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2017 DIGILAW 477 (GUJ)

Gangaben v. State of Gujarat

2017-03-01

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2017
JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) to quash and set aside the order dated 09.12.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1125/2016. (B) direct the respondents authorities to release the seized accounts of the petitioner i.e. (i) State Bank of India, Godhra Branch, Account No. 10690603961; (ii) Dena Bank, Godhra Branch, Account No. 003510029498 and (iii) Bank of Baroda, Kakanpur Branch, Account No. 11640100018230. (C) pass such orders as thought fit." 2. It appears from the materials on record that the son of the writ applicant herein, namely, Hareshbhai Govindbhai Vanjara is a public servant, serving as a Class-III Surveyor with the Government. The allegations against the son are that of assets disproportionate to the non-sources of income. The prosecution under section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been initiated against the son. As on date, there are no allegations against the writ applicant herein having abetted the commission of the offence by the son under the Act, 1988. The writ applicant has not been even named in the first information report. However, in the course of the investigation, three accounts, running in the name of the writ applicant, were ordered to be freezed. The details are as under: "(i) State Bank of India, Godhra Branch, Account No. 10690603961. (ii) Dena Bank, Godhra Branch, Account No. 003510029498. (iii) Bank of Baroda, Kakanpur Branch, Account No. 11640100018230." 3. In the account maintained with the State Bank of India, the balance, as on date, is Rs. 17,240/- The balance in the Dena Bank is Rs. 9,52,000/- and the balance in the account maintained with the Bank of Baroda is Nil. 4. It is the case of the writ applicant herein that she is running a beauty parlour and has nothing to do so far as the allegations levelled against her son are concerned. 5. In such circumstances, she is here before this Court for an appropriate writ, order or direction to de-freeze the three accounts referred to above. 6. Mr. 4. It is the case of the writ applicant herein that she is running a beauty parlour and has nothing to do so far as the allegations levelled against her son are concerned. 5. In such circumstances, she is here before this Court for an appropriate writ, order or direction to de-freeze the three accounts referred to above. 6. Mr. Dave, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant, vehemently submitted that the Investigating Officer, in the first place, could not have exercised his powers under section 102 of the Cr.P.C. for freezing of the bank accounts. He would submit that the learned Special Judge also did not take notice of the settled position of law and committed an error in passing the order, asking the Banks to freeze the accounts. Mr. Dave submitted that a case of disproportionate wealth could only be proved from the entries effected in the books of accounts so as to trace the past bank dealings of the accused and of his near relatives during the check period, but not freezing the accounts unless the Investigating Officer is of the view that by permitting the accused or his relatives to continue to operate the accounts, any damage would be caused to the entries already effected in the past, which are relevant for the check period and, therefore, no purpose would be served in the progress of investigation by freezing the accounts and obstructing the writ applicant being the mother of the accused from operating her accounts. 7. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Paresha G. Shah vs. State of Gujarat and Others, Special Criminal Application No. 150 of 2015, decided on 15th June, 2015, a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of B. Ranganathan vs. State and Others, 2003 Criminal Law Journal 2779 and a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ms. Swaran Sabharwal vs. Commissioner of Police, 1988 Criminal Law Journal 241(1). 8. On the other hand, this writ application has been vehemently opposed by Ms. Pathak, the learned APP appearing for the State. Ms. Pathak would submit that the Investigating Officer was well within his power under section 102 of the Cr.P.C. to get the accounts freezed for the purpose of effective investigation. 8. On the other hand, this writ application has been vehemently opposed by Ms. Pathak, the learned APP appearing for the State. Ms. Pathak would submit that the Investigating Officer was well within his power under section 102 of the Cr.P.C. to get the accounts freezed for the purpose of effective investigation. She would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the learned Special Judge in passing the impugned order. 9. Ms. Pathak submitted that the bank accounts will not be kept freezed for an indefinite period, but at least, till the time the charge-sheet is filed, they should not be allowed to be operated by the writ applicant. Ms. Pathak submitted that if this Court is inclined to permit the applicant to operate her accounts, then, the interest of the prosecution may be protected or safeguarded by imposing the appropriate conditions. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the writ applicants are entitled to the relief prayed for in the two writ applications. 