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2017 DIGILAW 477 (JHR)

Arjun Das v. State Of Jharkhand

2017-03-06

RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

body2017
ORDER Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. – Heard Mr. Mahesh Prasad Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Sudhansu Kumar Deo, learned A.P.P. 2. In this application the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Hirodih P.S. Case No. 69 of 2015 instituted for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. A further prayer has been made for challenging the order dated 18.12.2015 and 07.01.2016 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Giridih whereby and where under non-bailable warrant of arrest and proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. has been ordered to be issued. 3. It has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the husband was arrested and in course of trial since the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts he was acquitted. Learned counsel submits that the benefit of acquittal of the husband should also percolate in favour of the petitioners in view of the fact that none of the witnesses have come forward to support the allegation levelled against the accused persons. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Md. Sajjad @ Raju @ Salim reported in 2017 (1) JBCJ 281 (SC). A further argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that so far as the direction for issuance of proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the same does not contain any valid reasons. Learned A.P.P. has opposed the prayer made by the petitioners. 4. With respect to the prayer made by the petitioners for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings he has banked upon a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Md. Sajjad @ Raju @ Salim (Supra). The facts of the said case and the facts of the present case are entirely different and what has been culled out from the judgment under reference is to the effect that if a convict does not prefer an appeal the benefit of acquittal on appeal is granted to other convicts the same benefit must be extended to similarly situated co-accused. The facts of the present case are apparently contrary to the facts of the case under reference. The facts of the present case are apparently contrary to the facts of the case under reference. In the present case the petitioners seek advantage of the fact that the husband has been acquitted by the learned trial court. The petitioners have not faced trial on account of the fact that they were absconding and merely because the husband has been acquitted by the learned trial court the same benefit cannot be granted to the other accused persons as the trial of those six accused persons have to be held afresh. 5. It is not a case that the husband was acquitted by the learned appellate court whereas the petitioners were convicted and did not prefer an appeal and their case stood on the same footing to that of the husband. If such was the circumstance the benefit accruing to the husband would have definitely percolated to the other accused persons but that being not the facts of the present case, the prayer for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings is, hereby, negated. 6. However, with respect to the impugned order dated 07.01.2016 is concerned, the same appear to have been passed merely on the requisition of the Investigating Officer without there being any subjective satisfaction as could be reflected in the said order. Since no cogent and justifiable reasons have been assigned by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Giridih, the impugned order dated 07.01.2016 is, hereby, quashed and set aside. 7. This application is allowed to the extent mentioned herein above. 8. Pending I.A. also stands disposed of.