ORDER : Mr. Pankaj Bhandari, J. 1. The appellant has preferred this misc. application under Section 151 CPC stating therein that the appellant after passing of the order in Second Appeal No.198/2015 dated 15.12.2015 has purchased the shares from co-sharers and therefore, is no longer tenant as he has now become a co-owner. 2. It is contended that in the order dated 15.12.2015 passed by the Hon’ble High Court, the appellant was directed to submit undertaking within three months which was to expire on 15.02.2016, prior to that date, the applicant has purchased the property from co-sharers therefore, now he is not required to submit the undertaking. 3. Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 373 SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate and (2013) 3 JLJ 186 Hafizullah v. Puran Chand Jain. 4. It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act would not have any applicability and Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable. 5. Reliance has also been placed on AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2256, Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani and others v. Girish Chandra Dutta and another; 2010 AIR SCW 1411, Joseph Kantharaj and Anr. v. Attharunnisa Begum S and 2001 AIR SCW 2369, R. Kanthimathi and another v. Mrs. Beatrice Xavier. 6. In the aforesaid judgments, it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases to exist once an agreement to sale is entered between lessor and lessee and the old relationship is not revived even if the consideration amount is returned by the landlord to the tenant. The court also held that in such cases, the suit is not maintainable on the ground of wilful default. 7. Counsel for non-applicant has placed reliance on 2003 AIR SCW 2436, T. Lakshmipathi and others. v. P. Nithyananda Reddy and others and 2005 AIR SCW 3240 Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano and others, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that on purchase of property from some of the co-owners, the tenancy as a whole is not extinguished and the position as a tenant continues and the purchaser tenant if bound to comply with the requirement of Rent Control Act. 8. I have considered the rival contentions. 9. 8. I have considered the rival contentions. 9. Section 111(d) provides that a lease of immovable property determines in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. 10. The contention of counsel for the petitioner that this would apply only if purchase is made by sub-tenant cannot be accepted because the provision is clear and if a tenant purchases the entire property then the lease of such immovable property would stand determined. 11. In the present case, admittedly, the appellant has not purchased the entire property from all the co-sharers. 12. Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others v. Bibi Husn Bano and others (supra), was a case where the tenant had purchased the rights of certain co-owners, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that on purchase of property from co-owner landlord by the tenant, there is no extinguishment of the tenancy by merger as postulated by Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court placed reliance on T. Lakshmipathi v. P. Nithyananda Reddy (supra) wherein also the doctrine of merger/frustration was considered by the Court, para 17 of the judgment reads as under: “In the case at hand, it cannot be denied, nor has it been denied, that the appellants herein are not purchasers of the entire ownership interest in the property. What they have purchased is interest of some out of all the co-owners of the property. The interest of the respondent No.1, whatever be its extent, has not come to vest in the appellants. The appellants have also acquired the tenancy rights in the property. Thus they have acquired partial ownership and full tenancy rights. It cannot be said that the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property have become vested in the appellants at the same time and in the same right. The lease cannot be said to have been determined by merger. Thus they have acquired partial ownership and full tenancy rights. It cannot be said that the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property have become vested in the appellants at the same time and in the same right. The lease cannot be said to have been determined by merger. So long as the interests of the lessee, the lesser estate and of the owner, the larger estate to not come to coalesce in full either the water of larger estate is not deep enough to enable annihilation or the body of lesser interest does not sink or drown fully.” 14. In the present case in hand, also the appellant has purchased shares from co-sharers but has not purchased the entire property therefore, the doctrine of merger would not apply and the application seeking amendment of the order dated 15.12.2015 is having no force and the misc. application deserves to be dismissed. 15. Consequently, this misc. application is dismissed.