JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Since the issues raised in both the captioned applications are interrelated and the challenge is also to a selfsame order of further investigation passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the Special Criminal Application No. 288 of 2016 is treated as the lead matter. 3. By this application, the applicant seeks to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the legality and validity of the order dated 04.01.2016 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat on Exh.18 application for further investigation under section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005. 4. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarized as under; "4.1 The respondent No. 2, namely, Manubhai Kalyanjibhai Nayak lodged a complaint for the offence punishable under sections 408. 420, 423, 465, 468, 471 read with section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code against one Ashok Rameshchandra Shah and others in respect to the land situated at Vesu, bearing Old Revenue Survey No. 596 and New Revenue Survey No. 393 paiki 2, admeasuring 13700 sq. mtrs. 4.2 The court concerned passed an order of police investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The order of police investigation led to the registration of the M. Case No. 3 of 2004 at the DCB Police Station, Surat. At the end of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the same culminated in the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005. The prosecution is based on the charge of using a forged power of attorney for the purpose of executing the sale-deed. 4.3 It appears from the materials on record that the respondent No. 2 herein, being dissatisfied with the manner in which the investigation was carried out, came before this Court by filing the Special Criminal Application No. 702 of 2007. The said writ application was disposed of vide order dated 18th April, 2007 in the following terms; "Heard learned advocate Ms. Kruti Shah for the petitioner. The said writ application was disposed of vide order dated 18th April, 2007 in the following terms; "Heard learned advocate Ms. Kruti Shah for the petitioner. Remedy is available to the petitioner to move before the criminal court before which M Case No. 3/04 is pending by submitting an application under section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Court will decide the same in accordance with law. In view of the above learned advocate for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition with a liberty to approach the trial Court for appropriate remedy with liberty to apply in case of difficulty. Permission is granted. Petition stands disposed of." 4.4 Pursuant to the order passed by this Court referred to above, the respondent No. 2 preferred an application, Exh.12 under section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C and prayed for further investigation before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat in connection with the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005. 4.5 The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat, vide order dated 12th October, 2007, allowed the application Exh.12 and ordered further investigation under section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. 4.6 One of the accused persons, namely, Ashok Rameshchandra Shah, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with such order of further investigation, challenged the same before the Sessions Court at Surat by filing the Criminal Revision Application No. 370 of 2007. The revision application came to be allowed by the Sessions Court vide order dated 7th May, 2010. In such circumstances, the order of further investigation was quashed. 4.7 The respondent No. 2 herein, being dissatisfied with such order passed by the Revisional Court, came before this Court by filing the Criminal Revision Application No. 406 of 2010. 4.8 This Court, vide judgment and order dated 30th September, 2010, allowed the revision application and quashed and set aside the order passed by the Revisional Court at Surat. I may quote the relevant observations made by this Court; "2. On the premises that, subsequently also, similar 'Power of Attorney' was used further, the petitioner wanted to lodge another FIR before the police. Since, no FIR was recorded, the petitioner approached the High Court, by filing Special Criminal Application No. 702 of 2007, seeking direction for recording of the complaint. This Court (Coram: M.D. Shah, J.), however, disposed of the said petition, by an order dated 18.04.2007, which is reproduced herein below, Heard learned advocate Ms. Since, no FIR was recorded, the petitioner approached the High Court, by filing Special Criminal Application No. 702 of 2007, seeking direction for recording of the complaint. This Court (Coram: M.D. Shah, J.), however, disposed of the said petition, by an order dated 18.04.2007, which is reproduced herein below, Heard learned advocate Ms. Kruti Shah for the petitioner. Remedy is available to the petitioner to move before the criminal court before which M Case No. 3/04 is pending by submitting an application under section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Court will decide the same in accordance with law. In view of the above learned advocate for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition with a liberty to approach the trial Court for appropriate remedy with liberty to apply in case of difficulty. Permission is granted. Petition stands disposed of. 3. In terms of the order dated 18.04.2007, the petitioner, therefore, approached the learned Magistrate, seeking further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by filing an application dated 08.10.2007. This application came to be granted by the learned Sessions Judge, by an order dated 12.10.2007. He discussed the reasons for his conclusions. He found that certain documents are required to be seized. On those grounds, he granted further investigation. 4. One of the accused, respondent No. 2 herein, filed Criminal Revision Application No. 370 of 2007 and contested the said decision of the learned Magistrate. His revision application came to be allowed by the impugned judgment dated 07.05.2010. The learned Sessions Judge set aside the order of the learned Magistrate, relying on the decision of this Court to the effect that once the cognizance is taken, it would not be within the powers of the learned Magistrate to direct further investigation. 