ORDER : P. NAVEEN RAO, J. 1. Petitioner was selected and appointed as Casual Driver in 1989 on contract basis. His services were regularized with effect from 1.10.1992. His date of birth was entered in the Service Register as 1.7.1959. As per the date of birth as recorded in the Service Register, he is entitled to continue in service upto 30.6.2017. While so, petitioner was served notice informing that at the time of joining service, a wrong date of birth was recorded in his Service Register, whereas his date of birth ought to have been shown as 1.2.1959 and in such an event, petitioner is liable to retire from service with effect from 31.1.2017. It appears, even though notice dated 18.8.2016 was acknowledged by him, petitioner did not respond to it. Further orders are passed on 15.12.2016 altering the date of birth of petitioner to 1.2.1959 and thereby, petitioner is informed that he would retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation, as per the corrected date of birth, on 31.1.2017. Challenging the same, this writ petition is filed. 2. Though initially, it was contended by learned Counsel for petitioner that alteration of date of birth in the Service Register was not preceded by notice and opportunity, the material filed alongwith the counter-affidavit would disclose that notice was served and petitioner did not respond to it and after having given sufficient time, decision was taken for altering the date of birth of petitioner. Learned Counsel has not seriously pressed this contention. 3. Learned Counsel would submit that once date of birth of petitioner was already recorded in the Service Register at the time of joining service, the same could not have been altered after long lapse of time that too just before his retirement and that action of respondent authorities is ex facie illegal. He would submit that principle of law is well-settled that no date of birth can be altered at the fag end of service and all such claims made by employees should be rejected. When this is the principle of law, the question of employer undertaking exercise of altering the date of birth of employee at the fag end of service also does not arise, and they should also be subjected to the same principle. When this is the principle of law, the question of employer undertaking exercise of altering the date of birth of employee at the fag end of service also does not arise, and they should also be subjected to the same principle. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble and others, (2010) 14 SCC 423 . 4. Learned Standing Counsel submits that at the time of submission of application, petitioner declared his date of birth as 14.4.1959 but he did not submit any material in support of his claim. Therefore, he was subjected to medical examination. The medical certificate disclosed that the petitioner's age was assessed as 31 years as on the date of medical examination i.e., 1.2.1990. Since medical examination was conducted and age of the petitioner was assessed at 31 years as on the date of such examination, 1.2.1959 was taken as relevant for recording his date of birth in the Service Register whereas 1.7.1959 was recorded erroneously. He would submit that there is no material in support of the date of birth entered in the Service Register as 1.7.1959. By referring to the provisions under Regulation 19(2)(b) of TSRTC Employees Service Regulations, 1964, he would submit that if no certificate is produced in support of the age, the assessment made by the Medical Officer shall be the basis to determine the age. Therefore, on an audit objection that date of birth of petitioner was wrongly recorded in the Service Register, it was reviewed and after due opportunity to petitioner, such alteration was made. He would therefore justify the action of the respondent-Corporation. 5. It is not in dispute that when the petitioner joined service, his date of birth was recorded as 1.7.1959. It is not the case of the respondents that petitioner gave a wrong statement and based on his wrong statement, wrong date of birth was recorded. It is not their case that the date of birth of petitioner recorded in the Service Register is subsequently altered. The date of birth as entered in Service Register at the time of petitioner joining service is 1.7.1959. It is not their case that the date of birth of petitioner recorded in the Service Register is subsequently altered. The date of birth as entered in Service Register at the time of petitioner joining service is 1.7.1959. The only basis for correction of date of birth is that during the course of audit, it was found that the date of birth of petitioner is not in terms of Regulation No. 19(2)(b) of TSRTC Employees (Services) Regulations, 1964 and on verification of the record of the petitioner, it was seen that the Medical Officer, who conducted medical examination of petitioner, assessed the age of petitioner at 31 years as on 1.2.1990 and therefore, the date of birth of petitioner would come to 1.2.1959 but not 1.7.1959. The counter-affidavit is silent as to why steps were not taken immediately after recruitment of petitioner and the authorities concerned have undertaken revision of date of birth of petitioner just few months before his retirement. It is not in dispute that the date of birth of petitioner as entered in Service Register, when he joined service, remained unaltered till the decision is taken a few months back. 6. The original record is produced. As seen from the certificate of Medical Officer dated 1.2.1990, the age of petitioner was assessed at 31 years as on 1.2.1990 and in the brackets, it was mentioned as 14.4.1959 which, according to the learned Standing Counsel, refers to the declaration given by petitioner at the time of his joining service. The assessment of age by the Medical Officer would be on physical appearance only. No medical examination, as required with regard to the assessment of age of a person, was undertaken. It is not explained as to why the Medical Officer wrote 14.4.1959 in the certificate issued by him. It is appropriate to notice that there is a correction in the Service Register with regard to the date of birth of petitioner as 14.4.1959. When this correction was made is not explained in the counter-affidavit. Even assuming that the date of birth of petitioner as declared by him at the time of submission of application is true, petitioner is having still three more months of service to do. 7. When this correction was made is not explained in the counter-affidavit. Even assuming that the date of birth of petitioner as declared by him at the time of submission of application is true, petitioner is having still three more months of service to do. 7. Having regard to the certificate given by the Medical Officer disclosing the age of petitioner as 31 years and the fact that the date of birth of petitioner is recorded in Service Register as 1.7.1959, it can be safely assumed that the competent authority treated the age of petitioner as 31 years as on 1.7.1959 since the Medical Officer did not indicate particular date in his report. Having regard to the undisputed fact that the date of birth of petitioner is recorded in the Service Register as 1.7.1959, in the absence of any incriminating material to hold that a wrong entry was made in Service Register due to false declaration given by the petitioner, alteration of date of birth of petitioner in the Service Register at the fag end of his service is illegal. In view of long line of precedent decisions on the question of alteration of date of birth holding that there cannot be alteration of date of birth at the fag end of service of employee, which principle equally binds employer, the action of the respondent authorities cannot be appreciated. 8. For all the above reasons, order passed by respondent No. 3 retiring petitioner from service with effect from 31.1.2017 is set aside and respondents are directed to continue petitioner in service till 30.6.2017 as per the date of birth originally recorded in his Service Register. 9. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. 10. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.