JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This appeal by the claimant is directed against the award passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-III, Shimla on 25.6.2016 whereby the learned claims Tribunal refused to award any compensation in favour of the appellant on the ground that the appellant was unable to prove that he had received multiple injuries caused in view of driving of JCB No. 51B-9831 by the respondent. 2. The pleaded case of the appellant before the learned Tribunal was that on 10.9.2010 he was going from Ruini to Village Bag on foot and at a place Dharoli Kainchi, the JCB which was being driven by respondent No.2 in a rash and negligent manner hit him thereby causing serious injuries to his body especially on the right leg and heel. The appellant was initially taken to Chopal hospital from where he was referred to IGMC, Shimla and remained in casualty till 15.9.2010 and was thereafter taken to PGI, Chandigarh and remained admitted there till 18.9.2010. The appellant was again admitted in IGMC, Shimla on 21.9.2010 and remained there till 10.10.2010. During this period he was operated twice at IGMC, Shimla. The appellant was subsequently again admitted on 13.10.2010 and thereafter discharged on 25.10.2010. He claimed to be still undergoing treatment for which he incurred more than Rs. 3,00,000/-. He also pleaded that he had employed an attendant as he was unable to move on account of leg injury and still requires an attendant. The claimant claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- on the ground that he was earlier earning Rs. 25,000/- per month from his work and after the accident was unable to do any work. 3. Respondent No.1 is the owner of the vehicle and had raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability, cause of action, estoppel acquiescence etc. On merits, it was alleged that his vehicle was not involved in the accident and the appellant suffered injury on his leg due to his own act as he slipped in the mud and consequent thereto received injury in question. The driver of the JCB was not at fault and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to claim any compensation from either of the respondents. 4. The driver of the JCB was not at fault and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to claim any compensation from either of the respondents. 4. Respondent No.3-Insurance Company filed a separate reply wherein preliminary objections were taken to the effect that the JCB was being driven in sheer violation of the insurance policy, vehicle was being driven without any registration, fitness certificate and permit, driver of the JCB was not having licence required for driving the said machine. On merits, it was contended that as the appellant has not supplied any document regarding the accident or his treatment at various hospitals, he be put to strict proof of the same. In addition thereto, it was alleged that the claim of the appellant even otherwise is highly exaggerated and, therefore, should be disallowed. 5. The learned Tribunal below on 6.5.2015 framed the following issues: “1. Whether on 10.09.2010 Mast Ram petitioner sustained injuries due to rash and negligent driving of JCB No.51B-9831 by respondent No.2 Kuldeep Singh? ..OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved in the affirmative to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled and from whom? ..OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? ..OPR-1. 4. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action?.OPR-1. 5. Whether the petitioner is estopped to file the present petition on account of his own acts, deeds and acquiescence? ..OPR-1. 6. Whether the JCB Machine was being driven in violation of insurance policy? ..OPR-3. 7. Whether the vehicle was being driven without permit as required under Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, if so its effect? OPR-3. 8. Whether the driver of JCB Machine was driving the vehicle without any licence, as alleged?..OPR-3. 9. Relief. 6. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned Tribunal, as observed earlier, proceeded to dismiss the petition on the ground that the appellant had not been able to prove that he had received multiple injuries because of the rash and negligent driving of the JCB in question. 7. Aggrieved by the award passed by learned Tribunal, the claimant/appellant has filed this appeal on the ground that the findings returned by the learned Tribunal below are perverse, inasmuch as not only pleading but even oral and documentary evidence led by the parties has not been appreciated in its right perspective and has rather been misinterpreted and, therefore, should be set-aside. Whereas, the learned counsel for the respondents would support the award and contend that the same being legal one ought not to be interfered with. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on record carefully. 