JUDGMENT : 1. The writ petitioner challenges the entire disciplinary proceedings conducted against him including the order of suspension, the charge-sheet issued, the entire Enquiry Officer’s report, the second show-cause notice, the recommendation of the Disciplinary Authority, the punishment of termination of service, the order of the Appellate Authority affirming the order of termination and the order of the Revisional Authority. The petitioner’s case:- 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Railway Protection Force (in short ‘RPF’) of Eastern Railway on 2 June, 1977. His appointment was in the Schedule Tribe category. Learned Counsel has relied on the following documents in support of his case that the petitioner belongs to the Kharwar Community which is recognized as a Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe: (i) A certificate issued by the Appropriate Authority; (ii) Copy of family register maintained by the concerned authority; (iii) Copy of the Scholar’s register & Transfer Certificate form; 3. Learned Counsel then referred to the Constitution (Schedule Tribes) (Uttar Pradesh) Order, 1967 which provides, inter alia, that the Kharwar Community in the Districts of Deoria, Balia, Ghazipur, Varanasi and Sonbhadra shall be deemed to be Schedule Tribes. 4. It was submitted that from time to time the petitioner was promoted. He became the Head Constable and then promoted to the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector and then Sub-Inspector. At the time of initial appointment as also at the time of each promotion his Schedule Tribe certificate was verified by the Authorities and the authenticity of such certificate was never disputed. 5. On 21 December, 2010 a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. The charge framed read as follows:- “CHARGE Sri Jitendra Prasad posted at RPF Post/BWN as sub-Inspector who belongs to ‘Kumri’ community ‘Other Backward Class’ (OBC) misled and defrauded Railway administration by furnishing forged certificate of his belonging to ‘Schedule Tribe’ community, and fraudulently availed the benefit of reservation under ‘Schedule Tribe’ category for his appointment as Rakshak in RPF. Hence, he has violated provisions mentioned in Rule 146.6 (iv) of RPF Rules, 1987.” 6. The petitioner gave his reply to the charge-sheet. A domestic enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 8 August, 2011. A Second Show-cause notice dated 14 December, 2011 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner duly gave his reply to the second show-cause notice. The petitioner gave his reply to the charge-sheet. A domestic enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 8 August, 2011. A Second Show-cause notice dated 14 December, 2011 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner duly gave his reply to the second show-cause notice. After considering the representation of the petitioner the Senior D.S.C./RPF/Howrah-II by an order dated 12 December, 2011 observed that the punishment warranted in the case was beyond his competency and accordingly he forwarded the case to the Chief Security Commissioner/ER for suitable orders. 7. By an order dated 25 January, 2012 the Dy. Chief Security Commissioner/RPF, Eastern Railways, imposed the punishment of dismissal on the petitioner. The petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority being the Addl. Chief Security Commissioner/RPF, Eastern Railways by an order dated 28 June, 2012. The petitioner’s application for revision was also rejected by the Revisional Authority being the IG-cum-Chief Security Commissioner/RPF by an order dated 1 October, 2012. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Disciplinary Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order of dismissal. The matter was referred to the Chief Security Commissioner to act as the Disciplinary Authority. However, the order of dismissal was passed by the Dy. Chief Security Commissioner who did not have the power to dismiss the petitioner as per Schedule III to the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. 9. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Addl. Chief Security Commissioner could not have acted as the Appellate Authority since the posts of Addl. Chief Security Commissioner and Dy. Chief Security Commissioner are parallel and coordinate posts. The dismissal order having been passed by the Dy. Chief Security Commissioner, the Addl. Chief Security Commissioner could not have heard and disposed of the appeal against the order of dismissal. 10. Learned Counsel then referred to the charge-sheet and drew my attention to the list of witnesses. Three witnesses were named on behalf of the Eastern Railways. Learned Counsel submitted that the Enquiry Officer recorded the evidence of four additional witnesses without prior notice to the petitioner. This is in breach of Rule 153.17 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 which reads as follows:- “153.17. Under no circumstances additional prosecution witnesses shall be examined after the defence has been let in unless supplementary defence witnesses have been allowed on that ground. This is in breach of Rule 153.17 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 which reads as follows:- “153.17. Under no circumstances additional prosecution witnesses shall be examined after the defence has been let in unless supplementary defence witnesses have been allowed on that ground. However, if at any stage during the inquiry, it appears to the Inquiry Officer that examination of any witness who has not been produced by either party so far or recall of any witness who has already been examined is essential in the interest of justice or to clear any doubt, he may summon him for the purpose and examine him as a witness of the Inquiry Officer after recording his reasons for doing so. Such a witness may also be cross-examined by the party charged, if desired.” Learned Counsel submitted that the Enquiry Officer did not record any reasons for calling four additional witnesses, thus, acting contrary to the said Rule, which vitiates the entire proceedings. 11. The next submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the defacto complainant was the Assistant Security Commissioner who was also examined as PW 7. The Enquiry Officer was of the rank of an Inspector, lower in hierarchy than the Assistant Security Commissioner. Hence, there was every possibility of the Enquiry Officer being biased against the petitioner. 12. It was next submitted that the ADM who had issued the Schedule Caste certificate was not examined and this was a grave error committed by the Enquiry Officer. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner belongs to a Schedule Tribe community and does not come under the purview of Other Backward Classes. The category of OBC was not in existence prior to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 16 November, 1992. As per the direction of the President of India, a National Commission for Backward Classes Ordinance, 1993 was promulgated and the National Commission for Backward Classes Act came into force with effect from 2 April, 1993. However, the appointment of the petitioner in the post of ‘Rakshak’, RPF, was much before the said statute coming into existence, when your petitioner had the status of belonging to a Schedule Tribe Community. 13. On the factual score, learned Counsel finally submitted that out of four additional witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer, one was a legal expert. However, the appointment of the petitioner in the post of ‘Rakshak’, RPF, was much before the said statute coming into existence, when your petitioner had the status of belonging to a Schedule Tribe Community. 