11. In the case of Paresha G. Shah (supra), this Court observed as under; "Like any other property a bank account is freezable. Freezing the account is an act in investigation. Like any other act, it commands and behoves secrecy to preserve the evidence. It does not deprive any person of his liberty or his property. It is necessarily temporary i.e. till the adequate material is collected. It clothes the authority with the power to preserve a property suspected to have been used in the commission of the offence in any manner. The property, therefore, requires to be protected from dissemination, depletion or destruction by any mode. Consequently, under the guise of being given information about the said action, no accused, not even a third party, can overreach the law under the umbrella of a sublime provision meant to protect the innocent and preserve his property. It is also not necessary at all that a person must be told that his bank account, which is suspected of having been used in the commission of an offence by himself or even by another, is being frozen to allow him to have it closed or to have its proceeds withdrawn or transferred upon such notice. It is also not necessary at all that a person must be told that his bank account, which is suspected of having been used in the commission of an offence by himself or even by another, is being frozen to allow him to have it closed or to have its proceeds withdrawn or transferred upon such notice. In the aforesaid context, I may quote with profit a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685 . The issue before the Supreme Court was, whether a police officer investigating into an offence can issue prohibitory order in respect of a bank account of the accused in exercise of powers under Section 102 of the Code. The Supreme Court, after an exhaustive consideration of the provisions of Section 102 of the Code, took the view that the bank account of an accused or of his relations could be said to be property within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Code. I may quote with profit the following observations made by the Supreme Court, as contained in paras 5 to 12 of the judgment: 5. Coming now to the provisions of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the said provisions are extracted herein below in extenso: "Section 102. Power of Police Officer to seize certain property:- (1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. (2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer. (3) Every Police Officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same." 6. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the Police Officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. The legislature having used the expression "any property" and "any offence" have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act. But the two pre- conditions for applicability of Section 102(1) are that it must be property and secondly, in respect of the said property there must have suspicion of commission of any offence. In this view of the matter the two further questions that arise for consideration are whether the bank account of an accused or of his relation can be said to be property within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Cr.P.C. and secondly, whether circumstances exist, creating suspicion of commission of any offence in relation to the same. Different High Courts in the country have taken divergent views in this regard. In the case of Ms. Swaran Sabharwal vs. Commissioner of Police, 1988 (94) Criminal Law Journal 241, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court examined the question whether bank account can be held to be property within the meaning of Section 102 of the Cr.P.C. in the said case, proceeds realised by sale of official secrets were deposited by the accused in his wife's account. The Court in that case came to hold that it is not quite sure whether monies deposited in a bank account can be seized by means of a prohibitory order under the provisions of Section 102 but even assuming that a bank account is a property within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the further consideration must be satisfied namely the property has been found under circumstances which create the suspicion of the commission of an offence. But in that case it is not the discovery of the property that has created suspicion of commission of an offence but on the other hand the discovery of the bank account is a sequel to the discovery of commission of offence inasmuch as the police suspected that some of the proceeds realised by the sale of the official secrets have been passed on to the bank account of the wife of the accused. Therefore, the Court was of the opinion that the provisions of Section 102 cannot be invoked. In the case of M/s. Purbanchal Road Service, Gauhati vs. The State, 1991 (97) Criminal Law Journal 2798, a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court examined the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the validity of an order by a Police Officer, prohibiting the bank from paying amount to the accused from his account. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that word seize used in Section 102 Cr.P.C. means actual taking possession in pursuance of a legal process and, therefore, in exercise of the said power, a bank cannot be prohibited not to pay any amount out of the account of the accused to the accused nor can the accused be prohibited from taking away any property from the locker, as such an order would not be a seizure within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Single Judge agreed with the view taken by Allahabad High Court in the case of Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. Bulandshahr vs. The State of U.P. AIR 1960 Allahabad 405 (Vol. 47). In the Allahabad Case on which Gauhati High Court relied upon AIR 1960 Allahabad 405, what was decided by the Court is, once money passes on from the accused to some other person or to the bank, money itself becomes unidentifiable and, therefore, there cannot be any question of seizure of the same by the Police Officer. 7. In the case of M/s. Malnad Construction Co. Shimoga and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, 1994 (100) Criminal Law Journal 645, a learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court examined the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and relying upon the Gauhati High Court's decision, referred to supra, came to hold that the seizure in Section 102 would mean taking actual physical possession of the property and such a prohibitory order to the banker of the accused not to operate the account is not contemplated under the Code and consequently, the police has no power to issue such order. Thus the High Courts of Karnataka, Allahabad, Gauhati and Delhi have taken the view that the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked by the Police Officer in course of investigation to issue any prohibitory order to the banker or the accused from operating the bank account. 8. In P.K. Parmar and Others vs. Union of India and Another, 1992 (98) Criminal Law Journal 2499, a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court considered the power of police officer under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in connection with the fraudulent acquisition of properties and opening of fictitious bank accounts and withdrawal of huge amounts as subsidy from Government by producing bogus documents by the accused. The learned Judge took note of the earlier decision of Delhi High Court in Ms. Swaran Sabharwal vs. Commissioner of Police, 1988 (94) Criminal Law Journal 240 and analysed the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the facts of the case were as under. It was revealed that during investigation the prosecution came to know that without actually manufacturing phosphate and fertilizers, the accused withdrew as much as Rs. 3.39 crores as subsidy from the Govt. of India by producing bogus documents. The Court ultimately came to the conclusion that the recovery of assets in the bank links prima facie with the commission of various offences with which they have been charged by the CBI and, therefore, the police officer could issue directions to various banks/financial institutions freezing the accounts of the accused. The learned Judge in the aforesaid case has really considered the amount of money which the accused is alleged to have swindled by producing bogus documents which prompted him to hold that the power under Section 102 Cr.P.C. can be exercised. 9. In Bharath Overseas Bank vs. Minu Publication, 1988 Madras Law Weekly (Crl.) 106, a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court considered the same question and came to the conclusion that the expression property would include the money in the bank account of the accused and there cannot be any fetter on the powers of the police officer in issuing prohibitory orders from operating the bank account of the accused when the police officer reaches the conclusion that the amount in the bank is the outcome of commission of offence by the accused. The Court considered the fact as to how in modern days, commission of white collar crimes and bank frauds are very much on the increase and banking facilities have been extended to the remotest rural areas and, therefore the expression property may not be interpreted in a manner so as to exclude the money in a bank which in turn would have the effect of placing legal hurdles, in the process of investigation into the crimes. According to the learned Judge, such literal interpretation of the expression property could not have been the intent of the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code. In paragraph 11 of the said judgment, the learned Judge referred to the object behind investing the police with powers of seizure. It will be appropriate to extract the same in extenso: "It would now be useful to refer to the object behind investing the police with powers of seizure. Seizure and production in court of any property, including those regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence or any other property will have a two-fold effect. Production of the above property may be necessary as evidence of the commission of the crime. Seizure may also have to be necessary, in order to preserve the property, for the purpose of enabling the Court, to pass suitable orders under S.452 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the conclusion of the trial. This order would include destruction of the property, confiscation of the property or delivery of the property to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereto. It cannot be contended that the concept of restitution of property to the victim of a crime, is totally alien to the Criminal Procedure Code. No doubt, the primary object of prosecution is punitive. However, Criminal Procedure Code, does contain several provisions, which seek to reimburse or compensate victims of crime, or bring about restoration of property or its restitution. As S.452, Crl. P.C. itself indicates, one of the modes of disposing of property at the conclusion of the trial, is ordering their return to the person entitled to possession thereto. Even interim custody of property under Ss. 451 and 457, Crl. P.C. recognises the rights of the person entitled to the possession of the properties. As S.452, Crl. P.C. itself indicates, one of the modes of disposing of property at the conclusion of the trial, is ordering their return to the person entitled to possession thereto. Even interim custody of property under Ss. 451 and 457, Crl. P.C. recognises the rights of the person entitled to the possession of the properties. An innocent purchaser for value is sought to be reimbursed by S.453, Crl. P.C. Restoration of immovable property under certain circumstances, is dealt with under S.456, Crl. P.C. Even, monetary compensation to victims of crime or any bona fide purchaser of property, is provided for under S.357, Crl. P.C. Wherein when a Court while convicting the accused imposes fine, the whole or any part of the fine, if recovered, may be ordered to paid as compensation to any person, for any lose or injury, caused by the offence or to any bona fide purchaser of any property, after the property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto. This two fold object of investing the police with the powers of seizure, have to be borne in mind, while setting this legal issue." 