8. It would be noticed that Mast Ram while appearing as PW-11 had deposed that in the month of September, 2010 while he was going to his house from Chopal alongwith Dinesh, then at a place near Dharoli Kainchi, the JCB came from behind and caused injury to the appellant as it was being driven by respondent No.2 in a rash and negligent manner. He was brought to Chopal hospital for treatment but had to be referred to IGMC, Shimla where he remained admitted till 15.9.2010 and was also operated upon. Thereafter, he was sent to PGI, Chandigarh and remained there for three days and was again admitted in IGMC, Shimla till 21.9.2010 and was again operated upon. He employed one attendant at Rs. 300/- per day and had to hire taxi to visit hospital and bills whereof were Ext.PW-5/A to Ext. PW-5/F. He further deposed that after the accident he was not in a position to do any work and could not stand for very long. He deposed that earlier to the accident, he was earning about Rs. 22,000/- to 25,000/- per month. He produced on record his disability certificate mark ‘X’ and now Ext.PW-11/A and his medical treatment bills Ext.PW-11/B-1 to Ext.PW-11/B-70. 9. The claimant was cross-examined and stated that he had reported the matter to the police, but his statement was not recorded. He denied having put his signature upon the statement encircled ‘A’ and claimed that the same was not of his. He also feigned ignorance regarding any similar statement having been made by his wife Krishna. He further feigned ignorance as regards the proceedings having been allegedly cancelled by the police as no fault was found with the driver. He could not tell about the speed of the JCB when he was hit. He deposed that the police had not conducted any investigation in this case and he had not filed any complaint with the higher police officials. 10. PW-1 HHC Bheem Singh has produced on record DDA dated 13.9.2010 Ext.PW-1/A. DD Ext. He could not tell about the speed of the JCB when he was hit. He deposed that the police had not conducted any investigation in this case and he had not filed any complaint with the higher police officials. 10. PW-1 HHC Bheem Singh has produced on record DDA dated 13.9.2010 Ext.PW-1/A. DD Ext. PW-1/A dated 13.9.2010 (Ext.PW-2/A) which revealed that these rapats were entered by Manoj Rathore and the reporting official is one Gian Singh, wherein a mention is made regarding the admission of the appellant Mast Ram S/o Sh. Lachhi Ram, at IGMC, Shimla and it is also mentioned that when he reached IGMC, the appellant was admitted in hospital vide OPD slip No. 19297 dated 11.9.2010. The appellant had given a statement that on 10.9.2010 he had hired the JCB machine of respondent No.1 for removing the debris and while giving signal to its driver he had slipped in the mud resulting in his right foot being struck with the blade of JCB and that the driver of the JCB was not responsible for this accident. 11. PW-6 is Dinesh, who was accompanying the claimant on the date of the occurrence, deposed that the appellant sustained injuries after the JCB which was being driven at a high speed struck him on the right foot. He further stated that he had brought the appellant to Ruini and thereafter to Chopal hospital. He specifically deposed that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the JCB by its driver. In cross-examination, he denied that the appellant sustained injuries because he slipped and not because he had been hit by the JCB. 12. PW-10 Dr. Vikas Padha, was posted as Registrar, IGMC, Shimla at the time when the appellant was admitted and operated upon on 16.9.2010 and discharged on 18.9.2010. He proved on record the discharge slip Ext.PW-10/A and further stated that the appellant had been sent to PGI, Chandigarh for consultation. In cross-examination, this witness feigned ignorance as to who had brought the appellant to the hospital. He admitted that in Ext.PW-10/A there was no mention of the patient being admitted with injuries in a road accident and further stated that the appellant on his own request was referred to PGI. 13. Now, adverting to the evidence led by the respondent. In cross-examination, this witness feigned ignorance as to who had brought the appellant to the hospital. He admitted that in Ext.PW-10/A there was no mention of the patient being admitted with injuries in a road accident and further stated that the appellant on his own request was referred to PGI. 13. Now, adverting to the evidence led by the respondent. Gian Singh, Constable appeared as RW-1 and deposed that on 10.9.2010 he was travelling from Police Station, Chopal to Crime Meeting at Kaithu, Shimla. On 11.9.2010 he had received information from Police Station, Chopal that Mast Ram had been referred to Shimla in accidental condition. On the basis of such information, he reached at IGMC, Shimla on 11.9.2010 itself and found the appellant to be admitted in Casualty Ward of IGMC, Shimla vide OPD slip No. 19297 dated 11.9.2010. The appellant gave his statement Ext.RW-1/A and to the similar effect was the statement of his wife Krishna Devi Ext.RW-1/B and the signatures were also obtained encircled C-1 and encircled C-2, respectively. The original statement was alleged to have been handed over to MHC, Police Station, Chopal and copy thereof handed over to the appellant. The information of his departure was recorded in the concerned Police Station on 11.9.2010 Ext.RW-1/C and his arrival report is Ext. RW-1/D. 14. RW-2 Kuldeep Sharma stated that in the year 2009-2010 he was working as Munshi with Yogesh Azta, who was possessing JCB machine and used to give the same on rent on daily basis. He further stated that he use to accompany the machine for inspection and was maintaining the records. Even when the appellant had taken the machine on rent, he had accompanied the same for the purpose of accounts. The machine had been hired by the appellant for the purpose of clearing the road as due to heavy rains, there were land slides on the road. On 10.9.2010 when he reached at the spot, the machine was lying stationary as