P. K. Abdul Raheem v. Special Thahsildar, Fort Kochi
2017-03-10
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. Section 44 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1966 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] reads as under: "44. Effect of engagements and transfers by the defaulter-(1) Any engagement entered into by the defaulter with any one in respect of any immovable property after the service of the written demand on him shall not be binding upon the Government. (2) Any transfer of immovable property made by a defaulter after public revenue due on any land from him has fallen in arrear, with intent to defeat or delay the recovery of such arrear, shall not be binding upon the Government. (3) Where a defaulter transfers immovable property to a near relative or for grossly inadequate consideration after public revenue due on any land from him has fallen in arrear, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that such transfer is made with intent to defeat or delay the recovery of such arrear, and the Collector or the authorised officer may, subject to the order of a competent Court, proceed to recover such arrear of public revenue by attachment and sale of the property so transferred, as if such transfer has not take place: Provided that, before proceeding to attach such property, the Collector or the authorised officer shall- (i) give the defaulter an opportunity of being heard; and (ii) record his reasons therefore in writing." 2. The question in this case is whether the provisions of Section 44 being so, the jurisdictional Tahsildar could have cancelled a sale deed relating to a property over which there were proceedings for recovery. Though I do not propose to go into the details of the liabilities that are said to be against the owner of the property, I notice that more than one proceedings were initiated or were pending against the owner of the property when he sold it to the petitioner herein. The petitioner, after such sale, applied for transfer of registry in his name but orders were issued by the Tahsildar, not merely denying the transfer of registry, but cancelling the sale itself. The petitioner has filed this writ petition asserting that the Tahsildar has no power, even under the provisions of Section 44 of the Act, to cancel the sale deed. 3. I have heard Sri.
The petitioner has filed this writ petition asserting that the Tahsildar has no power, even under the provisions of Section 44 of the Act, to cancel the sale deed. 3. I have heard Sri. V.K. Peer Mohamed Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the Revenue. 4. The provisions of Section 44 as extracted above are absolutely clear and perspicuous. It says that any engagement entered into by the defaulter with anyone in respect of any immovable property after the service of a written demand shall not be binding upon the Government. It also says that any transfer of the property with the intent to defeat or delay the recovery shall also not be binding on the Government. The 3rd sub-Section of Section 44 is pellucid when it mandates that if the defaulter transfers the property to a near relative or for an inadequate consideration, which is intended to defeat recovery of the arrears, the Collector or the authorised Officer can proceed to recover such arrear by attachment and sale of the property so transferred. The last limb of the said Section mandates that if the transfer had already taken place, then the Collector or the authorised Officer will be obligated to give the defaulter an opportunity of being heard and record the reasons thereof in writing. The conspectus of all these provisions makes it inescapable that a property which has been proceeded against for the recovery of arrears would always be subject to the burden of the arrear, if such arrear is a public revenue. 5. The Act provides for recovery of arrears under two broad heads. The first is that the recovery of public revenue as defined therein. This includes the land revenue charge on the land and includes all other taxes, fees and cesses on land whether charged on the land or not and all other dues payable to the Government on account of water useful purpose of irrigation. Under Section 71 of the Act, certain other arrears can also be recovered, which are duly notified under the provisions of the statute as if they are arrears of public revenue. There is a clear and distinct dissimilarity between these two liabilities.
Under Section 71 of the Act, certain other arrears can also be recovered, which are duly notified under the provisions of the statute as if they are arrears of public revenue. There is a clear and distinct dissimilarity between these two liabilities. While the first is undoubtedly a public revenue, which occupies the first charge over the land, the second is only an arrear that can be recovered as if it is a public revenue. Therefore, the question would be as to what extent can the power under Section 44 be used by the authorities when a property is sold by the defaulter. I have no doubt that when it comes to the arrears of public revenue the land is burdened by the charge and that notwithstanding that the sale has been completed, it will be obligated to answer such charge until it is satisfied. However, in the case of arrears which is sought to be recovered in the nature of public revenue, the position may be slightly different. This is because even though the arrears are not really a first charge on the land, it will still be answerable for the demand because the provisions of the statute is very clear that such demands will also be recoverable notwithstanding such transfer. 6. It is in this background that I have to see whether the action of the Tahsildar in having ordered the cancellation of the sale deed, executed by the original owner in favour of the petitioner, is legally competent or otherwise. It does not require more than an examination of the provision to see that no such power is given to the Tahsildar or to any other Authority under it. The provision only declares that such transfers, effected by the defaulter, will not be binding upon the Government. When the Statute declares that the transfer is not binding on the Government, it means that they can proceed against the land, to recover, subject to the available remedies of the owner or the transferee, all arrears recoverable under the Act, in spite of the fact that the land has been so transferred. However, this does not concede in any manner to a power into the Authorities under the Act to cancel a sale deed, which power according to me is vested only under the Registration Act.
However, this does not concede in any manner to a power into the Authorities under the Act to cancel a sale deed, which power according to me is vested only under the Registration Act. I say this because it is unnecessary to the Tahsildar to have ordered cancellation of the sale deed, since even without such an order it was forensically capable of him to have proceeded against the property for recovery of the arrears. The action of the Tahsildar, therefore, appears to be completely superfluous and unnecessary. 7. For the reasons recorded above, I quash Exts.P3, P7, P8 & P11 orders which are impugned in this writ petition to the extent to which it orders cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner but making it clear that notwithstanding the sale, the property sold by the defaulter will continue to be responsible for the demand if it is legally permissible and authorised, subject to the available remedies and contentions, as is legally available to the petitioner or to the defaulter. The writ petition is ordered as above. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs and I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs.