JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner was originally appointed as a conductor under the erstwhile Orissa Road Transport Company Limited (for short “ORTC Ltd.”) on 20.07.1981 and continued as such, when the ORTC Ltd. was acquired by Orissa State Road Transport Corporation (OSRTC) under Section 19(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 with effect from 16.08.1990. On acquisition of ORTC Ltd. by the OSRTC, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between ORTC Ltd. and OSRTC on 23.06.1990. Clause-15(b) of the MOU clearly provided that the terms and conditions of service of the personnel (employees) of the taken-over ORTC Ltd. would be the same as existed in the Certified Standing Orders, 1974 on 16.08.1990, when ORTC Ltd. was acquired by OSRTC, and they would enjoy all such benefits. But, however, in exercise of powers conferred under Clause-13(1)(a) and 13(2)(e) of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974, the petitioner was made to retire from service, in the public interest, with effect from 31.12.0998 after attaining the age of 50/55 years or 30 years of qualifying service, whichever is earlier, by paying three months salary in lieu of notice of three months, vide office order dated 31.12.1998 (Annexure-1), hence this application. 2. Mr. K.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the reason for retirement, i.e., “in the public interest”, as mentioned in the impugned order at Annexure-1 dated 31.12.1998 and provided in Clause-13.1(a) and 13(2)(e) of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974, is no reason at all in the eye of law and, as such, being contrary to the settled position of law the impugned order is accordingly liable to be quashed. 3. Mr. Asok Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the OSRTC, by supporting the order of retirement at Annexure-1, argued with vehemence that the retirement, being made in public interest, is wholly and fully justified and does not warrant any interference by this Court at this stage. He thus contended that the petitioner, having been retired in the year 1998 and in the meantime nineteen years having been elapsed, no relief can be granted to him and, therefore, the writ application is liable to be dismissed in limine. It is further contended that in respect of a particular issue if the Certified Standing Order is silent and/or provisions are not available, the Rules and Regulations applicable to the government employees shall be made applicable. It is further contended that in respect of a particular issue if the Certified Standing Order is silent and/or provisions are not available, the Rules and Regulations applicable to the government employees shall be made applicable. In the instant case, even though the Certified Standing Orders, 1974 prescribe provisions for retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, but the provision for premature retirement of the employees on review of past incidents has not been specifically enumerated. Therefore, the Rules applicable to the government employees are applicable to the petitioner. Accordingly, circular no.162(c) dated 02.02.1995 was issued to give effect to the provisions of compulsory retirement. If action has been taken in consonance with the said provisions, then no fault can be found with the OSRTC for taking such action. 4. Mr. B.K. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel for the Transport Department submits that since it is a matter concerning an employee of the OSRTC, the State has no role to play. 5. This Court heard Mr. K.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. Asok Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the OSRTC; and Mr. B.K. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel for the Transport Department and perused the records. Pleadings between the parties having been exchanged, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The undisputed fact being that the petitioner was a conductor under ORTC Ltd., which was acquired by OSRTC under Section 19(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 with effect from 16.08.1990, as a consequence of which the services of the petitioner were placed under OSRTC. In order to protect the service conditions of the employees of ORTC Ltd., a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between ORTC Ltd. and OSRTC. Clause 15(b) of the Memorandum of Understanding reads thus: “The terms and conditions of services of the personnel shall be same as existing on the 30th June, 1990 and they will continue to enjoy all the benefits enjoyed by them in their respective undertakings before the acquisition of the undertaking.” 7. In view of the aforesaid, the service conditions of the employees of ORTC Ltd., which were existed under Certified Standing Orders, 1974, are to be applicable to the taken-over employees to the OSRTC. In view of the aforesaid, the service conditions of the employees of ORTC Ltd., which were existed under Certified Standing Orders, 1974, are to be applicable to the taken-over employees to the OSRTC. The provisions contained in Clause-13(1)(a) and 13(2)(e) of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974, being relevant for the purpose of this case, are extracted hereunder: “13(1)a). The employment of any permanent employee may be terminated by one month’s notice in writing or payment of wages for one month in lieu of notice. 