JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. The instant Civil Revision Petition is directed against the impugned order recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan, H.P., on 04.04.2015, whereby, he granted interim maintenance to Miss Ridhima and Miss Sidhima, the minor daughters of deceased Sanjay Shandil, interim maintenance whereof is comprised in a sum of Rs. 3000/- each per month. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has with much vigour contended that the reason assigned by the learned trial Court for granting interim maintenance in favour of the aforesaid minor daughters of deceased Sanjay Shandil, is ridden with a pervasive taint of illegality, comprised in want of statutory provisions apposite thereto standing engrafted in the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). 3. Contrarily, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, for validating the impugned pronouncement recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Burman versus Mitul Chatterjee (Burman), (2009)1 SCC 398, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, has while making an in depth analysis of the provisions of the Act, has pronounced that irrespective of want of any statutory provisions standing engrafted in the Act, for leveraging a claim of the plaintiffs' for interim maintenance, yet the husband is entailed with an obligation pay interim maintenance to the aggrieved, “only” with respect to monetary sums covering expenses incurred by her towards her medical treatment. Relevant paragraph No.30 of the judgment supra stands extracted hereinafter:- “30. Recently in Ajay Saxena v. Rachna Saxena, AIR 2007 Del 39 , analysing the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the Court held that in a suit under Section 18 of the Act, the wife can claim interim maintenance. It was further held that such interim maintenance may also cover expenses incurred towards medical treatment. Obligation of the husband to pay such expenses cannot be deferred till final adjudication of the suit. Nor can husband avoid obligation to pay further sum to his wife towards medical reimbursement on the ground that the amount of interim maintenance being passed included entire expenses on medical treatment. (See also Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi, (1995)6 SCC 88 )” (….P.406) 4. Nor can husband avoid obligation to pay further sum to his wife towards medical reimbursement on the ground that the amount of interim maintenance being passed included entire expenses on medical treatment. (See also Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi, (1995)6 SCC 88 )” (….P.406) 4. The innate nuance of the verdict pronounced by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Barman's case (supra), does leverage the espousal of the aggrieved, to claim interim maintenance from her husband, yet the clout of the pronouncement is restricted for validating only those claims of interim maintenance which cover “only” the expenses incurred by the aggrieved towards hers medical treatment also obviously, the grant of interim maintenance vis-a-vis the aggrieved plaintiffs' dehors no statutory provisions apposite thereto standing engrafted in the Act, is with a further implied rider that the liability thereof being fastenable only upon the surviving husband of the aggrieved. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has also relied upon a pronouncement made by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Atul Shashikant Mude vs. Niranjana Atul Mude, AIR 1998 Bombay 234, wherein, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has recorded an explicit judicial mandate that absence of any express provisions in the “Act”, with respect to the grant of interim maintenance would not be either fatal to the success of an application “filed” for grant of interim maintenance by the aggrieved plaintiff during the pendency of the “suit” nor curtails the power of the Civil Court to rely upon the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, conspicuously, when there is no express prohibitive provision, cast in the apposite statute against rendition of affirmative orders by the Civil Court upon an apposite application for grant of interim maintenance. 5. Apparently, both the decisions as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, do succor his submission that there occurs no absolute bar upon Civil Courts against theirs granting relief of ad interim maintenance to the aggrieved plaintiffs, yet the occurrence of a visible graphic fact as borne in the pronouncements recorded in the aforesaid citations, fact whereof, is constituted by the pronouncements aforestated fastening the apposite liability upon the surviving husband of the aggrieved plaintiff, “whereas”, the impugned order hereat occurring with respectively the husband and the father of the aggrieved not surviving. Contrarily, also when the extant claim for interim maintenance, in a suit constituted under the Act, is reared against the estate of the predeceased husband of plaintiff No.1/respondent No.1 herein, rather hence, brings to the fore, an apparent distinctivity inter se the factual scenario existing in the aforesaid citations vis-a-vis the factual scenario prevailing in the instant