JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present Criminal Appeal is filed by the State under Section 378(1) of Criminal Procedure Code feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order passed by learned Sessions Judge, Valsad on 29.04.2006 in Sessions Case No. 311 of 2002. 2. The case of the prosecution is that deceased Mangubhai Bhagabhai, real brother of respondent-accused No. 1 and uncle of respondent-accused Nos. 2 and 3, was attacked by all these accused and giving stick blows on the head and various parts of the body and the said scuffle took place on account of fetching water from the water pump. The incident said to have occurred on 21.10.1999 at village Gorgam of Valsad Taluka. The incident has further narrated the circumstance that wife of the deceased Baviben also sustained serious injuries on account of the said attack executed by respondents-accused. This incident in question has been reported to Valsad Rural Police Station in the form of First Information Report being C.R. No. I-227/1999, lodged by the son of the deceased Deepakbhai. The First Information Report came to be registered for the offences punishable under Sections 322, 325, 504 and 114 of Indian Penal Code as well as Section 135 of Bombay Police Act. During the course of investigation, the deceased Mangubhai Bhagabhai succumb to the injury and died on 26.10.1999. Resultantly the charge of Section 302 read with Section 114 of the I.P.C. came to be added. After investigation of the incident in question, the Investigating Officer has submitted the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate, 1st Class, Valsad and since the case was triable by learned Sessions Judge in exercise of power under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., the case was committed to the Sessions Court and it was registered as Sessions Case No. 311 of 2002 in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Valsad. 2.1 The said case was put up for adjudication and the plea was recorded of the respondents accused persons, but since they have denied the offence being committed, the charge came to be framed on 04th October, 2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 325, 323, 504 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code vide Exhibit-16. After framing of the charge to prove the case, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- Sr. After framing of the charge to prove the case, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- Sr. No. P.W. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1 1 Naniben Bhikubhai (Daughter of deceased and eye witness) 24 2 2 Baviben Mangubhai (Wife of deceased and eye witness) 26 3 3 Deepakbhai Mangubhai (Son of deceased and complainant) 27 4 4 Nathubhai Pursotambhai Patel (Panch witness) 28 5 5 Champakbhai Mangubhai Dheemar (Panch witness) 31 6 6 Harishbhai Maganbhai (Panch witness) 32 7 7 Dr. Bharat Narendra Joshi (Medical Officer) 37 8 8 Mohanbhai Raghubhai (P.S.O. who take the complaint of the complainant) 39 9 9 Sumanbhai Ravjibhai (Investigating Officer) 42 10 10 Jethalal Trivuanbhai Patel (Investigating Officer) 44 11 11 Dr. Vinayakrao Vasudevrao Patil (Medical Officer) 52 LIST OF DOCUMENTS: Sr. No. Exhibit No. Description 1 41 Date of complainant 21.10.99. 2 43 Panchnama of place of offence. 3 45 Panchnama of body of accused. 4 33 Inquest Panchnama. 5 29 Panchnama of clothes of dead body. 6 46 Panchnama of body of accused & Panchnama of recovery of Muddamal. 7 30 Arrest panchnama of accused. 8 38 Medical Certificate of Baviben. 9 54 Medical Certificate in respect of death of Mangubhai.Postmortem Note. 10 55 Description 2.2 After leading the evidence in the aforesaid manner, the prosecution has given a closure pursis and thereafter with a view to give an opportunity the further statement was recorded of the respondents accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the defense was put up and the offence have been denied to have been committed by the respondents-accused and therefore, the issues came to be framed for further adjudication, which ultimately after examination of evidence on record and after considering the submissions made by the learned advocates in exercise of power under Section 235 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Sessions Judge, Valsad was pleased to pass an order on 29.04.2006, whereby all the respondents-accused came to be acquitted from charge of Sections 302 and 114 and an order of acquittal came to be passed for the offences for which they have been tried. It is this judgment and order, which is subject matter of present appeal by the State. 3. Learned APP, Mr. It is this judgment and order, which is subject matter of present appeal by the State. 3. Learned APP, Mr. Poojari appearing on behalf of the State has contended specifically that the learned Judge has committed grave error in exercising the jurisdiction whereby on such a serious offence an order of acquittal came to be passed. Mr. Poojari has contended that the evidence which has been led by the prosecution have not been properly appreciated in its true perspective and upon erroneous inferences the order came to be passed in favour of the respondents-accused. 