13(2)(e). The Manager or management as the case may be may terminate the service of any employee otherwise than by way of punishment in the following cases or on grounds of similar nature. xx xx xx (e) On any other ground stipulated in the contract of employment.” Applying the above mentioned provisions of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974, the petitioner was made to retire from service prematurely, when he had to undergo seven years more service, on 31.12.1998 vide Annexure-1. 8. At this juncture, it is of relevance to note that vires of Clause-13.1(a) of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974 was challenged before this Court in Bhagaban Dash v. Personnel Officer, Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd., (1989) Vol.31 OJD 72 (Service & Labour), and this Court held as follows: “Counsel for the petitioner submits that the blanket power vested in the employer under the aforesaid clause is arbitrary, unjust and unfair. It is violative of Article 14 and the Directive Principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41. The question raised has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions. We need only refer to a few. The question has been considered threadbare in Central Inland Water Corporation Limited –v-Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571. It was held that the naked power of the employer to terminate the service of an employee according to him pleasure on payment of wages for a month or some months, was arbitrary and discriminatory. Such a power not only offended Article 14 but also Articles 39(a) and 41. The provisions also contravened the audi alterampartem rule. The rule was followed and the view was reiterated in M.K.Agarwal –V-Gurgaon Gramin Bank, and others A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 286. Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Regulations of Gurgaon Gramin Bank (Staff) Services Regulations, 1980 provided : “10. Such a power not only offended Article 14 but also Articles 39(a) and 41. The provisions also contravened the audi alterampartem rule. The rule was followed and the view was reiterated in M.K.Agarwal –V-Gurgaon Gramin Bank, and others A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 286. Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Regulations of Gurgaon Gramin Bank (Staff) Services Regulations, 1980 provided : “10. Termination of service by notice: (2)(a) The Bank may terminate the service of an– (i) Officer after giving his three months notice or pay in lieu thereof; (ii) employee after giving him one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof.” The Supreme Court held that the regulation conferring, as it did, on the bank arbitrary and unguided, power, was arbitrary and unconstitutional. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board and others –v-Desh Bandhu Ghosh and others, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 722 and O.P. Bhandari –v-Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 111 and the rule conferring naked power to terminate service of an employee by giving him notice or pay in lieu of notice was declared ultra vires. He have, therefore, no hesitation that Clause 13(2)(a) of the Standing Order of the Orissa Road Transport Company Limited is unconstitutional and ultra vires.” 9. If the provisions contained in Clause-13(1)(a) of the Certified Standing Orders, 1974 have already been declared ultra vires by judgment dated 02.11.1989, the impugned order dated 31.12.1998, which has been passed resorting to the said provisions, cannot sustain in the eye of law. Consequentially, the impugned order at Annexure-1 is hereby quashed. 10. At this stage, Mr. K.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the event the impugned order at Annexure-1 is quashed, the petitioner would be entitled to continue in service for the rest of the period, which would come to around seven years and, if the petitioner would get the salary of Rs.4200/- per month, his total entitlement for seven years would come to around Rs.3,50,000/- besides increment and other financial benefits. 11. The order dated 31.12.1998 at Annexure-1, by virtue of which the petitioner was retired from service with effect from 31.12.1998, having been quashed, as a necessary corollary the petitioner would be entitled to reinstatement in service with all consequential financial benefits. 11. The order dated 31.12.1998 at Annexure-1, by virtue of which the petitioner was retired from service with effect from 31.12.1998, having been quashed, as a necessary corollary the petitioner would be entitled to reinstatement in service with all consequential financial benefits. But, as the seven years period has already been expired since 2005, the question of reinstatement of the petitioner in service at this point of time does not arise. The petitioner can only be compensated by granting some financial benefits. Therefore, taking into consideration the claim made by the petitioner and keeping in mind the fact that the petitioner has rendered no service during the period of seven years, it would be just and equitable if a lump sum amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (rupees one lakh fifty thousand) is granted in favour of the petitioner and this Court directs so. In the event the petitioner has been getting pension, his scale of pay shall be notionally re-fixed, by computing in accordance with the provisions of law w.e.f. his actual date of retirement, so as to entitle him to get pensionary benefits. The entire exercise shall be completed by the opposite parties within three months from the date of communication of this order. 12. The writ application is allowed to the extent indicated. No order to cost.