JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Manan Mehta, learned AGP for Petitioner State and learned advocates for Respondents in captioned 3 petitions. 2. The 3 captioned petitions are taken out by the State (through Collector) against 3 different Orders passed by learned Tribunal in 3 different proceedings concerning different opponents. However, in view of the fact that learned Tribunal has passed common order in 3 Revision Applications and since similar and common issues are involved in these 3 petitions and the opponents have opposed the petitions on similar, common and identical grounds, the captioned petitions are heard together and decided by this common judgment. 3. In this view of the matter, it would be profitable and convenient to summarize relevant facts involved in these 3 cases. 4. So far as Special Civil Application No. 547 of 2010 is concerned, the State is aggrieved by common order dated 28.11.2005 passed by learned Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN B.S. No. 220 of 1995, Revision Application No. 222 of 1995 and Revision Application No. 223 of 1995. The said 3 Revision Applications were taken out by private opponents in captioned 3 petitions and the learned Tribunal allowed the said Revision Applications vide its common order dated 28.11.2005 wherein learned Tribunal accepted the objections raised by Revisionist against the proceedings instituted for cancellation of sale transaction and consequential entry mutated in Revenue Record. The revisionist challenged the proceedings instituted by Mamlatdar/Deputy Collector, essentially on the ground that the proceedings were hit by inordinate, abnormal and unreasonable delay. In all 3 cases, the proceedings were instituted after delay of more than 5 years. The learned Tribunal considered the said contention raised by the revisionist and relying on the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Gujarat vs. Raghav Natha and Others decisions, the learned Tribunal allowed the Revision Application holding that the proceedings were vitiated on account of inordinate delay. The Petitioner State felt aggrieved by the said common order dated 28.11.2005 passed by learned Tribunal. Hence, these petitions. 5. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that even present petitions are also inordinately delayed inasmuch as the petitioner State has filed present petitions after unreasonable delay of almost 5 years. The Petitioner State felt aggrieved by the said common order dated 28.11.2005 passed by learned Tribunal. Hence, these petitions. 5. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that even present petitions are also inordinately delayed inasmuch as the petitioner State has filed present petitions after unreasonable delay of almost 5 years. 5.1 In that view of the matter, the Respondents have opposed the petitions on the ground that such highly belated petitions do not deserve to be entertained and the same may be rejected on the said ground. 5.2 Having regard to the said vital features of present proceedings viz. (i) that the original proceedings came to be instituted by Mamlatdar/Deputy Collector, after unreasonable, abnormal and inordinate delay of more than 5 years in each case and (ii) even present petitions came to be preferred after delay of almost 5 years, this Court is of the view that the grievance and objections raised by the petitioner State against common order of learned Tribunal, does not deserve to be entertained, more particularly when the petitioner State slept over the said decision of the learned Tribunal for almost 5 years suddenly woke up from its slumber and filed present petitions without offering any explanation for the delay caused in challenging the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 6. In this context, it would not be out of place to mention relevant facts involved in these 3 cases, which would demonstrate that the decision by learned Tribunal holding that the initiation of proceedings, was hit by inordinate delay, is justified and the said decision of learned Tribunal does not suffer from any error- either of law or of jurisdiction. (i) SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 547 OF 2010 7. So far as Special Civil Application No. 547 of 2010 is concerned, the land in question is block No. 78 admeasuring 1.53.78 hecs. situated at Village Devadh, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. 7.1 The Respondents herein purchased the said land in question on or around 23rd November, 1981. 7.2 The said transaction was entered into Revenue Record by virtue of entry No. 667 and the mutation of said entry No. 667 was certified on 28th November 1981. situated at Village Devadh, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. 7.1 The Respondents herein purchased the said land in question on or around 23rd November, 1981. 7.2 The said transaction was entered into Revenue Record by virtue of entry No. 667 and the mutation of said entry No. 667 was certified on 28th November 1981. 7.3 About 13 years after the said transaction was executed and entry was mutated and certified, the Mamlatdar & ALT initiated proceedings in 1994 with the allegation that the land in question was allotted/granted to the allottee/grantee as new tenure land and that, therefore, restriction under Section 43 of the Act was applicable and that the purchaser of the land in question were non-agriculturists and consequently the sale of the land to the Respondents in 1981 was in breach of Sections 43 and 63 of the Act. With the said allegations, the Mamlatdar & ALT registered Tenancy Case in 1994. The Mamlatdar & ALT decided the said case vide his order dated 26.04.1994 and on the ground that the transaction violated Section 63 of the Act, directed cancellation of the entry and also directed that the land should be restored. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Respondents herein preferred Appeal/Revision Application before Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector rejected the Appeal/Revision Application vide his order dated 30.06.1995 and also directed that necessary actions in accordance with law should be taken for restoration of land to its original position. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 30.06.1995 by the Deputy Collector, the purchaser preferred Revision Application No. 220 of 1995. They challenged the orders by Mamlatdar & ALT and Assistant Collector, on diverse grounds, including the principal contention that such proceedings, more particularly such suo motu proceedings should not have been instituted after unreasonable and abnormal delay of 13 years. 8. As mentioned above, learned Tribunal accepted the said contention and allowed the Revision Application in favour of the purchaser i.e. present Respondents. (ii) SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 549 OF 2010 9. So far as Special Civil Application No. 549 of 2010 is concerned, it has emerged from the record that the land in question is block No. 63 admeasuring 4.59.33 hecs situated at Village Devadh, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. 9.1 The Respondents herein purchased the said land in question on or around 8.2.1982. 549 OF 2010 9. So far as Special Civil Application No. 549 of 2010 is concerned, it has emerged from the record that the land in question is block No. 63 admeasuring 4.59.33 hecs situated at Village Devadh, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. 9.1 The Respondents herein purchased the said land in question on or around 8.2.1982. 9.2 The said transaction was entered into Revenue Record by virtue of entry No. 671 and the mutation of said entry No. 671 was certified on 16.02.1982. 9.3 About 13 years after the said transaction was executed and entry was mutated and certified, the Mamlatdar & ALT initiated proceedings in 1994 with the allegation that the land in question was allotted/granted to the allottee/grantee as new tenure land and that, therefore, restriction under Section 43 of the Act was applicable and that the purchaser of the land in question were non-agriculturists and consequently the sale of the land to the Respondents in 1982 was in breach of Sections 43 and 63 of the Act. With the said allegations, the Mamlatdar & ALT registered Tenancy Case in 1994. The Mamlatdar & ALT decided the said case vide his order dated 28.04.1994 and on the ground that the transaction violated Section 63 of the Act, directed cancellation of the entry and also directed that the land should be restored. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Respondents herein preferred Appeal/Revision Application before Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector rejected the Appeal/Revision Application vide his order dated 30.06.1995 and also directed that necessary actions in accordance with law should be taken for restoration of land to its original position. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 30.06.1995 by the Deputy Collector, the purchasers preferred Revision Application No. 222 of 1995. They challenged the orders by Mamlatdar & ALT and Assistant Collector, on diverse grounds, including the principal contention that such proceedings, more particularly such suo motu proceedings should not have been instituted after unreasonable and abnormal delay of 13 years. 10. As mentioned above, learned Tribunal accepted the said contention and allowed the Revision Application in favour of the purchaser i.e. present Respondents. (iii) SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 550 OF 2010 11. 10. As mentioned above, learned Tribunal accepted the said contention and allowed the Revision Application in favour of the purchaser i.e. present Respondents. (iii) SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 550 OF 2010 11. So far as Special Civil Application No. 550 of 2010 is concerned, it has emerged from the record that the land in question is block No. 55 admeasuring 1.20.39 hecs situated at Village Devadh, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. 11.1 The Respondents herein purchased the said land in question on or around 8.2.1982. 11.2 The said transaction was entered into Revenue Record by virtue of entry No. 672 and the mutation of said entry No. 672 was certified on 16.02.1982. 11.3 About 13 years after the said transaction was executed and entry was mutated and certified, the Mamlatdar & ALT initiated proceedings in 1994 with the allegation that the land in question was allotted/granted to the allottee/grantee as new tenure land and that, therefore, restriction under Section 43 of the Act was applicable and that the purchaser of the land in question were non-agriculturists and consequently the sale of the land to the Respondents in 1982 was in breach of Sections 43 and 63 of the Act. With the said allegations, the Mamlatdar & ALT registered Tenancy Case in 1994. The Mamlatdar & ALT decided the said case vide his order dated 26.04.1994 and on the ground that the transaction violated Section 63 of the Act, directed cancellation of the entry and also directed that the land should be restored. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Respondents herein preferred Appeal/Revision Application before Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector rejected the Appeal/Revision Application vide his order dated 30.06.1995 and also directed that necessary actions in accordance with law should be taken for restoration of land to its original position. Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 30.06.1995 by the Deputy Collector, the purchasers preferred Revision Application No. 223 of 1995. They challenged the orders by Mamlatdar & ALT and Assistant Collector, on diverse grounds, including the principal contention that such proceedings, more particularly such suo motu proceedings should not have been instituted after unreasonable and abnormal delay of 13 years. 12. The learned Tribunal accepted the said contention and allowed the Revision Application in favour of the purchaser i.e. present Respondents. 13. 12. The learned Tribunal accepted the said contention and allowed the Revision Application in favour of the purchaser i.e. present Respondents. 13. As mentioned above, by virtue of common judgment, learned Tribunal allowed the said 3 Revision Applications by accepting the objection on the ground that institution of the proceedings was hit by inordinate delay. The question, therefore, is only this: whether learned Tribunal's decision is erroneous or arbitrary. 14. In this view of the matter, when the decision and observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, 1969 (2) SCC 187 , in case of Bhaniben Makanbhai Tandel vs. State of Gujarat and Another, AIR 1991 Gujarat 184, in case of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71 , in case of Pune Municipal Corpn. vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 211 and the decision of this Court in case of Patel Somabhai Devidas vs. Dahyaji Somaji Thakor and Others, 2010 (5) GLR 4152 and in case of Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah vs. State of Gujarat and Another, 2011 (3) GLR 98 are taken into account, it becomes clear that the proceedings are hit by unreasonable and inordinate delay. 15. In view of the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court and Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court, the decision of the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted. It cannot be said that common order dated 28.11.2005 passed by the learned Tribunal in the said 3 Revision Applications suffers from any infirmity much less any error of law or jurisdiction. The impugned proceedings are undoubtedly vitiated by abnormal delay and that, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Tribunal committed any error in allowing the Revision Applications. Consequently, the present petitions against common order dated 28.11.2005 against learned Tribunal must fail. 16. There is additional reason for not accepting these petitions. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner State slept over the decision of the learned Tribunal for almost 5 years. 16.1 The Petitioner State woke up from its deep slumber in 2010 and filed the captioned 3 petitions. Consequently, the present petitions against common order dated 28.11.2005 against learned Tribunal must fail. 16. There is additional reason for not accepting these petitions. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner State slept over the decision of the learned Tribunal for almost 5 years. 16.1 The Petitioner State woke up from its deep slumber in 2010 and filed the captioned 3 petitions. Even if provisions under Limitation Act are not applied to the writ petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the principle of reasonable period would certainly apply to writ proceedings as well, unless very strong and equitable ground is made out or question of public policy or larger public interest is established and convincing as well as compelling circumstances are demonstrated. Otherwise Court would not help the indolent and negligent, not even the State. There cannot be different yardstick for the State. In present case the Petitioner State has miserably failed to offer any explanation and to make out any case or show sufficient cause. The State has not considered it necessary to even make request to excuse or overlook the laches and entertain the petition after abnormal delay of 5 years. 17. On this count, it is appropriate to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : "14. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. 15. The expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. 15. The expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. 23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest." 18. It is profitable to make reference of decision dated 03.03.2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 139 of 2016 wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench observed, inter-alia, that: "Respondent No. 1 to 16 preferred Revision Application No. TEN B.S. 41 of 2006 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad by challenging the order dated 27.09.2002 passed by the office of Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant. During pendency of the revision application before Tribunal, the respondent Nos. 1 to 16 sold the lands in question to respondent No. 17 by two different registered sale deeds dated 28.06.06 and a revenue entry No. 3400 & 3401 were mutated to the said effect. Respondent No. 19, without appreciating the facts of case and against the settled legal position was pleased to allow the Revision Application being No. ITEN B.S. 41 of 2006 and directed to remove the endorsement of liable to pay premium for NA use. It is submitted that by the above referred order the state government is at huge financial loss of premium and therefore the present petition is preferred. A revenue entry No. 3549 was mutated to the revenue record recording the order passed by the Tribunal dated 29.6.07. The respondent No. 17 sold the lands in question to respondent No. 18 by registered sale deed dated 5.12.2011 and a revenue entry No. 4135 were mutated to the said effect. As the Special Civil Application came to be rejected by learned Single Judge on many fold grounds including no explanation rendered for long delay of 7 years in challenging order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and inspite of the opportunities were given to file further affidavits, State of Gujarat the petitioners/appellant failed to convince learned Single Judge about inordinate delay and accordingly petition came to be rejected. Learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decision in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 were delay on the part of Mumbai Corporation of 7 years and explanation rendered therein was considered insufficient for exercise of powers to condone the same and thus, finally a writ petition was not entertained. Learned AGP appearing for the appellant/petitioner-State further would contend that the manner in which transaction had taken place for the agricultural land and after certain facts came to the notice exercise was undertaken by the authorities and thus, delay has occurred. Learned AGP appearing for the appellant/petitioner-State further would contend that the manner in which transaction had taken place for the agricultural land and after certain facts came to the notice exercise was undertaken by the authorities and thus, delay has occurred. It is further contended that transactions of dealing with the agricultural land were regularized in the year 1961 for token charge of Rs. 1 and land remained to be new tenure land but by an order dated 27.9.2002 it was converted to old tenure for agricultural use only and therefore, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal erred in removing the conditions by the order of Dy. Collector, Chorasiya since at the time of usage of land for nonagricultural purpose premium was required to be paid and by not doing so huge revenue loss has occurred to State Government. It is therefore submitted that order impugned passed by learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside. We have heard Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the aggrieved respondent who would contend that not only on the ground of delay but on merit also State Government has no case and learned Single Judge has considered all aspects by assigning reasons on which findings and conclusions are based while rejecting the writ petition do not require any interference by this Court and appeal be dismissed accordingly. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perusal of the record which contain orders passed by the authorities below and the order under challenge in this appeal, we find that inspite of opportunity given to the State of Gujarat failed to give proper explanation about 7 years of delay in challenging the order dated 29.7.2007 passed by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. 41 of 2006. It also appears that order dated 27.9.2002 passed by Dy. Collector, Chorasiya Prant was also challenged before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal after a delay of 4 years. Thus delay galores on the record at two stages. On the strength of order dated 27.9.2002, the parties have acted and ownership and possession were transferred to 3rd parties and different sale deeds were registered. Collector, Chorasiya Prant was also challenged before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal after a delay of 4 years. Thus delay galores on the record at two stages. On the strength of order dated 27.9.2002, the parties have acted and ownership and possession were transferred to 3rd parties and different sale deeds were registered. It is trite that if inordinate delay remained unexplained in invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under article 226/277 of the Constitution of India the same would be fatal and rights created and crystalised in favour of parties ordinarily cannot be disturbed in absence of any glaring and gross illegality at the end of authorities below. The contention that the order impugned as bad and illegal being contrary to provisions of Section 43 of BT & AL Act, 1948 is devoid of merit and decision by the 1st authority was taken by applying law in this regard and even earlier by order dated 12.1.1961 penalty was levied, no doubt, at the rate of Rs. 1 but a certificate was also issued. Thus, learned Single Judge relief on the decision in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah (supra) with regard to delay even sufficient cause not shown as required under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be said to contrary to law. The Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bhailal reported in 1964 AIR 1006, the Apex Court held that period of limitation for invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordinarily would be not beyond the limitation of filing suit namely for 3 years and/or within reasonable time limit. So is not the case and, therefore, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. No costs." 19. In light of the said decisions and in view of the fact that the petitioner State filed captioned 3 petitions after 5 years, the petitions do not deserve to be entertained. 20. In view of the foregoing discussion and for reasons mentioned above, the Petitions failed and deserves to be rejected. Consequently, these petitions are dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition Dismissed.