JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This jail appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.06.2012, rendered by learned VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Haridwar, in Sessions Trial No. 218 of 2010, whereby the appellant, was charged with and tried for the offences under Section 363, 366-A, 302, 120-B, 363 and 201 of IPC. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo two months of additional imprisonment. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo one month simple imprisonment. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 363 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo one month simple imprisonment. He was further convicted and sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment under Section 366-A of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo two months simple imprisonment. All the sentences imposed under the aforesaid sections were directed to run concurrently. The appellant was acquitted for the offence under Section 120B of IPC. Co-accused Kishan was acquitted of the charges framed against him under the aforesaid sections. 2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that PW-1 Chainshuk has filed a report to the effect that his two daughters namely Kamlesh and Vimlesh has gone to eat community food on 19.03.2010. His younger daughter Vimlesh came back at 9:00 PM. She told him that Kamlesh was taken away by some boy. They searched for her. Her age was 10 years. Thereafter, the FIR was registered and the investigation was carried out and the challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities. The dead body was recovered. It was sent for postmortem examination. According to opinion of doctor, the deceased died due to asphyxia. The prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses in its support. The statement of appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. He has denied the case of the prosecution. He was convicted and sentenced as noticed hereinabove. Hence, this jail appeal. 3. According to opinion of doctor, the deceased died due to asphyxia. The prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses in its support. The statement of appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. He has denied the case of the prosecution. He was convicted and sentenced as noticed hereinabove. Hence, this jail appeal. 3. Learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant has vehemently argued that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused-appellants. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has supported the judgment dated 27.06.2012. 4. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the judgment and record carefully. 5. PW-1 Chainsukh has deposed that on 19.03.2010, his daughters namely Kamlesh and Vimlesh had gone to eat community food at 8:00 PM. His younger daughter Vimlesh came back at 9:00 PM. She told him that Kamlesh was taken away by some boy. 6. PW-2 Baburam has deposed that police has taken him on 21.03.2010 in the jeep. The appellant was also with them. He was boarded in the jeep. The appellant took them to Rajaji Park. They were following him. The appellant got the dead body recovered after walking 200 feet. The dead body was taken into possession. 7. PW-3 Km. Vimlesh is the material witness, though she is minor but her statement does inspire confidence. According to her, few years back, she along with her sister Kamlesh was going to take community food. Her maternal uncle namely Yogesh was following them. He was accompanied by another boy. He took her elder sister towards forest. She narrated the incident to her father and mother. She recognized the appellant in the Court. 8. PW-4 S.I. Rajendra Singh has prepared the panchayatnama of dead body of Kamlesh. He has taken the photographs of the dead body. 9. PW-5 Pankaj Devrani was the Investigating Officer. He prepared the spot map. The accused-appellant was arrested. He disclosed his identity. He confessed his crime and told that he killed Kamlesh and undertaken to recover the dead body. The appellant got the dead body recovered. A small towel was also recovered at his instance. It was taken into possession. 10. PW-7 Jitendra Kumar testified that the appellant has got the dead body recovered from forest. 11. PW-8 Dr. Shashikant has conducted the postmortem examination on 22.03.2010. He noticed six injuries on the dead body. The appellant got the dead body recovered. A small towel was also recovered at his instance. It was taken into possession. 10. PW-7 Jitendra Kumar testified that the appellant has got the dead body recovered from forest. 11. PW-8 Dr. Shashikant has conducted the postmortem examination on 22.03.2010. He noticed six injuries on the dead body. According to him, the death has occurred 2-4 days before the postmortem examination. He proved the postmortem report. The cause of death of the deceased was asphyxia due to ante mortem strangulation. He has also noticed that hyoid bone was broken. 12. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently argued that in the initial report, the father has not mentioned the name of the appellant. The appellant is the real brother-in-law of PW-1 Chainsukh. There is no possibility of the appellant being falsely implicated. 13. PW-3 Km. Vimlesh, though minor, has categorically deposed that she along with her sister were going to eat community food on 19.03.2010, the appellant was following them. He has taken away her sister towards the jungle. She has narrated the incident to her mother. Thus, the possibility of mother not telling the true facts to her husband PW-1 Chainsukh, being the real sister of the appellant cannot be ruled out. PW-3 Km. Vimlesh, though is a minor, but her statement was recorded after adjudging her intelligence. The cause of death is strangulation. The hyoid bone was broken. The death has occurred 2-4 days before the postmortem examination. The dead body was recovered at the instance of the appellant. PW-2 Baburam has signed the recovery memo of dead body. PW-4 Rajendra Singh has prepared the panchayatnama of dead body and a small towel was also recovered at the instance of the appellant. The dead body was identified by PW-1 Chainsukh. 14. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2017 (7) SCC 177 , in the case of Charandas Swami vs. State of Gujarat and Others, have held that “fact” discovered pursuant to disclosure includes mental facts. Their Lordships have further held that discovery of fact arises by reason of fact that information given by accused exhibited knowledge or mental awareness of information as to its existence at a particular place. Their Lordships have held as under:- “57. Their Lordships have further held that discovery of fact arises by reason of fact that information given by accused exhibited knowledge or mental awareness of information as to its existence at a particular place. Their Lordships have held as under:- “57. The dead body of deceased Gadadharanandji was found on 4th May, 1998 in a burnt condition in a ditch behind the house of PW-50 in Barothi village in Rajasthan. How the dead body of Gadadharanandji reached that spot was revealed by none other than Accused No. 3. In what circumstances burnt injuries were caused on the dead body of Gadadharanandji, no prosecution witness has spoken about that. Be that as it may, the fact that the dead body recovered from Barothi village on 4th May, 1998 was that of Gadadharanandji could be known only after Accused No. 3, during the course of investigation, made a disclosure about the location where he had disposed of the dead body of Gadadharanandji. Till the aforesaid disclosure was made, in the records of the Rajasthan police, the dead body was noted as that of an unknown person. If, the Accused No. 3 had not disclosed to the Investigating Officer about the location where the dead body was dumped by him-which information was personally known to him and at best Accused No. 5 and none else, then the investigation would not have made any headway. 58. The disclosure made by Accused No. 3 to the investigating officer was recorded in the panchanama Exh.188, when he had led the police party to the spot where the dead body was dumped by him. That location matched with the location from where the dead body of an unknown person was recovered on 4th May, 1998 on the information given by PW-50 to the local police at Barothi. The fact that the dead body was already recovered from the same place on 4th May, 1998 and so noted in the public records in the State of Rajasthan does not undermine the admissibility of the disclosure made by Accused No. 3 to the investigating officer about the location where the dead body of Gadadharanandji was dumped by him, which information was exclusively within the personal knowledge of Accused No. 3. The fact that the dead body recovered on 4th May 1998 was of Gadadharanandji, was unraveled and discovered only after the results of its medical examination became available to the investigating agency. Till then, it was considered to be of an unknown person. The Courts below have accepted the case of the prosecution that the disclosure made by Accused No. 3 about the location where the dead body of Gadadharanandji was dumped by him, was admissible Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Appellants, however, take exception to that by relying on the reported decisions. 59. In our view, the decision in the case of Navjot Sandhu (Supra) has adverted to all the previous decisions and restated the legal position. In paragraph 114, while considering the arguments advanced by the parties regarding the sweep of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court formulated two questions which read thus: (i) Whether the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 should be confined only to the discovery of a material object and the knowledge of the Accused in relation thereto or the discovery could be in respect of his mental state or knowledge in relation to certain things- concrete or non-concrete. (ii) Whether it is necessary that the discovery of fact should be by the person making the disclosure or directly at his instance. The subsequent event of discovery by the police with the aid of information furnished by the Accused - whether can be put against him Under Section 27. In the context of these questions, the argument of the counsel for the State in that case has been adverted to in paragraphs 115 to 118. The Court then after analyzing Section 27 of the Evidence Act, in paragraphs 120 to 144 adverted to the relevant decisions on the point. In paragraphs 120 and 121, the Court noted thus: “120. The history of case-law on the subject of confessions Under Section 27 unfolds divergent views and approaches. The divergence was mainly on twin aspects: (i) Whether the facts contemplated by Section 27 are physical, material objects or the mental facts of which the Accused giving the information could be said to be aware of. Some Judges have gone to the extent of holding that the discovery of concrete facts, that is to say material objects, which can be exhibited in the Court are alone covered by Section 27. Some Judges have gone to the extent of holding that the discovery of concrete facts, that is to say material objects, which can be exhibited in the Court are alone covered by Section 27. (ii) The other controversy was on the point regarding the extent of admissibility of a disclosure statement. In some cases a view was taken that any information, which served to connect the object with the offence charged, was admissible Under Section 27. The decision of the Privy Council in Kottaya case which has been described as a locus classicus, had set at rest much of the controversy that centred round the interpretation of Section 27. To a great extent the legal position has got crystallised with the rendering of this decision. The authority of the Privy Council's decision has not been questioned in any of the decisions of the highest court either in the pre-or post-independence era. Right from the 1950, till the advent of the new century and till date, the passages in this famous decision are being approvingly quoted and reiterated by the Judges of this Apex Court. Yet, there remain certain grey areas as demonstrated by the arguments advanced on behalf of the State. 121. The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27 in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in consequence of the information received from an Accused person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a consequence of information received. Of course, it is axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free from any element of compulsion. The next component of Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information that can be proved. It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in the Section that there is no taboo against receiving such information in evidence merely because it amounts to a confession. At the same time, the last Clause makes it clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information furnished. At the same time, the last Clause makes it clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement to the police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the section. The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case 64: (AIR p. 70, para 10) "......clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered." The information must distinctly relate to that fact. Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70, para 10) "......Normally the Section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused." (Emphasis supplied) We have emphasised the word "normally" because the illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive. The next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that the fact discovered is the physical object produced and that any and every information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view, the information given by a person that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of the murder will be admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the Crown's counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words: (AIR p. 70, para 10) If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding Sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. Then, their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition of the expression "fact discovered" in the following passage, which is quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70, para 10) In Their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the fact discovered within the Section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to this and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added with which I stabbed "A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. (Emphasis supplied) 60. This Court has restated the legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated by Section 27 is not limited to "actual physical material object." It further noted that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the Accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. In paragraph 128, the Court noted the statement of law in Udai Bhan (supra) that: (Navjot Sandhu Case 19, SCC p. 705) "128........11. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to its existence." (Udai Bhan Case 20, AIR p. 1118, para 11)" The Court then posed a question as to what would be the position if the physical object was not recovered at the instance of the accused. That issue has been answered on the basis of precedents, as can be discerned from Paragraphs 129 to 132 of the reported judgment. 61. In paragraph 139, the Court noticed the decision in the case of Damu (Supra) which had dealt with the case where broken glass piece was recovered from the spot matched with broken tail lamp and in paragraph 37 of that decision, the Court observed thus: "139..........37. How did the particular information lead to the discovery of the fact? No doubt, recovery of dead body of Dipak from the same canal was antecedent to the information which PW-44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused, there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. But when the broken glass piece was recovered from that spot and that piece was found to be part of the tail lamp of the motorcycle of A-2 Guruji, it can safely be held that the investigating officer discovered the fact that A-2 Guruji had carried the dead body on that particular motorcycle up to the spot. (Damu Case 21, SCC p. 283)" (Emphasis supplied) 62. The Court then noted that the above view taken in Damu's case does not make it a dent on the observations made and the legal position spelt out in Om Prakash (supra) which distinguishes Damu's case because there was discovery of a related physical object at least in part. We may usefully reproduce paragraph no. 142 to 144 of the same reported decision, wherein the Court observed thus: “142. There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the Accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. 142 to 144 of the same reported decision, wherein the Court observed thus: “142. There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the Accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the police officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible Under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the investigating officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the investigating officer will be discovering a fact viz. the concealment of an incriminating Article and the knowledge of the Accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the police officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the police officer chooses not to take the informant Accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility Under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence. 143. How the Clause "as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" has to be understood is the next point that deserves consideration. The interpretation of this Clause is not in doubt. Apart from Kottaya case various decisions of this Court have elucidated and clarified the scope and meaning of the said portion of Section 27. The law has been succinctly stated in Inayatullah Case. The interpretation of this Clause is not in doubt. Apart from Kottaya case various decisions of this Court have elucidated and clarified the scope and meaning of the said portion of Section 27. The law has been succinctly stated in Inayatullah Case. Sarkaria, J. analysed the ingredients of the Section and explained the ambit and nuances of this particular Clause in the following words: (Inayatullah Case 13 SCC p. 832, para 12) "12.........The *last* but the most important condition is that only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word distinctly means directly, indubitably, strictly, unmistakably. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the Accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered." In the light of the legal position thus clarified, this Court excluded a part of the disclosure statement to which we have already adverted. 