JUDGMENT : BIRENDRA KUMAR, J. 1. This writ application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is for quashing the order dated 21.10.2014 passed in Complaint Case No. 72 of 2013 by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance (North Bihar) at Muzaffarpur, whereby the Superintendent of Police/Station House Officer of the Vigilance Investigation Bureau, Patna has been directed to register an FIR against the petitioner and other erring persons and to investigate the matter and to submit report. 2. A complaint petition (Complaint Case No. 72 of 2013) was filed by the respondent no. 6 Sudhir Kumar Ojha under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act with averment that the petitioner was posted for 33 years at Primary Health Centre, Sakara as Primary Health Worker. He was transferred by the order of the Civil Surgeon to Primary Health Centre, Katra vide transfer letter no. 1496 dated 06.06.2009. However, the petitioner did not report to the Primary Health Centre, Katra and remained away from duty in between 07.06.2009 to 12.07.2010. Later on, in collusion with the staff and authorities of the Health Directorate, Patna and Civil Surgeon office, Muzaffarpur, the petitioner received salary for the aforesaid period of his absence by filing false affidavit, as such, committed fraud with the public exchequer and was involved in defalcation and misappropriation of the public money causing revenue loss to the State. The aforesaid complaint petition was filed on 15.05.2013 and on 17.05.2013 the learned court below passed the following order vide Annexure-2:- ^^ifjoknh dh gkftjh gSA iqdkj ij ifjoknh vius vf/koDrk ds lkFk mifLFkr gq,A muds }kjk ifjokn i= dks pkfyr dj ifjokn i= esa of.kZr rF;ksa dh tk¡p fdlh l{ke inkf/kdkjh ls djkus dh izkFkZuk dh x;hA lqukA ifjokn i= ,oa vuqyXud dkxtkrksa dk voyksdu fd;kA izkFkZuk Lohdkj dh x;hA ifjoknh ds }kjk ifjokn i= ,oa dkxtkrksa dh izfrfyfi nkf[ky djus ij izkjafHkd tk¡p dj tk¡p izfrosnu lefiZr djus gsrq iqfyl v/kh{kd] fuxjkuh vUos"k.k C;wjks iVuk dks vxzlkfjr fd;k tk;sA ifjoknh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd izfrfyfi nkf[ky djsaA ifjoknh ds }kjk ifjokn i= ,oa dkxtkr dh izfrfyfi nkf[ky dh x;hA dk;kZy; iqfyl v/kh{kd fuxjkuh vUos"k.k C;wjks iVuk dks vxzlkfjr djsaA fnukad 19-6-2013 okLrs vfxze dk;ZokghA** 3. Thereafter preliminary report of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance was received and the impugned order has been passed. 4. Thereafter preliminary report of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance was received and the impugned order has been passed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has faulted the impugned order on two grounds - (i) firstly, on the ground that once the Magistrate entered into an enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. he had no power to direct the police to institute an FIR and (ii) secondly, without previous sanction a public servant cannot be prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act on private complaint and in the present case there was no previous sanction. The learned Spl. Judge did not apply its judicial mind at the time of directing institution of FIR by the impugned order. 5. Though notice was validly served on the respondent no. 6, but no one appears on his behalf. The respondent no. 2 has filed counter affidavit on behalf of the Vigilance Investigation Bureau, but no one appears to argue this case. 6. Submission of the petitioner is that such complaint at the instance of a private individual could not have been acted upon in absence of valid sanction for prosecuting the petitioner who is a public servant and against whom there is charge of corruption under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. His further contention is that the learned Special Judge, Vigilance who was exercising power of a Judicial Magistrate could not have invoked the powers conferred under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. i.e. upon receiving a complaint of fact which constitute such offence. Further contention is that after taking cognizance of the offence under the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. the learned Special Judge, Vigilance could not have switched back to the pre-cognizance stage and directed the police for institution of an FIR. 7. Learned counsel for the State-respondents submits that apparently the complaint petition is disclosing a cognizable offence against the petitioner inasmuch as there is sufficient disclosure of defalcation of public money by the petitioner while holding public office. Moreover, the intentional and deliberate act of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that he withdrew salary by managing the office for the period of his absence from duty rather non-joining of the duty. Therefore, for technical reasons, the criminal prosecution of the petitioner cannot be faulted at the initial stage. Moreover, the intentional and deliberate act of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that he withdrew salary by managing the office for the period of his absence from duty rather non-joining of the duty. Therefore, for technical reasons, the criminal prosecution of the petitioner cannot be faulted at the initial stage. 8. In the case of Md. Yousuf vs. Smt. Afaq Jahan and Another, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the difference between an investigation under chapter XII and an investigation under chapter XV Cr. PC. Paragraphs 6 to 10 of the judgment are relevant for this purpose. Hence, the same are being reproduced below:- “6. Section 156 falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section 202 contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated under Section 156 of the Code. 7. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to “Information to the police and their powers to investigate” whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a police officer.” But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code. 8. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. 9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. “or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.” 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.” 9. In the case of Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 185 , the same question was considered in paragraphs 23 to 25 of the judgment, which are as follows:- “23. Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Mohd. Yousuf vs. Afaq Jahan, (2006) 1 SCC 627 , where it has been held that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII of the Code, he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence, he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. Yousuf vs. Afaq Jahan, (2006) 1 SCC 627 , where it has been held that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII of the Code, he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence, he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. The inquiry contemplated under Section 202(1) or investigation by a police officer or by any other person is only to help the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further on account of the fact that cognizance had already been taken by him of the offence disclosed in the complaint but issuance of process had been postponed. 24. The law is well-settled that an investigation ordered by the Magistrate under Chapter XII is at the precognizance stage and the inquiry and/or investigation ordered under Section 202 is at the post-cognizance stage. What we have to consider is whether the Magistrate committed any error in refusing the appellant's prayer for an investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code and resorting to Section 202 of the Code instead, since both the two courses were available to him. 25. The power to direct an investigation to the police authorities is available to the Magistrate both under Section 156(3) Cr PC and under Section 202 Cr PC. The only difference is the stage at which the said powers may be invoked. As indicated hereinbefore, the power under Section 156(3) Cr PC to direct an investigation by the police authorities is at the pre-cognizance stage while the power to direct a similar investigation under Section 202 is at the post-cognizance stage.” 10. In the case of Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai & Others vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2009) 6 SCC 576 , while considering the power of the Magistrate to recall an order passed by him under section 156(3) Cr PC, the Supreme Court observed that before taking cognizance the Magistrate can invoke his powers under section 156(3) but once he takes cognizance, he has to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter XV Cr.PC. including the power to take enquiry or investigation under section 202 Cr PC. 11. including the power to take enquiry or investigation under section 202 Cr PC. 11. The above referred cases make it clear that a Magistrate may order investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which would end with police report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. However, an investigation referred to under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is certainly after taking cognizance and is of limited nature. Such investigation is only to satisfy/decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for the Magistrate to proceed further. The Magistrate cannot order investigation under Chapter XII Cr.PC. after taking cognizance of the offence on complaint case. 12. In the present case, the learned Magistrate (Special Judge, Vigilance) after receiving the complaint petition entertained the same and applied his judicial mind to proceed with the case which would be evident from the order dated 17.05.2013. Therefore, by necessary implication, the learned court below took cognizance of the offence on complaint petition. Therefore, the learned court below was wholly incompetent to pass impugned order whereby police was directed to register an FIR on the basis of the very same complaint petition. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is not sustainable in law and is fit to be set aside. 13. I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from non-application of judicial mind inasmuch as the learned Spl. Judge directed for institution of FIR on the private complaint without prior sanction for prosecution. The learned counsel has relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Others vs. M.K. Aiyappa & Another, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 . In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows:- “The scope of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed Case examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.PC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation.” 14. Admittedly, in the present case, the complaint by private person was not accompanied with any sanction order as required under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar (Supra), the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, North Bihar, Muzaffarpur could not have entertained the complaint and proceeded with the same. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 21.10.2014 passed in Complaint Case No. 72 of 2013 by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance (North Bihar) at Muzaffarpur is set aside and accordingly the entire criminal proceeding arising out of the aforesaid complaint case also stands quashed. 16. This writ application is allowed accordingly.