10. This Judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court was followed in a later decision in the case of Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. vs. Mrs. Prema Ramalingam, 1991 Madras Law Weekly (Criminal) 353, wherein the learned Judge agreeing with Padmini Jesudurai, J in Bharat Overseas Bank's case came to hold that money in bank account is property within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which could be seized by prohibiting order. In the aforesaid case, the learned Judge has also noticed the fact that the Judgment of Padmini Jesudurai, J. in 1988 LW (Crl.)106, was upheld by the Division Bench subsequently. 11. In the case of Dr. Gurcharan Singh vs. The State of Punjab, 1978 (80) PLR 514, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court differing with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1960 Allahabad 405, came to hold that the bank account would be property and as such would be capable of being seized under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. 12. Having considered the divergent views taken by different High Courts with regard to the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether the bank account can be held to be property within the meaning of said Section 102(1), we see no justification to give any narrow interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in public offices has become so rampant that it has become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again the time consumed by the Courts in concluding the trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and the Courts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence committed by the accused as a public officer. We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the bank account of the accused or any of his relation is property within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into. The contrary view expressed by Karnataka, Gauhati and Allahabad High Courts, does not represent the correct law. It may also be seen that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in the matter of imposition of fine under sub-section (2) of Section 13, the legislatures have provided that the Courts in fixing the amount of fine shall take into consideration the amount or the value of the property, which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, the pecuniary resources or property for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. The interpretation given by us in respect of the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in accordance with the intention of the legislature engrafted in Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act referred to above. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated upon. Though we have laid down the law, but so far as the present case is concerned, the order impugned has already been given effect to and the accused has been operating upon his account and so, we do not interfere with the same. At this stage, it deserves to be noted that the Supreme Court considered a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Swaran Sabharwal vs. Commissioner of Police, 1988 Cri. L.J. 241 (Del). The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court took the view that the suspicion of an offence did not arise on account of discovery of the property (bank account). There were no circumstances attendant upon the bank account or its operation that had led the officer to suspect that some offence had been committed somewhere. The discovery of the bank account was a sequel to the discovery of the commission of the offence. The police suspected that some of the proceeds realized by the sale of official secrets had been passed on to the petitioner by her husband. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court finally concluded that it was not sufficient to attract 102 of the Code as it could not be said that the bank account had been traced or discovered in circumstances which had made the police aware of the commission of an offence." 12. In the Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ms. Swaran Sabharwal (supra), the Court observed as under: "6. We are not able to accept this argument. In the first place, we are not quite sure whether monies deposited in a bank account can be "seized" by means of a prohibitory order as has been done in the present case under the provision of section 102. Swaran Sabharwal (supra), the Court observed as under: "6. We are not able to accept this argument. In the first place, we are not quite sure whether monies deposited in a bank account can be "seized" by means of a prohibitory order as has been done in the present case under the provision of section 102. But assuming that a bank account is "property" within the meaning of the section, it should be property "found under circumstances which create the suspicion of the commission of an offence" to justify under section 102. In other words, it applies where a police officer comes across certain property in circumstances which create in his mind a suspicion that an offence has been committed. Thus in the cases cited by counsel, action under section 102 was upheld where a public servant was found in possession of moneys in his bank account far in excess of his known source of income, when a person was found in possession of a large quantity of small coins for sale in contravention of the defense of India Rules, where a trader was found to have stored a large number of bags of rice in contravention of rules and orders and where a person was found standing on a public road with a bag containing several bundles of the currency notes. The position here is different. Here, it is not the discovery of the property that has created the suspicion of an offence. There are no circumstances attended upon the bank account or its operation that have held the officer to suspect that some offence has been committed somewhere. The discovery of the bank account hear is a sequel to the discovery of the commission of the offence. The police suspect that some of the proceeds realised by the sale of official secrets have been passed on to the petitioner by her husband. This, we think, is not sufficient to attract section 102 as it cannot be said that the bank account has been traced or discovered in circumstances which have made the police aware on the commission of an offence. 7. We may further point out that no justification seems to exist for "seizing" the amounts in the bank account. All that the respondents seem to want to establish from the bank account is that some funds were transferred by the petitioner's husband to her. 7. We may further point out that no justification seems to exist for "seizing" the amounts in the bank account. All that the respondents seem to want to establish from the bank account is that some funds were transferred by the petitioner's husband to her. This can be proved at any time by comparison of the two account and since the entries in the accounts are always available, no purpose seems to be served by restarting the operation of the bank account. Since, as we point out below, it is not the case of the moneys in the bank constitute "case property" i.e. the property involved in the commission of the crimes with which Ram Swarup is charged, the seizure of the monies by the issue of a prohibitory order cannot be upheld. 8. Again even if the provisions of section 102 are held applicable, the respondents have not followed the requirements of the section. Reading that provision, by adapting in to the case of seizure of a bank account, the police officer should have done two things: he should have informed the concerned magistrate forthwith regarding the prohibitory order. He should have also give notice of the seizure to the petitioner and followed her to operate the bank account subject to her executing a bond undertaking to produce the amounts in court as and when required or to hold them subject to such orders as the court may make regarding the disposal of the same. This was not done. Even a copy of the prohibitory orders was not given to the petitioner. The police did not seek the directions of the Magistrate trying the offence. Not only that, when the petitioner herself approached the Magistrate who was trying the petitioner's husband under the official Secrets Act, her request to be allowed to operate the account was opposed by the police contending that the bank account was not "case property" and that the petitioner's remedies lay elsewhere than in the court of the Magistrate. The Magistrate accepted the plea of the police and dismissed the application of the petitioner and directed to seek remedy elsewhere before the appropriate authority. The petitioner having lost before the Magistrate, had no other recourse except to file a writ petition praying for the setting aside of the prohibitory order." 13. The Magistrate accepted the plea of the police and dismissed the application of the petitioner and directed to seek remedy elsewhere before the appropriate authority. The petitioner having lost before the Magistrate, had no other recourse except to file a writ petition praying for the setting aside of the prohibitory order." 13. It may not be out of place to state that the Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court referred to above has been considered in the case of Paresha G. Shah (supra) and distinguished. The case of Paresha G. Shah (supra) arose from the proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. 14. In B. Ranganathan (supra), a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court took the view that a case of disproportionate wealth could only be proved from the entries effected in the books of accounts so as to trace the past bank dealings of the accused and of his near relatives during the check period, but not freezing the accounts unless the Investigating Officer is of the view that by permitting the accused or his relatives to continue to operate the accounts, damage would be caused to the entries. 15. Again, at this stage, it may not be out of place to state that such apprehension has not been expressed by the Investigating Officer. 16. In B. Ranganathan (supra), the court held as under: "12. 15. Again, at this stage, it may not be out of place to state that such apprehension has not been expressed by the Investigating Officer. 16. In B. Ranganathan (supra), the court held as under: "12. From the import of the Section 13 of the said Act barely dissected, it is clear that Section 13(2) is the penal Section for the commission of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) which offers an opportunity for the public servant to satisfactorily account for either the pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income thereby meaning that in these types of cases of acquisition or being in possession of disproportionate wealth to the known sources of income, the cases could only be registered on reasonable suspicion and could be proved subject to the opportunity for the accused to satisfactorily account for the same and therefore prima facie no case could be made out by the prosecution bluntly either on registering a case or even during the course of investigation since according to the warranting ingredients of the Section, the accused cannot be preliminarily held to have committed the offence as it could be in other cases arising out of the IPC or the other criminal acts or even from out of the Prevention of Corruption Act itself. Therefore, the framers of law have been careful enough to impose a pre-condition or a subjective clause to the effect that the commission of the offence by the accused could only be complete, provided on a fair and reasonable opportunity being afforded to the public servant in spite of which if he fails to satisfactorily account for the pecuniary resources after the case has been put up by the prosecution but not on a case being registered on suspicion. Therefore, on a case registered on reasonable suspicion of the accused being in possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income, the pecuniary resources of which he cannot satisfactorily account for, it is not correct to conclude that either the commission of offence is complete as it is in most of the other cases or could it be said that the Investigating Officer shall have all such freedom as he would have in other cases in the exercise of such powers pending investigation. 13. 13. From this background, the case of the petitioner has to be studied in the context of Sections 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Regarding the freezing of the bank accounts operated by the petitioner and his family members hitherto, it has become necessary on the part of this Court to ascertain the powers and jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer particularly in view of the fact that the first respondent/Investigating Officer is the Inspector of Police in rank, and therefore it is relevant to consider the authorisation granted by the Superintendent of Police, Directorate of Vigilance and Anti corruption Special Investigation Cell and the very freezing order passed by the first respondent. 14. No doubt, the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, in exercise of his powers conferred under Section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, has empowered the first respondent to investigate an offence specified under Section 17 of the said Act against the petitioner and to exercise powers under Section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 'for the purpose of investigation into such offences to inspect any Bankers' Book in so far as they relate to the accounts of the person suspected to have committed those offences and of any other persons suspected to be holding money on behalf of such person and to take or cause to be taken certified copies of the relevant entries, therefrom........considered necessary for the purpose of the investigation into aforesaid offences. No explanation need be necessary that the specific acts that the first respondent/Inspector is empowered to do are spelt out in the above authorisation made by the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Special Cell, in his letter dated 16.8.2002, which does not, in any manner, empower the first respondent to freeze the accounts operated by the petitioner and his family members. 15. 15. However, based on this authorisation given by the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Special Investigation Cell, Chennai, the first respondent has not only carried out the searches at various places during the course of investigation, during which the first respondent would allege that the bank accounts numbering six in different persons' names and businesses have been detected and pursuant to the detection of the operation of the said accounts, the first respondent Inspector of Police has caused the requisition to the respective Banks to freeze the said six accounts and that the account holders should not be allowed to operate the accounts. 16. The point that is to be ascertained is whether the first respondent could exercise his power and jurisdiction to that extent as to freeze the accounts of not only the petitioner, who is an accused but also the other family members or the businesses? 17. At the outset, it may be remembered that the first respondent has not been specifically empowered or authorised to do such acts of freezing the accounts or obstruct the account holders from operating the accounts and while so, it has to be considered whether the authorisation made by the Superintendent of Police, dated 16.8.2002 implies such powers to be exercised by the first respondent/Inspector of Police, who is empowered to investigate into the case? 18. The authorisation given by the Superintendent of Police to the first respondent is specific to the effect of carrying out certain acts for the purpose of investigation that is to inspect any bankers' book and to take the copies of the relevant entries therefrom, which are considered necessary for the purpose of the investigation into the aforesaid offences. It could be stated that if freezing of the accounts would have also been thought of by the authorising Officer, in one sentence, he could have included the freezing of the accounts of the petitioner and others also in the said authorisation letter. It could be stated that if freezing of the accounts would have also been thought of by the authorising Officer, in one sentence, he could have included the freezing of the accounts of the petitioner and others also in the said authorisation letter. But it was not intended on the part of the empowering authority, the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Special Investigation Cell and therefore it is safe to conclude that the said Superintendent of Police has not authorised the first respondent/Inspector of Police with such drastic powers to be exercised by him since the empowering officer would have thought of serious consequences to follow in the aftermath of such drastic steps taken by the Inspector of Police. The Superintendent of Police would have also further considered that for the purpose of the case of the possession of disproportionate wealth to the known sources of income, the object sought to be achieved is to prove from the sources of income whether disproportionate wealth has been acquired by the accused or in his possession by inspection of bankers book and by certified copies of the relevant entries taken and not freezing the accounts or obstructing the account holder from running his life or day-to-day business or in operating the accounts since he is susceptible to be crippled and thrown out of his routine by such unwanted drastic steps falsely initiated by the first respondent without there being anything to achieve by such acts. 19. A case of disproportionate wealth could only be proved from the entries effected in the books of accounts so as to trace the past bank dealings of the accused and of his near relatives during the check period but not freezing the accounts unless the Investigating Officer is of the view that by permitting the accused or his relatives to continue to operate the accounts any damage would be caused to the entries already effected in the past which are relevant for the check period and therefore no purpose is also going to be served in the progress of investigation by freezing the accounts and obstructing the accused and his relatives from operating the accounts abruptly. The net result would be that the daily routine of personal life or business of the account holders would be paralysed with no scope for making any progress in the investigation by such of the acts of ordering to freeze the accounts. Therefore, at this juncture, the only conclusion that could be arrived at by this Court is that neither the first respondent is authorised to indulge in such acts of freezing the bank accounts of the petitioner and his family members as per the authorisation made by the Superintendent of Police, dated 16.8.2002 nor could the first respondent assume such powers himself and therefore it is safe to conclude that the act perpetrated by the first respondent in freezing the accounts of the petitioner and others listed here before is without authorisation and without jurisdiction and they could be termed only as illegal. 20. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out from the proviso to Section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which is specific to the effect that no power under this section in relation to the accounts of any person shall be exercised by a police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police, unless he is specially authorised in this behalf by a police officer of or above the rank of a Superintendent of Police. No clarification is required that this proviso to Section 18 requires special authorisation by officer not less than the rank of Superintendent of Police to any police officer who is below the rank of Superintendent of Police. Since as aforementioned, the first respondent is not specifically authorised by the Superintendent of Police, the requisition made by him to the banks to freeze the accounts of the petitioner and others mentioned in his letter dated 3.1.2003 is an act done in excess than what he was empowered or not authorised to and the same is illegal. 21. Yet another legal aspect pointed out on the part of the petitioner by his counsel is the procedure that is to be adopted on seizure of bank account. In case of seizure of a bank account, the police officer should do two things: he should inform the concerned Magistrate forthwith regarding the prohibitory order. 21. Yet another legal aspect pointed out on the part of the petitioner by his counsel is the procedure that is to be adopted on seizure of bank account. In case of seizure of a bank account, the police officer should do two things: he should inform the concerned Magistrate forthwith regarding the prohibitory order. He should also give notice of the seizure to the accused and allow him/her to operate the bank account subject to his/her executing a bond undertaking to produce the amounts in court as and when required or to hold them subject to such orders as the court may make regarding the disposal of the same. An order under Section 102, without doing so is liable to be set aside, as held in Ms. Swaran Sabharwal vs. Commissioner of Police, 1988 Crl. L.J. 241 (Delhi) (extracted supra). This procedure that is to be followed and felt mandatory has also not been followed by the first respondent." 17. Without going into any further discussion, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if the writ applicant is directed to execute a bond of Rs. 10,00,000/- with a solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Judge, Godhra. I, accordingly, direct the writ applicant to act accordingly. She shall execute the bond of the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- with the solvent surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, Godhra within a period of eight days from today. No sooner, the direction is complied with, the Investigating Officer shall inform the Banks concerned to de-freeze the accounts and permit the writ applicant to operate her accounts. The writ applicant is directed that she shall not cause any damage to the entries, which are already effected in the past and are relevant for the check period. This order shall not come in the way of the Investigating Officer so far as the investigation of the alleged offence is concerned. 18. With the above, this writ application is disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Disposed off.