5. The question of calling for further investigation, for taking cognizance, I would have examined further, in view of a large number of judgments on the point, of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, in the facts of the case, it is not necessary to go into that controversy and the reason for such a conclusion is that, previously, when the petitioner had approached the High Court, the High Court desired that he should seek further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in the facts of the case, it is not necessary to go into that controversy and the reason for such a conclusion is that, previously, when the petitioner had approached the High Court, the High Court desired that he should seek further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. From a perusal of the order dated 18.04.2007, which is reproduced herein above, it clearly emerges that it was not the suggestion of the petitioner or his Counsel, but, the opinion of this Court that the remedy is available to the petitioner to move the criminal Court, by submitting an application under Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When, previously, the High Court had found that the petitioner should seek further investigation, the Sessions Court could not have held that such complaint was not maintainable. If such a complaint was turned down on some other ground, on merits, the issue would have stood on a different footing, because the High Court did not close the doors of the learned Magistrate, under such complaint, on the basis of factual aspects, emerging from the record. In fact, the Magistrate did examine such aspects and even found that the application was required to be granted. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, ought not to have reversed the decision of the learned Magistrate, only on the ground that such complaint was not maintainable. Taking such a view would leave the petitioner remedy less. The High Court directed him to seek further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the lower Court holds that such investigation is not permissible, the petitioner's grievance will remain unattended. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds. Order of the learned 3rd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Surat, dated 07.05.2010, passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 370 of 2007, is QUASHED and order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat, dated 12.10.2007, passed in application EXHIBIT-12 in criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005, is RESTORED. Rule is made absolute." 4.9 On 18th September, 2012, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Agency in pursuance to the order of further investigation (Exh.12) against Ramjibhai Maganbhai Rabari and Kanjibhai Maganbhai Rabari. 4.10. It appears that the respondent No. 2 herein, once again, preferred an application, Exh.18, for further investigation before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat. Rule is made absolute." 4.9 On 18th September, 2012, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Agency in pursuance to the order of further investigation (Exh.12) against Ramjibhai Maganbhai Rabari and Kanjibhai Maganbhai Rabari. 4.10. It appears that the respondent No. 2 herein, once again, preferred an application, Exh.18, for further investigation before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat. The said application came to be allowed vide order dated 4th January, 2016. The applicants before me seek to challenge this order of 4th January, 2016 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat for further investigation." 5. Mr. A.D. Shah and Mr. I.H. Syed, the learned counsel appearing for the respective applicants, vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. In response to the query raised by this Court as regards the locus of the two applicants to challenge such order of further investigation, it was submitted by both the learned counsel that it is very likely that both the applicants herein may be arraigned as the accused in the supplementary charge-sheet that the Investigating Agency may file. It is submitted that even as the proposed accused persons, they have a locus to question the legality and validity of the order of further investigation. 6. Mr. A.D. Shah, the learned counsel submitted that the respondent No. 2 herein executed a registered sale-deed on 15.05.2007 in favour of his client, namely, Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharwad. On 31st August, 2008, Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharwad executed a Satakhat (Agreement to Sell) in favour of one Jayprakash Khanchand Aswani being a non-agriculturist and not in a position to obtain permission under section 63 of the Tenancy Act. On 13th June, 2011, Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharwad executed a registered sale-deed in favour of Himmatbhai Haribhai, and Jayprakash Aswani signed as the confirming party. No proceedings have been initiated by the respondent No. 2 for cancellation of the registered sale-deed in favour of Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharwad or Himmatbhai Haribhai. Mr. Shah pointed out that on 3rd May, 2012 and 13th June, 2012 respectively, the respondent No. 2 submitted the applications against Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharward and others. 7. On 9th August, 2012, the Police Commissioner submitted a report to the Deputy Collector (Public Relation), Gandhinagar. 8. Mr. Shah pointed out that on 3rd May, 2012 and 13th June, 2012 respectively, the respondent No. 2 submitted the applications against Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharward and others. 7. On 9th August, 2012, the Police Commissioner submitted a report to the Deputy Collector (Public Relation), Gandhinagar. 8. On 2nd December, 2015, the CID Crime submitted a report before the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat in the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005 in pursuance to the Exh.18. According to Mr. Shah, the Investigating Officer came to the conclusion that the order of further investigation on Exh.12 and application for further at Exh.18 relate to totally different transaction and the transaction with Rajubhai Lakhabhai Bharwad and others directly refers to the execution of the document by the complainant. 