144. In Bodhraj vs. State of J & K, this Court after referring to the decisions on the subject observed thus: (SCC p. 58, para 18) "18.......The words so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, are very important and the whole force of the Section concentrates on them. Clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. (Emphasis supplied) 63. Reliance was also placed on the recent decision of this Court in the case of Dupare (supra). The Court adverted to the relevant precedents and observed thus, in paragraphs 23 to 29: 23. (Emphasis supplied) 63. Reliance was also placed on the recent decision of this Court in the case of Dupare (supra). The Court adverted to the relevant precedents and observed thus, in paragraphs 23 to 29: 23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya vs. King Emperor has held thus: (IA p. 77)... It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the Section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added with which I stabbed "A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. 24. In Mohmed Inayatullah vs. The State of Maharashtra, while dealing with the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that: 11. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 has been the subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its application to concrete cases is not always free from difficulty. It will therefore be worthwhile at the outset, to have a short and swift glance at the Section and be reminded of its requirements. The Section says: 27. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 has been the subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its application to concrete cases is not always free from difficulty. It will therefore be worthwhile at the outset, to have a short and swift glance at the Section and be reminded of its requirements. The Section says: 27. How much of information received from Accused may be proved.-Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person Accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. 12. The expression provided that together with the phrase whether it amounts to a confession or not show that the Section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this Section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this Section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person Accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the Accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only so much of the information, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word distinctly means directly, indubitably, strictly, unmistakably. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the Accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which' may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. 13. At one time it was held that the expression "fact discovered" in the Section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact (See Sukhan vs. Emperor and Ganu Chandra Kashid vs. Emperor). Now it is fairly settled that the expression "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to this (See Palukuri Kotayya vs. Emperor and Udai Bhan vs. State of U.P.). (Emphasis in original) 25. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari vs. State of Uttaranchal after referring to the decision in Palukuri Kotayya, the Court adverted to seizure of clothes of the deceased which were concealed by the accused. In that context, the Court opined that: (Aftab Ahmad Anasari Case, SCC p. 596, para 40) 40..........the part of the disclosure statement, namely, that the Appellant was ready to show the place where he had concealed the clothes of the deceased is clearly admissible Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act because the same relates distinctly to the discovery of the clothes of the deceased from that very place. The contention that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the clothes of the deceased were recovered from the house of the sister of the Appellant pursuant to the voluntary disclosure statement made by the Appellant, the prosecution has failed to prove that the clothes so recovered belonged to the deceased and therefore, the recovery of the clothes should not be treated as an incriminating circumstance, is devoid of merits. 26. In State of Maharashtra vs. Damu it has been held as follows: 35. ...It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in [Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. 26. In State of Maharashtra vs. Damu it has been held as follows: 35. ...It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in [Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya vs. King Emperor is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the fact discovered envisaged in the Section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the Accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. The similar principle has been laid down in State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh, State of Punjab vs. Gurnam Kaur, Aftab Ahmad Anasari vs. State of Uttaranchal, Bhagwan Dass vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Rumi Bora Dutta vs. State of Assam. 27. In the case at hand, as is perceptible, the recovery had taken place when the Appellant was Accused of an offence, he was in custody of a police officer, the recovery had taken place in consequence of information furnished by him and the panch witnesses have supported the seizure and nothing has been brought on record to discredit their testimony. 28. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken note of. The fact that the Appellant had led the police officer to find out the spot where the crime was committed, and the tap where he washed the clothes eloquently speak of his conduct as the same is admissible in evidence to establish his conduct. In this context we may refer with profit to the authority in Prakash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) wherein the Court after referring to the decision in H.P. Administration vs. Om Prakash held thus: (Prakash Chand Case, SCC p. 95, para 8) 8....There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is excluded by Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an Accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an Accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 29. In A.N. Vekatesh and Another vs. State of Karnataka, it has been ruled that: (SCC p. 721, para 9) 9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the Accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the Accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration). Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused-Appellants (Exts.P-15 and P-16) is not admissible Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant Under Section 8. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs. 1, 2, 7 and PW-4 the spot mahazar witness that the Accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence Under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. Presence of A-1 and A-2 at a place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the police party is a relevant circumstance and are admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. (Emphasis supplied) 64. Presence of A-1 and A-2 at a place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the police party is a relevant circumstance and are admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. (Emphasis supplied) 64. The other decision relied upon is the case of Pandurang Kalu Patil (supra). 65. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this aspect. In our opinion, the Courts below have rightly placed reliance on the fact discovered by the Investigating Officer (PW-64) on the basis of the disclosure made by the Accused No. 3 on 2nd April 1999, after his arrest on 29th March, 1999, as recorded in Exh.188. The panchanama Exh.188 was proved by pancha witness PW-30. The fact that PW-30 was not on good terms with the Accused cannot be the basis to discard his evidence. This aspect has been considered by the High Court and in our opinion, rightly, that the evidence of PW-30 was relied upon for the limited purpose to prove the panchanama and not for any other relevant fact. We affirm the view taken by the courts below about the admissibility of disclosure of the spot where the dead body of Gadadharanandji was disposed of by Accused No. 3. The same stood corroborated from the recovery of a dead body of an unknown person from the same spot by the Rajasthan Police on 4th May, 1998 on the information provided by PW-50. That dead body, on subsequent medical examination was found to be of none other than that of Gadadharanandji. 66. As regards the identity of the dead body, the Courts below took note of the evidence of PW-57 and PW-50. PW-50 had informed the local police of Barothi on 4th May, 1998 about the dead body of an unknown person lying at the same spot, later on discovered to be that of Gadadharanandji due to the disclosure made by Accused No. 3. PW-57 conducted the post-mortem of the burnt dead body found at Barothi village in Rajasthan. He deposed that the death was homicide. He also deposed about the golden teeth and a key found near the dead body. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the said key could open the lock put up on the room of the deceased in the Vadtal Temple complex. PW-3 corroborated that fact. He deposed that the death was homicide. He also deposed about the golden teeth and a key found near the dead body. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the said key could open the lock put up on the room of the deceased in the Vadtal Temple complex. PW-3 corroborated that fact. Further, the identity of the dead body was conclusively established from the DNA testing results of the skin sample of the body which matched with the blood samples of the biological sister of the deceased. Additionally, PW-1 also confirmed that he had treated the deceased in 1993 by implanting gold caps on his teeth. That statement was corroborated by the receipts and diary entries of PW-1. Indeed, the Appellants have vehemently contended that the said medical records are fabricated because of the discrepancies therein. However, the said discrepancies would not discredit the other evidence regarding the identity of the dead body which has been duly corroborated. This view taken by the High Court, in our opinion, is a possible view. It is certainly not a perverse view. As the identity of the dead body of deceased Gadadharanandji is established, it is a strong circumstance to link it to Accused No. 3 who had voluntarily disclosed to the investigating agency about the spot/location where the dead body of the deceased was dumped by him and that being the same place in Barothi village in Rajasthan from where the dead body of an unknown person was recovered earlier by the local police. 67. That brings us to the efficacy of the disclosure made by Accused No. 5 to the investigating agency-the place where Gadadharanandji was brought from Vadtal Temple and the crime of murder was finally executed. The disclosure so made by Accused No. 5 on 18th April, 1999, after his arrest, has been corroborated by the panchanama Ex.198 proved by pancha PW-31. The Accused No. 5 disclosed the room number in Navli Temple complex where Gadadharanandji had stayed on the day of incident. The Courts below have held the disclosure by Accused No. 5 about the place where Gadadharanandji was brought at Navli Temple complex, as admissible. We affirm that view for the reasons noted while considering the efficacy of disclosure of Accused No. 3. The Courts below have held the disclosure by Accused No. 5 about the place where Gadadharanandji was brought at Navli Temple complex, as admissible. We affirm that view for the reasons noted while considering the efficacy of disclosure of Accused No. 3. From this evidence, it is obvious that Gadadharanandji was taken away by Accused No. 3 in a car from Vadtal Temple complex and brought to Navli Temple complex on 3rd May, 1998 itself. His dead body was dumped in a ditch in village Barothi in Rajasthan (another State) which was traced on 4th May, 1998 as a consequence of the information given by PW-50. 74. As noted earlier, it was only on the basis of the disclosure made by Accused No. 5 as to the place where the murder was committed, that the investigating agency was able to take the investigation forward and then interrogate the aforesaid witnesses i.e. PW-25, PW-42, PW-43 and PW-49. Only a person who was present at the time of commission of the offence could have known about the location of the offence and Accused No. 5 undoubtedly had exclusive knowledge about the place where the crime was committed, a fact which has been affirmed by both the courts. The panchnama drawn on the basis of this disclosure has been corroborated by independent pancha witness PW-31. The Courts below, on analyzing the relevant evidence, have held that the inescapable conclusion is that the deceased was taken to Navli. We are in agreement with this finding, as the evidence on record supports that conclusion.” 15. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. The appellant is already in jail. He shall serve out the sentence, so awarded to him, by learned Trial Court. 16. Let a copy of this judgment along with LCR be sent back to the trial court for forthwith compliance.

Yogesh Kumar v. State