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2017 DIGILAW 468 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Vanrajsinh Bhavsinh Dabhi

2017-02-27

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The state has preferred the present appeal against the judgment and order dated 8th March 2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 31 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court, Disa, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has granted benefit of doubt to the respondent - accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code for which he has been tried. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 30th September 2004, the complainant - Balaben Dharsinh Chamansinh gave a complaint to the effect that she was having one son and five daughters. Out of five daughters, two were married and remaining three daughters were staying with her. It was a further case of the complainant that at about 11:00 O'clock in the morning, the daughter Vilasben was going to nature's call and she did not return till night. Resultantly, search was made for her in the nearby vicinity, where the Vilasben could not be found and thereafter, one Shantubha came with Vilasben at about 5:00 O'clock in the morning next day and upon inquiry Vilasben narrated the entire incident, which has shown in the complaint. Vilasben - the prosecutrix i.e. the daughter of the complainant has conveyed that when she was going for attending nature's call, she was then forcibly taken to the sim of village and thereafter one Vanrajsinh - Son of Bhavsinh has committed rape on her and for a pretty long period she was kept under confinement and till late night, the offence was committed by the accused person. The detail narration is mentioned in the complaint, which has been filed by the mother of the prosecutrix, which was registered as C.R. No. I-90 of 2004 for the offence punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The complaint was registered before Shihori Police Station, wherein the investigating officer then, has conducted an investigation from 1st October 2004 by executing panchnama of scene of offence, which has shown as Exh. 18 in the paper-book compilation. Thereafter, the accused persons came to be arrested and accused No. 2 since was minor was sent to Juvenile Court for onwards proceedings against him. The recovery of clothes and incriminating material came to be recovered and sent for further analysis before F.S.L. Office. 18 in the paper-book compilation. Thereafter, the accused persons came to be arrested and accused No. 2 since was minor was sent to Juvenile Court for onwards proceedings against him. The recovery of clothes and incriminating material came to be recovered and sent for further analysis before F.S.L. Office. The medical examination has been undertaken of both i.e. the prosecutrix as well as accused person before the Shihori Primary Health Center and the birth certificate also came to be secured by the investigating officer from Primary School, Shihori of prosecutrix -Vilasben and after taking the entire investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned J.M.F.C. at Shihori, which was then registered as Criminal Case No. 107 of 2005, which was came to be filed for the offence punishable under Section 376 of I.P.C. On the basis of material, it was noticed by the learned Magistrate that the incident in question for which the offence is registered, is triable by the Court of Sessions in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. and therefore, the case was committed to Sessions Court, Banaskantha at Palanpur, by order dated 8th February 2005 and the same was registered as Sessions Case No. 31 of 2005. 4. Pursuant to the registration of Sessions Case, a charge came to be framed against the respondent - accused at Exh. 5 on 30th September 2005 for the offence punishable under Section 376 of I.P.C. and the case was then put up for further adjudication. During the course of process, the respondent - accused was ordered to be enlarged on bail. The plea therefore, recorded of the respondent - accused to which the accused has pleaded not guilty. The case was therefore, put-up for further adjudication wherein the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence and the same in following manner are reproduced as under:- Oral Evidence : Sr. No. Exhibit Name Remarks 1. Exh.9 Dr. Devendra Nagindas Parmar Doctor 2. Exh.15 Balaben W/o Dharsing Chamansing Dabhi Complainant 3. Exh.16 Vilasba Dharsing Victim 4. Exh.17 Mr. Prahladsing Harising Solanki Panch 5. Exh.23 Mr. Dhanesinh Ajitsinh Chauhan I.O. 6. Exh.33 Mr. Jethabhai Khanabhai P.S.O. Documentary Evidence : Sr. No. Exhibit Description 1 Exh.34 Report letter. No. Exhibit Name Remarks 1. Exh.9 Dr. Devendra Nagindas Parmar Doctor 2. Exh.15 Balaben W/o Dharsing Chamansing Dabhi Complainant 3. Exh.16 Vilasba Dharsing Victim 4. Exh.17 Mr. Prahladsing Harising Solanki Panch 5. Exh.23 Mr. Dhanesinh Ajitsinh Chauhan I.O. 6. Exh.33 Mr. Jethabhai Khanabhai P.S.O. Documentary Evidence : Sr. No. Exhibit Description 1 Exh.34 Report letter. 2 Exh.25 Report for registration of offence 3 Exh.24 Complainant of Balaben Dharsing 4 Exh.18 Panchnama of scene of offence 5 Exh.22 Panchnama of dead body of victim Vilasba 6 Exh.19 Panchnama of body of accused 7 Exh.10 Yadi for medical test of Victim 8 Exh.12 Medical Certificate of victim 9 Exh.13 Yadi for medical test of accused 10 Exh.14 Medical Certificate of accused 11 Exh.26 Dispatch note. 12 Exh.20 Yadi sent to Primary School Principal 13 Exh.21 Birth Certificate of Vilasba Dharsingji 14 Exh.27 Yadi regarding correction in registering the offence 15 Exh.28 Report of F.S.L., Ahmedabad to P.S.I. 16 Exh.29 Inspection report of F.S.L., Ahmedabad 17 Exh.30 Serological report of F.S.L. 5. After leading the evidence in the aforesaid form, the closure purshis has been given by the prosecution at Exh. 36 and with a view to give further opportunity, a further statement of the respondent - accused came to be recorded under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. and having denied the offence being committed by the respondent - accused, the case was then further proceeded for final adjudication by framing issues. 6. After considering the evidence and after looking at the documentary evidence and upon appreciation of the depositions of relevant witnesses including medical evidence, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, was pleased to grant benefit of doubt to the accused and acquit the respondent - accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of I.P.C. in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 232 and 235(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure vide judgment and order dated 8th March 2006 and thereafter, the Sessions Case came to be disposed of. 7. It is this judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which is a subject matter of present criminal appeal. The criminal appeal appears to have been admitted by order dated 18th June 2008. 8. Ms. 7. It is this judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which is a subject matter of present criminal appeal. The criminal appeal appears to have been admitted by order dated 18th June 2008. 8. Ms. Hansa B. Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State has vehemently contended that on the basis of material on record, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, no benefit of doubt could have been given by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. It was also contended that the deposition of prosecutrix and mother, which are led by the prosecution have completely establishes the allegations, which are levelled against the respondent - accused and therefore, the deposition of these two material witnesses ought not to have been overlooked. On the contrary, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has committed an error in appreciating the version of these witnesses in its proper perspective and therefore, Ms. Punani, learned APP has requested the Court to correct the mistake committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Ms. Punani, learned APP for the State further submitted that on the basis of panchnama, which has been drawn during the course of investigation, more particularly from the panchnama of scene of offence, the incriminating circumstances are very much reflecting, which suggests and corroborates the version of prosecution and therefore, this material piece of evidence ought not to have been ignored by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge while passing the order. Ms. Punani, further submitted that even the medical evidence also supporting the case of the prosecution, as on the back-side of the prosecutrix some minor abrasions are reflecting and the injury certificate is also reflecting some marks, which can suggest that incident in question has occurred and therefore learned Addl. Sessions Judge has made an error of law while appreciating the evidence on record. Ms. Punani, learned APP further submitted that looking to the entire material and conjoint reading of it would suggest that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, but however by assigning no cogent reasons and by raising inference, the benefit is granted in favour of the accused and therefore, this being a serious error in exercising jurisdiction committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, the same is required to be corrected and ultimately Ms. Sessions Judge, the same is required to be corrected and ultimately Ms. Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State requested the Court to allow the appeal by setting aside the order of acquittal and impose appropriate punishment in this regard. 9. To oppose the stand taken by the learned APP, Mr. Himansu Padhya, learned advocate appearing for the respondent - accused has contended that there is no error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa in passing the judgment and order, impugned by the State. In fact, the bare reading of the judgment itself would make it clear that some reasons are assigned to grant benefit of doubt to the respondent-accused. While contending this, Mr. Padhya, learned advocate taken us to various documents and by referring to this material, he contended that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent contended that the medical officer, who has deposed before the Court as PW-1 has not given any clear opinion, which can substantiate the case of the prosecution. He further contended that from the entire reading of the depositions of the mother of the prosecutrix as well as victim, it is quite clear that on account of earlier animosity in which both the sides have suffered the imprisonment, the complaint appears to have been filed as a counter blast and from the reading of evidence of those two witnesses, though they have denied, but an inference has rightly been drawn by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge that there might be some affair between respondent - accused and prosecutrix and therefore, the case cannot be said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Learned advocate for the respondent further drawn our attention to the F.S.L. report, which is also reflecting no corroboration to the case of the prosecution. On the contrary, by referring to page No. 62 of the paper-book's compilation, there appears to be no sign emerging from the report, which would suggest the commission of crime by the respondent - accused and therefore, when the medical evidence is not supporting the version of the prosecution, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has not committed any error in granting the benefit of doubt. Learned advocate for the respondent further drawn our attention to the reasons, which are assigned at page No. 97 onwards by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has not committed any error in granting the benefit of doubt. Learned advocate for the respondent further drawn our attention to the reasons, which are assigned at page No. 97 onwards by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa in which the entire analysis has been done in exercise of jurisdiction and therefore, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that each and every aspect of the case has been dealt with by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and arrived at a specific finding, which cannot be disturbed in exercise of power conferred under appellate jurisdiction, more particularly, while dealing with the order of acquittal. Learned advocate for the respondent further contended that the age of the prosecutrix is also not seriously contested anywhere by the prosecution. On the contrary, it is undisputedly believed as more than 17½ years in any case and therefore, no offence of rape appears to have been committed by the respondent-accused. On the contrary, the entire case of the prosecution emerging a tacit consent by the prosecutrix and therefore, the accused has been wrongly roped into by the prosecution. Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent further contended that even apart from this, the unnatural conduct on the part of the prosecutrix has also lead to believe that the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge cannot be said to be perverse. On the contrary, the prosecutrix has not made any attempt to rescue herself not even shouted and remain silent for pretty long period would suggest that the entire incident probably happened with the tacit consent of the prosecutrix, in which it can safely be inferred that the respondent accused is not responsible for commission of crime and therefore, learned advocate for the respondent accused submitted that there is no error committed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in passing the acquittal judgment and order. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent - accused requested the Curt that the appeal of the State may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice. 10. Mr. Sessions Judge in passing the acquittal judgment and order. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent - accused requested the Curt that the appeal of the State may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice. 10. Mr. Padhya, learned advocate for the respondent - accused further submitted that this acquittal appeal in which the order of March 2006 is assailed, which is now coming-up for final hearing, but now as per the deposition of prosecutrix, she settled down in her matrimonial home and therefore, he submitted that keeping in view the afflux of time, the order of acquittal may not be interfered with and ultimately requested the Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 11. Having heard learned advocates representing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record, more particularly the reasons assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa the following circumstances cannot be ignored even while assessing and reassessing the evidence on record. (1) From the material on record, as it has been appreciated by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge from the F.S.L. examination, no incriminating material is found, which would suggest the commission of crime by the respondent - accused and that has been observed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa as well. (2) From the panchnama, which has been drawn during the investigation of scene of offence, there is also no stigmatic material and marks found, which would suggest commission of crime. Even this panchnama, which is reflected in compilation of paper-book, suggests no sign of such nature has been proved by the panch witnesses and therefore, on the basis of this panchnama also, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has arrived at a finding that respondent - accused appears to be not solely responsible. (3) The version of the prosecutrix has also been examined by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in which also the learned Addl. Sessions Judge found that she has not resisted herself for a pretty long period of more than 16 hours. She has not shouted also and such conduct has been found by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge as unnatural. On the contrary, there is a specific finding on the basis of entire version that there appears to be a tacit consent on the part of the prosecutrix. She has not shouted also and such conduct has been found by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge as unnatural. On the contrary, there is a specific finding on the basis of entire version that there appears to be a tacit consent on the part of the prosecutrix. (4) Even from the record, the medical evidence has also been examined by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, which suggest clearly that no specific opinion is given by the doctor upon examination and further this medical officer has in his deposition has categorically stated that no history is given by the prosecutrix and this evidence is also been examined by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. (5) From the record, it further also appears that though the alleged incident in question has occurred on 23rd September 2004, the examination of prosecutrix came to be made on 2nd October 2004 and in furtherance to that also, the complaint also came to be filed at a much belated stage and this aspect is also been appreciated by the learned Addl. Session Judge. (6) Even from the reading of the evidence of mother of prosecutrix Vilasben, who was examined as PW-2 has also admitted that no immediate steps have been taken for a pretty long period and on the basis of her version, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has also opined specifically that there was a prior animosity on account of some scuffle, which took place for which both the persons were suffered the jail imprisonment. Therefore, from this evidence on record it is specifically found that the case has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. (7) The bare reading of the judgment would also indicate a strong application of mind of learned Addl. Sessions Judge in evaluating the evidence on record and it appears that each and every evidence has been dealt with by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to arrive at a specific finding to justify the grant of benefit of doubt to the respondent accused. 12. From the aforesaid situation, which is prevailing on record and upon analysis of the evidence in the context of the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa, we are of the considered opinion that there appears to be no error committed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge in granting benefit of doubt to the respondent - accused. From the aforesaid situation, which is prevailing on record and upon analysis of the evidence in the context of the reasons, which are assigned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa, we are of the considered opinion that there appears to be no error committed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge in granting benefit of doubt to the respondent - accused. The judgment of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge reflects not only an application of mind, but also supported by cogent reasons to substantiate the findings. 13. To arrive at this conclusion, we are further mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by the apex Court in catena of decisions. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 13.1 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 13.2 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 13.3 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: 30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 13.4 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 13.5 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 13.6 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N., (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 14. From the aforesaid position prevailing on record coupled with the proposition of law laid down by apex Court in catena of decisions regarding appellate jurisdiction upon reassessment of evidence on record, also do not suggest any extraordinary distinguishable feature, which may permit us to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Disa and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge requires no interference and we find no merits in the appeal filed by the State and the same deserves to be dismissed. 15. In the result, present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 8th March 2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 31 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court, Disa is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.