9. Both the learned counsel vehemently submitted that assuming for the moment that they have no locus to question the legality and validity of the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat for further investigation, the same is a nullity in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1171 of 2016, decided on 2nd February, 2017. 10. In such circumstances referred to above, both the learned counsel pray that the impugned order be quashed. 11. On the other hand, both the applications have been vehemently opposed by Ms. Kruti Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2. Ms. Shah seriously questioned the locus of the two applicants in questioning the legality and validity of the impugned order. She submits that the applicants herein are not even the accused as on date. They may be arraigned as the accused, if, ultimately, a supplementary charge-sheet is filed. Even if they are the accused, they cannot question an order passed by the Trial Court for further investigation. In support of her submission, strong reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 740 . She submits that on the ground of locus alone, both the applications deserve to be rejected. 12. Mr. In support of her submission, strong reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 740 . She submits that on the ground of locus alone, both the applications deserve to be rejected. 12. Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the applicants have no locus to question the legality and validity of the impugned order of further investigation passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat. Both the applicants are totally strangers and are not the accused, as on date, in the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005. Mere apprehension that they are likely to be arraigned as the accused, if ultimately the supplementary charge-sheet is filed pursuant to the order of further investigation, does not vest in them any right to question the legality and validity of the order of further investigation. Mr. Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor, however, submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat could not have passed the impugned order and the same could be termed as a nullity because nobody invited the attention of the Magistrate to the decision of this Court in the case of Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel & Anr. v. Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel, Special Criminal Application No. 2268 of 2014, decided on 10.04.2015, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1171 of 2015 referred to above. 13. Mr. Amin clarified that it is always open for the Investigating Agency on its own to look into the issue and undertake the further investigation seeking formal permission of the learned Magistrate concerned. Mr. Amin submits that, as such, even no formal permission is required in law, but what is necessary is to inform the court concerned of the further investigation undertaken by the police. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, two questions fall for my consideration. Mr. Amin submits that, as such, even no formal permission is required in law, but what is necessary is to inform the court concerned of the further investigation undertaken by the police. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, two questions fall for my consideration. First, whether the applicants herein have the locus to question the legality and validity of the order of further investigation under section 173(8), more particularly, when they are not even the accused as on date; and secondly, whether the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had the power and jurisdiction to pass an order of further investigation under section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C at the instance of the de facto complainant at the post cognizance stage. 15. I am of the view that the two applicants before me have no locus to challenge the impugned order of further investigation. They are not even the accused as on date. Even if they would have been accused in the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005 pending in the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat they could not have questioned the legality and validity of the order of further investigation. In the aforesaid context, I may quote the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj (supra). "10. Power of the police to conduct further investigation, after laying final report, is recognised under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even after the court took cognizance of any offence on the strength of the police report first submitted, it is open to the police to conduct further investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1979 SC 1791 ). The only rider provided by the aforesaid decision is that it would be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation. 11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. 11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only result in encumbering the court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As law does not require it, we would not burden the magistrate with such an obligation." 16. The above takes me to consider the second question whether the Magistrate had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The Supreme Court, in the case of Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel (supra), while affirming the judgment and order passed by this Court, had laid down the following propositions of law. "The rendition in Bhagwant Singh (supra) was also relied upon. It was eventually held, by drawing sustenance from the pronouncement in Bhagwant Singh (supra) that a Magistrate before whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code had been filed, was empowered in law to direct further investigation and require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report. To reiterate, in Bhagwant Singh (supra), this Court had in particular dealt with the courses open to a Magistrate, once a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted on the completion of investigation under Section 173(2) of the Code and thus did essentially concentrate at the pre- cognizance stage of the proceedings. From the issues sought to be answered in this decision and having regard to the overall text thereof, it is not possible to discern that the power of the Magistrate, even at the post cognizance stage or after the accused had appeared in response to the process issued, the suo motu power of the Magistrate to direct further investigation was intended to be expounded thereby. Significantly, the adjudication was essentially related to the pre-cognizance stage. In Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State through Inspector of Police and others, (2015) 8 SCC 774 , the appellant had filed a FIR with the Kulasckaram Police Station against the respondents-accused alleging unlawful assembly and assault resulting in multiple injuries. Significantly, the adjudication was essentially related to the pre-cognizance stage. In Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State through Inspector of Police and others, (2015) 8 SCC 774 , the appellant had filed a FIR with the Kulasckaram Police Station against the respondents-accused alleging unlawful assembly and assault resulting in multiple injuries. After the initial investigation, the same was transferred to the District Crime Branch Police, Kanyakumari which eventually filed a final report in favour of the respondents-accused, which was accepted by the learned Magistrate. Meanwhile, however the appellant/informant filed a protest petition before the Magistrate praying for a direction to the CBCID to reopen the case and file a fresh report. As before any decision on this protest petition, the final report filed by the police had already been accepted, the appellant approached the High Court, which called for the report from the learned Magistrate and finally interfered with the order accepting the final report and directed the Magistrate to consider the same along with the protest petition. The Magistrate next held that there was no justification for ordering reinvestigation of the case and directed that the protest petition be treated as a separate private complaint. This order being challenged again before the High Court, the matter was remanded to the learned Magistrate with a direction to consider the final report and the other materials on record and pass appropriate orders after hearing both the public prosecutor and the de facto complainant. This time, the learned Magistrate returned a finding that the investigation by the District Crime Branch was a biased one and that the final report was not acceptable and consequently forwarded the complaint for further investigation by the CBCID, which was a different investigating agency. The matter was taken to the High Court by one of the respondents/accused, whereupon it annulled the direction of the learned Magistrate for reinvestigation, holding that not only there were material discrepancies in the evidence brought on record, but also there was no exceptional circumstance for such a course to be adopted by the Magistrate. It was also of the view, having regard to the scheme of the Section 173(8) of the Code that the investigating officer only could request for further investigation. It was also of the view, having regard to the scheme of the Section 173(8) of the Code that the investigating officer only could request for further investigation. While disapproving the approach of the High Court in reappreciating the facts in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, this Court adverting, amongst others to the three Judge Bench exposition in Bhagwant Singh (supra) reiterated that a Magistrate could disagree with the police report and take cognizance and issue process and summon the accused, if satisfied as deemed fit in the attendant facts and circumstances. The rendition in Vinay Tyagi (supra) was also alluded to. It was ultimately expounded that the learned Magistrate had really intended to direct further investigation, but as a different investigating agency had been chosen, the word re-investigation had been used. This Court thus construed the direction for investigation by the CBI to be one for further investigation and upheld the same, but nullified the selection of a new investigating agency therefor. As a corollary, the investigating agency that had investigated the case earlier and had submitted the final report, was directed by this Court to undertake further investigation to be supervised by the Superintendent of Police and to submit a report before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with law. This decision too was concerned with a fact situation, pertaining to the pre-cognizance stage of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate and therefore, does not, in our comprehension, further the case of the appellant. As adumbrated hereinabove, Chapter XIV of the Code delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a Magistrate. Section 190, which deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrate, sets out that any Magistrate of the first Class and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, as contemplated, may take cognizance of any offence either upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts or upon information received from any person other than the police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed. Section 156, which equips a police officer with the power to investigate a cognizable case mandates vide sub-section 3 thereof that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter XV of the Code. Section 156, which equips a police officer with the power to investigate a cognizable case mandates vide sub-section 3 thereof that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing therein predicates that any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or which had been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit and shall in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The contents of this text of Section 202(1) of the Code unmistakeably attest that the investigation that can be directed by the Magistrate, to be undertaken by a police officer would essentially be in the form of an enquiry for the singular purpose of enabling him to decide whether or another there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint of an offence, of which he is authorised to take cognizance. This irrefutably is at the pre-cognizance stage and thus logically before the issuance of process to the accused and his attendance in response thereto. As adverted to hereinabove, whereas Section 311 of the Code empowers a Court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, if construed to be essential to be just decision of the case, Section 319 authorizes a Court to proceed against any person, who though not made an accused appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to have committed the same and can be tried together. These two provisions of the Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a material witness or examine a person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, if it considers it to be essential to the just decision of the case and even proceed against any person, though not an accused in such enquiry or trial, if it appears from the evidence available that he had committed an offence and that he can be tried together with the other accused persons. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court on the scope and purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the consistent trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to hold that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudication in hand. The un-amended and the amended sub-Section (8) of Section 173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, would overwhelmingly attest that by the latter, the investigating agency/officer alone has been authorized to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of the proceedings relatable thereto. This power qua the investigating agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be available at any stage of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report which manifesting heralded the amendment, significantly had limited its proposal to the empowerment of the investigating agency alone. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 of the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing investigation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 of the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing investigation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by the Magistrate under Section 202, while dealing with a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage, it is in the nature of an inquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the proceedings initiated ought to be furthered or not. Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Code. If the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme envisaged by the Cr.P.C to order further investigation even after the cognizance is taken, accused persons appear and charge is framed, is acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the state of law, as enunciated by this Court and also the relevant layout of the Cr.P.C. adumbrated hereinabove. Additionally had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C would have been worded accordingly to accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the three options open to the Magistrate, after a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation, as has been amongst authoritatively enumerated in Bhagwant Singh (supra), the Magistrate, in both the contingencies, namely; when he takes cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant. Not only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant after cognizance is taken and the accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of Sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be summoned by a Court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial at any stage, in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the impugned decision annulling the direction of the learned Magistrate for further investigation is unexceptional and does not merit any interference. Even otherwise on facts, having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable as has been rightly held by the High Court." 17. Thus, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to above, the impugned order could be termed as without jurisdiction. 18. In the result, this application is disposed of in the following terms; "(I) The applicants have no locus in law to question the legality and validity of the order of further investigation, they not being the accused as on date. Mere likelihood of being arraigned as the accused or mere likelihood of being affected in one way or the other by the order of further investigation, would not vest in them the right to question the legality and validity of an order of further investigation. (ii) The Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have passed the order of further investigation at the instance of a de facto complainant in exercise of power under section 173(8) of the Code. (iii) After a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation, the Magistrate, in both the contingencies, namely, when he takes cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though the Investigating Agency may for good reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct the further investigation, the Magistrate, suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or to take that initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant or accused. (iv) Such power to the Magistrate to direct the further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant/accused after cognizance is taken and the accused person appears pursuant to the process, issued, or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C. redundant. " 19. In such circumstances, the impugned order is declared to be without jurisdiction and is hereby quashed. 20. However, the above shall not come in the way of the Investigating Officer to undertake the further investigation on its own by seeking formal permission or rather informing the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat in this regard. 21. Mr. Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submits that the concerned Investigating Agency shall carry out the further investigation on its own as the same is warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, and for that purpose, a formal permission or rather an intimation shall be given to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat, before whom the Criminal Case No. 3008 of 2005 is pending. He further submits that at the end of the further investigation, an appropriate report shall be filed before the court concerned. 22. It is needless to clarify that I have addressed myself only on the two neat questions of law and have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 23. With the above, both the applications are disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Disposed off