JUDGMENT : Sreenivas Harish Kumar, J. 1. Is the legal representative of the injured claimant Hussain Sab entitled to prosecute the appeal after his death during pendency of this appeal? - is the question that needs to be answered. Briefly mentioned, the facts that gave raise to claim petition being lodged and subsequently this appeal are that on 3-8-2008 at about 4.30 p.m. Hussain Sab, a lorry driver was sitting in the cabin of a Truck bearing No. KA-25/7476 while it was being driven by additional driver. As he was rash, negligent and reckless in driving, he lost control over the truck which turned turtle. As a result, Hussain Sab sustained fracture to pubic region, both the hips and interior pubic rams. In connection with this accident, he claimed compensation, and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sirsi, in MVC No. 92 of 2005 passed an award on 23-9-2008 granting compensation of Rs. 91,000/- with interest 6% per annum from the date of petition. 2. Dissatisfied with this award, Hussain Sab preferred this appeal before this Court on 12-1-2009 seeking enhancement of compensation, and then died on 18-11-2009. His wife, Smt Modin Bee, was permitted to come on record as his legal representative. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the cause of action has survived in favour of the wife to prosecute the appeal. The Tribunal has already determined a certain sum of money to be paid as just compensation, that means the amount has been crystallised. The compensation payable to an injured is a statutory liability. It is not tortuous liability. Therefore, the principle "Actio personalis moritur cum persona" is not applicable. He raises a question, when Insurance Company files an appeal challenging the award of the Tribunal, if a legal representative of the injured can be permitted to come on record on the death of injured during the pendency of the appeal, why not the same is permitted when the injured files an appeal and dies subsequently? In this regard, he has further argued that necessity to file an appeal arises when the Tribunal fails to award just compensation. If just compensation is awarded by the Tribunal, the legal representatives will be entitled to execute the award if the claimant dies after passing of the award. So this being the position, the appeal survives in favour of the legal representative. 4. If just compensation is awarded by the Tribunal, the legal representatives will be entitled to execute the award if the claimant dies after passing of the award. So this being the position, the appeal survives in favour of the legal representative. 4. He has further argued that the Tribunal has failed to award just compensation. The amounts awarded towards pain and suffering, loss of amenities and other heads are very meager and therefore this Court has to enhance compensation under various heads. 5. On the other hand, the leaned Counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company has argued that the legal representative of the deceased injured claimant is not entitled to prosecute the appeal. This is founded on the principle, "actio personalis moritur cum persona". He has argued that the compensation awarded to Hussain Sab was for the injuries sustained by him. So, the remedy available to an injured under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is personal in nature unlike in case of death. If the injured dies during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal, the legal representatives of the injured cannot claim that cause of action survives in their favour to further prosecute the claim petition. Now in this case the injured died during the pendency of the appeal and therefore, the legal representative is only entitled to the amount awarded by the Tribunal; she cannot prosecute the appeal filed seeking enhancement of the compensation. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kannamrna v. Deputy General Manager, K.S.R.T.C.ILR 1990 Kar. 4300 (FB) and the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Shantabai Dube and Another v. Kanhaiyalal 1995 ACJ 706 (M.P.) Therefore, it is his argument that this appeal deserves dismissal. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant has replied that the ratio laid down in Kannamrna's case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. The whole case is to be examined in the light of the arguments of the learned Counsel as referred to above. For the injuries sustained by Hussain Sab, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 91,000/- with interest. According to the injured, this amount was not adequate and just, and therefore he preferred this appeal on 12-1-2009. He died on 18-11-2009. The whole case is to be examined in the light of the arguments of the learned Counsel as referred to above. For the injuries sustained by Hussain Sab, the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 91,000/- with interest. According to the injured, this amount was not adequate and just, and therefore he preferred this appeal on 12-1-2009. He died on 18-11-2009. Subsequently his wife, Smt Modinbee was permitted to come on record pursuant to an application made by her under Order 22, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Just because she was permitted to come on record, it cannot be said that she has a right to prosecute the appeal. The cause of action does not survive in her favour because compensation was awarded by the Tribunal for the injuries sustained by her husband. If he had not died, he could have prosecuted the appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. The moment he died, his wife is only entitled to recover the compensation granted by the Tribunal. Right to prosecute an appeal being a legal representative is not heritable. If it is possible to make out the cause of death as due to personal injuries owing to accident, the wife gets a right to further prosecute the appeal. The circumstances narrated above clearly fall within the scope of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which is extracted here with its first Illustration. "306. Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator.- All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. Illustrations (i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive." 8. Illustrations (i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive." 8. It may be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kannamrna (supra) also. The principles enunciated in this case are as follows: "(i) The Common Law Rule 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' as embodied in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act since applies to India, a claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries caused in a motor accident does not, on that person's death not being the consequence of such injuries, survive to his/her legal representatives; (ii) Cause of action for personal injuries being founded on tort (motor accident caused by the tortfeasor) injured person's claims for damages under Heads recognised by Common Law and not by Statute, based on such tort and not independently of it, cannot, on such person's death, survive for prosecution by his/her executors or administrators (or legal representatives) since Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, in express terms, declares that the cause of action in favour of a person for personal injuries (tort) does not survive on such person's death to his/her executors or legal representatives; (iii) A claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries, be it pending before the Claims Tribunal, be it pending in the First Appellate Court or be it pending in the Second Appellate Court, does not survive on such person's death not caused as a consequence of personal injuries, to his legal representatives; (iv) A claim of a person for compensation for personal injuries if has resulted in award of the Claims Tribunal or decree of the Appellate Court, survives to his legal representatives on his death, even if such death is not the consequence of personal injuries sustained by him and hence, if such award or decree is disputed in the First Appellate Court of the Second Appellate Court, the same could be resisted by the legal representatives of the claimant. (v) A person's claim for compensation for personal injuries under the head loss to his/her estate, can, on his/her death as a consequence of such injuries, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives, if they do not include a claim for compensation under that head, as and when they file a claim petition under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act, on the death of the person injured." 9. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had an occasion to examine same aspect in the case of Shantabai Dube and Another v. Kanhaiyalal and Another, 1995 ACJ 706 (M.P.). The observation made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court is as follows: "8. After coming into force of Legal Representatives' Suits Act (Act No. XII of 1855) the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona was made applicable in India as per proviso of that law. The right to sue is not heritable and, therefore, the suit for personal injuries as personal wrong will not be maintainable by the legal representatives after the death of the plaintiff." 10. Therefore, it is to be concluded now that the wife of Hussain Sab, who has come on record does not inherit the right to prosecute the appeal after death of her husband. Although compensation is payable in accordance with Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but the award thus made is for the personal injuries sustained by an injured in an accident. Therefore, following the principles laid down in Kannamrna's case, it has to be stated that an application under Order 22, Rule 3 of CPC cannot be made at all and even if it is allowed inadvertently, yet the legal representative has no right to prosecute the appeal further. This principle is applicable even if an injured dies during the pendency of the claim petition before the Tribunal. 11. The learned Counsel for the claimant has raised a point, referred to in the beginning of this judgment and that point needs to be answered. Once a person dies having suffered injuries in an accident, and if the Tribunal awards compensation for the injuries, the award thus made by the Tribunal gets converted into estate if the injured dies after passing of the award. Once a person dies having suffered injuries in an accident, and if the Tribunal awards compensation for the injuries, the award thus made by the Tribunal gets converted into estate if the injured dies after passing of the award. In case, the owner or the Insurer disputes the award and prefers an appeal, the legal representative of the injured deceased has a right to defend the award made in the view of crystallisation of the award into estate. The cause of action against the legal representative does not extinguish in a situation like this. But a legal representative cannot challenge the award for the reasons aforementioned. In this context it may be useful to place reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair ( 1996 SCC 118 )It is held as below: "7. Where a suit for defamation is dismissed and the plaintiff has filed an appeal, what the appellant-plaintiff is seeking to enforce in the appeal is his right to sue for damages for defamation and as this right does not survive his death, his legal representative has no right to be brought on the record of the appeal in his place and stead if the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal. The position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representative is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore, entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent-plaintiff." 12. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the claimant is not acceptable. As a result of this discussion, the appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed without order as to costs.