13. On the factual score, learned Counsel finally submitted that out of four additional witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer, one was a legal expert. The petitioner requested for assistance in defending himself and he suggested the name of one Sri P. N. Singh, ex-Inspector, RPF, Eastern Railway to act as a ‘defence friend’. This was why a letter dated 3 April, 2011 addressed to the Enquiry Officer. However, such request was rejected by the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 11 April, 2011 and the petitioner was asked to submit the name of a defence friend as per Rule 153.8 of the RPF Rules, 1987 which reads as follows:- “153.8. The enrolled member charged shall not be allowed to bring in a legal practitioner at the proceedings but he may be allowed to take the assistance of any other member of the Force hereinafter referred to as ‘friend’ where in the opinion of the Inquiry Officer may, at the request of the party charged, put his defence properly. Such ‘friend’ must be a serving member of the Force of or below the rank of sub-Inspector for the time being posted in the same division or the battalion where the proceedings are pending and not acting as a ‘friend’ in any other proceedings pending anywhere. Such ‘friend’ shall, however, not be allowed to address the Inquiry Officer nor to cross-examine the witnesses.” This, according to learned Counsel, was completely arbitrary and was done on a misunderstanding of the aforesaid Rule. 14. Learned Counsel referred to and relied on a catena of decisions:- (i) Shalini-vs.-New English High School Association, (2013) 16 SCC 526. Learned Counsel relied on this decision in support of his submission that since there was no dishonest motive on the part of the petitioner he ought not to have been dismissed from service. In particular learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 6, 7.2, 15 and 16 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “6. Learned Counsel relied on this decision in support of his submission that since there was no dishonest motive on the part of the petitioner he ought not to have been dismissed from service. In particular learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 6, 7.2, 15 and 16 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “6. It is evident that there is a plethora of precedents on this aspect of the law, and perhaps for this reason Counsel for the parties were remiss in drawing our attention in the present proceedings to the detailed judgment in Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 430 , in which one of us, Thakur J, had analysed as many as eleven precedents including those discussed above. After reviewing all the judgments it was held, in the facts and circumstances of that case, that since that party had not intentionally or with dishonest intent fabricated particulars of a scheduled tribe with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment, she was entitled to protection against ouster from service, but no other benefit. 7.2 Where there is some confusion concerning the eligibility to the benefits flowing from Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe status, such as issuance of relevant certificates to persons claiming to be ‘Koshtis’ or ‘Halba- Koshtis’ under the broadband of ‘Halbas’, protection of employment will be available with the rider that these persons will thereafter be adjusted in the general category thereby rendering them ineligible to further benefits in the category of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be. 15. It requires specialised bodies such as Caste Scrutiny Committees, specialised lawyers, seasoned bureaucrats etc. to decipher which category a relatively backward, or ostracized or tribal person falls in. Can it therefore seriously be contended that a person who has honestly, in contradistinction with falsely, claimed consanguinity with a certain group which was later on found not to belong to an envisaged Scheduled Tribe but to a special backward class be visited with termination of her employment? We think that that is not the intent of the law, and certainly was not what the Three-Judge Bench was confronted with in Dattatray. In our opinion, therefore, the Appellant should have been debarred from any further advantage that would enure to persons belonging to the ‘Halba’ Tribe. 16. We think that that is not the intent of the law, and certainly was not what the Three-Judge Bench was confronted with in Dattatray. In our opinion, therefore, the Appellant should have been debarred from any further advantage that would enure to persons belonging to the ‘Halba’ Tribe. 16. Accordingly, we direct reinstatement of the appellant in service but without any back wages. With the passage of time it is possible that there may be another incumbent as Head Mistress of the Respondent No.1-School and we think that it would not be equitable to remove such person. However, if this post falls vacant before the Appellant reaches the age of retirement or superannuation she shall be re-appointed to that post but with no further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate unless she is otherwise entitled as a special backward class candidate. The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. The parties shall bear their respective costs.” (ii) Kavita Solunke-vs.-State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 430 . Learned Counsel relied on this decision in support of his submission that the appointment of the petitioner attained finality after so many years and ought not to have been invalidated after so long. In particular he relied on paragraphs 15, 16, 18 and 22 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “15. The appellant before us relies upon the above passage extracted above to argue that her appointment had attained finality long before the judgment of this Court was delivered in Milind’s case and even when she was found to be a ‘Koshti’ and not a ‘Halba’ by the Verification Committee, she was entitled to protection against ouster. We find merit in that contention. 16. If ‘Halba-Koshti’ has been treated as ‘Halba’ even before the appellant joined service as a Teacher and if the only reason for her ouster is the law declared by this Court in Milind’s case, there is no reason why the protection against ouster given by this Court to appointees whose applications had become final should not be extended to the appellant also. The Constitution Bench had in Milind’s case noticed the background in which the confusion had prevailed for many years and the fact that appointments and admissions were made for a long time treating ‘Koshti’ as a Scheduled Tribe and directed that such admissions and appointments wherever the same had attained finality will not be affected by the decision taken by this Court. 18. Reference may also be made to Punjab National Bank v. Vilas (2008) 14 SCC 545. That too was a case of appointment based on a certificate which was later cancelled on the ground that ‘Halba Koshti’ was not the same as ‘Halba’ Scheduled Tribe. The High Court had set aside the termination of the service of the affected candidates relying upon a Government resolution dated 15th June 1995 as applicable to Punjab National Bank. While upholding the said order, H.K. Sema, J. held the candidate to be protected against ouster on the basis of the resolution. V.S. Sirpurkar, J., however, took a slightly different view and held that the appointment made by the Bank having become final the same was protected against ouster in terms of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind’s case (supra). The question whether the Government resolution protected the candidates against ouster from service was for that reason left open by His Lordship. Reliance in support of that view was placed upon the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Viswanath (wrongly mentioned in the report as Civil appeal No. 3375 of 2000) mentioned above. The Court observed: “20. The situation is no different in case of the present respondent. He also came to be appointed and/or promoted way back in the year 1989 on the basis of his caste certificate which declared him to be Scheduled Tribe. Ultimately, it was found that since a “Koshti” does not get the status of a Scheduled Tribe, the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated the said certificate holding that the respondent was a Koshti and not a Halba. I must hasten to add that there is no finding in the order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee that the petitioner lacked in bona fides in getting the certificate. I say this to overcome the observations in para 21 in Sanjay K. Nimje case. But it is not a case where the respondent pleaded and proved bona fides. I must hasten to add that there is no finding in the order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee that the petitioner lacked in bona fides in getting the certificate. I say this to overcome the observations in para 21 in Sanjay K. Nimje case. But it is not a case where the respondent pleaded and proved bona fides. Under such circumstances the High Court was fully justified in relying on the observations made in Milind’s case. The High Court has not referred to the judgment and order in Civil Appeal No. 3375 of 2000 decided on 12-12-2000 to which a reference has been made above. However, it is clear that the High Court was right in holding that the observations in Milind’s case apply to the case of the present respondent and he stands protected thereby”. 22. Applying the above to the case at hand we do not see any reason to hold that the appellant had fabricated or falsified the particulars of being a Scheduled Tribe only with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment as a Teacher. There is, therefore, no reason why the benefit of protection against ouster should not be extended to her subject to the usual condition that the appellant shall not be ousted from service and shall be re-instated if already ousted, but she would not be entitled to any further benefit on the basis of the certificate which she has obtained and which was 10 years after its issue cancelled by the Scrutiny committee.” (iii) Dattu S/O Namdev Thakur-vs.-State of Maharashtra, (2012) 1 SCC 549 . In this case the Hon’ble Apex Court held that even if the findings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee and that of the High Court were to be accepted, the various circumstances that had intervened between the issuance of the caste certificates and the cancellation thereof could not be ignored. Accordingly while dismissing the SLP of the concerned employees, the Hon’ble Apex Court directed that whatever advantage the petitioners may have derived on the basis of their caste certificates would not be disturbed and the cancellation of the caste certificates would not deprive them of the benefits which they had already enjoyed. However, the petitioners would not be entitled to take any further advantage of reservation in future. (iv) Rajeshwar Baburao Bone-vs.-State of Maharashtra, AIR 2015 SC 3024 . However, the petitioners would not be entitled to take any further advantage of reservation in future. (iv) Rajeshwar Baburao Bone-vs.-State of Maharashtra, AIR 2015 SC 3024 . In this case the Caste Scrutiny Committee had recalled its earlier order of granting validity certificate in favour of the petitioner on the basis that the petitioner had induced the Committee to grant such certificate by making false representations of facts. The petitioner’s writ petition challenging the Committee’s order was dismissed by the High Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the SLP preferred by the petitioner but held that because of inordinate delay in considering the certificate of the petitioner the benefit of the certificate already availed by the petitioner was not to be disturbed but the petitioner would not be entitled to take any further benefit of reservation in future including the benefit of continuing in service. (v) State of Maharashtra-vs.-Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraph 38 of the reported judgment which reads as follows:- “38. Respondent no. 1 joined the medical course for the year 1985-86. Almost 15 years have passed by now. We are told he has already completed the course and may be he is practicing as doctor. In this view and at this length of time it is for nobody’s benefit to annul his Admission. Huge amount is spent on each candidate for completion of medical course. No doubt, one Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived of joining medical course by the admission given to respondent no. 1. If any action is taken against respondent no. 1, it may lead depriving the service of a doctor to the society on whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes Order any further or for any other constitutional purpose. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 16372/85 and other related affairs, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment.” (vi) Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani-vs.-Union of India, 1983 (1) CLJ 8. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 16372/85 and other related affairs, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment.” (vi) Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani-vs.-Union of India, 1983 (1) CLJ 8. In this case it was argued on behalf of the Union of India that the mere fact that the enquiry officer is subordinate to the appointing authority is not sufficient to clothe him with bias. The Hon’ble Division Bench noted that the charge-sheeted employee in various applications made to the Management pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to appoint an Enquiry Officer of the status and rank of an Additional Collector as the Additional Collector (Preventive) himself was the main witness and complainant in the case. It was pointed out that the appointment of an Enquiry Officer who was lower in rank than that of the Additional Collector and lower in position than that of the Superintendent (Preventive) was not legal and correct as the Enquiry Officer in such a position would be subject to a bias and as such will not be able to hold fair and independent proceedings and will not be in a position to impart fair justice with an open mind and the enquiry will be a mere formality. The Hon’ble Division Bench held that the appellant/charge-sheeted employee was justified in his apprehension that the Enquiry Officer could not act independently in the matter. The Division Bench also held that there had been a violation of the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Central Board of Revenue Manual which provides, inter alia, that ‘enquiry should not be held by an officer directly subordinate to an officer who had expressed a definite opinion on the point at issue and where such opinion is adverse to the accused. In such cases an independent officer should be associated with the formal enquiry.’ The Division Bench held that the charge-sheeted officer had the right to demand the appointment of an independent person as the Enquiry Officer as the enquiry concerned his reputation and livelihood. An enquiry to find out whether the accused officer is guilty of the offences charged which may ultimately affect the reputation and livelihood of the said officer is not an idle formality. An enquiry to find out whether the accused officer is guilty of the offences charged which may ultimately affect the reputation and livelihood of the said officer is not an idle formality. (vii) Unreported judgment delivered on 4 April, 2012 by a learned Single Judge in WP No. 6148 (W) of 2012 (Utpal Kumar Biswas-vs.-Union of India). In that case the Learned Judge directed that the Enquiry Officer to be appointed must be superior in rank to the witnesses that the Management proposed to examine. Learned Judge accepted the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that an Enquiry Officer lower in rank to some of the witnesses would not be able to assess the evidence impartially. This decision of the learned Judge was upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench by an order dated 5 March, 2013 passed in MAT 907 of 2012. (viii) The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay-vs.-Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109 . Learned Counsel relied on this decision in support of his submission that where in an enquiry before a domestic Tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner, the refusal to grant such request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated. In particular learned Counsel relied on paragraph 10 of the judgment which reads as follows:- “10. Even in a domestic enquiry there can be very serious charges and adverse verdict may completely destroy the future of the delinquent employee. The adverse verdict may so stigmatize him that his future would be bleak and his reputation and livelihood would be at stake. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a managerial function and the Enquiry Officer is more often a man of the establishment. Ordinarily he combines the role of a Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer and an Enquiry Officer a Judge and a prosecutor rolled into one. In the past it could be said that there was an informal atmosphere before such a domestic tribunal and that strict rules of evidence and pitfalls of procedural law did not hamstring the enquiry by such a domestic tribunal. We have moved far away from this stage. In the past it could be said that there was an informal atmosphere before such a domestic tribunal and that strict rules of evidence and pitfalls of procedural law did not hamstring the enquiry by such a domestic tribunal. We have moved far away from this stage. The situation is where the employer has on his payrolls labour officers, legal advisers-lawyers in the garb of employees and they are appointed Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officers and the delinquent employee pitted against such legally trained personnel has to defend himself. Now if the rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on the right to the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the Enquiry Officer whether looking to the nature of charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend himself should be permit ted to appear through a legal practitioner. Why do we say so? Let us recall the nature of enquiry, who held it, where it is held and what is the atmosphere? Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a court presided over by an unbiased judge. The Enquiry Officer combines the judge and prosecutor rolled into one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to this uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent employee. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the delinquent is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not an euphemism for courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible for fair play in action. And a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot view the matter with equanimity on inequality of representation. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not an euphemism for courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible for fair play in action. And a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot view the matter with equanimity on inequality of representation. This Court in M. H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544 , clearly ruled that in criminal trial where prosecution is in the hands of public prosecutor, accused, for adequate representation, must have legal aid at State cost. This will apply mutatis mutandis to the present situation.” (ix) Monotosh Kanti Das-vs.-Union of India, 2013 (3) CLJ 357. In this case Rule 153.8 of the RPF Rules, 1987 fell for interpretation. A learned Judge of this Court held that the request of the charge-sheeted member of the RPF to take assistance of a ‘friend’ who is not covered by Rule 153.8 was wrongly rejected by the Disciplinary Authority. In paragraphs 15 to 18 of the judgment, the learned Judge observed as follows:- “15. Reading Rule 153.8 at it stands, a charge-sheeted member of the Force as of right may claim assistance of another member of the Force, of or below the rank of Sub-Inspector, posted in the same division or battalion where the disciplinary proceeding is pending and, a fortiori, there can be no doubt that the petitioner cannot claim, as of right, such assistance of a ‘friend’ that is not covered by Rule 153.8. 16. Does it follow that the disciplinary authority was right in rejecting the petitioner’s request? I shall now proceed to consider the question. 17. Here, the petitioner is a cook. It would not be unreasonable to presume that he has limited knowledge or absolutely no knowledge of disciplinary proceedings. I wonder what his educational qualifications are. 16. Does it follow that the disciplinary authority was right in rejecting the petitioner’s request? I shall now proceed to consider the question. 17. Here, the petitioner is a cook. It would not be unreasonable to presume that he has limited knowledge or absolutely no knowledge of disciplinary proceedings. I wonder what his educational qualifications are. If Rule 153.8 is read to mean what it says, and the petitioner does not get the assistance of a ‘friend’ of his choice and is left with no other option but to put questions himself in course of cross-examination to the listed witnesses who are all public servants holding high posts in their respective organisations, which in all likelihood he may not be able to put because of his inability, in my view it would be a virtual no contest or a walk-over, and only a matter of time for the enquiry officer to hold the petitioner guilty. I do not consider that Rule 153.8, in the circumstances, ought to be so read so as to sound the death knell for the petitioner. A different way of reading it is possible, not inconsistent with the dictum of the Supreme Court in K. Raghuram Babu (supra), and this is what I propose to do. 18. To read Rule 153.8 differently for advancing the cause of justice, I refer to a case by way of illustration. Take the situation of a charge-sheeted member of the Force, who has no training in respect of laws or legal procedures. In disciplinary proceedings initiated against him for commission of an act that amounts to gross misconduct, the prosecution prefers to obtain the services of a presenting officer who is legally trained to function as such. I need not burden this judgment by referring to those decisions of the Supreme Court holding that if the prosecution takes the services of a legally trained prosecutor to drive home the charges of misconduct levelled against the charge-sheeted employee, he could claim a right to be represented by a lawyer. If in such a situation the charge-sheeted member of the Force prays for permission to engage the services of a lawyer, can permission be refused relying on the decision in K. Raghuram Babu (supra)? I do not think so. If in such a situation the charge-sheeted member of the Force prays for permission to engage the services of a lawyer, can permission be refused relying on the decision in K. Raghuram Babu (supra)? I do not think so. The decision there has to be followed in normal or ordinary circumstances, but if the provision requires a different reading in keeping with the facts and circumstances that arise before the Court in a given case, it would be quite permissible for the Court to so read it without in any manner touching upon or tinkering with its basic purport.” Contention of the respondents:- 15. Appearing for the Union of India Mr. P. S. Basu, learned Sr. Counsel submitted that the scope of judicial review of domestic enquiry proceedings is very limited. If the enquiry report and the Disciplinary Authority’s order are based on some evidence, the court will not interfere. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the enquiry report as well as deposition of the prosecution witnesses. He submitted that there was sufficient evidence on record to establish the charge of securing appointment by practising fraud. Since it cannot be said that the enquiry report and the impugned order of dismissal was based on no evidence, the writ Court should not interfere. In this connection, learned Counsel relied on the following three decisions:- (i) Union of India-vs.-B.C. Chaturvedi, (1995) 6 SCC 750. Learned Counsel relied on in particular paragraphs 12 and 13 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support there from, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 , this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” (ii) High Court of Judicature at Bombay-vs.-Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 16, 19 and 21 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High Court. Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 16, 19 and 21 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. The reasoning of the High Court that when the Disciplinary Committee differed from the finding of the Inquiry Officer it is imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer, is quite unsound and contrary to the established principles in administrative law. The Disciplinary Committee was neither an appellate nor a revisional body over the Inquiry Officer’s report. It must be borne in mind that the inquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such inquiry as well as the view expressed by the Inquiry Officer thereon. It must be borne in mind that the inquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such inquiry as well as the view expressed by the Inquiry Officer thereon. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the Inquiry officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should “discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer.” Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. 21. Thus the Division Bench of the High Court has not approached the question from the correct angle which is evident when the Bench said that it is imperative for the Disciplinary Committee to discuss materials in detail and contest conclusions of the Inquiry officer. The interference so made by the Division Bench with a well-considered order passed by the High Court on the administrative side was by overstepping its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (iii) State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur-vs.-Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 . Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 7 and 9 of the reported judgment which are to the following effect:- “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749 , Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham - 1997 (7) SCC 463 , Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil – (2001) 1 SCC 4 16). 9. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the preliminary inquiry and to whom the respondent had made a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted the subject-matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence, the Inquiry Officer found the respondent to be guilty of the second charge and that has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental inquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bona fide in an “increasing customer friendly atmosphere”. There was no justification for the division bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.” 16. Regarding the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer violated Rule 153.17 of the RPF Rules, 1987, Mr. Basu submitted that there is no such violation. Such an objection was never raised before the Enquiry Officer or before the Appellate Authority or before the Revisional Authority and in any event, the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine all the witnesses. Hence, no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner. 17. Basu submitted that there is no such violation. Such an objection was never raised before the Enquiry Officer or before the Appellate Authority or before the Revisional Authority and in any event, the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine all the witnesses. Hence, no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner. 17. Regarding the grievance that the Enquiry Officer was likely to be biased since the defacto complainant who was PW 7 was superior in rank to him, Mr. Basu submitted that the facts of the case in Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani-vs.-Union of India (supra) were different. There was a substantive rule in the Customs Manual in that case but there is no such rule in the present case. Further, in that case the charge-sheeted officer made repeated requests to change the Enquiry Officer and have an independent Enquiry Officer. In the present case, the petitioner never made any such request and participated in the enquiry proceedings without any reservation. 18. Regarding the point that the Disciplinary Authority who passed the dismissal order had no jurisdiction to do so, Mr. Basu referred to Schedule III of the RPF Rules, 1987 and pointed out that the authority who passed the dismissal order was the Dy. Chief Security Commissioner and he had the power of issuing dismissal order in respect of enrolled numbers of the force below the rank of Inspector. Since the petitioner was a sub-Inspector, the person issuing the dismissal order had the power to do so. 19. Mr. Basu relied on an unreported decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 3 March, 2008 delivered in Appeal (C) No. 3964 of 2002 (D. G. Railway Protection Force & Ors.-vs.-K. Raghuram Babu) wherein it was held that Rule 153.8 of the RPF Rules, 1987 is constitutionally valid. Learned Counsel further relied on the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in that case, to the following effect:- “8. It is well settled that ordinarily in a domestic/departmental inquiry the person accused of misconduct has to conduct his own case vide N. Kalindi and others vs. M/s. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd, AIR 1960 SC 914 . Such an inquiry is not a suit or criminal trial where a party has a right to be represented by a lawyer. Ltd, AIR 1960 SC 914 . Such an inquiry is not a suit or criminal trial where a party has a right to be represented by a lawyer. It is only if there is some rule which permits the accused to be represented by someone else, that he can claim to be so represented in an inquiry vide Brook Bond India vs. Subba Raman 1961 (11) LLJ 417. 9. Similarly, in Cipla Ltd. and others vs. Ripu Daman Bhanot and another 1999 (4) SCC 188 it was held by this Court that representation could not be claimed as of right. This decision followed the earlier decision Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Maharashtra General Kamgar Union 1999 (1) SCC 626 in which the whole case law has been reviewed by this Court. 10. Following the above decision it has to be held that there is no vested or absolute right in any charge-sheeted employee to representation either through a counsel or through any other person unless the statute or rules/standing orders provide for such a right. Moreover, the right to representation through some one, even if granted by the rules, can be granted as a restricted or controlled right. Refusal to grant representation through an agent does not violate the principles of natural justice. 11. In the present case, Rule 153(8) only provides for assistance to a charge-sheeted employee by an agent. Thus, a restricted right of representation has been granted by Rule 153(8). Even if no right of assistance had been granted by the rules, there would be no illegality or unconstitutionality. How then can it be said that when a restricted right is granted, the said restricted right is unconstitutional?” 20. As regards the denial of the petitioner’s request to have the assistance of a ‘defence friend’, Mr. Basu handed up to me a copy of a letter dated 30 April, 2011 written by the petitioner to the Enquiry Officer informing him that the petitioner would defend his case himself. Mr. Basu submitted that this letter has been deliberately suppressed by the petitioner which shows that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and as such is not entitled to any relief. 21. Mr. Basu finally submitted that the petitioner obtained the benefit of employment by practising fraud. Fraud unravels everything. In this connection he relied on the following three decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 21. Mr. Basu finally submitted that the petitioner obtained the benefit of employment by practising fraud. Fraud unravels everything. In this connection he relied on the following three decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. (i) Ram Preeti Yadav-vs.-U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311 . In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court quoted with approval the observation of the English Court of Appeal in Lazarus Estates Ltd.-vs.-Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341, to the effect that no Court will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. The Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever. (ii) District Primary School Council, West Bengal-vs.-Mritunjoy Das, (2011) 15 SCC 111 . In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court found that the contesting respondents had inflated their marks in order to obtain admission in the Primary Teachers Training Institution and without inflating such marks they would have got such admission. The admission sought for was through an illegal means. In that context, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if a particular act is fraudulent, any consequential order to such fraudulent act or conduct is non-est and void ab initio. Hence, the dismissal of the contesting respondents by the appellants School Council was justified. (iii) Shalini-vs.-New English High School Association (supra). Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 7.1 and 9 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “7.1 If any person has fraudulently claimed to belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and has thereby obtained employment, he would be disentitled from continuing in employment. The rigour of this conclusion has been diluted only in instances where the Court is confronted with the case of students who have already completed their studies or are on the verge of doing so, towards whom sympathy is understandably extended. 9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. 9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. Therefore, as we see it, on one bank of the Rubicon are the cases of dishonest and mendacious persons who have deliberately claimed consanguinity with Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes etc. whereas on the other bank are those marooned persons who honestly and correctly claimed to belong to a particular Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe but were later on found by the relevant Authority not to fall within the particular group envisaged for protected treatment. In the former group, persons would justifiably deserve the immediate cessation of all benefits, including termination of services. In the latter, after the removal of the nebulousness and uncertainty, while the services or benefits already enjoyed would not be negated, they would be disentitled to claim any further or continuing benefit on the predication of belonging to the said Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe.” Court’s View:- 22. Going through the pleadings on record and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties I find that the following issues arise for determination in the present case:- (i) Whether the Disciplinary Authority lacked jurisdiction to pass the order of dismissal as contended by the petitioner? (ii) Whether it was incompetent for the Addl. Chief Security Commissioner to act as the Appellate Authority as contended by the petitioner? (iii) Whether there was breach of Rule 153.17 of the RPF Rules, 1987 as contended by the petitioner? (iv) Whether there was a real possibility of the Enquiry Officer being biased against the petitioner as argued on his behalf? (v) Whether non-examination of the ADM who had issued the Schedule Caste certificate in question vitiated the enquiry proceeding as urged on behalf of the petitioner? (vi) Whether the enquiry proceeding was vitiated by reason of the petitioner’s request for assistance in defending himself not being granted, as contended by the petitioner? (vii) Whether there is any other ground on which the orders under challenge should be interfered with? 23. I will take up each of the issues one by one. Re: Whether the Disciplinary Authority lacked jurisdiction to pass the order of dismissal as contended by the petitioner? 24. (vii) Whether there is any other ground on which the orders under challenge should be interfered with? 23. I will take up each of the issues one by one. Re: Whether the Disciplinary Authority lacked jurisdiction to pass the order of dismissal as contended by the petitioner? 24. It is not in dispute that the Sr. DSC/RPF/Howrah-II after going through the representation in respect of the second show cause notice came to a conclusion that the punishment warranted was beyond his competency. Hence, he forwarded the case to the CSC/ER/KKK for suitable orders. It is also not in dispute that the order of dismissal dated 25 January, 2012 was passed by the Dy. CSC/RPF, Eastern Railway/Kolkata. I have gone through Schedule III to the RPF Rules, 1987. The said Schedule provides that the Dy. CSC can impose the punishment of dismissal from service on all enrolled members of the Force below the rank of Inspector. Admittedly, the petitioner was a Sub-Inspector at the time of his dismissal from service. Hence, the order of dismissal cannot be said to be without Authority. The Dy. CSC was authorized to issue the order of dismissal as per Schedule III of the RPF Rules. Hence, the first issue is decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether it was incompetent for the Addl. Chief Security Commissioner to act as the Appellate Authority as contended by the petitioner? 25. I also do not find any merit in this contention of the petitioner. The petitioner has not produced any material to substantiate his contention that the Addl. CSC could not have acted as the Appellate Authority or that the posts of Dy. CSC and Addl. CSC are co-ordinate posts. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to Schedule III to the RPF Rules and submitted that the Addl. CSC and Dy. CSC have similar powers regarding imposition of punishment. Hence, the said two posts must be co-ordinate posts. I am afraid, I am unable to agree with this contention. The Addl. CSC and Dy. CSC may have similar powers regarding imposition of punishment but that per se does not establish that the said two posts are co-ordinate posts. Addl. CSC, as the name of the post would suggest would be higher in hierarchy than the Dy. CSC. To my mind there was nothing irregular in the Addl. CSC acting as the Appellate Authority. CSC may have similar powers regarding imposition of punishment but that per se does not establish that the said two posts are co-ordinate posts. Addl. CSC, as the name of the post would suggest would be higher in hierarchy than the Dy. CSC. To my mind there was nothing irregular in the Addl. CSC acting as the Appellate Authority. In any event, the petitioner did not take this objection before the Appellate Authority or even the Revisional Authority. It is for the first time that the petitioner is raising this issue in the present writ application. In my opinion, at this belated stage the petitioner should not be permitted to agitate this point and is estopped from doing so. This issue is accordingly decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether there was breach of Rule 153.17 of the RPF Rules, 1987 as contended by the petitioner? 26. Rule 153.17 of the RPF Rules has been extracted above. The said Rule, in effect enshrines the principle of natural justice. It is true that the Enquiry Officer should have recorded his reasons for examining witnesses other than those mentioned in the list of the witnesses. However, failing to do so, in my opinion, is only a technical breach of the Rule. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses including the additional witnesses. Hence, there has been no breach of the principles of natural justice and no prejudice on that count has been caused to the petitioner. In my opinion, there has been substantial compliance with Rule 153.17 and a technical breach thereof cannot render the enquiry proceeding bad. In any event, this objection was not raised before the Enquiry Officer or before the Disciplinary Authority or before the Appellate Authority. Hence the petitioner must be deemed to have waived his right to raise any objection in this regard. This issue is also decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether there was a real possibility of the Enquiry Officer being biased against the petitioner as argued on his behalf? 27. Hence the petitioner must be deemed to have waived his right to raise any objection in this regard. This issue is also decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether there was a real possibility of the Enquiry Officer being biased against the petitioner as argued on his behalf? 27. As regards the possibility of the Enquiry Officer being biased against the petitioner since the de facto complainant was the Assistant Security Commissioner who was examined as PW 7 and who was superior in rank to the Enquiry Officer, I am of the opinion that, theoretically speaking, the Enquiry Officer should be at least of the same rank as the de facto complainant or the ranks of the witnesses that the Management proposes to examine. This was also the view of a Division Bench of this Court in Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani-vs.-Union of India (supra), as also of a Learned Single Judge in the case of Utpal Kumar Biswas-vs.-Union of India (supra). However, no absolute principle of law has been laid down in the aforesaid two decisions that if the Enquiry Officer is lower in rank to the de facto complainant or one or more of the witnesses that the Management proposes to examine, then for that reason alone the enquiry proceeding must be held to be vitiated. The allegation of bias is a factual allegation and the person alleging bias on the part of an Adjudicating Authority must establish so by cogent evidence. At least he should establish that there is a real possibility of bias. In Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani (supra), the facts were different. There was an express rule in the Central Board of Revenue Manual to the effect that enquiry should not be held by an officer directly subordinate to an officer who had expressed a definite opinion on the point at issue and where such information is adverse to the accused. Further in that case, the delinquent officer had repeatedly requested for change of the Enquiry Officer and to have the enquiry proceeding conducted by an independent person. In the present case, there is no such rule which required the Enquiry Officer to be at least of the same rank of the de facto complainant or of the witnesses that the Management proposed to examine. In the present case, there is no such rule which required the Enquiry Officer to be at least of the same rank of the de facto complainant or of the witnesses that the Management proposed to examine. Further, the petitioner did not raise any objection in this regard before the Enquiry Officer or before the Disciplinary Authority or before the Appellate Authority. By participating in the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer without protest or reservation, the petitioner must be deemed to have waived his right to raise any objection in this regard. Further, having perused the enquiry report, I am of the opinion that the same is a well-reasoned report and the conclusion is supported by the reasons recorded. It does not appear to me that the Enquiry Officer was biased against the petitioner. Accordingly, this issue is decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether non-examination of the ADM who had issued the Schedule Caste certificate in question vitiated the enquiry proceeding as urged on behalf of the petitioner? 28. This objection of the petitioner pertains to the merit of the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer whose decision was upheld by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. It is well-known that the Writ Court while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not generally concerned with the decision under challenge but reviews the decision making process. In my view, non-examination of a particular person did not vitiate the decision making process since on a reading of the enquiry report there appears to be other evidence in support of the decision arrived at by the Enquiry Officer holding the petitioner guilty of the charge leveled against him. There could have been very many reasons for non-examination of the ADM who had issued the Schedule Caste certificate to the petitioner. The certificate was issued by the ADM, Azamgarh, UP, on 21 April, 1976. The enquiry proceeding took place in 2010/2011. 34/35 years elapsed between the date of certificate and the holding of the domestic enquiry. It is not even known whether the concerned ADM was still in this world when the enquiry proceeding was conducted. In any event, the petitioner did not raise this issue before the Enquiry Officer, or the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. In my opinion, at this belated stage the petitioner cannot be permitted to agitate this issue. It is not even known whether the concerned ADM was still in this world when the enquiry proceeding was conducted. In any event, the petitioner did not raise this issue before the Enquiry Officer, or the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. In my opinion, at this belated stage the petitioner cannot be permitted to agitate this issue. Accordingly this issue is also decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether the enquiry proceeding was vitiated by reason of the petitioner’s request for assistance in defending himself not being granted, as contended by the petitioner? 