Sufficient cause sought for by sub-rule (1) of rule 26A is for the purpose of setting aside the ex-parte order, award or report, as the case may be, as distinguished from the sufficient cause sought for under sub- rule (2) thereof for extension of the period referred to in sub- rule (1). There is nothing in the language of sub-rule (2) making exercise of the powers contingent upon the nature of the order, award or report, as the case may be, passed under rule 26A of the Rules. There is nothing in the language of sub-rule (2) making exercise of the powers contingent upon the nature of the order, award or report, as the case may be, passed under rule 26A of the Rules. If the sufficient cause for extension of period is shown to exist, the specified authority would have no jurisdiction to decline the extension on the ground that the order in question is not ex-parte order. The decision under rule 26 read with rule 26A about the nature of the order passed can be taken after notice to the opposite party as provided in rule 26A(1) and the specified authority may set aside the order, award or report, as the case may be, if it finds the same to be an ex-parte, otherwise it may decline to do so. 10. In the instant case, the extension of period as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of rule 26A of the Rules was sought pleading ignorance of the death of the counsel representing the petitioner herein. Death of the counsel was not in dispute, neither was the fact that after his death on 6.2.2012, the order came to be passed on 20.4.2012. It was not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had knowledge about the death of his counsel. Thus, sufficient cause was shown for not preferring the application for setting aside the ex-parte order within the period specified under sub- rule (1) of rule 26A as also for extension of the period for the purpose under sub-rule (2) thereof. In above view of the matter, in the opinion of this court, the Tribunal fell in serious error for not exercising the jurisdiction vested in it by sub-rule (2) of Rule 26A of the Rules. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, it is ordered that the period as contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 26A of the Rules stands extended and the Tribunal shall, now, be obliged to decide the case under Rule 26A on merits without being influenced by any of the observations made herein on merits of the case. With the above observation, this petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly.