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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 492 (HP)

Benu Dhar Bhanja v. Dyalo

2017-05-09

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.06.2006, passed by learned District Judge, Solan, District Solan, in Civil Appeal No.9- NL/13 of 2005/03, affirming the judgment and decree dated 29.10.2002, passed by learned Sub Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, where by suit of the plaintiff was partly decreed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) filed a suit for specific performance of contract dated 29.2.1988, directing respondents-defendants No.1 to 6 (here in after referred to as defendants No.1 to 6) to execute sale deed of land measuring 1 bigha and in the alternative 1/3rd share i.e. 7 biswas of the suit land, description whereof has been given in the head note of the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’). It is averred by the plaintiff that on 29.2.1988 Partap Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6, entered into an agreement for sale of 1 Bigha of land for a sum of Rs.40,000/- with the plaintiff and defendants No.7 and 8 and handed over the possession to them on the same day on receipt of full sale consideration. It is averred by the plaintiff that plaintiff and defendants No.7 and 8 effected the partition amongst themselves and subsequently plaintiff raised the construction over his share measuring 7 biswas with the consent of Partap Singh and defendants No.7 and 8. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the said Partap Singh conspired with defendants No.8 and wife of defendant No.7. It is further averred in the plaint that the plaintiff, on coming to know about it, approached Partap Singh for execution of the sale deed, but, Partap Singh, delayed the execution of the sale deed till his death. It is also averred by the plaintiff that Partap Singh, during his life time and after his death his legal representatives, is/are bound to obtain the requisite permission of the State Government of Himachal Pradesh and to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, pursuant to the agreement dated 29.2.1988. In this background, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of contract and for prohibitory and mandatory injunction and in the alternative for possession against the defendants. 3. In this background, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of contract and for prohibitory and mandatory injunction and in the alternative for possession against the defendants. 3. Defendants No.1 to 6, by way of filing written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiff on the ground of maintainability, locus standi, cause of action and estoppel. It is alleged by the defendants that the suit is not maintainable under the provisions of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules framed there under as well as the same is also hit by the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and barred by limitation. On merits, it is alleged by the defendants that the plaintiff is not Himachali bonafide and is non-agriculturist in the State of Himachal Pradesh, there fore, the agreement is hit by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and that the same stood frustrated on account of want of permission of the State Government. It is specifically denied that the possession was delivered to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff had raised any construction. It is averred by the defendants that the agreement is indivisible as the same has been rescinded by other co-owners i.e. defendants No.7 and 8, therefore, the same has become unenforceable. In the aforesaid background, the defendants sought dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the plaintiff had entered into agreement dated 29.2.1988 with Shri Partap Singh? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform agreement? OPP. 3. Whether this suit is not maintainable? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit on account of his act, conduct and acquiescence? OPD. 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules? OPD. 6. Whether this suit is barred by Limitation ? OPD. 7. Whether agreement dated 29.2.1988 cannot be specifically performed, as alleged? OPD 8. Relief” 5. OPD. 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules? OPD. 6. Whether this suit is barred by Limitation ? OPD. 7. Whether agreement dated 29.2.1988 cannot be specifically performed, as alleged? OPD 8. Relief” 5. Subsequently, learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.13,333.33 along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the date of its realization against defendants No.1 to 6. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court of learned District Judge, Solan, District Solan, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No.9-NL/13 of 2005/03. Learned District Judge, taking note of the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court. 7. In the aforesaid background, appellant-plaintiff filed instant Regular Second Appeal, laying therein challenge to the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Solan, District Solan, whereby suit of the plaintiff was partly decreed; with a prayer to quash and set aside the same and decree in its entirety be passed. 8. This Court vide its order dated 01.10.2007 admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law:- “1. Whether the learned lower appellate Court being last court of fact is right in not discussing the entire evidence of the parties as required of it in view of the law laid down in 2000(5) SCC Page 652. 2. Whether the impugned judgment and decree is the result of complete misreading as well as misappreciation of Exhibit P13 agreement dated 29.2.1998 (sic). 3. Whether the learned courts below have misread as well as misconstrued the law laid down by the Apex Court reported in AIR 2000 SC Page 172. 4. Whether the learned courts below are right in not considering the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. 3. Whether the learned courts below have misread as well as misconstrued the law laid down by the Apex Court reported in AIR 2000 SC Page 172. 4. Whether the learned courts below are right in not considering the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. Whether the learned courts below are right in holding the agreement Ext.P13 to be indivisible more particularly when on the date of agreement itself, the plaintiffs as well as respondents No.7 and 8 were put in separate possession.” 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case carefully. 10. This Court propose to take the aforesaid substantial questions of law altogether for consideration. Mr. Saurav Rattan, learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, while inviting the attention of this Court to the impugned judgment passed by learned Courts below, strenuously argued that same is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence adduced on record by respective parties, as a result of which erroneous findings have come on record. During proceedings of the case, Mr. Rattan also made this Court to travel through evidence led on record by the plaintiff to demonstrate that learned Courts below misread, mis-appreciated and misconstrued the evidence led on record by the plaintiff, specifically Ex.P-13 i.e agreement dated 29.2.1988 entered into between the plaintiff along with defendants No.7 and 8 as well as predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6. Learned counsel further contended that bare perusal of impugned judgment passed by the first appellate Court, nowhere suggests that it took into consideration the entire evidence led on record by the plaintiff while considering the grounds of appeal having been preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment passed by learned trial Court. In this regard, learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Harphool Singh (Dead) through his LRs, (2000)5 SCC 652 , to state that it was incumbent upon the learned first appellate Court being last facts finding Court to consider all the issues and then decide the same by assigning reasons. Lastly, learned counsel contended that learned Court below miserably erred in holding agreement Ex.P-13 to be indivisible, more particularly, when plaintiff as well as defendants No.7 and 8 were put in separate possession on the date of agreement itself. 11. Lastly, learned counsel contended that learned Court below miserably erred in holding agreement Ex.P-13 to be indivisible, more particularly, when plaintiff as well as defendants No.7 and 8 were put in separate possession on the date of agreement itself. 11. This Court, with a view to explore answer to the substantial questions of law, as referred above, as well as to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of aforesaid submissions having been made by learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, carefully perused pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, perusal whereof certainly not suggest that Court below mis-appreciated, mis-read and mis-construed the evidence, more particularly, Ex.P-13 i.e. agreement dated 29.2.1988. 12. It is undisputed that appellant-plaintiff along with respondents No.7 and 8 entered into an agreement to sell of suit land for a sum of Rs.40,000/- with predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6. Perusal of aforesaid agreement Ex.P-13 certainly suggests that late Partap Singh had agreed to sell suit land in favour of appellant-plaintiff along with respondents-defendants No.7 and 8, but sale deed was to be executed after grant of permission under Section 118 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) from the State Government. Since appellant as well respondents No.7 and 8 were non-agriculturists, sale deed qua the suit land could not be executed by late Partap Singh in favour of appellant-plaintiff as well as defendants No.7 and 8 in the absence of permission under Section 118 of the Act. 13. This Court is unable to lay its hand to any averment/recital made in the agreement Ex.P-13 suggestive of the fact that permission for sale/purchase of land was to be obtained by vendor Partap Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6, rather, there is no specific mention, if any, with regard to person by whom permission was to be obtained under Section 118 of the Act. Hence this Court is unable to accept contention of Shri Saurav Rattan, learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, that the appellant-plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract in terms of agreement, but since defendants failed to procure requisite permission, sale deed could not be executed. This Court, after having carefully perused Ex.P-13, sees/finds substantial force in the arguments having been made by Mr. This Court, after having carefully perused Ex.P-13, sees/finds substantial force in the arguments having been made by Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, that relief of specific performance of contract, as prayed for by the appellant-plaintiff, could not be granted to plaintiff since contract was not alone with the appellant-plaintiff, but also was with other vendees i.e. defendants No.7 and 8, who lateron not pressed their claim. Since suit land was intended to be sold by the predecessor-in- interest of defendants No.1 to 6 by way of agreement Ex.P-13 in favour of appellant-plaintiff as well as defendants No.7 and 8, no decree for specific performance could be passed by Court below in the suit having been filed by the appellant-plaintiff alone, because admittedly, contract was indivisible. 14. True, it is, that in the instant suit, appellant-plaintiff arrayed other co-contractees as party respondents-defendants, but that cannot be termed to be sufficient for grant of decree of specific performance in favour of appellant-plaintiff. Though appellant-plaintiff, by way of making averment in his suit, claimed that immediately after execution of agreement all the contractees were put into possession qua the specific share, but unfortunately there is no evidence of partition, if any, between the appellant and other two vendees, who allegedly came into possession of 7 biswas of land each after execution of agreement Ex.P-13. Otherwise also, it is not understood that how plaintiff Along with other co-contractees i.e. defendants No. 7 and 8 could be put to possession of the suit land in the absence of requisite permission under Section 118 of the Act to effect the sale. There is no evidence of partition between the appellant and other two co-contractees on the record, rather, co-contractee; namely Mukar Charan, respondent No.7, while deposing before the Court as DW-2, has categorically stated that when permission was not obtained under Section 118 of the Act, they left the possession in favour of Partap Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6, after taking the amount from him, which amount was equally divided by them. Aforesaid defendant witness has also stated that he and respondent No.8 Lachhman Dass had specifically written to Partap Singh that agreement should be treated as cancelled. This Court carefully perused cross-examination conducted upon the defendant witnesses, which certainly not suggest that plaintiff was able to extract anything contrary to what he stated in their examination-in-chief. Aforesaid defendant witness has also stated that he and respondent No.8 Lachhman Dass had specifically written to Partap Singh that agreement should be treated as cancelled. This Court carefully perused cross-examination conducted upon the defendant witnesses, which certainly not suggest that plaintiff was able to extract anything contrary to what he stated in their examination-in-chief. Once two co-contractees conveyed to the vendor Partap Singh that agreement may be treated as cancelled, learned Court below rightly came to the conclusion that they were not interested in specific performance of the agreement and, as such, no decree of specific performance can be passed in favour of appellant-plaintiff, who happened to be one of the co-contractee. 15. Similarly, this Court finds that though plea has been taken by the appellant-plaintiff that after having taken possession qua 7 biswas of land, he raised construction over the same, but interestingly, no evidence worth credence has been led on record by the appellant-plaintiff in this regard. Appellant-plaintiff in this regard has placed on record electricity and water bills, which are admittedly not his name. Appellant-plaintiff produced PW-2 and PW-3, who happen to be mason and tenant, to prove that construction has been raised on the suit land by the appellant-plaintiff, but same was rightly not considered by Courts below in view of peculiar facts, wherein other co-contractees specifically stated before Court that since permission under Section 118 of the Act was not obtained, they left the possession in favour of Partap Singh and amount of Rs.40,000/- was taken from him which was divided equally. Though appellant-plaintiff has placed on record site-plan Ex.P-1, but there is no document suggestive of the fact that Nagar Panchayat, under whose jurisdiction suit land situates, ever issued permission to appellant-plaintiff to raise construction over the suit land. Otherwise also, perusal of Ex.P-1 nowhere suggests that site-plan in question was ever approved by the Nagar Panchayat. There is no evidence led on record by plaintiff that no permission for construction is/was required from Nagar Panchayat. Otherwise also, perusal of Ex.P-1 nowhere suggests that site-plan in question was ever approved by the Nagar Panchayat. There is no evidence led on record by plaintiff that no permission for construction is/was required from Nagar Panchayat. Further perusal of record suggests that appellant-plaintiff was only able to prove on record notice dated 29.3.1997 Ex.P-2 because there is no communication between 1980 to 1994 from where it could be inferred that appellant-plaintiff repeatedly asked Partap Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6, to execute sale deed during aforesaid period and as such learned Court below rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been able to show his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. 16. This Court, after having carefully examined and analyzed the evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff-appellant, sees no force in the aforesaid contentions having been raised/made by learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, rather this Court is of the view that both the Courts below have carefully appreciated/perused the evidence in its right perspective and there is no misreading or misconstruction of evidence, as alleged by the appellant-plaintiff, in the instant proceedings. Since this Court, in process of finding answer to substantial questions of law, had an occasion to peruse pleadings as well as impugned judgments, it really finds it difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff that learned lower appellate Court has failed to discuss the entire evidence of the parties, while upholding the judgment passed by learned trial Court. Perusal of impugned judgment passed by first appellate Court clearly suggests that learned first appellate Court has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and has carefully analyzed the evidence led on record by appellant-plaintiff. 17. True, it is, that Court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Similarly, it is well settled that when first appellate Court reverses findings of trial Court, it is expected to record findings in clear terms specifically stating there in, in what manner reasoning of trial Court is erroneous. 18. Similarly, it is well settled that when first appellate Court reverses findings of trial Court, it is expected to record findings in clear terms specifically stating there in, in what manner reasoning of trial Court is erroneous. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh vs. S.P. Srivastava, (2017)2 SCC 415 , has held that when appellate Court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that when the first appellate Court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasoning of the trial court are erroneous. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court are erroneous.” 19. In the case at hand, learned first appellate Court, who concurred with the findings returned by learned trial Court was not expected to reiterate reasons given by trial Court, rather mere expression of general agreement with the reason given by the trial Court was sufficient. In the case at hand, learned first appellate Court, who concurred with the findings returned by learned trial Court was not expected to reiterate reasons given by trial Court, rather mere expression of general agreement with the reason given by the trial Court was sufficient. Moreover, in the instant case, as clearly emerge from the reading of impugned judgment passed by the first appellate Court that it has dealt with each and every issue involved in the case and as such there is no force in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that first appellate Court has failed to discuss the entire evidence of parties as required in terms of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Harphool Singh’s case supra. 20. This Court also carefully examined the submissions having been made by learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff that learned Courts below misread as well as mis-construed law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Mukesh Kumar and Others vs. Col.Harbans Waraiah and others, AIR 2000 SC 172 . It would be apt to reproduce para-6 of the aforesaid judgment:- “6. Specific performance of a contract can be enforced by any party to the contract. If there are more parties than one specific performance of a contract cannot be decreed in the absence of some of the parties to the contract. If some of the parties entitled to the benefit of the contract are not willing to be arrayed as plaintiffs they should be impleaded as defendants. Section 23 (a) of the Specific Relief Act (now Section 22) covers such a case. In Nirmala Bah Dasi v. Suddarsan Jana, AIR (1980) Cal. 258, it is held that one of the co-promisees may sue for specific performance making the other copromisees as defendants. Judgment can be given in favour of the persons interested whether they are joined as plaintiffs or as defendants. See: Monghibai v, Cooverji Umersry, AIR (1939) PC 170, In a case where property was agreed to be transferred to three co- promises and all the three filed a suit for specific performance of the contract but only one of them came to witness box in support of the claim, it has been held that the other two co-promisees would also be entitled to a decree of specific performance. In the case of co-contractees it is not necessary that all of them should be ranged on the same side for obtaining specific performance. It is sufficient if all of them are before the court. (See: Jagdeo Singh v. Bisambhar, AIR (1937) Nag. 186). But where a single contract is to convey a land to several persons and the contract is not indivisible some of the joint contractees cannot seek specific performance if the other contractees do not want that relief. (p.174) 21. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that specific performance of contract can be enforced by any party to the contract. If there are more parties than one, specific performance of a contract cannot be decreed in the absence of some of the parties to the contract. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that it is not necessary that all of them should be ranged on the same side for obtaining specific performance and it is sufficient, if all of them are before the Court. 22. In the instant case, learned appellate Court has rightly held the suit, having been filed by appellant-plaintiff, to be maintainable because admittedly other co-contractees were impleaded as party respondents No.7 and 8. But in the afore said judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that where a single contract is to convey a land to several persons and the contract is not indivisible, some of the joint contractees cannot seek specific performance, if the other contractees do not want that reliefs. 23. As has been discussed here in above, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6, by way of specific contract, intended to sell suit land in favour of appellant-plaintiff and defendants No.7 and 8. There is nothing in the agreement Ex.P-13 from where it could be inferred that suit land was intended to be sold to the appellant as well as defendants No.7 and 8 in portion. Rather, entire suit land was intended to be sold in favour of appellant as well as defendants No.7 and 8. It is another matter that appellant-plaintiff claimed that after execution of agreement, co-contractees i.e. plaintiff and respondents No.7 and 8, partitioned the land and plaintiff was put to the possession qua specific share i.e. 7 biswas of land. Rather, entire suit land was intended to be sold in favour of appellant as well as defendants No.7 and 8. It is another matter that appellant-plaintiff claimed that after execution of agreement, co-contractees i.e. plaintiff and respondents No.7 and 8, partitioned the land and plaintiff was put to the possession qua specific share i.e. 7 biswas of land. Admittedly, in the present case plaintiff agreed to purchase land with –respondents-defendants No.7 and 8 equally and as such learned trial Court, taking note of stand taken by defendants No.7 and 8, wherein they claimed that they did not want specific performance of contract, rightly held that agreement cannot be performed specifically in favour of plaintiff since contract is indivisible. 24. This Court also perused the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Bombay Bench at Nagpur in Jagdeo Singh and others vs. Bisambhar and others, AIR 1937 Nagpur, 186, wherein the Court has held that where one or more co-contractors want to enforce specific performance of the contract against the will of others, they can do so under Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act and it is not necessary, therefore, that all the co-contractors should be arranged on the same side for obtaining specific performance of contract and it is enough if all persons to the contract are before the Court. 25. Since all the co-contractees were impleaded as party by the appellant-plaintiff, his suit was held to be maintainable by the learned Court below. But, where a single contract was to convey a land to several persons, learned Court below rightly came to the conclusion that contract is not indivisible and one of co-contractees cannot seek specific performance if the other co-contractees do not want that relief. Hence, this Court, after having carefully perused the judgment, referred hereinabove, sees no illegality in the judgment passed by Court below and is of the view that learned Courts below have rightly applied the ratio of the aforesaid judgment in the case at hand. 26. This Court also perused Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which is reproduced here in below:- “53A. 26. This Court also perused Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which is reproduced here in below:- “53A. Part performance.- Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed there for by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: PROVIDED that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance there of.” 27. This Court, after having carefully perused the afore said provisions of law, finds that the same is not applicable in the case at hand. In the instant case, as has been discussed hereinabove, appellant-plaintiff was not able to prove on record that he was put into possession of the property, pursuant to agreement executed interse him as well as Partap Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6. Had appellant-plaintiff succeeded in proving on record that he had taken possession of the property, pursuant to agreement Ex.P-13, he could take refuge to the aforesaid provisions of law. 28. Had appellant-plaintiff succeeded in proving on record that he had taken possession of the property, pursuant to agreement Ex.P-13, he could take refuge to the aforesaid provisions of law. 28. In the instant case, appellant-plaintiff has not been able to prove his possession over the suit land after execution of agreement to sell Ex.P-13, rather co-contractees i.e. defendants No.7 and 8, who had entered into an agreement along with appellant-plaintiff with predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 6 have categorically stated that since no permission was obtained in terms of Section 118 of the Act, they left possession in favour of Partap Singh and took amount of Rs.40,000/- from Partap Singh and divided the same equally. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 29. This Court is fully satisfied that both the Courts below have very meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, in the present matter. Since both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings, which otherwise appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence, this Court has very limited jurisdiction/scope to interfere in the matter. In this regard, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant contents of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein the Court has held as under: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 30. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 30. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, this Court is of the view that findings returned by the trial Court below, which were further upheld by the first appellate Court, do not warrant any interference of this Court as finding given on the issues framed by the trial Court below as well as specifically taken up by this Court to reach the root of the controversy appears to be based on correct appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence. 31. Hence, in view of detailed discussion made here-in-above, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the judgment passed by both the Courts below. The judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are upheld. The present appeal fails and is dismissed, accordingly. 32. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All the miscellaneous applications are disposed of.