4. Mr. Poojari has drawn the attention of the Court and thereby contended that there is enough material available on record on the basis of panchnamas drawn over the scene of offence, the arrest panchnama as well as recovery panchnama, which would clearly indicate that the offence has been committed by the respondents-accused and therefore, there was no earthly reason for the learned Sessions Judge to pass an order of acquittal. Mr. Poojari has further contended that the medical evidence is also clearly substantiating the version of the prosecution and, therefore, simply because some of the witnesses are not supporting the case of prosecution the same may not be a sole ground to pass an order of acquittal. 5. Mr. Poojari the learned APP has further contended that there is adequate material available on record and on the basis of the examination of witnesses also there is enough corroboration available to the case of prosecution and prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, no order of acquittal should have been passed. Mr. Poojari for that purpose drawn our attention to some of the documents attached to the paper book compilation, more particularly, gist of First Information Report as well as Exhibit-43, the panchnama of scene of offence, and in addition thereto Mr. Poojari also drawn our attention to postmortem note which is elaborating the injuries which has been caused by the respondents-accused. Thereafter, after drawing the attention, Mr. Poojari, has specifically contended that the order of acquittal is nothing, but a clear case of illegality in exercising the jurisdiction and therefore, requested the Court to correct the same. 6. Mr. Poojari also drawn our attention to postmortem note which is elaborating the injuries which has been caused by the respondents-accused. Thereafter, after drawing the attention, Mr. Poojari, has specifically contended that the order of acquittal is nothing, but a clear case of illegality in exercising the jurisdiction and therefore, requested the Court to correct the same. 6. Mr. poojari has further contended that the evidence of the witnesses and the medical evidence is clearly suggesting that the reasons which are assigned by the learned Judge are not in consonance with the record and therefore, such perverse reasons can be made subject matter of allowing the present appeal and thereby requested the Court to allow the appeal by granting relief, as prayed for in the appeal. 7. To oppose the stand taken by Mr. Poojari, Mr. J.M. Buddhbhatti, learned advocate, appearing with Mr. Tejas D. Shukla, learned advocate for the respondents-accused, has vehemently contended that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Even Mr. Buddhbhatti has submitted that eye witnesses have seen the commission of crime by the respondents, are also not supporting cogently the case of prosecution. While contending this, Mr. Buddhbhatti has drawn the attention to the deposition, which was recorded at Exhibit-24 of prosecution witness No. 1, Naniben Bhikubhai, and on the basis of this Mr. Buddhbhatti has submitted that her version not at all substantiating the case of the prosecution. On the contrary, self contradictory stand is appearing from the deposition of this witness. Similarly, Mr. Buddhbhatti, has drawn the attention to yet another witness Baviben Mangubhai, as prosecution witness No. 2, examined at Exhibit-26 and as contended that her version is also not probable enough to substantiate the case of prosecution and therefore, by drawing the attention to some of the witnesses' deposition Mr. Buddhbhatti, has submitted that case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 8. Mr. Buddhbhatti, learned advocate, has further submitted that on the contrary the scene of offence i.e. place of occurrence is also not certain looking to the witnesses who have deposed before the Court and therefore, in absence of any cogent material available on record, it cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge and therefore, Mr. Buddhbhatti, has submitted that no such contention canvassed by learned APP, which can be accepted. 9. Mr. Buddhbhatti, has submitted that no such contention canvassed by learned APP, which can be accepted. 9. Mr. Buddhbhatti has further submitted that sister i.e. Naniben, the daughter of deceased who herself claimed to have been an eye witness to the incident in question, but careful analysis, on the contrary, suggest that she was not even present at the scene of occurrence. On the contrary, there is a specific assertion that she has come after 4 to 5 days from her in-laws place after the incident said to have been occurred. Mr. Buddhbhatti has categorically submitted that the incident in question has infact occurred at the agricultural field of the deceased and mother i.e. injured eye witness said to have sustained injury out of the incident in question but has sustained injury on account of felling down on the road while she was passing through place and therefore, the witness to the incident in question are not cogently explaining the actual occurrence as suggested in the case of prosecution and therefore, on the basis of such a contradictory evidence, which is available on record, it cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge. 10. Mr. Buddhbhatti, the learned advocate, has further contended that from the cross-examination of the witnesses even the place of occurrence is not also certain and therefore, the learned Judge has not committed any error in appreciating the evidence on record. 11. The overall submission of Mr. Buddhbhatti, is that there is no cogent evidence available on record sufficient enough to justify the guilt of the respondents accused and therefore, Mr. Buddhbhatti requested the Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. It has also been contended that on the basis of evidence on record, it appears that it is the deceased who said to have been aggressor, as is visible from the evidence on record and on account of the blow given by deceased to one of the accused who sustained injuries and therefore, there is no sufficient material available on record to establish the guilt of the respondents accused. It cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge in evaluating the evidence on record. It cannot be said that any error is committed by the learned Judge in evaluating the evidence on record. It is settled position of law that when the learned Judge has considered each and every aspects and arrived at the conclusion simply because another view is possible, no order of acquittal be interfered with. The normal principle is not to substitute the findings on the basis of same material. Mr. Buddhbhatti has submitted that there is no other distinguishable material available on record to take a different view and therefore, requested the Court that considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction more particularly sitting in an appeal over an order of acquittal, no finding be disturbed as is arrived at and ultimately requested the Court to dismiss the appeal. 12. Having heard learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, as a whole, and upon reassessment of the evidence in co-relation with the reasons assigned by the learned Judge, we are of the view that there is no extraordinary distinguishable material available, which would permit us to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned Judge. On careful consideration of the reasons which are assigned by the learned Judge, we also found that those reasons are assigned by the learned Judge after analyzing the entire evidence on record and also upon reassessment of the evidence, we found that the main witness i.e. Naniben Bhikubhai as well as wife of the deceased in context of deposition, which has given by the son, no confidence is generating in the case of prosecution and therefore, we are of the view that there appears to be no error committed by the learned Judge in coming to the conclusion which has very much reflected in paragraph Nos. 14 and 16 of the judgment and order. 13. We are coming to this conclusion in view of the scope of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with the order of acquittal and we are also mindful of the fact that the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in series of decisions that in what circumstance the order of acquittal can be disturbed. Same are reproduced hereinafter: 13.1 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. Same are reproduced hereinafter: 13.1 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. 22. In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:- "12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1 , Madan Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637 , Atley AIR 1955 SC 807 , Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217 , Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal AIR 1963 SC 200 , Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286 , Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Lekha Yadav (1973) 2 SCC 424 , Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603 , Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288 , Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 , K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC 355 , Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529 , Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677 , Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85 , Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470 , C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1 , K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291 , Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415 . It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 13.2 In case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 13.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 13.4 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 13.5 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 13.6 The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further get assistance from one another decision, State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 11. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 14. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 14. The normal trend by series of decision, therefore, is that even if another plausible view is possible, but when the learned Judge has considered the evidence and arrived at a particular finding, the same cannot be disturbed or substituted, as the learned Judge has also an advantage of seeing the demeanor of witnesses and therefore in absence of any stinking distinguishable feature or perversity or illegality, no judgment and order passed by the learned Judge deserves to be interfered with. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts situation prevailing on record and after careful consideration of few of the evidence in co-relation with the findings arrived at by the learned Judge, and considering the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the view that the appeal filed by the State being meritless, deserves to be dismissed. 16. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 29.04.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 311 of 2002 by the learned Sessions Judge Valsad, is hereby confirmed. Bail Bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.