case. Also in their suit, the plaintiffs foist their claim for maintenance against the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, foisting whereof is averred to be holding an aura of tenability, arising from the fact of the estate of their predecessor-in-interest holding traits and characteristics of it being construable to be ancestral coparcenary property, wherein,on his demise, they obviously hold an indefeasible right to inherit it. The sequel of the aforesaid manner, of rearing by the plaintiffs, of their apposite claim upon the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, comprised in the fact of it holding besides partaking the traits of ancestral coparcenary property, fact whereof remains not firmly denied by the defendants, thereupon, with no personal claim for maintenance being reared by the plaintiffs upon the salary or income derived from the respective avocations of the defendants also when the fact of the estate of the deceased holding the tinge of it being construable to be ancestral coparcenary property, hence, theirs holding a right to inherit it along with the defendants, remains not firmly denied by the contesting defendants. The obvious corollary thereof is, hence, when from the estate of the deceased, obviously, income may accrue to the plaintiffs, in aftermath, awaiting the plaintiffs' acquiring through inheritance the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, it was insagacious for the learned trial Court, to make an order for grant of ad interim maintenance with respect to the aggrieved concerned also it was insagacious for the learned trial Court, to, order for the grant of interim maintenance being satisfied from the salary of the defendants and from not the profits earned by them from the estate of their predeceased son, whereupon, hence as aforestated, they prima facie untenably stand fastened with a liability to personally satisfy the mandate of the order granting interim maintenance. The reason for forming the aforesaid conclusion, is, for reiteration besides for emphasis earned by the trite fact of its being in stark dichotomy with the plaintiffs rearing in their suit, a claim for maintenance against the defendants, claim whereof is harboured upon the fact of theirs holding the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, estate whereof holds or partakes the trait of it being construable to be an ancestral coparcenary property, wherein they hold a right to inherit it, fact whereof remains not firmly denied by the defendants. Corollary whereof, is on the plaintiffs inheriting the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, they may rear an income therefrom, whereupon, their claim in the suit may suffer frustration. Sequel whereof, is of the impugned order being prima facie construable to stand rendered in a post haste manner, also with the learned trial Court remaining oblivious tot he impact of the aforestated pleaded factum. 6. Be that as it may, as aforestated, the clout of the pronouncement of the Bombay High Court made in Atul Sashikant Mude's case (supra), “save and except” that dehors want of statutory provisions apposite thereto standing engrafted in the Act, the Civil Courts holding jurisdictional empowerment to award interim maintenance upon the aggrieved plaintiffs, “is immensely diluted” by a subsequent pronouncement thereto recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Burman's case (supra), wherein, contrarily, the Hon'ble Apex Court has restricted the grant of ad interim maintenance vis-a-vis the aggrieved only with respect to it being confined to cover the expenses incurred by the spouse upon her medical treatment. Hence, obviously with the verdict of the Bombay High Court recorded in Atul Sashikant Mude's case (supra), hence, holding no prevalence with respect to the facts at hand, conspicuously when the aggrieved plaintiffs do not within the ambit of the verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Burman's case (supra) claim interim maintenance confined to cover expenses incurred towards their medical treatment also rather when their claim is directed purportedly towards the income reared by the petitioners/defendants from the estate of the deceased husband of plaintiff No.1, thereupon, also the impugned order directing the apposite liability being satisfied from the income reared by the defendants from their respective avocations, hence, warrants interference. 7. Apart from the aforesaid discussion, the learned trial Court had merely dwelt upon the contentions reared in the pleadings of the respective parties. 7. Apart from the aforesaid discussion, the learned trial Court had merely dwelt upon the contentions reared in the pleadings of the respective parties. The learned trial Court has not either struck issues on the relevant pleadings nor has asked for adduction of evidence thereon. Consequently, imputation of credence by it to the pleadings of the plaintiffs is also unwarranted. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the instant Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 8th June, 2017. The learned trial Court is directed to conclude the trial of Civil Suit within six months. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Records be sent back forthwith.