the operator was not available. In the meantime, the appellant slipped on the road due to the mud and got hurt on his feet, as a result of which blades of stand by loader/machine caused a cut on his feet. He further stated that there were 6-7 persons present on the spot. He further deposed that Mast Ram was taken to Chopal hospital where he was given first-aid. 15. He further stated that there were 6-7 persons present on the spot. He further deposed that Mast Ram was taken to Chopal hospital where he was given first-aid. 15. RW-3 Yogesh Azta is the owner of the JCB and stated that he had to give the machine on hire. In September, 2010, the appellant had hired the machine for clearing the road and he later came to know through a telephonic call received from his helper that the appellant had sustained injuries, who had informed that the machine was stationary and appellant had fallen on the mud and his feet had got injured. This in entirety is the evidence led by the parties. 16. At the outset, it may be noticed that the only factor which apparently weighed with the learned Tribunal below in dismissing the claim of the appellant was that with regard to the accident, no FIR had been registered and the appellant himself had given a statement to the police officials that he had slipped due to mud and his right foot had struck with the blade of the JCB and had further given a statement that the driver of the JCB was not responsible for the accident. This is evidently clear from para 20 of the ward, which reads thus: “20. Admittedly, no FIR was registered in this case either by the petitioner or his relatives. Whereas DD Ext.PW-1/A (Ext. PW-2/A) reveals that petitioner himself has given the statement to the police official Gian Singh that as he slipped due to mud and his right feet struck with the blade of the JCB, driver of JBC is not responsible for this accident. He did not want any police investigation in this case. In statement Ext.RW-1/A, which was recorded by Gian Singh, Mast Ram specifically stated that while JBC machine was removing the debris, he was giving the signal and at that time he suddenly slipped in the mud and his right foot struck with blade of JCB and the driver of JCB is not responsible for this accident and due to slipping he received injury on his right foot. This accident occurred due to the fact that he himself slipped. Even Krishna, wife of Mast Ram has also given the statement that while backing the machine her husband slipped and his right foot got injury. The driver of the JCB is not responsible for this accident. This accident occurred due to the fact that he himself slipped. Even Krishna, wife of Mast Ram has also given the statement that while backing the machine her husband slipped and his right foot got injury. The driver of the JCB is not responsible for this accident. She does not want any police investigation in this case.” 17. To say the least, the learned Tribunal committed error in assuming 161 Cr.P.C. statement recorded by the police as evidence for proprio vigore and it is settled law that statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. ought to be confronted to the party to elicit the contradiction and prove the statement alleged to have been made before the police to the maker of such statement and eliciting from him what he had actually stated before him. After all it is the maker of the statement who can vouch for the alleged statement to have been made by him. 18. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that Mast Ram claimant had appeared as PW-11 and was never confronted with the statements Ext.PW-1/A (Ext.PW-2/A) or the statement Ext.RW-1/A and, therefore, no reliance on the same as has been placed by learned Tribunal below could have been placed on such statements. 19. It would be noticed that the learned Tribunal below has not appreciated the statements of the appellant as also PW-6, who was the eye witness in right perspective and rather viewed the same with suspicion without even considering the fact that it was the defence put forth by the owner, which appeared to be suspicious. 20. In addition thereto, the learned Tribunal has illegally placed strong reliance upon the documents Ext.RW-1/A and Ext.RW-1/B which are alleged to be the statements given by the appellant and his wife to RW-1. In fact, no reliance could have been placed on these so called statements as the same were not even proved in accordance with law. Moreover, these so called statements are only the photocopies and thus could not have been exhibited. 21. Though, Ms. Anu Tuli Azta, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would vehemently argue that both these statements have been duly attested by the SHO concerned and therefore, were presumed to be true and correct of the original copy. Moreover, these so called statements are only the photocopies and thus could not have been exhibited. 21. Though, Ms. Anu Tuli Azta, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would vehemently argue that both these statements have been duly attested by the SHO concerned and therefore, were presumed to be true and correct of the original copy. However, I am afraid such arguments cannot be accepted for the simple reason that these documents cannot be treated to be certified copies of the original under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned Tribunal has erroneously come to the conclusion that the appellant has not sustained injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of the JCB and had sustained the injuries while falling in the mud. 22. Having thus concluded that the petitioner had sustained injuries in a vehicular accident, the next question that falls for consideration is as to what amount he is entitled to? 23. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) Loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. 24. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv). Inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.” 25. Therefore, quantification of damages divided under different heads must be very carefully observed by the courts while awarding compensation to the victims of motor-vehicle accidents. Inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.” 25. Therefore, quantification of damages divided under different heads must be very carefully observed by the courts while awarding compensation to the victims of motor-vehicle accidents. It is extremely essential for the courts to consider the two main components of damages i.e. both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages as per the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court so that the just and reasonable compensation is awarded to the injured. 26. In Phillips Versus Western Railway Co. 1874 (4) QBD 406, Field, J., while emphasizing that damages must be full and adequate, held thus: “You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. (The plaintiff) can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once and for all. He has done no wrong; he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered." Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the measures of damages in all these cases "should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure". The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what the contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing", should be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases. 27. In the case of Mediana, 1900 AC 113, Lord Halsbury held: “Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case; how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Take the most familiar and ordinary case; how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident....But, nevertheless, the law recognizes that as a topic upon which damages may be given.” 28. In H.West & Son Ltd. vs. Shephard, 1958 (65) ACJ 504 (HL, England), Lord Morris in his speech observed as under: “Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards.”. 29. In Ward vs. James, 1965 1 AIIER, 563, Lord Denning while speaking for the Court, laid down the following three basic principles to be followed in such like cases: “Firstly, accessibility: In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity: There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions may be given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability: Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good.” 30. Thirdly, predictability: Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good.” 30. In Perry vs. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest held thus: “To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment.” 31. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Nirmala Devi, 1980 ACJ 55 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court held: “The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales.” 32. Mc Gregor on Damages, 14th Edn., para 1157, referring to heads of damages in personal injury actions states: “The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, viz., the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories, viz., pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life.” 33. The principles for determining the compensation in case of permanent and partial disability have been exhaustively dealt with by referring to the relevant case law on the subject in Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343 in the following words: “Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 ('Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation. 9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%. 10. If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%. 10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanently disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terns of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd., 2010 (10), SCC, 254 and Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 (8) SCC 341).” 34. The appellant has claimed compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- on the allegation that prior to the accident, he was a healthy person doing both agriculture work as also the work of painting. Ltd., 2010 (8) SCC 341).” 34. The appellant has claimed compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- on the allegation that prior to the accident, he was a healthy person doing both agriculture work as also the work of painting. However, on account of the injuries sustained, he had become crippled and was not in a position to do either of the works having sustained disability of 52%. It was further alleged that he was further treated for a long period and even today requires an attendant in order to meet day to day visit. He had claimed that prior to the accident he had been earning Rs. 25,000/- per month. As per his own showing, the appellant was 50 years when his statement was recorded on 6.4.2016 and would therefore be about 44/45 years at the time of the accident. 35. The appellant while appearing as PW-11 has though stated that prior to the accident he had been earning Rs. 22,000/- to Rs. 25,000/-. However, if that be so, he definitely would have been income tax payee, but no such income tax returns have been placed on record. That apart, no other evidence has been led by the appellant to prove his income. The appellant examined PW-3 Dev Dutt, who had stated that the petitioner had worked with him while he was having furniture unit and had been paying him Rs.350/- per day, but no document whatsoever has been placed by this witness to substantiate such plea. Similarly, PW-4 Ramesh Chauhan had deposed that the appellant had worked with him as Painter and thereafter was not in a position to do any work, but then again this witness too not produced any document which may prove the actual wages being drawn by the appellant. 36. As regards the income from the agriculture, the appellant has not produced on record any revenue record which may prove the actual land holding possessed by the appellant. Thus, in absence of any clear, cogent and convincing proof of income and after taking into consideration that the appellant was hale and hearty person, his income is taken to be Rs.3000/- per month. Out of this income, he was obviously spending some amount on himself and, therefore, in the given circumstances, it would be reasonable to assume that the appellant had been spending a sum of Rs. 1000/- on himself. Out of this income, he was obviously spending some amount on himself and, therefore, in the given circumstances, it would be reasonable to assume that the appellant had been spending a sum of Rs. 1000/- on himself. Since the appellant has sustained injuries and suffered disability though to the extent of 52%, but the functional disability will have to be treated 100% taking into consideration the nature of work and duty performed by him. 37. Now, as regards the question of multiplier, I feel that the multiplier of 13 would be appropriate and can conveniently be applied in the instant case and in this manner, the appellant would be entitled to a compensation of Rs. 2000x13x12= Rs. 3,12,000/-.The petitioner has produced on record the medical charges Ext.PW-11/B-1 to Ext. PW-11/B-71, which prove that the appellant had incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 17,365/- obviously these could not be the entire bills and some of such bills may have even been misplaced and in addition thereto, in some of the bills, the amount is not legible, therefore, it would be appropriate to award a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards medical expenses. 38. In addition thereto, it has come on record that the appellant on account of the injuries sustained by him had to hire taxi for coming and going to various hospitals. This fact has been duly proved in the statement of PW-5 Sh. Rajinder Singh, who has proved on record the taxi bills Ext.PW-5/A to Ext. PW-5/F, which in total worked out to Rs. 22,000/-. 39. Taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained, it is not difficult to assume that the appellant had undergone immense pain and suffering as well as mental shock and trauma on account of such accident. 40. Applying the aforesaid principles, I now proceed to decide the just compensation in the instant case as under: (i) Medical Expenses incurred Rs. 20,000/- (ii) Loss of income Rs. 3,12,000/- (iii) Mental and physical agony Rs. 1,00,000/- (iv) Special diet Rs. 20,000/- (v) Permanent disability loss of amenities of happiness and enjoyment of life. Rs. 50,000/- (vi) Future medical expenses Rs. 20,000/- (vii) Transportation charges Rs. 22,000/- Total Rs. 5,44,000/- In addition, the appellant is also entitled for interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition. 41. 1,00,000/- (iv) Special diet Rs. 20,000/- (v) Permanent disability loss of amenities of happiness and enjoyment of life. Rs. 50,000/- (vi) Future medical expenses Rs. 20,000/- (vii) Transportation charges Rs. 22,000/- Total Rs. 5,44,000/- In addition, the appellant is also entitled for interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition. 41. Now the crucial question that arises for consideration is as to who is required to pay the aforesaid amount. It would be noticed that the Insurance Company has led no evidence except tendering on record copy of the policy Ext.RW-3/A. 42. As regards the owner of the vehicle, he has examined one Rajesh Kapila, who was posted as Branch Manager in respondent No.3-Company as RW-4. It would be noticed that on 18.6.2010 the JCB of respondent No.1 (owner) had met with an accident for which the Insurance Company itself had assessed loss at Rs. 68,652/-. It was during investigation of this claim that the Insurance Company verified all the documents pertaining to the vehicle and this fact has now been proved in the statement of RW-4, who in his deposition has categorically stated that at the time of assessing the loss, the Company had verified about the registered owner, insurance policy, R.C. and all other documents and only thereafter the claim of the owner was accepted. 43. Once this be the position, then obviously the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability to indemnify the owner. 44. In view of the above, since the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the owner, the award amount shall ultimately be payable only by the Insurance Company. 45. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications if any, also stands disposed of.