JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral) By means of present writ petition, the petitioner seeks following reliefs, among others: i) issue a writ, order, or direction in the nature of certiorari, setting aside the order dated 17.08.2017, passed by learned District Judge, Nainital, in misc. civil appeal no. 18 / 2017, Vijendra Nath Gupta vs Parvati Prema Jagati Saraswati Vihar and another (Annexure 12 to the petition). ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to transfer the petitioner in the garb of the said orders passed by the respondents which have been challenged in misc. civil appeal no. 18/2017, as the appeal is still pending disposal on merits. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved with outcome of application paper no. 7-Ga (Annexure 12 to the petition) filed in misc. civil appeal no. 18 of 2017. By a detailed and reasoned order, learned Educational Tribunal, Nainital has found that since, there is no prima facie case in favour of the petitioner, therefore, he is not entitled to interim relief and, accordingly, his interim relief application was dismissed. The next date fixed before the learned Educational Tribunal, Nainital, is 18.09.2017, on which date, according to learned counsel for the parties, learned Educational Tribunal is expected to take a final call on misc. civil appeal no. 18 of 2017. 3. The question is whether the petitioner should be granted interim stay against his transfer order from Parvati Prema Jagati Saraswati Vihar Senior Secondary School, Durga Pur, Nainital to Heerawati Madhvanand Joshi S.V. Mandir School, Shantipuri no. 2, or not? 4. On administrative exigency, the petitioner was directed to be transferred from Nainital to a school in Shantipuri no. 2. The basic contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that Administrator / Manager (Vyavasthapak) was not competent to transfer the petitioner from Nainital to Shantipuri no. 2. The second submission is that the school where the petitioner has been transferred is not of equivalent standard. Inconvenience to the school going child of the petitioner is also emphasised. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the absence of any statutory provisions, learned Educational Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant interim relief to the petitioner. 2. The second submission is that the school where the petitioner has been transferred is not of equivalent standard. Inconvenience to the school going child of the petitioner is also emphasised. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the absence of any statutory provisions, learned Educational Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant interim relief to the petitioner. It may be made clear that this Court is not entering into this legal aspect at this stage, for, the petition has been filed only against denial of interim relief to the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Secretary, A.P.D. Jain Pathshala and others vs Shivaji Bhagwat More and others, (2011) 13 SCC 99 , to argue that Tribunals with adjudicatory powers can be created only by statutes. It is possible to achieve the independence associated with a judicial authority only if it is created in terms of the Constitution or a law made by the legislature. Constitution of a Grievance Committee as a public adjudicatory forum, whose decisions are binding on the parties to the disputes, by an executive order of the Government is impermissible. 7. It may be made clear in the context of aforesaid argument that although Educational Tribunal is not created by any law made by the legislature, but it was created in compliance of a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court. If respondents are of the view that such Educational Tribunal could not have been constituted, why did they submit to the jurisdiction of such Tribunal? Further, the respondents have not challenged the creation of such Tribunal either. 8. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. vs Manorama Sirsi, (2004) 3 SCC 172 that it is well-settled principle of law that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced and a court will not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee continues to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. An employer cannot be forced to take an employee with whom relations have reached a point of complete loss of faith between the two. An employer cannot be forced to take an employee with whom relations have reached a point of complete loss of faith between the two. This general rule of law is subject to three well-recognised exceptions: (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the industrial law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute. 9. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon its earlier decision in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College vs Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 , holding that unless there is a term to the contrary in the contract of service, a transfer order is a normal incidence of service. Impugned transfer order does not appear to be in violation of any term of employment of the petitioner. In the absence of a term prohibiting transfer of an employee, prima facie, the transfer order cannot be called into question. Further, it is to be considered that if the plaintiff does not comply with the transfer order, it may ultimately lead to termination of service. 10. Present case does not fall in any of the three exceptions as provided in the decision of Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. (supra). It is neither a case of public employment so as to attract Article 311 of the Constitution of India nor is a case under the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent is not a statutory body. There is no statute governing his service conditions. The relationship between the parties is based on a contract between two private parties. Since there is no written contract between the parties, the dispute cannot be resolved with reference to any terms and conditions governing the relationship between the parties. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot be said that Vyasthapak / Administrator / Manager had no locus standi to issue the transfer order. It cannot also be held that the transfer order is mala fide. 11. Reference in this regard may also be had to the decisions of Shyam Sunder Aggarwal vs Globe Detective Agency (P) Ltd., MANU/DE/7973/2007 and Anand Swarup Mittal vs Managing Committee of Ramjus Sr. Secondary School no. 4, MANU/DE/9134/2006. It cannot also be held that the transfer order is mala fide. 11. Reference in this regard may also be had to the decisions of Shyam Sunder Aggarwal vs Globe Detective Agency (P) Ltd., MANU/DE/7973/2007 and Anand Swarup Mittal vs Managing Committee of Ramjus Sr. Secondary School no. 4, MANU/DE/9134/2006. Unless there is a term to the contrary in the contract of service, a transfer is a normal incidence of service. 12. It was held by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. vs Gobardhan Lal, 2004 (11) SCC 402 , that transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do into confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, shown to be vitiated by mala fide. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by Courts or Tribunals as though they are appellate authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of administrative needs and requirements of situation concerned. An impression should not be gathered that Courts are attempting to take over the reigns of executive, attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective field or area of jurisdiction. [emphasis supplied] 13. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Secretary of Bhartiya Shiksha Samiti is only empowered to transfer an employee from one place to another. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the order to transfer the petitioner was passed by a resolution made by the Management Committee and the representation of the petitioner has already been dismissed. The Manager / Administrator had simply carried out the orders of the Management Committee. Manager / Administrator is empowered to pass the transfer order. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the order to transfer the petitioner was passed by a resolution made by the Management Committee and the representation of the petitioner has already been dismissed. The Manager / Administrator had simply carried out the orders of the Management Committee. Manager / Administrator is empowered to pass the transfer order. Bhartiya Shiksha Samiti is empowered to pass the transfer orders in respect of Principals and Teachers of the affiliated schools run by the Society. Present petitioner is only an Accountant. Financial irregularities are alleged against the petitioner while he was working in the capacity of Office Superintendent. The order of transfer is not a stigmatic transfer order and has been passed directing the petitioner to be transferred from one school to another school, governed by the same Society. 14. The petitioner has been transferred from a place, which is some 33 kilometers away from his present place of posting. The order of transfer is not a stigmatic order. Charges against the petitioner are grave, although not reflected in the transfer order. In the exigency of service, anybody can be transferred from one place to another, provided there is no mala fide. No mala fide is reflected in the instant case, at present. The Mantri / Secretary of Bhartiya Shiksha Samiti is entitled to transfer any employee from one place to another. In the instant case, since the petitioner is an Accountant, therefore, it was not necessary for Bhartiya Shiksha Samiti alone to have transferred him from one place to another, for the same is applicable to the Principals and teaching staff of the school run by the Society. Vyavasthapak is competent to issue transfer order in respect of an employee, who is neither Principal nor the teaching staff of a school run by the Society. Here the petitioner has been transferred after well considered resolution passed by the Management Committee of the Society and the Manager / Administrator has simply issued the transfer order. 15. In the background of the aforesaid facts, this Court does not think it proper to intervene in the well reasoned and detailed order of the learned Educational Tribuanl, Nainital. Otherwise also, this Court is unable to take a view contrary to what was taken by learned Educational Tribunal. 16. The misc. civil appeal is already listed for hearing on 18.09.2017. In the background of the aforesaid facts, this Court does not think it proper to intervene in the well reasoned and detailed order of the learned Educational Tribuanl, Nainital. Otherwise also, this Court is unable to take a view contrary to what was taken by learned Educational Tribunal. 16. The misc. civil appeal is already listed for hearing on 18.09.2017. A direction is, therefore, issued to the learned Educational Tribunal, Nainital, to make an endeavour to decide the misc. civil appeal pending before it, at an earliest possible, in accordance with law. 17. Needless to say that, while deciding the misc. civil appeal, learned Educational Tribunal shall not be influenced by any of the observations made by this Court, while deciding present writ petition. 18. With the direction as above, the writ petition is dismissed.