29. In support of this contention the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Board of Trustees for the Port of Bombay-Vs.-Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni, (supra), as also on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Monotosh Kanti-vs.-Union of India (supra). The principles of law laid down in the two decisions are indeed binding on me. However, none of the said two decisions would not apply in the present case. Learned Counsel for the respondents has handed up to me a copy of a letter dated 30 April, 2011 written by the petitioner to the Enquiry Officer, wherein the petitioner has stated, inter alia, ‘it is also informed to your good self I may defend my case myself as none is willing to act as defence friend in my case’. In view of the said letter, the petitioner cannot be permitted to agitate that he was prejudiced by not being extended the assistance of a defence friend or a lawyer. In any event Rule 153.8 of the RPF Rules categorically states that the enrolled member facing a charge shall not be allowed to bring any legal practitioner in the proceedings but may be allowed to take assistance of any member of the Force. The Apex Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the said Rule in the case of D. G. Railway Protection Force & Ors.-vs.-K. Raghuram Babu (supra). In that case, the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly stated that ordinarily in a domestic enquiry the person accused has to conduct his own case and only if there is a specific rule permitting him to be represented by someone else, can he claim to be so represented. In that case, the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly stated that ordinarily in a domestic enquiry the person accused has to conduct his own case and only if there is a specific rule permitting him to be represented by someone else, can he claim to be so represented. As noted above, in the present case, the petitioner informed the enquiry officer that nobody was willing to be his friend in the enquiry proceeding and hence he would conduct the proceeding himself. In view of the aforesaid, this issue is also decided against the petitioner. Re:- Whether there is any other ground on which the orders under challenge should be interfered with? 30. I have not been able to accept any of the contentions of learned Counsel for the petitioner as I have indicated above. I have carefully gone through the Enquiry Officer’s report, the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the order of the Appellate Authority and the order of the Revisional Authority. The basis for dismissal of the petitioner is the enquiry report. As already indicated above, the Writ Court does not sit in appeal over a decision under challenge before it. As the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in Union of India-vs.-B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), judicial review is not an appeal over a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. I have extracted above the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in that case. The Writ Court shall not interfere with the decision under challenge if the same has been taken following due procedure and after observing the principles of natural justice, unless the decision is perverse in the sense of being supported by no evidence at all and therefore arbitrary, or being in flagrant violation of any statutory requirement. The High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review will not go into the question of sufficiency of evidence in support of the impugned decision. So long as there is some evidence on record to support the decision under challenge, the Writ Court will refrain from interfering. So long as the view taken by the Authority is a plausible view on the basis of evidence on record, just because the High Court may have a different view, the Court will not substitute its own view for that of the Authority. 31. So long as the view taken by the Authority is a plausible view on the basis of evidence on record, just because the High Court may have a different view, the Court will not substitute its own view for that of the Authority. 31. In the present case, as I read the enquiry report, it cannot be said that the same is perverse in the sense indicated above. Seven witnesses have been examined on behalf of the Management by the Enquiry Office and the petitioner was given full opportunity of cross-examining all of them. It cannot be said that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence or that there is no nexus between the evidence on record and the finding of the Enquiry Officer. 32. In view of the aforesaid, I see no reason to interfere with the orders impugned in this writ petition. 33. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the charge-sheet in question was issued to the petitioner about 33 years after issuance of the Schedule Tribe certificate in his favour in the year 1976. In the mean-time, the petitioner was granted several promotions and ultimately reached the post of Sub-Inspector. For a long period of 33 years the Schedule Tribe certificate of the petitioner was not questioned. Various circumstances have intervened between the issuance of the caste certificate and the issuance of the charge-sheet. Hence, following the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shalini-vs.-New English High School Association (supra), Kavita Solunke-vs.-State of Maharashtra (supra), Dattu S/O Namdev Thakurvs.- State of Maharashtra (supra) and Rajeshwar Baburao Bone-vs.- State of Maharashtra (supra), I should direct that because of inordinate delay in assailing the validity of the petitioner’s certificate, the benefits of the certificate that have already accrued to the petitioner are not to be disturbed. I am unable to agree with this submission of learned Counsel. In the aforesaid cases, the Hon’ble Apex Court issued such direction in view of the finding in the facts of those cases that there was no dishonest motive on the part of the petitioner. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in those cases that the petitioner had not fabricated the Schedule Tribe certificate with a view to obtaining an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in those cases that the petitioner had not fabricated the Schedule Tribe certificate with a view to obtaining an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment. However, in the instant case, the clear finding of the Enquiry Officer is that the petitioner has misled and defrauded the railway administration by furnishing forged certificate pertaining to ‘Schedule Tribe’ community and fraudulently availed of the benefit of reservation under ‘Schedule Tribe’ category for his appointment as Rakshak in RPF. The Enquiry Officer has also found that the petitioner committed forgery by submitting forged certificate with the help of OS/DM Office, Azamgarh, during the enquiry conducted by IPF/IVG/ER. In exercise of power of judicial review, I should not be going into the question of correctness or otherwise of the factual finding of the Enquiry Officer. Since there is clear finding that the petitioner practised fraud, I am not inclined to pass any direction to protect the benefits that have already accrued to the petitioner as the Hon’ble Apex Court did in the aforesaid those cases. (35) Accordingly, WP No. 15724(W) of 2013 fails and is dismissed, without, however any order as to costs.